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Abstract 
In this thesis we examine the organisation of the UK venture capital industry. We draw on 
literature from finance, innovation and economic geography in order to build a model to 
understand the relationship between the distribution of investment and regional resources. 
Using network theory we then extend this model in order to understand the structure of ties 
between actors in the venture capital investment process. Thus, we analyse the relationship 
between regional venture capital activity in the UK and a range of relevant regional 
resources. 
The thesis argues that patterns of investment activity in the UK are well established, with 
well defined regional concentrations, resulting from the geographically-embedded nature of 
venture capital. However, at a sector level, regional relationships between local resources 
and investment vary. We find that investment in biotechnology is less regionally embedded 
and strongly influenced by changes in local resources, such as R&D. 
Although we demonstrate venture capital networks operate at a national level, our network 
analysis shows that regional variations persist in the strength and quality of relationships 
between investors and entrepreneurial directors. Consistent with a regionally embedded 
venture capital industry, and in agreement with social capital theory, our analysis indicates 
distinctive regional network patterns which support local investment activity. 
This thesis supports a regional innovation systems approach where the investor plays an 
important role in defining the system. However, we emphasise that individual regions may 
adopt different systems with regards to the presence and operation of venture capital, as a 
result of the distinctive characteristics of each region, their history, proximity to London and 
the structure of social networks. We suggest that policy can play a role in supporting these 
systems if it is sensitive to the variation in regional dynamics and takes account of access to 
entrepreneurial resources located outside the region. 
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I Introduction 
1.1 Aims and motivation 
The adequate provision of risk based finance to entrepreneurial firms is critical for the 
commercial exploitation of innovation, particularly in hi-tech sectors such as 
biotechnology. However, the availability of venture capital investment is not evenly 
distributed within nations. In fact, venture capital investment is known to be concentrated 
in particular locations. It follows that the expertise associated with growing venture capital 
backed entrepreneurial firms is also concentrated in the same locations. This thesis sets 
out to find whether these are also features of the venture capital industry in the UK. 
The aim of this thesis is to understand the financing of hi-tech commercialisation in the 
UK. The thesis is organised around the theme of exploring relationships between finance 
and hi-tech innovation from a regional perspective. A sub-theme of the thesis is to 
understand these relationships in the context of small to medium sized enterprises that 
operate in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical sector. Specifically the thesis explores 
the presence and effects of heterogeneity in the provision of venture capital in the UK 
through a study of the biopharmaceutical sector, venture capital fund manager's social 
networks and venture-funded firms' director's affiliations. 
1.1.1 Research Questions 
Our motivation for this research is centred on producing a comprehensive understanding of 
the dynamics of venture capital in the UK. We achieve this by using a multi-level analysis 
which dictates a mixed method approach. We utilise several related academic literatures to 
narrow our subject of study to a set of key research questions, which are as follows: 
1. What are the regional level determinants of venture capital investment in the UK? 
Sub question: Are the relationships between biopharmaceutical investment and regional 
resources different from other sectors? 
2. What relationships exist between investors, firms and entrepreneurial firm directors, 
how are these relationships organised and how does this relate to regional investment? 
The research questions are motivated by gaps found in the literature review. These 
research gaps on UK venture capital include the lack of systematic comparisons of 
investment activity across regions in time, and weaknesses in the detailed analysis of the 
regional investment process. Finally, following the emphasis on the use of networks by 
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US based venture capital; we apply a network perspective to our research on UK investors. 
The combination of these complementary approaches defines the PhD thesis. In the next 
section we justify the research focus, outline our thesis argument and detail the structure of 
the thesis. 
1.1.2 Motivations for research questions 
Over the last decade many national governments have been keen to develop a strong 
culture of entrepreneurship, creating policies to encourage entrepreneurial activity. At the 
core of this motivation has been a desire to develop national economies through the 
commercial exploitation of national innovation and knowledge. The benefits of this 
strategy are expected to result in generating employment, wealth and national prosperity. 
A core aspect of the national level motivation has been to focus on policy at the regional 
level. In the 1990's this was formed around the concept of encouraging innovation 
through high tech clusters. More recently innovation policy has been increasingly viewed 
from regional perspective and influenced by academic work on regional innovation 
systems (Boekholt and Jaker, 2004). A common aspect to both regional innovation 
systems and cluster building approaches is the desire to replicate the success of areas such 
as Silicon Valley in the USA. Silicon Valley is a very well known example of where 
public investment in basic research and development, and a culture of entrepreneurial start- 
ups have been supported by the availability of risk based finance. Silicon Valley is 
associated with many start-ups that have grown rapidly to become much admired names in 
world business. 
The venture capitalist is a core actor in the process of entrepreneurial firm and regional 
development. The venture capitalist operates at the interface of innovation and finance. In 
this role the venture capital firm acts as fundraiser and investor. Fundraising involves the 
venture capital firm demonstrating the necessary expertise to convince large corporate 
investors and pension fund managers of their ability to manage investment funds and 
produce profit. To return a profit, venture capitalists need to acquire and apply the 
experience necessary to successfully act as a `gatekeeper' to new innovations. In this 
gatekeeper role their ability to select investment opportunities and support their 
development, determines whether they can pick promising ideas to turn into high value 
businesses. 
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As such, venture capitalists are seen to be a key intermediary in the life cycle of 
entrepreneurial firms. It follows that if we can understand how this form of financing 
operates, we can assist governments in exploiting their hi-tech opportunities. In the US, 
where the venture capital industry first started, venture capital has evolved to become an 
important source of finance for new technology based entrepreneurial firms. Now, many 
countries have access to venture capital from home-grown and foreign venture capitalists. 
1.1.3 Investment concentration and regions 
Despite the globalisation of venture capital investment, the distribution of investment 
within nations is concentrated into key locations. These locations are perceived as offering 
the right resources and balance between demand for capital and supply of investment. 
In the UK, the evolution of the venture capital industry has been noted as lacking a focus 
on entrepreneurial early stage business. UK Governments have been concerned about the 
lack of risk based finance for entrepreneurial firms since the 1930s. This topic has 
received considerable attention over recent years, culminating in the creation of regional 
venture capital funds. The aim of these funds was to create local access to venture capital 
for entrepreneurs in any UK region. This policy has been criticised for failing to 
understand the dynamics of the industry. This generates our first research question: 
What are the regional level determinants of venture capital investment in the UK? 
This thesis contributes an assessment of the dynamics of venture capital at the regional 
level, by providing a systematic analysis of determinants of regional venture capital 
investment in the UK. The current view of the role of venture capital is based heavily on 
literature from the US. As a result, this thesis can also inform the general literature on 
venture capital, by providing additional detail of practice in the UK. 
Another important motivation for this thesis is concerned with understanding the role of 
finance in the development of biotechnology and pharmaceutical small and medium sized 
enterprises (SME). It is generally accepted that the biotechnology industry has been slow 
to produce new products or realise the commercial potential of this technology, a potential 
which was widely anticipated in the 1970s and 1980s. Despite performance concerns, the 
sector remains an important long term economic prospect given the advances in genetic 
technologies in the last decade. These advances are expected to provide new opportunities 
for the development of healthcare solutions to complex diseases. The complexities of the 
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sector mean it is of key interest to research aimed at understanding the commercialisation 
of innovation. 
The potential market for solutions to remaining incurable diseases is estimated to be worth 
as much as $1.6 trillion (Northrup, 2005). However, for the pharmaceutical industry to 
capture this market, it is increasingly dependent on biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
small and medium sized enterprise (SME) to sustain its revenues. SME contribute to the 
pharmaceutical industry by sourcing new knowledge, innovation and products, which are 
often sold to large multi-national pharmaceutical firms. For these reasons, the 
development of SME's in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical sector is important for the 
development of new healthcare solutions and for the national economy. In 1999 the UK 
Governments Biotechnology Cluster report, led by Lord Sainsbury, reported that the 
biotechnology industry and associated services accounted for 40,000 UK jobs. Thus, 
understanding more about the demands of this sector is of key policy interest. 
A crucial need for SME biopharmaceutical firms is finance. The development costs for 
firms in this sector are massive, due to the capital intensive nature of R&D, the regulatory 
burden and ultimately the lengthy timescales even to proof-of-concept stages. This means 
that biopharmaceutical SMEs demand large amounts of finance at a level of risk that 
generally prohibits traditional forms of start-up funding, such as bank loans. Venture 
capitalists that are prepared to live with these strong financial demands, accept the higher 
risks with the expectation of large potential returns. For biotechnology firms to offer large 
returns they must show how their potential products and services will address the demands 
of large international markets. 
Venture capitalists are expected to play a key role in financing and developing SME firms 
In particular they are expected to support new radical innovations such as biotechnology, 
where other investors would disapprove of the risk. On a regional basis, we investigate 
what factors are important in deciding the regional level of biopharmaceutical investment 
received, and how this compares to other sectors. This gives our sub-question: 
Are the relationships between biopharmaceutical investment and regional resources 
different from other sectors? 
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1.1.4 Venture capitalists and relationships 
Venture capitalists are central agents in the financing of innovative technology for 
commercial purposes. Venture capitalists provide the finance necessary for the 
development and growth of SME firms. In the process of maximising their investment 
return they also contribute to the governance and direction of the firm. 
The importance of venture capitalists, and other types of actors who support innovative 
firms at a regional level, is a feature of literature on regional innovation systems. In this 
literature there is particular emphasis on key individuals and their relationships which help 
regional development. Thus, we also argue that venture capitalists fulfil an important role 
in the process of regional development, acting as key networking agents between 
entrepreneurial firms and other sources of finance. As the network coordinators, venture 
capitalists, through their investment activities, also become intermediaries for the transfer 
of information, knowledge and expertise. In addition they help in the recruitment of other 
specialist expertise, which has regional level benefits. We argue that networks are crucial 
to the successful operation of venture capital and symbiotically the development of regions. 
In the UK little research has been focused on understanding the presence and role of key 
actors in biopharmaceutical SME regional innovation systems. A predominantly US 
literature maintains that investors do not operate in isolation. The identification of key UK 
actors and the relationships with other actors is less well understood. Therefore in line 
with the main relational theme of the thesis, we look at relationships: between investors; 
between investors and firms; and between directors of firms in the biopharmaceutical 
sector. This gives our final research question: 
What relationships exist between investors, firms and entrepreneurial firm directors, how 
are these relationships organised and how does this relate to regional investment activity? 
In summary, our research questions are concerned with relationships. Firstly, in terms of 
investment levels we look at the relationship between finance and regional resources. 
Then secondly in terms of the investment process, we examine the relationships created by 
venture capitalist whilst pursuing their own interests. 
In answering the thesis questions we examine two regional perspectives of the organisation 
of the venture capital industry in the UK. Firstly, we explain the factors affecting 
investment concentration across regions. Secondly we analyse the detailed patterns of 
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interaction formed by investors. Combining these two perspectives provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of venture capital in the UK. 
In summary, we support our research aims by examining the dynamics of the UK venture 
capital industry. We evaluate the general state of the UK venture capital industry, at the 
early and later investment stages, and across different technology sectors. We also 
evaluate the political aspects of venture capital, through an assessment of the impacts of 
public finance. Finally, we consider the industry as structured by relationships between 
investors and supporting entrepreneurial actors. The result is an assessment of UK venture 
capital which is sensitive to regional variation in the relationships between investment, 
resources and the actors that make investments happen. 
1.2 Argument 
We find that UK venture capital, despite being dwarfed by the private equity and buy out 
industry, is well developed. Investor participation, in terms of syndicate size, is on par 
with that of other countries. We also find that, like other developed nations, venture 
capital naturally concentrates into a minority of regions. We find that these concentrations 
are persistent over time; regional investment activity changes very slowly. 
However, there are sector differences. For biopharmaceutical firms, we find large pools of 
fund managers' (i. e. the investors of venture capital funds, rather than limited partners who 
invest into venture capital funds) willing to provide finance, although in smaller amounts 
than in countries such as the US. The distribution of biopharmaceutical investment is more 
strongly linked to changes of regional resources, such as R&D, whereas in non- 
biopharmaceutical sectors and the industry in general, we find more distinctive regional 
effects which are persistent overtime. 
Throughout the analysis we view the UK as constructed from heterogeneous regions, 
where investment activity can be linked to the regional resources and characteristics of that 
particular region and its relationships to others. UK VC funding is concentrated into the 
East, South East and London. London is a massive financial centre and home of virtually 
all large investors; as a result London is at the centre of UK investment activity. Proximity 
to London has a large influence on investment activity. In contrast to regions such as 
Silicon Valley, a hi-tech region with strong local ties between fund managers, venture 
1 Throughout this thesis the use of terms such as investor refer to fund managers, rather than limited partners 
who invest into venture capital funds. 
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capitalists in the UK are closely tied to the nation's major financial hub. In the UK, 
despite the large numbers of investors and a general willingness to participate in the 
financing of SME, only a minority of investors are central to the operation of the VC 
industry. Likewise, an even smaller minority of investors are central to biopharmaceuticals. 
We also find little evidence of large established investors who operate on a localised basis. 
Instead, we find well networked established investors who operate on a national basis, with 
multiple office locations dominating venture capital activity in the UK. Without doubt, 
London dominates the venture capital industry in the UK and acts as the national base. 
In biopharmaceutical investment we also find the major national players provide coverage 
of the UK, suggesting that distance does not necessarily prevent access to capital. We find 
London's investors play a supporting role in places like Cambridge. Resources from 
London, such as investment and spin out firms, help to support Eastern regions activities, 
but biopharmaceutical investment and expertise in managing biopharmaceutical firms is 
concentrated around Cambridge. In places like Scotland, which has also attracted 
investment in biopharmaceuticals, we find a diverse range of supporting actors, including 
investors from London and experienced directors from Cambridge. 
Although our analysis of the national investment networks indicates a UK-wide network, 
organised around investors rather than places, a detailed analysis indicates distinctive 
social structures that relate to specific locations. For example, we find an absence of 
strong trust based relationships between investors and directors in regions such as Scotland 
and Yorkshire, as shown by a lack of repeated syndicates and repeated relationships 
between firm directors. The lack of strong relations is expected to restrict the ability of 
actors within these regions to share information and cumulatively develop expertise. In 
agreement with the theory of social capital, places such as the East are associated with 
strong networks and established groups of investors and directors. This finding is evidence 
for the valuable regional contribution of relationships, beyond the contribution made by 
individuals. 
In agreement with network theories such as `small world' and hub type systems, we find 
the link between our national and regional views of venture capital activity. In these 
network theories the role of a minority of highly linked actors, provide ties that operate 
across the UK. However, we find differences in the network structures of investors and 
directors. 
-7- 
We find that even investors with a strong local presence, such as a local office, also tend to 
have interests outside of the region. Our findings suggest that VC in the UK is about 
developing national players rather than regional investors. Ensuring the presence of a 
regional VC maybe a valid strategy for providing access to entrepreneurial skills and 
experience, but artificial constraints on investment geography are a weakness (both for the 
VC firm and more generally for the future development of the region). Geographical 
constraints work against policy expectations that Regional Venture Capital Funds (RVCF) 
will eventually become established investors. For example investors with strong ties to the 
Cambridge region also provide investment to firms in Scotland. We conclude that policy 
attempts to restrict investment to particular locations are likely to fail. 
Investment may travel, but people and expertise do not. Despite a large number of 
investment firms, (public, public-private and a range of private players) the industry is 
reliant on a relatively small core of investment executives and a small core of directors 
with experience of managing investments who work across multiple boards. Firm 
directors with ties to national investors have a strong presence on SME company boards 
and affiliations to multiple firms. Examining the level of support provided to the firm 
demonstrates the majority of directors with multiple affiliations tend to remain tied to a 
particular location. In contrast, venture capitalists are the main business agents that 
operate across biopharmaceutical firms in multiple locations. 
We argue that this thesis supports a regional innovation systems approach, that the investor 
plays an important role in defining regional innovation activity. However, we emphasise 
that systems are sensitive to the distinctive characteristics of each region, their history, 
proximity to London and the structure of social networks which are influenced by a variety 
of factors. Investors use extensive nationally organised investment networks to obtain 
information about opportunities and create syndicates to finance distant firms. However, 
our regional analysis suggests distinctive patterns of regional activity, concentration in 
expertise and finance, and variances in syndicate sizes. We also find that regional 
relationships between local resources and investment vary according to sector. We 
suggest that regional policy can play a role in supporting these systems if it is sensitive to 
the variation in regional dynamics. 
1.3 Thesis structure 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows: 
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In Chapter 2, we lay the ground work for the thesis by reviewing the relevant literature. 
We take perspectives from literature on venture capital, entrepreneurship and regional 
development to build an understanding of how the financing of hi-tech firms operates. 
Firstly, we look at a national level across literature on different countries, mainly the UK 
and US. Then we look at how investment activity varies within nations. We extend this 
review to concentrate on the biotechnology sector, a particularly demanding area of 
technology innovation. 
In Chapter 2 we develop our focus for the thesis. We position this research between 
theories of financing innovation; specifically that the venture capitalist role is as an 
accelerant in the development of innovative firms, in conjunction with theory on regional 
innovation systems, which act to support these innovative firms. In combining these 
perspectives, we can understand venture capital as an important regional actor in 
supporting innovative firms. 
In Chapter 3 we address the issue of networking in venture capital. We show that 
networking is considered to be an important activity in venture capital and particularly 
relevant to entrepreneurial firms. In this chapter we build on the literature review in 
Chapter 2. We review the variety of network analysis perspectives and construct a 
framework for the analysis of networks in the remainder of the thesis. 
Chapter 4 introduces the approach used in the PhD and justifies the methods used in each 
part of the empirical work. We also describe the organisation of the PhD and deal with 
ethical considerations. This chapter helps explain the evolutionary organisation of the 
thesis, moving from an analysis of the organisation of the UK venture capital industry to 
the specifics of how these activities are co-ordinated in different UK regions. 
In Chapter 5 we present and analyse an econometric model of factors driving the 
distribution of regional investment activity across UK. The analysis uses investment data 
on the private equity industry. In Chapter 6 we repeat this analysis with a new database on 
SME investment detailing activity of different industry sectors. In this chapter we compare 
the regional investment in biotechnology to that of the other sectors. 
We use Chapters 5 and 6 to demonstrate that investment in the UK is concentrated into 
particular locations. In these chapters we also explore a set of expectations generated from 
the literature regarding the factors that determine the organisation of venture capital in the 
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UK. We show that our understanding of the organisation of venture capital is dependent 
on our knowledge of networks, providing an additional incentive to research the 
organisation of venture capital networks in Chapter 7 and 8. 
In Chapter 7 we continue our analysis of UK venture capital investors by analysing the 
networks created from the syndication of these investors. Chapter 7 starts the analysis of 
the network framework described in Chapter 3, analysing the regional social networks 
present in biotechnology firms receiving venture capital finance. 
In chapter 8 we continue our analysis of investment activity on the extent and nature of 
investment syndication. In this chapter we examine the factors that drive investors to 
syndicate using regression analysis. Chapter 8 is important because we also consider the 
motivations of investors to participate in investing in firms. This chapter brings together 
the regional analysis in Chapters 5 and 6, and the network analysis in Chapter 7. This 
chapter provides an insight into how the characteristic of firms, locations, deals and 
investors, determines the participation of investors. It is also an analysis of the building 
blocks upon which our networks in Chapter 7 are based. 
In Chapter 9 we perform a social network analysis of the networks created by the directors 
of venture capital funded biotechnology firms. From Chapters 7,8 and 9 we can 
understand how venture capital functions as a networked activity. We can see how 
relationships are organised, focusing on those actors that co-ordinate activities. These 
actors are an important group with the combination of experience, expertise and social 
connections that partly account for the concentration of activity we observe in the earlier 
chapters of the thesis. 
In Chapter 10 we take stock of our empirical work. We revisit four regions of the UK to 
examine the detail of relationships between actors in the networks found in Chapters seven 
and eight to clarify the assumptions we make in earlier chapters. In this chapter we can 
evaluate the role of venture capitalists active in four UK regions, using additional data 
provided from interviews, press reports and the Internet. 
In the final chapter we summarise the findings from each chapter, discuss the overall 
conclusions to the thesis questions and conclude with some policy recommendations. 
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2 Evolution of venture capital and its regional concentration 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to justify the focus of our empirical work and show how we 
arrive at our research questions. This chapter provides the necessary background on the 
venture capital industry, regional innovation systems and biotechnology, to appreciate the 
context in which early stage venture capitalists operate. From these targeted reviews of 
the literature we demonstrate how the gaps in the current research have influenced the 
chosen research questions. 
The provision of risk capital funding for start-up business is considered an important 
requirement for developing and supporting entrepreneurial firms. The expected role of the 
venture capitalist goes beyond the provision of funding in the US, where VC provide both 
financial and business support to entrepreneurial firms, particularly those in new 
technology-based markets. 
The development of modern forms of venture capital investment and its evolution away 
from the United States has been well documented. Whilst we have noted that venture 
capitalists operate in many countries across the world, the UK is seen to have one of the 
largest venture capital industries after the US. During recent decades, the availability of 
this form of financing has grown rapidly, driven by the demand for equity based finance 
from entrepreneurial businesses in regions with a strong technology focus, such as Silicon 
Valley or Cambridge (UK). The supply of venture capital investment has been encouraged 
as a means of supporting the development of new entrepreneurial ventures, but when 
applied to a particular location is shaped by different national and regional forces (Dossani 
and Kenney, 2002). 
In this chapter we first discuss the operation of venture capital and its evolution in the UK. 
Next we examine the role of venture capital in supporting the biotechnology industry. Then 
we examine the spatial concentration of venture capital in the US and the UK before 
finishing this chapter by reflecting on the literature associated with industrial clusters and 
regional innovation systems. 
2.1.1 The model of venture capital operation 
Venture capital is a form of finance specifically aimed at growing businesses by providing 
financial investment and additional business support services. Only certain business- 
opportunities are suitable for venture capital investment. Typically businesses which obtain 
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funding from venture capitalists are expected to grow rapidly and have the potential to 
provide significant return on investment. However, the venture capital cycle is very risky. 
On average only two out of ten investments will meet the original expectations of the 
venture capitalist and many investments make a loss (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992). 
A basic model for operating a venture capital company is largely accepted in the literature. 
Its historical development, processes and examples of successes and failures, have been 
provided by Florida and Kenney (1988), Sahlman (1990), Bygrave and Timmons (1992). 
More recently Gompers and Lerner (2001) have provided a detailed review of the "Venture 
Capital cycle". All these studies pertain to the evolution of this model in the United States. 
The focus of venture capitalist activities are in the initial 7-10 years of the technology 
cycle, which starts with the inception of the company and plots its development through 
the stages of emergence and consolidation. The venture capital cycle starts with a phase of 
due diligence to assess the investment opportunity. If a decision to invest is made, finance 
is provided to the company in return for partial ownership and control. The venture 
capitalist usually takes equity in the company and often reserves the various controlling 
rights including a position on the firm's board of directors. Venture capitalists realise the 
growth in the value of their investment by exiting through public stock markets via initial 
public offerings (IPO), or through the sale of their equity to another company, known as a 
trade sale. 
Usually, a venture capital investment is followed by an intensive effort by the 
entrepreneurial team and investors to accelerate development of the company through the 
technology cycle. In addition to providing finance, the venture capitalist is also expected 
to take an active involvement in managing firms. This can include providing guidance and 
assistance on business strategy, access to various business and technology networks, and if 
necessary recruiting the necessary senior management to develop the firm (Florida and 
Kenney, 1988). Over the lifetime of an investment, the role of the venture capitalist moves 
from entrepreneurial support, to more traditional management and marketing inputs, 
associated with established companies. 
For the economy and industry as a whole, venture capital thus assumes an intermediary 
function between financiers and industry that utilises "overlapping networks" for raising 
finance, performing due diligence and maintaining the internal resources of the venture 
capital company itself. Florida and Kenney (1988) suggest that the role of the venture 
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capitalist is to accelerate the speed of technology change, whilst taking on a "technological 
gate keeping role" (p. 125). 
2.1.2 The need for VC finance 
The origins of a need for alternative sources of finance from the traditional banking system 
have been traced back to the early 20th century. Around the 1930s, political and business 
leaders in both the US and UK, began to discuss the role of investment and expertise for 
supporting entrepreneurs and small firms, in order to stimulate economic development 
(Hsu and Kenney, 2005; Campbell, 2003). 
In 1931 a UK parliamentary committee chaired by Lord Macmillan identified the fact that 
compared to other countries the national banking system restricted loans available to new 
risky start-up enterprises (Campbell, 2003). This perceived gap was later termed the 
`Macmillan gap' and is now generally referred to as the equity gap. However, the 
Macmillan gap was not addressed until 1945 when the Bank of England with other major 
clearing banks established the Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation (ICPC). 
ICPC eventually became 3i (Investors in Industry) a major provider of equity investment in 
the UK (Campbell, 2003) 
In 1946 American Research and Development (ARD) was created and demonstrated the 
potential of a venture capital industry in the US. ARD, a result of the trial of several 
different organisational forms, aimed to provide investment to small US businesses. 
ARD's unique strategy combined raising funds from public and private sources, 
identifying and selecting suitable investment opportunities, and importantly providing 
professional management advice. As such, its mission combined being a profitable 
business as well as delivering wide economic benefits. It also set the practice for the 
creation of a new generation of investment firms, now known as venture capitalists (Hsu 
and Kenney, 2005). 
Following a number of changes by US Federal Government, the US venture capital 
industry proliferated. Changes to the tax system, the creation of limited partnerships and 
other federal initiatives, including the `prudent man' ruling that allowed pension fund 
managers to invest in venture capital funds, helped to make raising venture capital funds 
easier. This encouraged the entry of a host of smaller investment firms, which ultimately 
replaced ARD (Gompers and Lerner, 1999,2001; Hsu and Kenney, 2005). However 
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ARD demonstrated the potential of the industry which is now a feature of investment 
activity in many other countries across the world (Hsu and Kenney, 2005). 
2.1.3 Types of venture capital 
Bygrave and Timmons (1992) distinguish between `classic' and `merchant' private venture 
capital. `Classic' venture capital is based on "equity, invested for the longer term" where 
venture capitalists are, "prepared to live with losers and negative cash flows in the short 
term" (p. 21). `Classic' type venture capital is important for the financial support of early 
stage firms, particularly those developing innovative technology which require time and 
money to reach the market. Venture capitalists are able to provide risk capital because 
they specialise in managing the high risks applications with potential exists to obtain large 
returns. 
In contrast Bygrave and Timmons (1992) note many countries including the UK have 
developed a bias towards `merchant' venture capital. Merchant type venture capital 
involves investing in established later stage companies, looking for quicker returns at 
lower risk. Merchant VC deals are often structured as management buy-outs, buy-ins or 
financing for business expansion, using a combination of equity, debt and more complex 
financial instruments. `Merchant' venture capital involves a different skill base, designing 
complex deals, rather than entrepreneurial skills required for company building in `classic' 
venture capital. 
Classic type VCs develop a range of capabilities for managing the risks of supporting start- 
up firms. Firstly they are able to minimise the risks of investing. For example they utilise 
a range of tools to reduce information gaps and asymmetries between entrepreneurs and 
investor (Gompers and Lerner, 2001). These tools include close scrutiny of the firm and 
founders prior to, and during investment; the use of various networks associated with other 
investors, business people and technology experts to provide information on backgrounds 
of the founders, the technology and potential market for new technology (Bygrave, 1987; 
Zook, 2002); using positions on the firms' board to obtain more information on the 
performance of the firm and actively guide the strategic direction of the firm (Gompers and 
Lerner, 2001). 
Secondly, in addition to providing finance, venture capitalists may actively help the 
development of the firm. They develop specialist expertise and knowledge as well as a 
network of contacts to support the development of entrepreneurial firms. For example they 
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can improve the strategy of the firm by providing advice or recruiting experienced 
directors to support important decisions (Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Zook, 2004). These 
`value adding' activities help their investment grow in value, and reduce the probability of 
failure. 
2.1.4 UK Venture Capital 
The globalisation of venture capital has shown particular variation with regards to 
preferences of investment stages (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992; Murray, 1999; Gompers 
and Lerner, 2001; Mason and Harrison, 2002,2003). Despite the similarities in the timing 
of initiatives aimed at supplying risk capital in the US and UK; Bygrave and Timmons 
(1992), Murray (1999), Gompers and Lerner (2001) and Mason and Harrison (2002,2003) 
all state that venture capital investment in the UK has focused on later stage investment 
opportunities and failed to develop a core of `classic' venture capital skills. The UK is 
considered to have a relatively low proportion of finance directed towards early stage 
investing (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992; Gompers and Lerner, 2001). 
Despite the creation in 1945 of the precursor to 3i, the UK venture capital industry did not 
gain momentum until the 1980s (Martin, 1989). Initial investor cohorts were captive 
organisations, effectively operating as subsidiaries or divisions of larger financial 
institutions. The VC industry grew through funding available from sources such as 
insurance firms and pension funds, which enabled the growth of independent venture 
capital firms (Martin, 1989). However, despite this growth in investment activity, 3i 
remained the major investor across a range of asset classes (from seed stages upwards) 
accounting for 33% of the total investment in 1987 (Martin, 1989). 
2.1.4.1 Early stage finance dynamics 
Theoretically, successful early stage investors should have higher rates of return than safer 
later stage investment funds (Manigart et al, 2002). A higher rate of return should reward 
investors for the high level of risk and help attract new entrant investors. In reality UK 
early stage investment has been outperformed by later stage investments (Murray, 1999; 
BVCA, 20062). By the late 1980s UK venture capital industry's activities were 
concentrated around London; biased towards low frequency but high value management 
buyout deals (MBO) (Martin ,1 989). The strong performance of 
MBO funds are 
attributed to the continued emphasis on later stage investing in the UK, and a continued 
growth in MBO fund size. 
2 For UK funds created since 1996 
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One reason offered for the poor performance of UK investors relates to timing. For 
example, when investor sentiment in the UK has been favourable towards early stage 
investment, as in the mid 1980s and during the Internet bubble (1999-2000), this has been 
followed by the collapse of investment values, resulting in finance being diverted to the 
rapidly growing and more profitable management buy-out market (Murray, 1999. Lockett 
et al, 2002). In the US, despite the collapse of the Internet bubble, the preference of early 
stage venture capital over MBO remained (Mason and Harrison, 2002). 
In the UK, new entrant investors are critical for maintaining the availability of early stage 
investment, as incumbent investors tend to migrate towards larger late stage investments. 
Successful incumbents are able to raise larger fund sizes. Thus in contrast to prediction 
from theory based on risk and return (Manigart et al, 2002), successful incumbents tend to 
naturally migrate towards later stage opportunities because it is more efficient to invest in 
larger deals. This is known in the UK as the "catch 22" (Murray, 1999), or the "double 
paradox" in the US (Etzkowitz, 2005). For example, 3i, following its public flotation in 
1994, has re-positioned the company as a development capital firm, preferring to do deals 
of at least Elm in size (Sunley, Klagge, Berndt and Martin, 2005). Most recently, 3i and a 
number of other international investors have confirmed their complete shift from all early 
stage investment in the UK (Fortson, 2008). 
Thus, attracting high quality new entrants can help maintain the supply of early stage 
investment and fill the investment `spaces' left behind by the evolution of incumbent 
investors. However, the poor performance of UK early stage funds is unlikely to attract 
new entrants to fill the gaps left by the migrating incumbents. When early stage 
investment performance is poor, this naturally motivates incumbent investors to move 
towards later stage opportunities, and acts as a deterrent to new early stage entrants. 
Similarly, early stage investors must raise funds by obtaining suitable backers. This may 
be difficult in the UK contributors to investment funds may also have a preference for 
lower risk investments. For example Mayer et al (2005) found that a high level of pension 
fund contributions to venture capital funds increases later stage, lower risk deals. They 
found that UK VC funds receive significant backing from pension funds. However, the 
authors also note that this view differs from Gompers and Lerner (1999) who credits the 
growth of US Venture Capital on the "prudent man" ruling that allowed pension funds to 
invest into venture capital funds. 
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It is likely that a combination of these historical factors have resulted in a low level of 
private investment aimed at early stage firms. The lack of `classic' type skills in the UK 
may also compound the performance of early stage investments. Likewise the poor 
historical performance of early stage investment has resulted in a small pool of the 
necessary `classic' type competences for early stage investment in technology firms. It 
follows that other investment areas and career options may be perceived as more attractive 
than working with early stage firms. We can extend this argument to other shareholders in 
entrepreneurial process, such as serial entrepreneurs and executive directors who might 
provide expertise to entrepreneurial firms. These actors may forgo a salaried income in 
return for equity and future returns from working with an early stage firm. Due to the 
historical poor performance of early stage venture capital backed firms we might expect a 
relatively small pool of expertise in the UK associated with early stage investing. 
2.1.5 Summary 
We see that venture capital in the UK has developed differently from that in the US. The 
US industry has grown rapidly, maintaining an availability of early stage investment. In 
the UK, since 1931, various Government reports have consistently re-identified issues with 
access to early stage finance, without being able to successfully apply the resulting 
recommendations (Oakey and Muhktar, 1999; Oakey, 2003 a). This may have 
consequences for entrepreneurial firms in the UK, particularly those unable to obtain other 
forms of finance because of their perceived risk, like biotechnology firms. 
2.2 Biotechnology 
In this section we review the literature on biotechnology firms and entrepreneurship. 
Biotechnology firms play an important role in the development of new innovations in 
biopharmaceuticals. Biotechnology firms are strongly dependent on venture capitalists to 
support their initial stages of growth; they are also known to cluster in specific locations 
offering a supporting environment for innovative start-up firms. We briefly discuss what 
biotechnology involves, before concentrating on the commercial development of modern 
biotechnology firms, their relationship with venture capital, and specific geographical 
locations. 
2.2.1 The origins of modern biotechnology 
Biotechnology has a diverse range of applications, particularly within the human 
health/pharmaceutical sector. There are a several different definitions of biotechnology in 
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use. The DTI3 (Sainsbury, 1999) defines biotechnology as an enabling technology, 
involving "the application of biological knowledge about living organisms and their 
components to industrial products and processes". This can be regarded as a very general 
definition, as it includes processing applications in the food and agriculture industry. For 
example, we could argue that the production of yeast for beer and bread making is 
biotechnology. However, in this review we focus on the activities relating to the 
commercialisation of biotechnology in the human health biopharmaceutical sector, as it has 
been described as having the most entrepreneurial firm activity (Niosi, 2003). 
The initial commercial opportunities for biotechnology were presented from a number of 
breakthroughs in the early seventies, resulting from the discovery of the double helix 
structure of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) by Watson and Crick in the 1950s. The 
subsequent development of techniques for genetic engineering initially provided a new 
opportunity for developing processes to manufacture proteins. Subsequently, it has 
provided new tools for advancing the productivity of "conventional "small molecule" 
synthetic chemical drugs (Henderson et al, 1999). 
Increasingly, the initial trajectories of the science of biotechnology have merged. The 
focus of human health biotechnology has moved towards using genetic engineering 
techniques, in the search for large molecular weight drugs, often proteins, for a particular 
therapeutic purpose. The focus on molecular biology moved pharmaceutical research into 
areas such as microbiology and biotechnology (Cooke, 2003) and also represented a shift 
in the knowledge base of the pharmaceutical industry (Henderson et al, 1999). 
2.2.2 Commercial development of biotechnology 
The development of small firm activities in European biotechnology has followed 
America's lead. However, recently the number of European biotechnology firms has 
approached levels similar to those in the US (although these firms are often smaller in size). 
The UK has been one of the most active European countries in the development of 
biotechnology, in terms of company formation and finance (Howell et al, 2003). 
A key feature of biotechnology development has been the creation of a large number of 
SME's. SME's have emerged to exploit opportunities for the commercial application of 
knowledge resulting from scientific and technical advances in biotechnology. Despite the 
3 The Department for Trade and Industry was reorganised in June 2007 and now falls under the Department 
for Business Enterprise & Regulatory Reform (BERR). We continue to refer to the DTI in the text to reflect 
the department which was active during the period we analyse. 
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shift in the knowledge base of the pharmaceutical industry and the emergence of new 
innovative biotechnology firms aiming to exploit related advances, so far, incumbent 
pharmaceutical companies have not been swept away by these new entrants, as would be 
expected from a Schumpeterian perspective. 
The result of the emergence of biotechnology SME has been a complex interaction and 
cooperation between a numbers of different players, from SME to multinational 
pharmaceuticals (Henderson et al, 1999). Much of the new biotechnology related 
knowledge originates from university research, which is often commercialised through 
spin out activity. Biotechnology SMEs play an important role, acting as innovators for the 
pharmaceutical industry. This has left `big pharma' to integrate the lower order functions 
taking the `role of licenser and marketer of brought-in therapeutic treatments (Cooke, 
2003). Florida and Kenney (1998) observed these dynamic interplays of small and large 
firms, universities, and formal and informal knowledge exchanges. They suggest it 
represents a "new model of innovation which integrates components of entrepreneurial- 
driven versus corporate-led dichotomy posed by neo-Schumpeterian theory" p. 126. This 
positions biotechnology firms in the middle of relationships between R&D centres and 
multi-national pharmaceutical firms 
The venture capitalist is an important agent in the interactions and relationships developed 
by a biotechnology firm. The venture capitalist operates to "facilitate commercialisation" 
of new knowledge, by providing finance and the strategic knowledge of how to reach the 
pharmaceutical market (Cooke, 2003). Niosi (2003, p. 749) sees the commercialisation of 
biotechnology through spinout firms, as a process involving a sequence of milestones and 
collaborations where the venture capitalist plays a key role, 
"The sequence starts with obtaining patents. These will signal to the financial community 
the value of the new firm. Patenting is followed by venture capital, entry into the stock 
market under the guidance of the venture capital firm, and the organisation of a major 
alliance followed by the launching of the firms products in overseas markets, usually with 
the help of large international corporate partners. " 
Niosi (2003) classes venture capitalists as external factors involved in the transition of a 
biotechnology firm from a collection of scientific knowledge assets, to a functioning firm 
that can demonstrate its potential to the wider financial community. However, in this role 
the VC can also help support internal firm capabilities by bringing external resources and 
competences into the biotechnology firm. 
These discussions suggest that biotechnology commercialisation may present a certain type 
of entrepreneurship, which fills a role translating basic academic research into marketable 
forms. In this translation, the venture capitalists plays an important role in making the 
SME's products and services accessible for large multi-national firms to market, 
manufacture and distribute. This presents a much simplified picture of the industrial 
dynamics of the pharmaceutical industry and furthermore it is not clear whether this is a 
temporary or established industrial structure. However, we can, for the purposes of this 
thesis, see that biotechnology firms operate within a complex set of relationships between 
academia, large corporate firms and intermediary agents, such as venture capitalists. 
2.2.3 The economic importance of biotechnology 
In 1999 Lord Sainsbury's report for the Department of Trade and Industry on clusters of 
biotechnology companies stated the importance of the technology as follows: 
"Biotechnology offers enormous opportunities for improving the quality of life and being a 
major creator of wealth and high qualityjobs for the UK The world market for 
biotechnology products is forecast to reach £70 billion by the year 2000, and 
biotechnology-dependent sales by UK industry to reach f9 billion. The sectors for which 
biotechnology holds most promise account for almost a quarter of all UK's industrial 
output, employment and export earnings - including pharmaceuticals, agriculture and 
food. " (Sainsbury, 1999 p12). 
The report added that around 40 000 jobs in the UK depended on biotechnology, and in 
1999 there were around 270 small to medium sized enterprises (SME) specialising in 
biotechnology. It is also anticipated that factors such as an ageing population and the 
associated demand for pharmaceutical products will strengthen the market prospects for 
biotechnology products. Lord Sainsbury's report concluded that several policy measures 
were important to the development of the industry in the UK, specifically targeting, the 
promotion of entrepreneurship, the availability of finance, and the development of SME's. 
Developing a strong biotechnology sector is seen to be an important economic tool for 
many developed countries, and therefore maintaining the availability of deep venture 
capital markets for biotechnology opportunities is an important political priority. Clearly 
venture capital has an important role to play in the development of the biotechnology 
sector. 
2.2.4 Uncertainty of biotechnology 
Like other hi-tech sectors, such as semi-conductors, investing in biotechnology business is 
high risk. For example, although biotechnology firms are businesses, they are science 
intensive and often active in the development of "basic biomedical science" (Pisano, 2006. 
p. 2). There is high technical uncertainty in translating basic science into commercial 
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products and services. In addition to the usual activities associated with commercial 
activity, biotechnology firms frequently need to resolve scientific issues in order to 
demonstrate the feasibility or efficacy of the firm's product or processes (McKelvey et al, 
2004; Pisano, 2006). Biotechnology firm R&D may deal with scientific issues that are 
fundamentally unknown and this significantly increases the level of risk (Pisano, 2006). 
The emphasis on R&D in biotechnology SME results in lengthy product development 
times which increase the challenges of managing a biotechnology enterprise. 
Biotechnology research is time consuming and the costs of undertaking research, 
maintaining laboratory space and paying for qualified staff are high. For example it may 
take many laboratory hours, using expensive technology and materials, to determine 
whether a research programme will yield important advances, or demonstrate the required 
properties for market (Pisano, 2006). 
The risk (and costs) of running a biotechnology firm are also increased by the regulatory 
uncertainty, resulting from the close scrutiny, by national authorities, of new products. A 
new product must be thoroughly screened and tested in clinical trials before it can be 
marketed. The extensive regulatory process, necessary to make sure products are safe and 
effective, dramatically increases the development time and costs. For example, it is 
estimated that at the pre-clinical stage the probability of developing a single prescription 
drug through to launch is approximately 1%, for an outlay cost of £50-150m (Bioscience 
Innovation and Growth Team, 2003). These financial and time costs, together with the 
possibility of the failure of a product to meet these stringent tests, increase the risks 
associated with biotechnology (Pisano, 2006). 
Pisano (2006) states that this type of uncertainty demands a mechanism to reduce risk. 
Biotechnology firms operate in a variety of relationships to reduce risk. Biotechnology 
firms develop various collaborations, strategic agreements and licensing arrangements with 
academic institutions, other biotechnology firms and large corporate firms to share the risk 
of research and development, gain access to important competence and resource 
(Mckelvey et al, 2004) or to trade intellectual property assets according to their strategic 
plans (Pisano, 2006). 
An important part of the biotech mechanism is the venture capitalist (Florida and Kenney, 
1988; Bygrave and Timmons, 1992; Etzkowitz, 2005; Pisano, 2006). The high risks, long 
development times and significant costs make traditional forms of finance inappropriate. 
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For example biotechnology firms developing new pharmaceutical products may not 
produce revenue for many years, making repayments on loans difficult. Venture capitalists 
that fund biotechnology firms are expected to have a unique view of the industry with 
experience in understanding what makes a successful firm (Pisano, 2006). They develop 
capabilities that allow them to invest in and manage opportunities that provide an 
appropriate commercial risk to return balance. 
2.2.5 Bio- entrepreneurship = venture capital+ human capital 
Although the risks of investing in biotechnology are high, firms such as Genentech have 
demonstrated the commercial potential. Genentech is one of the most successful 
biotechnology companies in the world, with annual sales in excess of $5 billion. 
Genentech is often regarded as the start of commercialisation of biotechnology. 
Genentech also provides an important example of how venture capital can contribute to 
start-ups by providing early stage funding and acting as a pro-active technology gatekeeper. 
At Genentech the early stage investor joined the academic-scientist founder, to lead the 
company and help secure further `patient' long term or `classic' type venture capital 
(Florida and Kenney, 1988). 
The `classic' form of venture capital investment, particularly in biotechnology, demands a 
greater input from venture capitalists compared to other investments (Powell et al, 2002). 
The typical founders of biotechnology companies are scientists, and often lack some of the 
business skills and experience required to grow the firm rapidly. Kenney (1986) observed 
that the internal competences of entrepreneurial biotechnology firms matched 
Schumpeter's observation that there are four social roles critical to the creation of new 
entrepreneurial businesses: the entrepreneur, the inventor/scientist, the manager and the 
capitalist. Although, a combination of these different roles may be found in only one or 
two individuals involved in the start-up firm Kenney (1986) notes that, 
"The entrepreneurial role in genetic engineering has usually been a partnership between 
an entrepreneur and a scientist. This is due to the very complex nature of genetic 
engineering. This division of labour reflects the new realities of both science and finance - 
only a specialist can handle either of these areas" (p. 29). 
The scientific and commercial demands of running a biotechnology firm mean it is likely 
that venture capitalists will take an active role in supporting the firm. For example Wright 
et al (1997) observed that successful entrepreneurs were often used by venture capitalists 
to improve the performance of their businesses by giving them non executive or 
consultancy type positions. Hellman and Puri (2002) find that venture capital backed firms 
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have high frequencies of replacement in the initial management team and that the venture 
capitalist is active in the management of the firm's human resources. Whilst Higgins 
(2005) study of biotechnology firms reaching IPO found that certain managers with 
particular career experiences or "Imprints" can be highly effective when applied in the bio- 
entrepreneurial context. These individuals were frequently recruited by venture capitalists 
to provide additional management skills in the biotechnology firm. Firms with the right 
mix of skills and experience are also likely to obtain better exits for the venture capitalist, 
particularly at Initial Public Offering (IPO) (Finkle, 1998; Higgins and Gultati, 2003). 
In founding a company, those firms which offer good human capital coverage of key 
activities, including previous experience of the entrepreneurial process are more likely to 
be able to access venture capital funding (Zacharakis and Meyer, 2000; Burton et al, 2002). 
Biotechnology founders also recognise the importance of the availability of high quality 
human when choosing business locations (Bagshi-Sen et al, 2004). Bower (2003) notes 
that the maturity of the biotechnology sector has lead to the development of an 
infrastructure of expertise specialised in working with start-up biotechnology firms. In the 
UK, biotechnology firms typically include three founders with a mixture of scientific and 
commercial experience (Guräu, 2006); so we can expect the venture capitalist to be active 
in coordinating this specialist human capital resource. 
In biotechnology, the transition from academic lab to commercial return is lengthy and 
strategically complex. Biotechnology investments add complications to the traditional 
venture capital process in terms of large financial and time commitments, and in terms of 
strategic decision making. These complications mean biotechnology firms are likely to 
benefit from the venture capitalists expertise in the entrepreneurial process. However, 
given that a VC may have other opportunities with short timescales and of lower risk, what 
motivates investors to take this role? 
2.2.6 Investor motivations 
For the venture capitalist, one of the primary motivations for investing in biotechnology is 
the large expected return when, for example, large institutional investors are prepared to 
buy shares in the company. The public flotation of a firm provides the opportunity for the 
venture capitalist sell their equity in the company and realise the growth in its value. 
Pisano (2006) observes that despite the strong performance of several start-ups in the 
1970s and 1980s, the overall performance of biotechnology is disappointing, with 
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relatively flat growth in profits. Importantly for venture capitalist exiting deals, the stock 
market performance of IPO biotech firms based on US data has performed better (15%). 
However, Pisano (2006) estimates that overall venture capital fund performance over an 18 
year period (1986-2002) only achieved 16-17% annual rate of return4. This level of return 
is not commensurate with the level of risk involved in early stage investing vis-a-vis 
investing in public stock. The poor performance of biotechnology may present constraints 
for the attraction of quality investors and managers to the industry. For example 
experienced investors may prefer other lucrative healthcare opportunities. Similarly 
managers may prefer to work in more stable and lucrative large firms, rather than exchange 
good salaries for equity in a biotech business. Therefore, demand for specialist expertise in 
managing biotechnology firms may not be met. 
2.2.7 Summary 
In this section we have discussed two perspectives of biotechnology, firstly the view that 
biotechnology is positioned as an intermediate form. It is used to translate basic 
institutional research into viable business opportunities, where the outputs are distributed 
by large pharmaceutical firms. Secondly, biotechnology is a high risk enterprise, involving 
different forms of uncertainty; only confident investors will be prepared to provide funds 
on such a long term high risk basis. 
We have described the process of developing an entrepreneurial biotech firm as a relational 
activity composed of different types of multi-level relationships which evolve with the 
development of the firm. These include working with universities, large corporate firms 
and other SME to help the firm gain access to new scientific knowledge and commercial 
opportunities. In addition, because of the predominantly scientific/academic nature of the 
knowledge required to start-up a biotechnology firm, we find that biotechs are expected to 
build relationships with venture capitalist. Firstly the venture capitalist provides access to 
finance, an important requirement for many biotechnology start-ups. Secondly the venture 
capital acts as an important intermediary in supporting the commercial development of the 
firm. This role requires the venture capitalist to provide expertise and have access to 
networks and contacts that can add value to the firm. 
We have seen that venture capitalists and experienced professionals are important actors in 
the management and development of biotechnology firms. This review of the literature has 
shown that in order to understand the operation of venture capital and biotechnology we 
4 Although clever investors who sold stock during the peak of the stock market bubble in 1999-2001 would 
have made much more. 
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must include the additional actors that provide guidance to early stage firms. However, in 
the UK we have noted an apparent weakness in the UK venture capital industry - it is 
frequently criticised as demonstrating a lack of technology awareness, experience, or 
willingness to experiment with emerging technologies. Similarly Oakey (2003b) observes 
that technology entrepreneurs can be slow to accept assistance from the business 
community and prefer to maintain greater control of their businesses, even if this leads to 
sub-optimal outcomes. Therefore, to what extent to do we see relationships formed 
between venture capitalist and experienced bio-business directors in the UK? 
This section has suggested the wider economic and social role that venture capitalists and 
experienced entrepreneurial professionals can play in supporting the development of 
innovative sectors such as biotechnology. Biotechnology firms are also known to cluster in 
specific geographical locations. One suggested reason for this is that concentrations of 
specialist firms are expected to facilitate access to the important relationships and 
resources we have discussed. It logically follows that our final section should at how 
venture capital is organised and how this relates to regional hi-tech activity such as 
biotechnology. 
2.3 Spatial concentration of the venture capital industry 
Venture capital is invested across the world; however the availability of venture capital 
within a country is often concentrated in a few key regional geographies. There are 
striking variations in the spatial distribution of venture capital investment within countries. 
This has been observed in both the United States and the UK. Whilst this has great 
economic and social benefits for a few `chosen' regions, it may also present barriers to the 
development of other regions. In the UK, despite attempts by policy makers to encourage 
more even development, this has not occurred. 
2.3.1 Spatial concentration of venture capital in the US 
As the venture capital industry became established in the 1980s, Florida and Kenney (1988) 
observed that, in general, venture capital-financed innovation in the US was clustered 
around distinct types of financial or technological activity. Specifically, high levels of 
venture capital activity could be found in three types of centre, (i) technology-oriented 
centres involving a high concentration of research activity, (ii) in financially orientated 
centres with high levels of activity in financial services, or (iii) in a hybrid of (i) and (ii). 
Technology-oriented venture capitalists are embedded in social structures of innovation, 
which provide the mechanism for "reproducing, highly skilled labour and continuously 
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mobilizing information" (p. 130). This social structure also provides a means of learning 
about the financing of venture capital, and gaining access to types of information important 
in generating venture capital activity through networks, and resource sharing. 
Financially orientated complexes are based in the financial districts in large cities and are 
often connected with large banking institutions. A much lower level of organisation takes 
place in these types of centres, and syndication provides an important link between 
complexes and technology centres. In this relationship the financially located venture 
capitalists often take a passive role, providing a significant amount of finance, but allowing 
the venture capitalist in the technology-orientated location to take the `lead' (Florida and 
Kenney 1988). Syndication can lead to the formation of networks containing a "giant 
component that spans geographies and sectors" (p. 4) that suggests the formation of 
linkages at a national level. Financial centres also provide wider access to financial capital 
in order for venture capitalists to raise funds to support new entrepreneurial firms. 
The Florida and Kenney (1988) model suggests that in technology-oriented complexes, VC 
and their investments are co-located. Powell et al (2002) have observed that early stage 
US biotechnology companies received investment and support from local VCs, "while 
external [non-local] support flows to companies that have to `show' more in order to attract 
financing"(p. 303). In contrast to the `double paradox', referred to in section 2.1.4.1, they 
also observed that "as venture capitalist grow older and larger, they invest more in both 
younger and more distant biotechnology companies" (p. 303), in line with Bagshi-Sen et al 
( 2004) observation that biotech firms compete for funds beyond their local region (p. 209). 
In general, investor proximity is expected to arise because of the result of the opportunity 
costs involved with sourcing new deals, the benefits of access to information from the local 
business community and the need to provide business assistance to their deals (Mason and 
Harrison, 2002; Zook, 2002). Lerner (1995) finds that a high proportion of those investors 
who take up board positions are local to the firm. Early stage companies will require more 
of the venture capitalist time, and may explain the focus on local venture capitalists. 
2.3.2 Spatial concentration of venture capital in the UK 
Less research has been made on the organisation of venture capital in the UK. The effects 
of geography on venture capital are not well understood (Mason and Harrision, 2002). In 
the UK, London and the South Eastern region receive a disproportionate share of venture 
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capital, compared to the total business population. Therefore, a company's location in the 
UK may alter the access to the amount and quality of venture capital received. 
Martin et al (2002) suggest that the US model of a large successful venture capital industry 
based around clusters of high technology and localised investment may not be transferable 
to Europe. The authors suggest that Europe will not be able to support the development of 
high technology clusters on a similar scale to that found in the US unless each country 
decides to specialise in a particular type of hi-tech activity. Currently policy in the UK is 
aimed at achieving the opposite, instead encouraging "dispersed clustering" (p. 143) to try 
and re-distribute the economic benefits of areas of high technology. 
2.3.2.1 Influence of London 
The organisation of the UK VC industry has featured a bias towards the South since the 
industry began to develop in the 1980s (Martin 1989). London is the UK's premier 
international centre of finance. The proliferation of international finance, the deregulation 
of the London stock exchange and the influx of foreign banks have maintained London's 
position in a national/international stage, and was "inevitable, therefore that the 
development of the venture capital industry as yet one more specialist division of the 
financial system should be focused there" (Martin, 1989, p. 398). 
The rush to invest in MBOs also built on the historical organisation of national industry in 
the UK. Many large UK firms had head-office locations in London and the South East. 
These large firms were potential targets for MBO activity and so tied many venture capital 
fins to operating in London. Investors based in London had to make larger investments 
on account for higher deal costs associated with operating in the capital. Therefore, by the 
end of the 1980s early stage investment had become a small part of the UK venture capital 
industry (Martin, 1989). 
The concentration of investors in the South, including those investing in early stage 
businesses, may have created difficulties for investors to obtain information regarding 
opportunities elsewhere. For example, a lack of access to information and local networks 
outside the Southern UK region, may have contributed to a perception that opportunities in 
the North posed a greater risk. This perception of risk may have influenced the distribution 
of finance (Martin, 1989). Even firms like 3i with a strong local presence across the UK 
with 20 UK regional offices, still found their distribution of investment followed the 
national trend to the South (Martin, 1989). After 1994, the 3i business regional presence 
reduced to reflect their concentration of activities. 
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2.3.2.2 Role of public finance 
Outside of London an alternative source of regional funding was provided by Regional 
Development Agencies (RDA's). Several RDAs were responsible for the creation of 
smaller funds operating outside London. Regional investors, providing early stage capital, 
have operated in the UK since the 1980's. Typically these investors were funded by 
nationalised industries or old metropolitan county councils (Sunley et al, 2005)5. 
However, when public funding for these schemes stopped in the mid 1980s, several were 
privatised and looked for funding from the private sector (Sunley et al, 2005). Many of 
these investors operate today, such as Yorkshire Fund Managers and West Midlands 
Enterprise. In Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales, the respective development agencies 
created their own venture capital arms. The Scottish Development Agency's VC arm is 
now an independent venture capital firm, Scottish Equity Partners, in which Scottish 
Enterprise retained a 25% stake (Hood, 2000). 
Another source of regional investment resulted from RDA Training and Enterprise 
Councils. These Councils invested a combination of European Union and public-private 
finance. The private finance component was provided by Midland Bank (now HSBC). 
The aim for these funds was to target the perceived equity gap for SMEs. These schemes 
were supported by the Labour Government when it came to office in 1997. Since then, the 
Government has encouraged the development of a number of additional regional/local 
funds. These have included University Challenge funds which are designed to provide 
seed funding University spin outs, and a High Technology Fund which invests into other 
venture capital funds. 
More recently funds have been created using public finance as a cornerstone to secure 
further private finance. These funds, run by private fund managers, include schemes such 
as the Enterprise Capital Fund, the Early Growth Funding Programme, and the Regional 
Venture Capital Funds (RVCF) scheme (Cooksey, 2006). In total nine regional venture 
capital funds (RVCF) have been created as general funds managed by experienced fund 
managers (Sunley et al, 2005). 
The RVCFs were created to provide funding in the perceived equity gap at the start-up 
stage. They have also been designed to ensure each region's entrepreneurs and start-up 
5 According to Sunley et al (2005) two examples of nationalised industry funds created in the 1970-1980s are British Steel Enterprise and British Coal Enterprise. 
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firms have access to a local VC funding and expertise. The expectation is that new funds 
will utilise the benefits from working in the local environment, such as access to deal 
information from local business networks, to overcome local information asymmetries 
regarding viable investment opportunities. The Government anticipate that these funds 
will demonstrate the potential, to other private investors, for commercial returns in these 
regions (Sunley et al, 2005). 
However, doubts about the strategy of these funds have been raised. Firstly, the size of 
each fund, £15-30m, is too small to attract the quality `hands-on' management of classic 
venture capital (Mason and Harrison, 2003). In fact the lack of qualified fund managers 
has meant that some regional players control regional funds outside their original home 
territory (Sunley et al, 2005). 
Secondly, the limits to fund size, and a maximum investment of £500,000 per portfolio 
company, will restrict the level of follow-on investment which can be provided to firms. 
Firms that prove successful will need to obtain additional finance to drive companies 
rapidly through the development cycle to exit. The lack of follow-on funding may dilute 
the RVCF level of returns. A strong return performance will be necessary for the investors 
to raise new funds from private backers and achieve long term self-sufficiency (Mason and 
Harrison, 2003). 
Finally, the scheme has not been well received by the private VC industry, as it is seen to 
artificially increase funding in regions where demand is not of high enough quality, 
diluting returns for all investors. The industry suggests that investment cannot be tied to a 
location, but should be free to invest where suitable opportunities exist. There also appears 
to be debate within Government departments regarding the RVCF's targets: uneven 
geographical supply; or a national approach applied at the regional level to relieve an 
equity gap (Sunley et al, 2005). 
Ultimately, the UK Government has attempted to increase the amount of capital available 
for early stage investment. It has done this by including public finance in the creation 
regional venture funds. Given the previous discussions of finance and equity gaps this has 
positioned the Government as the providers of high risk start-up capital, but without the 
resource to follow the initial success stories through to the exit and reward. Consequently 
this may jeopardise the long term sustainability of the funds, which was cited as a driver 
for their creation. 
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2.3.3 Conclusions on the state of venture capital research 
The geographical organisation of venture capital in the US shows clear patterns of 
development, based around institutional structures, such as Universities and financial 
centres. These structures provide important sources of skilled labour. Our literature 
review has shown a lack of research on factors influencing the organisation of UK venture 
capital. However, many UK policies have used venture capital as a regional development 
tool, to dilute economic concentration around London and spread economic benefits 
nationally. 
It is widely recognised that the supply of venture capital investment is not distributed 
evenly across regions either in the US (Florida and Smith, 1993) or the UK (Mason and 
Harrison, 2002). This phenomenon has been researched following two complementary 
perspectives; firstly examining the characteristics of clusters of venture capital activity, and 
secondly by analysing the variations in regional supply and demand for venture capital. 
Specifically, we note absence of a systematic study of the factors that influence venture 
capital investment in the UK. In Chapter 5 we build and test a model to explain the 
distribution of investment in terms of the result of factors provided in the literature which 
are expected to influence supply and demand for investment (Florida and Smith, 1993; 
Mason and Harrison, 2002; Martin et al, 2002; Martin et al, 2005). To help inform this 
model next we review the literature on industrial clusters and regional systems of 
innovation to help explain the concentration of venture capital activity. 
2.4 Venture capital and industrial clusters 
We begin with a review of the work on clusters, as this work can be linked back to 
Marshall's observations regarding the importance of particular locations for specific types 
of firms. We then build on this by reviewing the more recent literature on regional 
innovation systems. 
2.4.1 Clustering in general 
The definition of a cluster is not universally accepted within the literature (Morosini, 2004). 
For example industrial clusters can vary according to the nature of innovation process and 
structural conditions that concentrations of firms evolve from (Iammarino and McCann, 
2006). Similarly clusters can evolve over time, such that places such as Silicon Valley 
which has grown from a localised cluster formed around strong local ties and relationships 
to a large agglomeration of competing firms (Iammarino and McCann, 2006). 
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The principles of the cluster concept are frequently based on Marshall (1925, cited 
Morosini, 2004 p. 307). Marshall made three observations in an attempt to understand why 
companies continued to locate in the same geographical areas. The first point Marshall 
made was that the geographical closeness of companies generated mutual benefit in 
accessing a pool of specialised talent or human capital, where co-location created a skilled 
workforce which could meet the needs of an industry. Marshall also suggested that this 
close geographical location could deliver economies of scale in developing and utilising 
localised technology innovations or infrastructures, such as roads, termed "non-traded 
inputs" (Morosini, 2004 p. 307). Finally, there was also a mutual benefit obtained from the 
flow of ideas or information, which could easily be exchanged when companies located in 
close proximity, as opposed to those in geographically dispersed locations. 
Porter (1990,2000) extended Marshall's work to include a range of additional inputs such 
as the relationships between universities and business, management of the supply chain, 
and the mutual benefit of competition in a concentrated geographical region. Porter defines 
the cluster from a competitive perspective: 
"Geographic concentrations of interconnected companies, specialized suppliers, service 
providers, firms in related industries, and associated institutions (e. g., universities, 
standards agencies, trade associations) in a particular field that compete but also 
cooperate" (Porter, 2000, p. 15). 
Porter (2000) makes the point that that the geographical scope over which clusters occur is 
related to the transaction efficiencies which result, and so can be regional, national, or 
international. For example clusters can vary in geographical size and concentration. 
Swann and Prevezer (1996) note that the distribution of biotechnology firms in the US is 
more even than for IT companies. Similarly Kenney and Patton (2004) find that 
supporting actors in biotechnology are also relatively more dispersed in biotechnology 
firms compared to other industries. In Europe the generally dispersed nature of clusters is 
anticipated to put them at a disadvantage compared to those in the US, as firm 
concentration is expected to increase the benefits of being located in a cluster (Martin et al, 
2002). 
Porter (2000) also argues that globalisation has reduced the locational benefits resulting 
from Marshall's first and second points, meaning that knowledge flows, the development 
of local specialisations and social networks can create key sources of competitive 
advantage for firms, particularly in an Internet age. Similarly Morosini (2004) has also 
commented that: 
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"Basic production factors such as capital and non-specialised labour are largely open to 
all, whereas flows of specialized knowledge and rich knowledge interactions that lead to 
valuable innovation remain stronger between agents in the same spatial group than among 
geographically dispersed firms" 
Recent studies, particularly of hi-tech clusters, have tended to concentrate on the 
interaction of knowledge flows and social networks, forming around the third Marshallian 
notion. Iammarino and McCann (2006) note that industrial clusters based on social 
networks can be categorised according to new and old types of social network. They relate 
the new type social network cluster to firms engaged in working with `sticky' tacit 
knowledge, originating from new research, typically involving science based SME. The 
old type of social network cluster involves less technology innovation and processes are 
driven by customer demand. This second form of social network relies on relationships 
built up over time in the local area, such as found in the textiles industry. For example 
Storper (1993) found that the historical factors were important for low technology clusters 
in northern Italy. These clusters demonstrated mutual cooperation under highly 
competitive conditions. In contrast Leibovitz (2004) study of Scottish hi-tech clusters, also 
stresses the importance of historical legacy and cumulative processes for cluster 
development. 
A key aspect of technology based clusters is the role of institutions that support their 
development, such as universities. Universities can act in a variety of ways to support the 
development of clusters. Firstly they can provide a source of knowledge that can be 
accessed or shared; secondly they can provide a source of innovation or knowledge with 
commercial potential. Finally they can be active in creating the necessary social conditions 
in the local environment through interaction and support of local innovative business and 
often academic founders to encourage the development of the cluster (Keeble et al, 1999; 
Leibovitz, 2004). 
2.4.2 The clustering of biotechnology firms 
Like other hi-tech firms engaged in basic R&D, biotechnology companies can be described 
as clustering for knowledge flows, to access the new scientific knowledge developed in 
universities and research centres, and to remain close to a constant supply of skilled labour 
and new ideas (Mytelka, 2004), therefore corresponding with Keeble et al (1999). In 
biotechnology start-ups there are frequently strong links between the start- up firm and 
local universities (Prevezer, 1997, Rickne, 2004), even if there are only partial previous 
ties to the university (Mytelka, 2004). The conclusion reached is that founders have a 
preference for maintaining existing relationships with local universities or research 
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institutes (Powell, et al, 2002). The preference to remain in a familiar location maximises 
the founders opportunity to develop local relationships and access to skilled labour (Keeble 
et al, 1999 Gertler and Levitte, 2005). 
In many universities, academic entrepreneurship is encouraged (Stuart and Ding, 2006). 
However, in biotechnology we have noted that academic founders often display a lower 
level of business awareness when compared to other types of founders. This weakness is 
suggested to increase founder preference to remain local, as they are more reliant on local 
networks to help obtain finance and business assistance (Kaufinann et al, 2003). Therefore, 
the quality of local business expertise or human capital is important. 
Similarly, the academic spin out process is not necessarily a linear transfer from academia 
to firm. Founders may experiment with different business models, such as licensing or 
services based activities within academia before deciding to pursue a spin out firm (Bower, 
2003). It is possible that this iterative approach may encourage founders to remain close to 
their roots to preserve career options. 
There are factors that may encourage scientists to move to new locations. For example we 
cannot rule out that key scientist with a particular commercial intention will move to 
locations that favour their commercial aspirations (Niosi and Banik, 2005). Also, as 
Bower (2003) points out, a lot of companies are founded by relatively senior managers 
from existing firms, who may also utilise contacts and networks gained from the parent 
firm in the initial start-up stages. 
In general the literature on the clustering of biotechnology firms has mixed results 
regarding the importance localised inter-firm networking. This casts some doubt on the 
importance of the third Marshallian notion in terms of inter-firm networking in 
biotechnology. For example, Cooke (2003) notes that notwithstanding biotechnology 
industry's close ties to academia and particular key scientists (following Zucker et al, 1998) 
that local network relationships at the "individual firm level are less pronounced than 
might be expected given the obvious cluster concentrations in which biotechnology firms 
exist" (Cooke, 2003, p. 762). 
However, we find strong evidence to suggest that biotechnology will be concentrated 
around regions with a strong research base, and that bio-entrepreneurship is a locally based 
activity. The founder builds a business by using local contacts, connections and 
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knowledge of the local business environment and network, rather than relocate to 
unfamiliar areas (Feldman and Francis, 2003). In this way Zucker et al (1998) found that 
star scientists were able to use their reputation to attract great interest and the necessary 
commercial resources, to realise their potential of scientific discoveries. Finally, there are 
also benefits from remaining close to cutting edge commercial or academic research in the 
form of knowledge spill overs and externalities (Jaffe et al, 1993; Audretsch and Feldman, 
1996). 
2.4.2.1 Cumulative processes and Regional Systems of Innovation 
The development of the biotechnology sector has not been evenly spread, with different 
countries showing pronounced variation in the rates of firm formation and cluster growth 
suggesting differences in the types of clustering activity (Walsh et al, 1995). Niosi (2003) 
suggests that (external) factors to support businesses may vary according to location. 
Similarly the presence of intellectual property and star scientists in a particular location 
does not automatically result in a cluster (Powell et al, 2002). 
Only certain regions evolve to support a concentration of biotechnology business and a 
minority of locations evolve to become bioscience `megacentres' (Cooke, 2004). In 
contrast to a cluster, whose focus is on competitive and co-operative links, a mega centre 
`capture[s] the full knowledge chain from exploration, through examination to exploitation 
of knowledge" (p. 164) and therefore includes research institutes, large pharmaceutical 
firms and the wider group of supporting actors such as `knowledgeable attorneys', 
consultants or venture capitalists (Cooke, 2004). 
This wider view of the processes occurring within concentrations of firms has similarities 
with Niosi and Banik (2005) description of a regional innovation system (RIS) defined as, 
"geographical concentrations of interacting organisations (innovative firms, research 
universities, government laboratories and venture capital firms) aimed at the development 
of specific technology" (p. 343). A particular region develops a regional innovation system 
as a product of routines relating to a particular technology or sector, producing a 
concentration of related organisations (p. 346). 
In Feldman and Francis (2003) study of the Capitol Region they find that the individual 
biotechnology entrepreneurs, in their creation and support of local academic spin outs, 
played a key role in shaping the development of the RIS. In pursing their own individual 
interests, entrepreneurs acted as the `critical element in the formation and the vibrancy of - 
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clusters of technology intensive firms' (p. 780) by drawing together the necessary resources 
to support entrepreneurial firms in the region. 
Following a similar position to Feldman and Francis (2003), Niosi and Banik (2005) 
suggest that as experience around a technology grows, intellectual property routines and 
technology transfer offices become established which attract venture capital to experiment 
with new opportunities. In doing so, venture capitalist learn how to market the technology 
such that it can achieve the credibility to support flotation on the stock market. 
However this view of RIS assumes that venture capital is naturally attracted to a location 
or technology. As Von Burg and Kenney (2000) generally note, the academic literature 
often assumes that venture capital is available for attractive firms who demonstrate an 
understanding of the investor's criteria. Instead, Von Burg and Kenney (2000) suggest that 
venture capital must be actively recruited by the firm; there are no guarantees that any 
particular firm will obtain finance. In agreement with Feldman and Francis (2003) this 
emphasises the important role of regional demand from entrepreneurs for VC. 
2.4.3 Processes within and across regions 
Our discussion to this point may suggest that biotechnology clusters will only arise in 
regions which are able to learn how to develop the interactions of local entrepreneurs, 
firms and institutions. Clusters that are able to foster this type of cumulative learning 
process, involving the continual "integration of up-to-date tacit knowledge into innovation 
processes, " may maintain or further develop their "competitive edge" (Cooke, 2004, p. 175). 
However, RIS do not exist in isolation. Important knowledge and information may be 
sourced from outside the RIS (Niosi and Banik, 2005). For example, large companies of 
strategic importance may be located outside the region in focus; equally firms located 
within particular clusters may have strong national or international relationships, 
particularly when it comes to accessing cutting edge specialist R&D knowledge (Mytelka, 
2004; Cantwell and Iammarino, 2000). 
As we have noted in previous sections, for a variety of reasons the literature suggests that 
biotechnology firms are co-located with concentrations of venture capital as a result of a 
co-evolution of money and ideas (Powell et al, 2002). As the founders of biotechnology 
firms often lack commercial experience venture capitalists are required to help supply the 
necessary business skills and experience, and this may further encourage the co-location of 
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biotechnology and venture capital (Powell et al, 2002). In support, Zook (2002) finds that 
venture capitalist prefer to invest close to their own office locations; proximity allows them 
to efficiently exploit their social network, as a resource for supporting entrepreneurial 
firms. 
However, Niosi and Banik (2005) note the syndication of venture capitalists may draw 
finance from investors in other areas. Similarly Kenney and Patton (2004) find expertise 
for supporting hi-tech firms may be sourced from beyond the region. For example actors 
supporting entrepreneurial biotechnology firms, such as non-executive board advisors and 
investment banks were often located over 50 miles from the biotechnology firm. In 
comparison to other sectors such as semi-conductors, co-location in biotechnology was less 
prominent. 
However, we can find agreement between Kenney and Patton (2004) and Powell et at 
(2002). Kenney and Patton (2004) base their analysis on the board membership of 
biotechnology firms at IPO, which are generally older and more established firms. Powell 
et at (2002) have shown that venture funded biotechnology companies based away from 
venture capitalists, were generally found in older and more established firms. 
2.4.4 Summary 
In support of the third Marshallian notion we have consistently found that universities and 
research institutes are at the centre of biotechnology firm activity (Prevezer, 1997; 
Feldman and Francis, 2003; Cooke, 2003). Biotechnology firms concentrate close to 
universities and research institutes to benefit from specialist knowledge and skills. In 
doing so they also rely on previous contacts and knowledge of local networks to which can 
be used to help the start up firm. The focus on sources of technology and local networks 
partially matches with the Florida and Kenney (1988) models technology complexes and 
venture capital. 
We also observe the multitude of relationships that exist around biotechnology firms that 
McKelvey et al (2004) believe to be one of the stylized facts of biotechnology. We find 
reference to `academic' relationships between research institutes, individual academic 
entrepreneurs, and the firms they go on to build at a local level. However, in contrast to 
the industrial clusters the literature identifies weak local relationships between different 
biotechnology firms, and between biotechnology firms and large corporations. 
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We have discussed how a wider variety of relationships support bio-entrepreneurs, both 
locally and further afield. The venture capitalist is described as being important for 
supporting entrepreneurial firms. In line with the Florida and Kenney model of venture 
capital, the RIS literature describes the venture capitalist as an important part of the 
regional system, but not necessarily local. They intermediate between financial capitalists 
and innovators, using commercial expertise to help businesses move from the scientific to 
the commercial world. 
The literature indicates that clusters of firms are a result of regional activities, such as 
strong R&D activity, high quality human capital, and entrepreneurship which also suggest 
these places maybe attractive for venture capitalists. However, VC funds rely on 
contributions from other types of investors, encouraged by access to strong financial 
communities. The industrial cluster literature suggests that regional supply of venture 
capital would be strengthened by local financial activity. Florida and Kenney (1988) allow 
for venture capitalists to interact between technology and financial complexes. The RIS 
literature includes reference to the role of investors and the wider financial community, but 
is less clear about co-location. In Chapters 5 and 6 we explore whether the concentration 
of investment activity can be directly related to regional activities. In Chapters 7,8 and 9 
we refine our analysis using the region as a tool for exploring the organisation of UK 
venture capital activity in detail. 
Clearly regions with strong networks increase the flow of information between 
entrepreneurs and the business community, including investors, and help to connect 
investment supply and demand. At a detailed level the venture capitalist is strongly 
associated with relationships and ultimately networks. The venture capitalist can clearly 
be described as an intermediary, between finance and innovation. However, the venture 
capitalist is also shown to act at the centre of a variety of relationships, as an investor, a 
board director and as a social networker, to bring together resources to support the 
entrepreneurial firm. As Zook (2002) suggests, venture capital, like Martin's (1999) 
observations regarding money and finance, can be viewed as a social relation. In the 
regional systems of innovation literature, the dynamics of venture capital based 
relationships have not been adequately explored. 
In this chapter we have discussed the literature relevant to the development of the thesis 
and shown how we position the research questions to focus our analysis. The view of 
venture capital operating on the basis of social relationships that help investors achieve 
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purposeful outcomes has strong resonance with the literature on social capital. We 
conclude this chapter by stating that it is clear that more work is needed to understand 
regional networking activity involving venture capitalists and other business actors that 
support the firm. Our next step is to review the literature more generally on network 
concepts and theories to provide a more comprehensive understanding of networks. 
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3 Networks in venture capital 
In our literature review on venture capital and regional innovation systems we find 
networks are an important part of regional activity. Frequent interactions or ties between 
proximate actors are thought to be one of the mechanisms through which clusters offer 
companies competitive advantage. The emphasis on `systems' in the regional innovation 
literature also implies that innovative regions function as a product of relationships 
between different actors. 
In this chapter we review the different theoretical literature relating to networks, and begin 
to answer research question two proposed in Chapter 1. We start by asking what networks 
are and why are they of value? Then we consider the role and value of networks for 
entrepreneurial SME firms and venture capitalists. We summarise our discussions by 
presenting a networked model of venture backed entrepreneurial firms. Finally we 
investigate the social network literature in view of interpreting network structure and 
variations in the type of ties. 
3.1 What are networks? 
A network is defined as a set of agents, such as individuals, firms or institutions linked by 
a set of relationships (Gulati, 2007). The relationship between two agents, for example 
between individuals, firms or mixture of both, is the basis for building networks (Scott, 
2000). Knoke and Kuklinski (1982) stress that relationships are not, "an intrinsic 
characteristic of either party taken in isolation but an emergent property of the connection 
or linkage between units of observation" (p. 10). Thus relationships can be viewed as a 
joint property between two agents. 
The analysis of relationships can be used to investigate the "structure of social action" 
(Scott, 2000 p. 5), where relational data, the contacts, ties and connections relate between 
agents, rather than about specific agent (Scott, 2000). Thus relationships between agents 
are conceptually distinct from the attributes of the same group of agents. Many aspects of 
social behaviour could be treated from either a relational or attribute perspective (Scott, 
2000), but the choice of measurement option is "neither polar nor mutually exclusive" 
(Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982. p. 10). For example, it may be the case that structure of an 
individual's network relations may interact with some measure of their attribute such as 
wealth or status. Importantly, analysis of the attributes of individuals in a network will not 
provide the same information as analysis of the relationships in the same network. 
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3.2 What do relationships achieve? 
In the final part of Chapter 1 we introduced the idea that relationships are important. 
Social capital theory suggests that relationships are an important means of achieving useful 
actions. In this section we discuss the relevance of social capital to entrepreneurial firms. 
3.2.1 Social capital 
Starting from the perspective of any given individual, the theory of social capital is - "the 
capital captured through social relations" which are a "social asset by virtue of actor's 
connection and access to resources in the network or group of which they are members" 
(Lin, 2002 p. 19). The distinction between social capital and personal capital is clear (Burt, 
1992). Personal or human capital rests with the individual's possessions, skills abilities 
and money, whilst social capital is based on relationships (Lin, 2002). Social relationships 
come "into existence when individuals attempt to make best use of their individual 
resources". Although social capital resides in relationships it can be seen as providing 
access to resources which can be utilised by the individual (Coleman, 1990. p. 300). 
We can view social capital as the starting point for examining the theoretical perspectives 
relating to networks, as all individuals share some level of social capital through their 
interaction with others. It follows that social capital theory predicts that social networks 
formed by the relationships between actors can enhance the outcomes of actions (Lin, 
2002). Social capital also introduces the idea the individuals do not act in isolation 
(Coleman, 1990). 
The literature suggests various mechanisms through which social capital can influence the 
success of actions for an individual. For example individuals investing in social capital 
may benefit from the flow of information from other agents. This can open up new 
opportunities or help reduce potential search and transaction costs. By creating ties with 
others, an individual increases their access to information from new sources or overcome 
imperfections in the market in terms of geographies or hierarchies (Granovetter, 1973, 
1985; Burt, 1992). 
Social ties also have the potential to influence critical decision making. Social ties to the 
right individuals may carry weight in terms of credibility. A tie to an influential individual 
maybe important if they are prepared to `put in a word' on your behalf (Lin, 2002). For 
example an entrepreneur with a relationship to an important industry contact, may benefit 
directly from their knowledge and experience, but may also gain access to other relevant 
associates or resources as a result of the social tie. Burt (1992) attributes value to 
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connections that create competitive advantages by providing information and access to 
resources which would be unlikely to become available otherwise. They can be 
particularly valuable if these relationships are generally unavailable to others, and therefore 
overcome "structural holes" where few relationships exist in a network. 
As Lin (2002) highlights, three elements of social capital include: the size of a person's 
network in terms of the number of people who would help you when required, the strength 
of their readiness to help and the resources of these contacts. Therefore social ties of an 
individual can provide some appreciation of their grand standing or their wider access to 
resources, which makes them more valuable than the aggregate of their own personal 
capital. It also follows that developing ties within a particular group with shared interests 
and resources, the associated social capital formed within the group may re-enforce 
members "identity and recognition" (p. 20). It follows that membership of a group may 
also promote an individual's worthiness, indicating their access to resources associated 
with other members of the group (Lin, 2002). 
3.2.1.1 Social capital of groups 
An alternative view, which still appreciates that social capital mechanics operate at an 
individual level, has been proposed by researchers such as Bourdieu (1986), Coleman 
(1990) and Putnam (1993). These authors have been interested in the overall dynamics of 
groups of connected individuals, to understand how social capital can function as a group 
or collective asset. 
Lin (2002) summarises that social capital, according to Bourdieu (1986), is based on the 
idea it provides a useful resource for individual members of a group. Members of the 
group mutually invest in relationships with other members of the group accumulating 
credits. When required, they can call down on their credits to gain access to the resources 
of other group members. In this way social capital is fungible, but an individual's resources 
have to be exchanged to acquire useful social capital within the group. However, Coleman 
(1990 p. 302) believes social capital is only fungible with regards to specific activities, and 
valuable for creating only certain actions relevant to a given individual. In Coleman's 
view of social capital actors have direct interest where they apply their own resources, but 
also shared interests in events or actions that are partially controlled by others (Lin, 2002). 
Therefore individuals engage in a trading or exchange of resources through their social ties, 
to satisfy their own interests or achieve certain actions (Lin, 2002). 
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Furthermore as Portes (2000) observes there are contrasting views of social capital as an 
individual, group, or collective asset that leads to different views on the function or value 
of social capital. At the collective level social capital is theoretically weaker as it becomes 
difficult to separate social capital from other broad types of activities or individual traits. 
From this perspective social capital risks becoming an explanation for all that is good in 
society (Portes, 2000). For example, regional economic performance can be explained by 
social capital following Putnam's focus on `civic spirit', but it is also possible that the civic 
behaviour is a result of the economic performance which binds people, or that a factors 
such as strong local education has promoted a sense of civic duty and economic success 
(Portes, 2000). Thus we should be cautious when talking about social capital and positive 
outcomes as the two may be interrelated. However, we can expect an undirected 
relationship whereby the aggregate network structure of a region will be associated with 
properties or characteristics of that region. 
It is clear that relationships and ultimately networks are fundamental to the development of 
social capital. Lin (2002) suggests the social capital maybe defined operationally as "the 
resourced embedded in social networks accessed and used by actors for actions" (p. 25). 
Individuals create ties to one another as a natural process of trying to achieve purposeful 
actions. During this process, the potential exists to develop and accumulate social capital. 
Therefore social capital comprises of resources based within relationships, but where 
access to these resources is managed by individuals. 
Extending this further, Lin (2002) observes the consensus view that social capital, "as 
theory generating concept should be conceived in the social network context; as resources 
accessible through social ties that occupy strategic network locations, and/or significant 
organisational positions" (p. 24). This view naturally suggests that a precursor to the 
analysis of social capital is to understand the network relationships that exist between 
actors. 
3.2.2 Relationships and a theory of social capital 
Whilst it is possible for individuals to invest in social capital by maintaining relationships, 
they can only realise the value of social relations from connections they are aware of (Lin, 
2002). It follows that a natural part of sustaining relationships and the utility of any social 
capital represented by them, is a certain amount of obligation between tied actors, in terms 
of reciprocity or compensation (Coleman, 1990). 
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Cohen and Fields (1999) see social capital as facilitated by trust, where trust is based on 
performance, reliability and reputation. For example they view social capital networks in 
Silicon Valley as focused, productive interactions among [.... ] social institutions, 
instruments and entities" (p. 193) which include Universities, venture capitalists, law firms 
and business networks influenced by the structure of local industry. In their view social 
capital is maintained through the productivity or performance of ties. 
3.2.3 Network approach to entrepreneurship 
The discussion of the value of networks and social capital shares a similar perspective to 
"network approach to entrepreneurship" coined by Brüderl and Preisendörfer (1998). 
Researchers in the field of entrepreneurship have long noted that networks make an 
important contribution to the field. For example entrepreneurs with larger, more diverse 
networks will be able to obtain more support for their projects and ventures, than those 
entrepreneurs with small networks (Witt, 2004). Sorenson (2003) sees social relationships 
as important for an entrepreneur to access range resources such as tacit industry knowledge, 
human and financial capital. In the network success hypothesis, networks based on 
founders personal and business relationships can be used to acquire information and 
resources that may generally be unavailable or more expensive if obtained on a market 
(Brüderl and Preisendörfer, 1998). 
Diverse networks can support the entrepreneur in the production and delivery of goods and 
services. In the initial phases of development a start-up founder is likely to use their current 
social capital and trial and error approach to develop their network of ties on an 
interpersonal level (Larson and Starr, 1993). The connections which prove useful to the 
entrepreneur in running their business become of value and reflect the entrepreneur's social 
capital. In this way relationships become a useful resource for the firm (ibid). 
Entrepreneurs can adapt and manipulate their network in terms of size, access to resource 
and information by building the right relationships to suit their needs (Greve and Salaf, 
2003). In particular, having contact with other entrepreneurs operating at a national or 
international level can provide access to a range of contacts and improve business growth 
(Donckels and Lambrecht, 1995). 
The utility of social networks is thought to be one explanation for the ability of 
entrepreneurial firms to grow and to compete with larger firms. The flexibility of informal 
relationships mean entrepreneurs can hold on to useful connections and build long term 
relationships (Johannisson, 1996 cited Schutjens and Stam, 2001). The ability to develop 
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social capital to provide access to resources can compensate for the liabilities of the start 
up in terms of their size, such as restricted firm level resource and a lack of historical 
legitimacy. Applying the network success hypothesis, those that access resources more 
cheaply than their competitors could via the market, will be more successful (Witt, 2004). 
3.3 Summary 
Although we fmd different perspectives on the organisation of social capital, at the 
individual, group or regional level, the consensus view is consistent; that relationships have 
value and are an important resource. Actors are motivated to create ties aligned with their 
own interests. However, in following their interests, they also collectively form indirect 
ties with others, resulting in the formation of networks. Therefore networks capture the 
wider social structure of actions. 
In line with our discussions in Chapter 2, regarding regional networking to support SME, 
we have shown that networking is an important part of the entrepreneurial process. A 
crucial ingredient in building new firms is developing relationships to provide access to 
resources. In sectors like biotechnology, we anticipate that new business founders may 
have access to social capital that is tied to academic success, but not necessarily business 
success. There is clearly a role in the entrepreneurial process for an experienced 
entrepreneur or firm director, whose access to social capital and stock of social ties can 
usefully be applied, to provide access to a range of commercial contacts and resources to 
support the firm. 
This section indicates the importance of non-financial contribution of actors in regional 
innovation systems like venture capitalists. We know from Chapter 2 that part of the 
activity of being venture capitalists requires building networks to obtain information on 
opportunities, finance and potentially other resources from the investment community. 
Agents, such as venture capitalists with many relationships to others, can be expected to 
develop a network of contacts that provide access to valuable resources to help their 
investments. 
Another important actor that supports entrepreneurial firms is experienced directors. 
Directors of venture backed firms often hold greater power over management than in other 
SME firms, having control of the finance and also the expertise. Venture backed boards 
often have more outside directors, who take an active role in managing the strategy of the 
firm (Rosenstein, 1988). Directors of SME firms, that are brought into the firm after start 
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up can bring prestige (Mizruchi, 1996), guidance and advice (Daily and Dalton, 1992) and 
training for the other directors (Deakins et al, 2000). It seems likely that individuals with 
multiple SME directorships will have accumulated important human and social capital, 
which can be used to develop important relationships for entrepreneurial firm. In the next 
section we consider the implications of social capital and networks in view of the investors 
and directors of venture backed entrepreneurial firms. 
3.4 Relationships between entrepreneurial actors 
Our discussion of social capital suggests that individuals with entrepreneurial type social 
capital should be in demand to fill positions in entrepreneurial firms. This is particularly 
true for venture capital backed firms. For example Higgins (2005) found US VC's often 
recruited business executives to lead their biotechnology investments. Higgins (2005) 
shows that the success of a particular group of healthcare executives, who shared similar 
backgrounds and experiences, was partly due to the presence of strong ties to each other, 
and the relevant business community. 
In-demand directors are a feature of corporate activity. Useem (1984) suggests 
relationships formed by directors shared between the boards of large corporate companies 
are extensive. Director ties between firms are known as interlocks (Mizruchi, 1996). 
Typically between two thirds and three quarters of US and UK non-executive directors are 
also top executive directors in large corporate firms. Useem (1984) observes that multiple 
interlocks make directors more valuable, as it connects them with the business community. 
Their multiple appointments provide them with a `business scan', obtained through a range 
of experiences and contacts in business that can aids their strategic and operational insight 
and input. Research has shown that directors with multiple interlocks are more likely to be 
selected for new board positions (Davis, 1993 cited Mizrurchi, 1996), and contribute 
positively to firm performance (Harris and Shimizu; 2004). Although Mizruchi (1996) and 
Johnson et al (1996) indicate variation in the literature regarding the motivation for 
interlocking, research generally suggests that experienced directors play an important role 
at the firm level. 
The concept of director `business scan' matches with Rosa and Scott (1999). They find at 
least three quarters of SME high growth firms in Scotland were associated with one or 
more directors who sat on multiple firm boards. They also found successful entrepreneurs 
pursued related diversification to grow several related businesses at the same time. 
Similarly, Storey et al (1987, cited Rosa and Scott, 1999) found that 80% of directors of 
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fast growth firms owned other businesses, compared to 30% in the remainder, supporting 
the role of directors with `business scan' in entrepreneurial firms. 
In summary we find an alternative measure of entrepreneurial performance involving 
`clusters' of firms linked by entrepreneurs and firm directors. The network approach to 
entrepreneurship also emphasises the importance of social networking between 
entrepreneurial firms, where relationships are created by between individuals that help to 
facilitate the entrepreneurial process. Combining these perspectives it should be possible 
to identify networks of individuals active in supporting entrepreneurial firms, who are 
related by shared ties to the same firms. In this way a network approach is a 
complementary technique for understanding the wider industry dynamics occurring within 
an entrepreneurial sector. 
3.4.1 Inter-investor relationships 
A different type of relationship is formed when a venture capital firm decides to finance an 
entrepreneurial firm. An investment agreement between the venture capitalist and the firm 
creates an inter-firm relationship. If another investor also provides funds to the same firm 
then two additional relationships are formed. Firstly between the second investor and the 
firm, and secondly between the two investors who are affiliated to the same firm. Wright 
and Lockett (2003) indicate that where two or more investors finance the same firm, then 
they work together as a syndicate. 
The relationship(s) between venture capitalists in syndicate may closely resemble a joint 
venture, where investors may jointly have some level of control over the SME. A 
syndicate is usually involves two or more VC firms taking an equity stake in the same 
investment round for a joint payoff, known as an equity syndicate (Wilson, 1968). 
However Brander et al (2002) also propose a broader definition of a syndicate, involving 
several investors providing funds to the firm over different periods of time. 
A syndicate of venture capital investors can be expected to involve formal and informal 
relational components. A formal investment agreement details the rights of each 
participant and their financial commitment, and is used as a backdrop upon which to 
operate the syndicate. However, the active management of the syndicate is likely to be 
based on more informal relationships between investors involving the discussion of the 
investment strategy and future expectations for the firm (Wright and Lockett, 2003). 
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Research is in agreement that syndication and frequent changes in firms leading and 
following in investment syndicates create a network of partners (Bygrave, 1987,1988; 
Wright and Lockett, 2003). Over time a "dense inter-firm network may be created"based 
on syndicated relationships between different investors (Manigart et al, 2006. p. 135). As 
informal relationships between investors outlive any formal agreement relevant to a single 
deal they help minimise opportunistic behaviour by the lead investor. For example an 
investor's reputation is important for gaining access to future syndications, as many deals 
are organised on the basis of referrals from other investors (Bygrave, 1987,1988). Thus 
informal relationships are important drivers of the patterns of syndication between 
investors (Wright and Lockett, 2003). 
Therefore, although individual deals have a strong formal component, the overlapping ties 
which result in syndicate networks, strongly represent social ties between investors. In 
agreement with Grandori and Soda (1995) formal networks are often supported by more 
informal or social networks. They define social networks as organised without legally 
binding agreements. However, it is important to remember that only same firm board 
positions create a direct linkage between venture capitalists in this way. 
In agreement with our discussion of social capital, we find relationships between investors 
to have value. In particular, ties between investors have strong influence over future 
access to deals. We can expect that VCs are situated in a network of past and present 
affiliations with other investors. This is supported by research that suggests syndication 
networks are an important means of disseminating information regarding investment 
opportunities in different geographical regions. Without the network it would be difficult 
for investors to gain access to opportunities outside their main locations (Manigart et al, 
2006 p. 135). 
A special type of relationship can arise in a venture capital backed firm, when an investor 
or investment company provides a director to the entrepreneurial firm. The literature in 
Chapter 1 proposes that a key activity that separates venture capital from other forms of 
investment is the specialist monitoring and advisory role performed by investors (Wright 
and Lockett, 2003). To manage their investments venture capitalists frequently reserve the 
right to take a board positions in their portfolio firms. They may choose to take up the 
position themselves or use a trusted non-executive director. Similarly, the US literature 
suggests that a core component of the value adding services provided by VCs to the firm is 
the recruitment of high quality human capital, to help guide the business forwards, and 
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social capital in the form of access to other external contacts and relationships. These 
value adding activities may be provided by the venture capitalist (usually the syndicate 
leader) or through the appointment of an associate of the investor. It is expected that these 
value adding services are also formally recognised through the appointment of directors to 
the board of firms. 
3.4.2 Network conceptualisation 
Based on our review of the literature thus far we can propose the following 
conceptualisation of interactions involved in venture capital - entrepreneurial team 
dynamic, as shown in the diagram below. Although it may not capture the complete 
variety of relationships found in venture capital, it provides a useful framework for further 
analysis. 
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The diagram shows two levels or planes of activity. The top plane shows the investment 
relationships of venture capitalists (dots) with entrepreneurial firms (squares). The second 
plane is similar to the venture capitalist plane, in that it contains the same population of 
firms, but includes the directors of the entrepreneurial firms (triangles) which can also 
include the venture capitalist director or a nominated representative. The two plane 
representation separates the network of investors from the network of directors. It is clear 
from the literature that a key component of venture capital deals is the application of value 
adding services to improve the performance of the entrepreneurial firm. This leads to the 
final type of relationship shown in the diagram; the intermediary linkage between investor 
and director planes. This creates a link between the investors and the directors. 
Our previous discussions highlight the importance of a range of technical and commercial 
expertise in the entrepreneurial process. This is emphasised by the importance placed on 
the human capital in the venture capitalists assessment of investments. Those individuals 
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with experience and contacts which can help entrepreneurial firms develop, will be in 
demand. 
We also expect that relationships are an important means of obtaining resources for the 
entrepreneurial firm, but the distribution of social capital across individuals is unlikely to 
be even. This raises an important question regarding the influence of social capital on the 
structure of social networks. 
3.5 The structure of social networks 
It is clear that the theory of social capital and the social networks perspective are closely 
related. A first step towards understanding social capital is to simply understand the 
network of relationships. Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) view social capital in terms of 
three dimensions, the first, structural social capital, relates to structure of the whole 
network, such as its configuration, density of ties and how different actors are connected. 
Their second dimension, relational social capital, is derived from the different types of 
personal relationships which develop between individuals, such as trust or friendships. 
Different types of relational social capital in a network may influence the behaviour of 
people, such that even if two networks are structurally similar, they may lead to different 
outcomes. The final category is based on a cognitive dimension that relationships 
represent resources that have a "shared system of meaning" or shared interpretation, such 
as a shared language or code (p. 244). 
Our focus in Chapters 7-9 will centre on the structural and relational social capital in 
venture capital networks. Social network analysis provides a method of representing and 
analysing social network structures. Although the techniques of social network analysis 
are frequently applied in academic research, there is less congruence in terms of a core 
theory regarding social networks; instead a pattern has emerged of the use of network 
terminology and techniques applied across multiple fields in different contexts. 
The themes of the thesis include combining an analysis of relational and geographical 
perspectives. This section will examine social network analysis tools, general mathematical 
network models and common characteristics of social networks as well as the links 
between clusters in terms of network and geographical space. 
3.5.1 Network structures 
Modelling networks mathematically provides an abstract approach to understanding 
networks, regardless of whether the unit of analysis is at an individual or firm level. 
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Importantly mathematical explanations for the general structure and formation of networks 
also demonstrate how different network structures influence the flow of information and 
knowledge around a system, which relates closely to our discussions in Chapter 2. 
The mathematician Erdös (Watts, 2003) proposed that networks can be modelled as the 
result of random processes. If we have a group of actors, and randomly create ties between 
any two agents, then as new connections are added, eventually the point is reached where 
each agent on average has a random connection. At this point, adding new connections 
between members of the group rapidly increases the connectivity between actors. As the 
number of relationships added increases, the number of unconnected agents decreases 
exponentially, quickly resulting in single giant component that can be called a network 
(Barabäsi, 2002). In a network, it is possible to move from one agent to the other, through 
the relationships that connect them. 
In a random network the number of relationships held by each agent will follow a Poisson 
distribution, with each agent tending towards an average number of relationships. The 
theory doesn't describe the mechanics of how the relationships are made, but is intended to 
model the overall structure of networks. Random networks have been found appropriate 
for describing many complex networks (Barabäsi 2002). 
The random network model, suggests a uniformity of network connections and an even 
distributed of ties between actors. It also suggests that any apparent sub-structures in the 
network occur randomly, rather than as a result of any geographical patterns in the location 
of actors. In random networks, on average, path lengths between any two actors are short 
compared to the Ising network and result in effective diffusion of information (Cowan, 
2004). 
The Ising model is the opposite of the random network. In the Ising model ties occur 
between agents located in the same physical space. Links are created between nearest 
neighbours in a geographical sense. The result is a network formed of overlapping local 
clusters. In this network the average path length between any actors is long, as links across 
distant clusters do not arise. For example, for information to reach distant parts of the 
network it must travel through each successive local cluster on the way (Cowan, 2004). 
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An alternative view of networks, which is a compromise between the random and Ising 
model, is described as the `small world' phenomenon. Small worlds are a characteristic of 
large networks that have sparse networks without any form of dominant central control, but 
also contain areas of highly clustered linkages. The surprising observations made when 
researching these large networks, was that it was possible to connect two actors in the 
network with a relatively low number of intermediate nodes (Watts, 1999). For example it 
is suggested that it only requires six people to connect two randomly chosen people in the 
world (Barabäsi 2002). 
Small world networks have been found to describe innovation networks, involving patent 
citations or R&D alliances. In these knowledge based networks, a small world structure 
represents a trade off between rapid dissemination of information found in random 
networks and the facilitation of knowledge sharing and the production of innovation found 
in localised clusters or Ising networks (Cowan and Jonard, 2008). For this thesis we might 
expect small world structures to be a feature of UK venture capital networks. In this case 
localised clusters of investment and entrepreneurial activity are loosely linked together to 
form a national network and would suggest an efficient national structure of linked clusters. 
However, both the random and small world networks fail to predict networks which 
contain a small minority of agents have extremely high number of connections. These 
networks contain actors who act like hubs and result in centrally organised networks. 
These highly connected minority agents have important network properties, in particular 
they can act as important connectors to other actors in the network. Hubs have an 
interesting property in that they considerably reduce the network distance between actors 
in the network, more than in the case of small world networks. As highly connected actors 
in the network, hubs strongly influence the network structure and have implications for the 
flow of information around the network (Barabäsi 2002). 
Networks which display the hub type properties, instead of showing random or small world 
characteristics, can be modelled according to power laws. The frequency of agent's 
connections in a network will follow a power law: the majority of nodes have only a few 
links, whilst a small minority of nodes have a vast number of links. We call the number of 
direct ties a vertex has to other vertices in the network, the "degree". A vertex of degree 
three has connections to three other vertices in the network. By plotting the frequency 
distribution of vertices degree in a network we can gain insight into the network structure. 
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A power law distribution can indicate that the structure of the network is a hub and spoke 
type system. 
The degree of a vertex is one measure of its network centrality, i. e. the more central an 
investor in a network, the higher the degree. Clearly actors in the network who act as hubs 
will have a high degree and be described as central. However degree centrality only 
provides a relatively localised assessment of network centrality as it only considers the 
direct ties an actor has, for example a hub may have relationships with one particular part 
of the network. Other measures of centrality reflect an agent's position in the wider 
network, by considering the indirect ties, i. e. the connections of the network actors to 
which a hub maybe attached. These measures are known as betweenness and closeness 
(De Nooy et al, 2005). 
A further consideration is that networks grow and change over time. If the growth of 
networks is considered, then the idea of preferential attachment becomes important to 
explaining the formation of hubs, simply that networks connections are not made in 
random, but follow a measure of popularity. New connections added to the system will be 
more likely to link with established hubs. The growth of networks therefore favours the 
early movers who establish a core of relations. The subsequent growth of the network 
through the entry of new nodes can be shown to be attracted more strongly to the 
established nodes. From this, hubs will develop, such that each node attracts links at a rate 
proportional to its current links - following a power law (Barabäsi and Albert, 1999; 
Barabäsi, 2002). 
In contrast to random networks, the concept of an average node fails to capture the 
structure of hub and spoke or preferential attachment type networks. Similarly, an increase 
in the size of the number of agents in the network will not change the structure of a 
preferential attachment network. The power law distribution will remain fixed, so 
effectively these networks are scale free. An example is the World Wide Web. The web is 
a large network where certain sites have extremely large number of connections to other 
web sites, whilst the majority have only a few, and so can't be explained as being random 
(Barabäsi 2002). 
Our discussion highlights that networks can be highly organised with well defined 
properties and sub-structures which influence the overall structure of the network. Clearly 
our discussions in this chapter represent several idealised or models of networks. For 
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example, according to Cowan (2004) it is possible to find some presence of hubs like 
structures in small world networks. Like hub based networks, small world networks are 
also characterised by some skewedness in the distribution of the degrees of actors. It is 
conceivable that an actor may connect across many other actors distributed across different 
clusters. Thus, in reality it is likely that real world networks will often fall between 
predicted model types. In line with social theory, networks can be analysed according to 
their sub-structures, in the next section we bring together literature on social capital theory 
and network structure. 
3.5.2 Social capital and network sub-structures 
Social capital theory can be used to describe the characteristics of an individual's social 
capital, in terms of their reach and access to most valued resources, the heterogeneity of 
the breadth of their relations and resources, and finally the overall size of their reach as 
defined by the number of contacts they have. 
The theory of social capital as proposed by Lin (2002), predicts that society is organised 
according to individuals structural positions along a spectrum of access to resources, class, 
power and authority. This view of society suggests that a structural advantage will exist 
for individuals higher up the positional scale. Higher positions will yield a greater access 
to the most valuable resources and provide a relative network advantage over lower 
structural positions. It also predicts that those sharing structural positions will have similar 
characteristics and potentially ties to similar agents. It follows that ties within structural 
positions are formed more easily that than across them. The closer people's social 
positions, the more likely they are to form a relationship. 
Lin (2002, p. 60) proposes that the "primary proposition of social capital theory suggests 
that the success of an action is positively associated with social capital", it follows that a 
"simple strategy to accomplish a purposive action is to access an actor who possesses or 
can access more highly valued resources". We might expect that agents with access to 
superior levels of social capital will have a relative position of power over those beneath 
them. 
However, Lin's (2002) theory of social capital has limitations. For example, the main 
motivation suggested for those in higher structural positions to relate with those below, is 
associated with gaining access to new information or resources. It should be anticipated 
that gaining access to someone with better resources than your own would involve some 
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type of barter; valuable resources should not given away easily. In the case of the venture 
capitalist, they exploit the value of their social ties to develop their portfolio. The 
application of social capital is expected to form part of the added value provided by 
venture capitalists, that their participation should (if beneficial) facilitate access to 
individuals with highly valued resources. Here, the investor's motivation is driven by 
profit, and they control the flow of resources to the entrepreneurial firm. On a superficial 
level this supports Lin (2002) observation of ties across structural positions. However, we 
emphasise that access is negotiated; only opportunities that provide financial returns will 
gain access to the venture capitalist resource. 
Lin (2002), like Putnam (1993,1995) also assumes a relatively static structural position of 
actors emphasising family history and social positions in determining structural positions. 
Cohen and Fields (1999) suggest a more dynamic model where an individual's access to 
social capital is responsive to their achievements and performance. We would expect an 
aspiring entrepreneur that is successful in negotiating access to an individual higher up on 
the social structure, will also increase their own structural position. In this way the value 
of the tie may provide credibility to the entrepreneur in addition to access to other 
resources. We see a similar influence of credibility, when important scientists or managers 
are recruited to a firm to attract investment at IPOs (Gulati, 2007). 
If we combine the perspective of Cohen and Fields (1999) that performance has strong 
links with social capital, with that of Garnsey and Heffernan (2005) that social capital like 
other forms of capital can be accumulated, it should be expected that those with an ability 
to perform in business will develop relationships and accumulate ties which represent 
valuable social capital. The best performers would be expected to take higher structural 
positions with access to the most valuable resources. This view of social capital implies a 
rapid dynamic development of social capital where `new comers' can arrive and thrive on 
the strength of their abilities. Thus the associated networks will represent the perceived 
importance and performance of actors operating in the entrepreneurial environment. 
Lin's (2002) theory of social capital suggests the distribution of people's structural 
positions is skewed. People with low structural positions are in the majority, and a small 
minority hold access to the most valuable relational resources. We also expect from the 
earlier discussions that relationships within structural positions are formed more easily. It 
follows that in the higher structural positions the number of actors are likely to be 
relatively small, increasing the likelihood that actors in the highest positions will share ties 
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or form groups. In the entrepreneurial context it suggests that a core group of either 
directors or investors (and potentially a combination of both) may emerge that has 
important consequences for network structure. 
It also follows that those with access to the most valuable resources should be targeted by 
those with lower structural positions. Actors in lower structural positions are anticipated to 
be abundant. We also expect that the number of ties per actor is greatest for those in the 
highest structural positions. These ideas resonate with characteristics of networks formed 
around hubs, where hubs are formed by a minority of actors that have access to highly 
valued social capital. These hubs attract connections to other actors in the network, 
particularly from those in lower structural positions. Therefore, the presence of hubs in the 
network would indicate the presence of important actors, with a centralised structure of co- 
ordination. 
This section has shown how the distribution of social capital across a population has 
important implications for network structures and sub-structures. We have started to 
explore the organisation of networks according to the role of particular actors or groups of 
actors, and the implications of forming relationships within and across different groups of 
actors. Another literature has explored the role of groups and network structure based on 
the idea that relational ties have different strengths. 
3.5.3 Strength of ties 
Granovetter (1973) proposed that network analysis should consider ties as varying between 
strong or weak. Granovetter (1973 p. 1360) stated that, "the strength of a tie is a (probably 
linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual 
confidentiality), and the reciprocal services which characterise the tie". Thus strong ties 
resulting from ties between relatives or friends, or where homophily is high, are 
characterised as intense, frequent, reciprocated relationships. Weak ties on the other hand 
are often formed between acquaintances where the frequency of contact between two 
agents is lower and less intense. 
An important consequence of strong ties is that to some extent they are obligated. Thus 
strong ties are more likely to provide access to resources than weak ties. Based on the 
work of Granovetter (1973,1985), Lin's (2002) theory of social capital proposes that the 
strength of ties are important for the formation of relationships and access to resources. In 
Lin (2002) strong ties between actors represent trust and sharing of resources, as well as 
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"the maintenance and reinforcement of existing" resources (p. 66). In Granovetter (1973) 
strong ties between actors represent social capital that provides access to resources of a 
similar nature to that of egos other ties. 
An important characteristic of strong ties is that they are likely to form closed groups. For 
example, if strong links exist between actors A and B, and B and C, then it is very likely 
that a strong link will exist between A and C. The strong connection of both actors 
through B means it's likely that the third relationship will occur, forming a closed triad. 
As a consequence, information flows efficiently and freely round groups of people that 
have strong connections. Following Coleman, (1990, p. 304) an advantage of a group, 
"whose members manifest trustworthiness and place extensive trust in one another will be 
able to accomplish much more than a comparative group lacking that trustworthiness and 
trust" (Coleman 1990 p. 304). 
However, because of the closed nature of the group, each member of the group tends to 
share similar information or resources. For the group to access new information, it is most 
likely to be sourced through weak ties which connect different groups together 
(Granovetter, 1973). From the perspective of social capital, weaker ties, unlike strong ties, 
provide a breath of relationships which are un-obligated and involve dissimilar 
relationships. Lin (2002) proposes that weaker ties between actors facilitate access to 
heterogeneous resources, potentially resources of greater value (and lower value too) than 
one's own structural position would suggest (Lin, 2002) and so characterise ties across 
structural positions. However, from a social capital perspective weaker ties are predicted 
to be less effective in achieving actions because they lack trust and so represent weaker 
incentive to share resources (Lin, 2002). 
The location of strong and weak ties has implications for the flow of information or 
knowledge through a network. Granovetter (1973) proposed that weak ties act as bridges 
between groupings of strong ties, such that it is mainly weak ties that connect between 
different groups and allow the flow of information from one social group to another. Thus 
in social capital theory a weak tie bridge from one social cluster provides access to 
resources embedded in another social cluster that would otherwise be unavailable (Lin, 
2002). 
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3.5.4 Application to the thesis 
In the venture capital-entrepreneurial firm context it is less clear which links should be 
strong or weak. For example, the members of a syndicate may need to work closely or 
share important information. In this case relationships may be characterised by significant 
commitment in terms of finance, time and ultimately career success, that result in intense 
or strong relationships. However, we also know from the literature that venture capitalists 
rely on a network of contacts to provide fresh information on investment, akin to weak ties. 
Therefore venture capitalist's networks are likely to involve a core of strong ties, supported 
by a wider networks based on weaker ties. 
One method of identifying strong ties is to use repeated ties. Cowan et al (2007) use 
repeated ties between firms to represent the concept of embeddedness which is based on 
the ideas of social capital. When firms choose to renew a previous partnership, this is an 
example of relational embeddedness. If that previous partnership was successful there may 
be a variety of benefits from working with that partner again. For example, repeating the 
partnership may benefit from the previous creation of effective coordination routines or 
trust between the two partners. Relational embeddedness can also be used to provide 
reliable information about other potential partners. For example, a contact you know well 
may offer information on their preferred partners. When new relationships are formed on 
the basis of recommendations, known as structural embeddedness, the result is to create 
clusters in the network, which represent the accumulation of social capital between groups 
of actors in a network. 
Our literature review highlights the variations in the strength of tie between individuals and 
the network structure. Strong ties between a group of venture capitalists or directors would 
suggest they all share the same information, effectively forming clubs of investors and 
directors. This would be observed as distinctive groups of repeated interactions. The 
alternative, where relationships are formed of weak connections would suggest a loose 
network without repeat interactions or identifiable patterns. 
3.5.5 Summary 
Our discussions in this section broadly support a networked view of venture capital and 
entrepreneurial firms. We find that networks have structures and sub-structures which 
indicate variation across different types of actors and relationships. Networks are not 
uniform, but contain distinctive patterns that represent structural positions of actors and 
different strengths of relationships between them. We have discussed theories relating to 
social capital and the strength of ties. We have also noted the expected relational patterns 
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associated with distinctive groups of actors. However, based on Chapter 2 we expect 
social networks to contribute to regional advantage. How do our observations in this 
chapter relate to the geography of networks? 
3.5.6 Geographical proximity and networks 
Cowan and Jonard (2008) expect that clusters found in social networks can arise from two 
mechanisms. Firstly that structural embeddedness creates dense ties or interconnected 
groups, which appear as `localised' clusters in the network. Secondly, that the literature on 
geographical clusters of firms (as discussed in Chapter 2) emphasises the role of physical 
proximity in helping the formation of relationships between agents. 
Sorenson and Stuart (2001) find in general, that the probability of forming social ties 
declines as the distance between partners increases. Similarly, Schutjens and Stam (2001) 
research on entrepreneurial networks finds that close distances enhance the value of the 
relationship between contacts which can be crucial in the early stages of business 
development. Thus adding weight to the idea that concentrations of relationships in social 
networks as described in both of Cowan and Jonard (2008) examples are partly the result 
of physical proximity between network actors. 
In many ways the random and Ising networks capture aspects of our previous discussions. 
Ising network have been associated with Marshall's view of local geographical clusters and 
the production of knowledge and innovation (Cowan, 2004). In contrast the random 
perspective of networks has some similarity with the concept of weak ties. Weak ties 
involve infrequent contact and lack reciprocation. Weak ties also represent more ad-hoc 
ties based on loose acquaintances, but are important for the effective dissemination of 
information. 
In geographical clusters social networks are motivated by mutually beneficial exchanges of 
tacit information or knowledge sharing through face to face contact (Cowan and Jonard, 
2008). For example Saxenian (1996) states that the prominence of social networking and 
informal relationships in Silicon Valley, resulted in regional networks concerned with 
professional and technical expertise, rather than being tied to firm specific boundaries. 
The presence of regional social networks formed from a combination of strong and weak 
ties aided the rapid transfer of information resulting in extensive labour mobility in the 
region (Castilla, Hwang, Granovetter and Granovetter, 2000). 
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In line with our discussions of regional clustering we see that localised networks provide 
an important mechanism for the flow of information and knowledge in regional innovation 
systems. Similarly local networks involving patterns of strong and weak ties provide a 
trade off between developing trust based relationships within groups whilst facilitating the 
transfer of information across groups to provide wider regional benefits. Equally regions 
with networks that include important individuals with access to high quality social capital 
will be able to provide competitive advantages. Finally our discussion of small world 
structures and the role of weak ties, indicate that regional advantage can be obtained by 
creating links across regions to provide access to different information and resources. 
However, as Cowan and Jonard (2008) note, network theories based on Marshallian 
clustering or social capital are less comfortable with explaining dense network pattern that 
occur over long distances. Gulati (2007) also notes that research involving industrial 
districts and the relationships within them, has not been fully explored from the network 
perspective. Research in these fields has often viewed the network as a property of the 
group of firms or the region without viewing networks as resources per se. As Gultai 
(2007) notes it would be useful to extend these analyses and understand the position of 
actors within the networks, as well as understanding the general structure. We share this 
view and use it to motivate an interest in understanding the role of geography in 
determining strong and weak patterns of relational ties. 
3.6 Summary and potential applications of network theory for this research 
This chapter has discussed the value of relationships and networks. In previous chapters 
we have focused on resources associated with the development of venture capital and 
entrepreneurial firms. In this chapter we have focused on a different resource known as 
social capital, which is defined as the value of resources associated with relationships. We 
have also shown how social capital is important for the development of entrepreneurial 
firms and the role it plays in the venture capital industry. This chapter suggests that any 
analysis of venture capital needs to focus on the network as an important resource, for 
investors, entrepreneurial firms and associated managers and directors. 
In partial answer to the second thesis research question we have used our discussion of the 
literature on networks to develop a conceptualisation of the type of interactions present in 
the venture capital - entrepreneurial firm dynamic. We use this conceptualisation to 
structure the chapters of the thesis focusing on investor and director networks. However, 
we note that the literature emphasises the uneven distribution of relationships across agents 
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in a network. Importantly, this indicates that network structure can inform our analysis of 
the organisation and distribution of resources across different actors, both within and 
across regional contexts. Understanding actors and their relationships with others can tell 
us about the structure the human and social capital dynamics of an industry. In this way 
analysing variation between groups of actors, or actors in different locations can offer 
interesting comparison to the literature describing the regional dynamics of venture capital 
and biotechnology in Chapter 2. 
Finally the techniques of social network analysis are expected to be important, together 
with the general emphasis of this paradigm which suggests that networks structures and 
sub-structures can offer insights which explain the social behaviour of individuals. The 
structure observed in networks has meaning, that frequent relationships represent a 
familiarity and strength of connection, resulting in trust and sharing resources. However 
infrequent or weaker ties are also useful, increasing connectivity and the flow of 
information across different actors. The terms `strong' and `weak' are relative to the 
context and patterns may emerge from the analysis that makes these concepts useful. In 
the next chapter we continue the discussion of methods for representing and analysing 
networks to highlight important patterns and structures. 
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4 Methodology 
This chapter provides an overview of the approach used in the empirical thesis chapters. In 
this chapter we focus on justifying the choice of methods used in the thesis and explaining 
how they can be applied to the thesis argument. We leave the detail of particular methods 
applied in this research to be described in the relevant empirical chapters. 
4,1 Approach 
4.1.1 Thesis narrative 
The approach taken by this thesis has been to build on the literature relating to hi-tech 
innovation, finance and regional development. We use the literature to develop the thesis 
research questions proposed in the introduction. The initial preparation for this research 
actually started with a set of very general research questions motivated by a combination of 
sources. These included my own personal experience in venture capital and my previous 
university studies in entrepreneurship, science and technology. In addition I received 
valuable direction from my supervision team to help focus my ideas. Finally, a range of 
policy literature, such as Lord Sainsbury's report into UK Biotechnology Clusters 
(Sainsbury, 1999), which assess national issues at a regional level, helped to shape a 
regional focus to the literature review. 
In the first instance I constructed a set of general research questions pertinent to the study 
of high tech innovation, finance and regional development, to provide an initial reference 
point for this research. From the outset this research was intended to take a 
multidisciplinary approach. It has involved searching through a variety of literatures 
which come from different disciplines, such as finance, economics and sociology. 
However, the core elements of these searches were always venture capital, 
entrepreneurship and regional development. 
As a result of these original literature searches my initial research questions centred on 
examining locations that support entrepreneurial firms in the UK, particularly locations 
that support biotechnology firms. My interest was concerned with understanding how 
these locations support entrepreneurial firms. This interest naturally led to an examination 
of these support processes at the regional level, using literature on clusters and regional 
innovation systems to understand the relationships between agents supporting 
entrepreneurship, the various agents' roles and the type of competences involved. 
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From these literature reviews I formed my thesis research questions. As such, my initial 
literature searches influenced the focus of the thesis research questions. It logically 
follows that each research question determines the appropriate research methods to use. 
The research questions involve different levels of analysis of activity within the UK. 
The thesis reflects this. I use a staged approach to develop the focus of chapters. The 
thesis starts by examining activities in the UK in terms of activities at the regional level. 
This allows use to describe the variations in activity within the UK. 
Progress through the empirical chapters increasingly interrogates the activities occurring 
within regions, looking particularly at the firms and investors and directors active within 
different regions of the UK. Here the purpose is to understand the detail of the regional 
activity, rather than just the aggregated regional level inputs and outputs. 
This multi-level approach, using the region as a boundary for comparison between 
different UK locations, can reveal the range of activities occurring in the UK. At the most 
detailed level of analysis I explore the relationships between investors, board directors and 
firms on a region by region case basis. 
The result is first to provide a comprehensive understanding of venture capital activities in 
the UK. I focus on the organisation of venture capital in the UK including areas of 
strength and weakness in terms of geography and relationship to regional resources and 
networks. Secondly, it is to examine the organisation of a specific sector of investment 
activity in comparison with the whole industry. Then to describe in detail, important 
processes occurring at a sub-regional level. Therefore, this thesis has the advantage of 
providing an analysis of activity in the UK as a sum of regional activities and also as the 
detail of activities occurring within regions. This mixed perspective is particularly relevant 
given the emphasis on regional innovation policy used by the UK Government to improve 
the national performance. 
4.1.2 Access to data 
The thesis has been developed by conducting empirical research, making use of a range of 
research resources. These resources include data relating to UK regions, UK firms and 
individuals who operate as UK firm directors. At a regional level I have accessed UK 
Government statistical data on various regional activities in the UK, such as education 
standards, commercial activity and technological activity. 
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At a firm level, which has also been aggregated to a regional level, I gained access to a 
propriety database, created by Library House. Library House is a research organisation 
based in the UK which monitors entrepreneurial activity in the UK. Library House, 
"discover, research and profile fast-growth, innovation-led private companies, their people 
and investors" and collect information directly from firms and their investors. Their 
database provides information of UK early stage venture capital investment. On average 
firms in the database were founded in 1999 and recorded their first round of investment in 
their second year. The database also provides an opportunity to obtain a reliable coverage 
of UK activities of 1,950 UK companies, of which 218 are classed as biopharmaceutical. 
I also randomly check the details of firms in the database against other newspaper and 
internet sources to confirm the accuracy of the data. 
The strength of the Library House database is the detailed firm information it provides on 
SME firms, including the names of investors, and characteristics of the firm, such as 
technology sector. The database also provides information on the source of investment to 
identify public venture capital. The database covers UK investment activity between 
January 2000 and September 2006. The main UK office address was used to classify the 
location of the firm, and then summarise the data to produce regional statistics on 
investment activity. Finally as a number of firms featured in the database were active 
prior to 2000, I also have some information on firm investment prior to the 1st January 
2000. Although I cannot use this additional pre-2000 information in aggregate regional 
statistics, this feature of the data allows me to accurately reflect firm level activity in the 
latter chapters of the thesis. 
However, the Library House database provides a relatively short timeframe to assess the 
historical development of the venture capital industry in the UK. To compensate for this I 
used other resources such as publications from industry associations, e. g. British Venture 
Capital Association (BVCA), and the Biotechnology Industry Association, to provide 
further data on investor and firm characteristics. I use the BVCA's annual investment 
survey to provide a 20 year history of investment in the UK, noting that this data only 
provides regional activity for the general investment activity of its members. This means I 
use the BVCA data to assess the general regional trends in UK investment activity. 
As I also focus on analysing director activity in Chapter 9 and 10, a second data source is 
used to provide additional information on the directors of each firm and to check the 
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accuracy of the Library House data. The second database used is called FAME. The 
FAME database administered by Bureau Van Dyjk is a database that contains information 
for companies registered in the UK and Ireland. FAME contains information on 3.4 
million companies, 2.4 million of which are in a detailed format. FAME collects details of 
firm ownership and registered directors from a range of sources including statutory 
registrations and other propriety databases. This database can be used to obtain the details 
of current and previous directors of UK businesses, with information on the date directors 
join and leave particular board positions. To provide further detail I search a range of 
information sources, including the Internet and published media to provide brief 
biographies of the most active directors. I use information on the career history and 
backgrounds of SME directors to inform our analysis in Chapters 9 and 10. 
A drawback of providing a very detailed analysis of UK directors, including searches on 
the backgrounds of individual directors, is the time required to search for information. To 
make our analysis of UK biopharmaceutical directors feasible, we limit our analysis of 
director activity to four UK regions. This means we cannot use our director data to 
describe activities in the UK overall. However, we select four regions as different `cases' 
of biopharmaceutical clusters. These regions are the East, London, Yorkshire and Scotland. 
These four regions provide good coverage of the UK, including approximately 50% of 
biopharmaceutical companies active in the Library House data. This choice of regions 
provides a good coverage of the main UK biopharmaceutical centres, particularly around 
Cambridge (in the East), London and Scotland. They also cover activity in different 
contexts, for example, London is the UK's capital city. The East is home to Cambridge 
University, one of the most important centres of biotechnology activity in the UK. 
Scotland is considered a UK `region', however regional development policy in Scotland is 
decided independently from regions in England and so provides an interesting comparison 
region. Yorkshire has a relatively low level of biopharmaceutical SME activity and can be 
considered as embryonic. Finally, these cases also provide a spread of locations in the UK, 
which is important for considering whether ties between distant regions occur. 
In addition, throughout the research process I have supplemented these predominantly 
secondary source resources with primary data through interviews with investors and 
academics researching in similar fields. This has not only complemented the statistical 
data on activities at the regional, firm and individual level, but also helped to tighten the 
focus of the empirical chapters, particularly providing additional support to examine 
venture capital networks. Finally during the process of developing this research there have 
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been opportunities to attend conferences, present working papers and have discussions 
with other academic researchers, public officials and industry experts. I have reviewed 
published academic research, company websites, promotional material, newspapers and 
trade magazines to provide further information for use in this research at all levels. All of 
these inputs also provide a useful source of material for the development of the thesis. 
4.1.3 Definitions 
In this thesis we negotiate two areas of research which have ambiguities regarding 
definitions of activity. The first is venture capital which is a term used widely to represent 
the financing of innovative start up companies. The second is biotechnology, which as we 
have described in Chapter one, is used to describe products and processes which are based 
utilising living organisms or tissue. 
4.1.4 Considerations when researching venture capital 
The term venture capital is used with a variety of meanings and is difficult to define 
(Martin, 1989). More recently industry analysts have suggested that venture capital is more 
a `state of mind' than equity class (Library House, 2008), as turbulent market conditions 
result in a blurring of traditional boundaries. For example there are several activities 
frequently connected to the core of venture capital such as investing finance in return for 
equity in companies rather than providing loan finance (Florida and Kenney, 1988. 
Gompers and Lerner, 2001). However both loan and equity finance can form part of the 
same deal, as is frequently found in larger private equity deals and even small investors 
may use mezzanine financing involving loans to reduce investment risks6. Similarly in the 
UK we note in Chapter three that venture capital is only a minority player in the wider 
defined `Private Equity Industry'. 
This naturally raises the question of investment type or stage. Venture capital is frequently 
connected to high risk ventures because those opportunities funded are of an early 
development stage and unproven. The lack of history or `track record' means they are 
generally considered inappropriate for traditional forms of finance which require security, 
such as loans (Florida and Kenney, 1998). However, the development of government and 
charity initiatives to encourage the commercialisation of innovation means finance sourced 
from tax payers is frequently positioned at the seed stage of company development, 
theoretically the most high risk stage. In these cases we observe finance being provided in 
the form of government or charity grants, loans. In some cases public money is invested as 
equity finance, as part of a professionally managed fund within a University or private 
6 Information from interview with early stage investor in UK. 
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investor. In many respects public finance is provided as "patient capital" in the way we 
describe in Chapter one. 
Secrecy is also a feature of all classes of private equity; venture capital is not regulated like 
public forms of financing, such as the stock market. There are no obligations for private 
equity or venture capital firms to publicly disclose the details of their investments. 
Therefore, in certain cases it is not possible to determine what form of finance is being 
provided to a particular firm. In some cases we may only have the name of the investor, 
rather than any specific information on the nature of the deal, and what type of finance was 
received. As many investors commit to a range of equity classes and financing forms, this 
can make identifying venture capital difficult. 
A discussion of investment types also begs the question of what is an investment? 
Typically we assume an investment to represent a financial commitment, but venture 
capital is expected to involve active investors (Florida and Kenney, 1988). Therefore it 
represents an investment in terms of expertise, assistance and guidance, and ultimately 
investor time. However, as we have discussed in the literature review, doubts have been 
cast on whether venture capitalist operating in the UK perform these more `hands on' tasks. 
We also note that venture capital can be defined as a process, involving multiple stages as 
we outline in Chapter one. It starts with opportunity recognition, then an assessment of the 
opportunity. If a decision to invest is made, then firms are expected to grow to a stage 
where it may be profitable to sell to another company directly, or sell venture capitalists 
equity holdings on a public market. The sale or exit of an investment is a key part of the 
venture capitalist activities. However, we also note that the majority of investors finance 
firms that do not reach this stage, and in the UK recent venture capital fund performance 
has on average achieved a loss (BVCA, 2006). 
Finally we note that a distinctive property of the venture capitalist is their position as an 
intermediary (Gompers and Lerner, 2001). For example, venture capitalists intermediate 
between the wider financial community and entrepreneurial firms. They raise finance from 
the financial community to create investment funds, on the expectation that they are able to 
increase the value of the fund and return a profit to the funds stakeholders. However, the 
financial intermediation role cannot be applied so clearly to investors such as angels. Angel 
investors, such as wealthy individuals or groups, use their own finance and invest in 
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businesses as they see fit. Naturally they keep any profits for themselves and tend not to 
act as intermediaries. 
The intermediation role in venture capital can also be complicated by funds formed in 
conjunction with the UK Government. Public finance can be used to attract additional 
private finance, often on preferential terms, to create an investment fund. Finally as 
syndication is a frequent occurrence in venture capital deals (discussed in Chapter 8) many 
different investors including angels and public funds may invest together in the same firm, 
obscuring the distinction between venture capital and other forms of early stage investment. 
In summary we find that there are a variety of investors found in entrepreneurial firms, 
including founders using their own capital, large investment banks and corporate firms. In 
practice an investment company may have a venture capital division, private equity 
interests and other corporate financing activities that make discerning which division 
provides capital to a particular firm particularly difficult. Furthermore throughout the 
early-stages of a firm's development, they may receive a range of different types of 
investment capital that further complicates the picture of venture capital financing in the 
UK 
In this thesis we take a general view of capital committed to early stage companies as 
venture capital. Our focus is on entrepreneurial firms or new start-ups that seek finance in 
order to grow rapidly, as opposed to lifestyle firms or firms that prefer to use bank loans 
rather than sell equity. However, as these high-growth firms and their investors are not 
under additional obligations to report their activities, they are not readily identifiable for 
the purpose of a general survey. 
In view of these difficulties in defining venture capital it is not surprising that Kaplan et al 
(2002) find much research on venture capital based on data obtained from external 
research firms. The research firms are in the business of providing data on venture capital 
and venture capital funded entrepreneurial firms. Many of these research companies report 
data on global investment activity. However, as information on deals is reliant on self 
reporting, Kaplan et al (2002) find that early investment rounds are often missing. As our 
research is focused on the UK we use the support of an external private research firm based 
in the UK to provide a sample of UK entrepreneurial companies that have received venture 
capital. In line with Kaplan et al (2002) we find that approximately 14% of deal values in 
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the Library House dataset were unavailable because of confidentiality issues and have not 
been disclosed. We check that missing values are evenly distributed across the regions. 
4.1.5 Biotechnology 
As McMeekin and Green (2002) note, the general definition of biotechnology given in 
studies in the UK is the same as we have stated in Chapter 2. However biotechnology, like 
venture capital, does not have neat boundaries. In fact, biotechnology can be described in 
terms of three generations of development. The first generation started from the use of 
traditional processes of the type used in beer and bread making. The second generation is 
based on the `microbiological revolution' and the third generation is based around recent 
scientific advances made with regard to genetic engineering starting in the 1970s (ibid). 
The authors note it is often this final technology wave that is taken to mean biotechnology. 
However, in both the second and third generations we also find reference to the application 
of the technology for pharmaceutical products (ibid). 
For the purpose of this thesis, we need to understand biotechnology with reference to 
entrepreneurial firms. We note the Walsh et al (1995) refer to biotechnology firms as 
those started after 1975 which are typically small and spun out from publicly funded 
research, particularly in molecular biology. Brink, McKelvey and Smith (2005) include a 
variety of definitions for biotechnology, noting that the diffusion of the technology has 
resulted in its application across a range of industries and sectors. 
As biotechnology is not defined as industry this makes identifying firms difficult, and we 
cannot expect to determine a definitive list of UK biotechnology firms. Our motivation is 
to understand the development of a sub-set of firms operating in the healthcare and 
pharmaceutical industry. As we look at entrepreneurial, new start-up firms in this area, by 
definition they will include biotechnology firms developing products and processes 
applicable to the Pharmaceutical industry. Our definition of biotechnology includes start 
up biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms (referred to as biopharmaceutical from now 
on). We exclude other types of firm in the healthcare industry, such as medical devices, 
where these represent purely mechanical innovations. 
To help define this group of firms, we use the International Classification Benchmark (ICB) 
to identify firms according to their main source of business revenues. We select firms 
classified as Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology. In addition, we also use Library House's 
own classification, based on self reported activity, to select firms operating in 
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pharmaceuticals and drug development. This adds a small number of software 
development firms active in R&D in the pharmaceutical industry to our biopharmaceutical 
dataset. Importantly this definition of biopharmaceutical firms excludes chemical 
suppliers or medical devices/technology firms. Therefore it is a group of firms with direct 
relevance to the pharmaceutical industry. 
In several chapters we compare the activity of investors or fines active in 
biopharmaceuticals to other sectors. We define these sectors in broad terms using the ICB 
definitions. This creates categories of, Communications (Comms), Information 
Technology (IT), Healthcare (HC) and Other. The Healthcare sector naturally excludes 
biopharmaceuticals. The sector labelled as Other includes activities related to media and 
financial services. 
4.1.6 Methods 
We employ several different approaches to the development of the thesis. Our first 
research question asks what factors determine regional investment in the UK. This is a 
`what' type question, which at its most basic level is a descriptive question concerning a 
list of factors which are important in determining regional investment activity. In part 
answer to this question, we generate a list of factors from the literature. However, to fully 
answer this question, it implies we consider `how' these factors influence investment, in 
order to be sure that we do not consider relatively unimportant factors. We can also take 
this further by considering, `what if, for example we increased the activity level of one 
type of factor. What would happen to the investment activity? By examining these `how' 
and `what if type questions, we can help to clarify our answer to the main question. 
In Chapters 5 and 6 we answer the first group of questions by developing a model of the 
operation of venture capital derived from the literature. We use the factors expected to be 
important in influencing venture capital investment to guide our data collection. Then, 
using this data, we can test to see if our expectations regarding the influence of the 
theoretical factors are found. The combination of collecting non-experimental data, based 
on a theoretical model, and then using the data to test the model, is at the heart of an 
econometric approach (Wooldridge, 2003). In this approach, we use statistical analysis 
(regression) to evaluate how well our model performs overall. We also consider the 
influence of each factor or variable included in the model, on the dependent variable. 
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We use econometrics in our thesis to answer the first research question. We look at how 
regional resources can be related to the overall level of investment in a region. Secondly 
we use a similar model to compare regional resources to investment activity in different 
sectors. 
We also use econometrics in Chapter 8 to provide a partial answer to the second thesis 
research question. We build a model to investigate the different factors that motivate 
investors to finance the same firms. In this way, we use econometrics to understand how 
factors, such as location and amount of investment in a firm, determine the size of 
participation of different investors. The analysis of factors that drive the syndication of 
investors (i. e. to finance the same firm) provides the starting point for our analysis of 
relationships found in venture capital. The syndicates act as the building blocks for a 
network of investors tied to the same investments. 
There are a variety of econometric techniques and methods applicable to different dataset 
and circumstances (Wooldridge, 2003. Kennedy, 2000). In this thesis our techniques are 
defined by our datasets. We use a panel data regression (Baltagi 2005) and count data 
models (Scott Long, 1999). We use specialist software to perform the regression analysis 
(STATA and EViews). 
To complement this statistical approach we also examine the second thesis research 
question using an exploratory social network analysis. The analysis of relational data 
using social network analysis has received contributions from many fields including 
anthropology, psychology and mathematics, emerging as a field in the 1960170s (Scott, 
2000, p. 7). Early contributions were made from psychology, based around sociometry. 
This work focused on the analysis of patterns of thought and perception, and used the 
sociograph as a tool for representing actors (using points) and relationships (using lines). 
This has resulted in a `sociometric' tradition of analysis patterns in the structure of 
networks, with the assumption that the individual components of network patterns would 
have different properties from the overall network. 
More recently these sub-groups have been termed cliques, clusters and blocks. Ultimately, 
the decomposition of networks into sub groups could potentially indicate important 
structural features (Scott, 2000 p. 10). Where "the social structure according to Nadel, is 
an overall systems network or patterns of relations (1957, p. 12), which the analyst abstracts 
from the concretely observable actions of individuals. By `network' he meant `the 
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interlocking of relationships whereby the interactions implicit in one determine those 
occurring in others" (Scott, 2000, p. 30) 
Similarly from an applied perspective De Nooy et al (2005) suggest that "the main goal of 
social network analysis is detecting and interpreting patterns of social ties among actors" 
(p. 5). It is also important to observe the absence of connections, such as structural holes, 
where few ties are found. Furthermore, 
"the structure of relations among actors and the location of individual actors in the 
network have important behavioural, perceptual and attitudinal consequences both for the 
individual units and for the system as a whole" (Knoke and Kuklinski, p. 12 1982). 
Although, in network analysis it is rarely possible to analyse the total network of 
relationships given the multitude of types of linkages within and between communities and 
organisations. The usual approach is to analyse a reduced number of aspects of the total 
network, known as a partial network (Mitchell, 1969, cited Scott, 2000, p. 30). The partial 
network can be based around an individual and their relationships, known as ego-centred 
networks, or an abstraction of the overall network such as, "a particular aspect of social 
activity: political ties, kinship obligations, and friendship or work relations ". (Scott, 2000, 
p. 31) 
The social network approach is particularly useful for interpreting individual actors in a 
network of relationships with other actors. As we have noted in Chapter 3, the network 
concept is frequently applied to the venture capital - entrepreneurial context. In Chapters 
7 and 9 we examine the network literature relevant to our research question to develop a 
number of expectations regarding the structure of networks in the UK. We use social 
network analysis, and social network tools, such as software called Pajek, to represent 
these networks and describe their properties. 
There are complex statistical methods for analysing networks. These techniques are more 
complex than traditional statistics, as the concept of independent units of analysis used in 
traditional statistics, is not appropriate when actors are inter-related (Wasserman and Faust, 
1994). There are relatively few studies of either investor, or director networks in 
biotechnology, and fewer still on UK regional networks. Therefore, instead of developing 
a statistical model we adopt an approach based on descriptive network statistics and 
manipulation of visual network representations, or sociograms, to examine the networks. 
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Sociograms are used in Chapters 7 and 9 to show the structure of networks involved in 
venture capital syndicates and relationships between directors. The sociogram represents 
both the individual actor (as a node) and the ties between actors (as a line). The sociogram 
is a graphical representation of the network data, which can be used to qualitatively assess 
the network structures and sub-structures we have discussed in Chapter 3, as well as 
support any statistics describing the various networks. 
In network analysis involving two modes, in our case using either investors and firms or 
directors and firms, there are two possible general network representations. The first is to 
include all modes in the representation of the network, a mode 2 representation. In the 
mode 2 network we see that firms are linked through having common investors or directors, 
as it is the investors and directors rather than the firms, that co-ordinate the network. 
In the alternative, mode 1 representation, we can choose to effectively `hide' one of the 
modes, and represent the connections between the remaining mode directly. Therefore we 
would choose to remove the firms from our network, such that the relationships between 
investors are shown to appear directly connected. A line is drawn whenever two investors 
are affiliated to the same firm. 
This transformation of a mode 2 network to a mode 1 representation results in some loss of 
information regarding the firms involved. However, generally the mode 1 representation is 
the standard form used to represent networks and can be analysed with standard techniques 
(De Nooy et al, 2005). It also simplifies the visual inspection of the network structure to 
the particular mode of interest. When interpreting networks transformed into 1 mode 
networks the lines between vertices (or nodes) may represent more than one common 
affiliation (line multiplicity). The value of these lines relates to the number of common 
affiliations between the two joined vertices. 
As we also want to evaluate the role of individuals in network sub-structures and regional 
dynamics an advantage of the descriptive sociometric approach is that we can explore the 
network without restricting our findings to a pre-determined model. We use the literature 
to generate expectations, which guide our analysis. However, as in qualitative analysis 
used in social theory construction, (such as grounded theorising) we remain open to other 
characteristics and observations of the network structure. This means that in the process of 
investigating our expectations, we refine our methodological approach, tailoring it to our 
observations. 
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Finally throughout the research thesis we also make use of a variety of qualitative data. 
This includes data collected from primary and secondary source to help situate the research 
in the field of venture capital and generate our research questions in the first instance. The 
use of qualitative data adds further interpretation to the results of the analysis based on 
quantitative data. And perhaps most importantly we use qualitative data as an additional 
source of data to `sense check' or triangulate our overall thesis findings. 
For example we use data from interviews with investors to check our findings in Chapters 
5 and 6. We also use interviews with academics and investors to justify our decision to 
examine networks in venture capital. Finally we use a range of qualitative data to support 
our analysis of the relationships between investors and directors in Chapter 9 and 10. 
The process of research involves making choices regarding the type of analysis performed 
and ultimately how to structure the empirical work. As part of this process, alternative 
versions of the thesis are considered. The final result represents the best possible thesis 
design, given the resources and time available. However, one alternative thesis structure 
considered would have been to examine activity in the UK at only the regional level or at 
the detailed level within regions. 
For example, one option for the thesis would have been to perform a more detailed 
econometric analysis of biotechnology investment activity, perhaps at the city or county 
data level. This would provide a more fine grained analysis. However, one persistent 
issue in this research has been to locate consistent data series on regional activities across 
both regions and sectors with time. 
In this thesis we make best use of the data available to study the dynamics of relationships 
between regional resources and financial investment. Many of the measures used in the 
econometric analysis of specific sectors are available for short periods and do not cover all 
UK regions. Rather than attempt to collect data through a survey instrument, we make use 
of the strength of our data. For example surveys typically receive low response rates and 
are therefore subject to a variety of biases (Sapsford, 1999) and would be unlikely to yield 
improved time series data. 
The strength of the data used in the thesis is that it provides information on each 
investment deal and the firms involved. This makes it possible to examine activities within 
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regions as well as aggregating the data across regions. As we move through each chapter 
we progress towards a more detailed sub-regional analysis and concentrate on the activities 
of the biopharmaceutical sector only. 
4.1.7 Summary 
In this thesis we have combined a variety of approaches, using different data sources to 
provide a more complete understanding of the dynamics of UK Venture Capital investment. 
We work with the limitations of the data and the available literature, and use a range of 
methods to support our findings. The mixed method approach employed in the empirical 
chapters enables the research to present a comprehensive assessment of UK venture capital 
activity, and therefore strengthens the thesis conclusions. 
4.2 Ethics 
It is the researcher's responsibility to design the research to ensure integrity and quality 
without causing harm to others. Therefore this research has been conducted in line with 
the British Sociological Association statement of ethical practice and in accordance with 
the six key principles of ESRC's research ethics framework7. 
As this thesis uses the names of particular investors and directors in reference to their 
activities, care has been taken to use these materials in a way that is sensitive to businesses 
and the individuals involved. Therefore we do not speculate or provide personal comment 
on individuals or firm performance. However, where published material is available we 
may refer to this in the thesis text. This includes published details of investments firms 
have made and their reported outcomes. This type of material is publicly available, for 
example directors of companies in the UK are required to notify Companies House of their 
directorship positions. Although we make every effort to insure the information we 
present is correct, we do not report the full directorship history of any individual, as we 
only provide information relating to activities connected to our firm sample. Our use of 
this material is in accordance with other published academic works, who have presented 
detailed information on director's activities. 
Finally, although no interview material is quoted directly in this thesis; several interviews 
with investors were used to inform the direction of the thesis. Where consent was given 
these interviews were record and transcribed, and a full transcript made available for each 
participant. To conform to ESRC requirements, transcripts and interview hard copies are 
kept only in the confidential file system at the ESRC Innogen Centre. 
7 http: //www. esrc. ac. uk/ESRCInfoCentre/Images/ESRC_Re Ethics_Frame_tcm6-11291. pdf 
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5 Geography of venture capital 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we begin our analysis of the distribution of venture capital investment in the 
UK. The aim of this chapter is closely related to the first thesis research question. In this 
chapter we examine the factors that determine the distribution of venture capital 
investment in the UK and also investigate whether these factors are similar across regions. 
The literature review in Chapter 2 has outlined the rise of venture capital finance over time. 
However, the development of venture capital has been characterised by a distinctive skew 
towards certain regions. In line with the literature on regional concentrations of venture 
capital activity we examine factors that may influence the supply and demand of 
investment. These include demand factors such as the number of entrepreneurial 
opportunities (Martin et al, 2002), the level of technology expertise (Florida and Kenney, 
1988; Florida and Smith, 1993), the presence of professional expertise and business 
infrastructure (Mason and Harrison, 2002). On the supply side, factors include the 
concentration of financial activity (Mason and Harrison, 2002) and the location of venture 
capitalists (Powell et al, 2002). Finally network activity is associated with both supply and 
demand (Florida and Smith, 1993; Martin et al, 2005). 
Drawing on the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, this chapter develops an empirical model 
based upon the factors that are expected to influence the supply or demand for venture 
capital. Next we provide descriptive statistics on the regional distribution of venture 
capital in the UK, before describing the dataset, the econometric model and the results. 
5.1.1 Supply and demand 
The level of demand for venture capital increases with the level of entrepreneurial activity. 
Entrepreneurs starting and running businesses demand finance to grow and develop their 
businesses. In the UK the greater demand for venture capital in the South East is 
suggested to be a result of the greater demand for risk capital for new and expanding 
business (Martin, 1989). Similarly, in the US, Florida and Smith (1993) show that regions 
with concentrations of high-tech start ups will demand greater levels of investment. 
Regions with higher concentrations of professional expertise are able to provide better 
quality business environments and support, in terms sources of skilled labour, advice and a 
general infrastructure that provide inputs into the development of business. These might 
include factors such as sources of trained management staff or consultancies with an 
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appreciation of how to organise a business to receive venture funding. Professional 
expertise can assist in the development of more viable investment opportunities directly by 
helping the management team or filling competence gaps. They may also provide services 
to help with the creation of appropriate strategies and business plans. In this way 
professional expertise can help entrepreneurial businesses become `investor ready' (Mason 
and Harrison, 2001). 
The demand for venture capital investment also increases with the concentration of 
technology activity. Technology centres have been historically associated with the 
development of the venture capital industry (Florida and Kenney, 1988). In particular 
Florida and Smith (1993) found that the level of R&D activity positively influenced 
venture capital investment. This type of activity creates investment opportunities through 
the development of new technologies and technology business which generally have high 
financial capital requirements. Therefore a region with a high concentration of technology 
expertise is likely to provide a source of technological capability with potential for 
exploitation through venture capital investment. 
Mason and Harrison (1992) and Martin et al (2005) have also observed that supply and 
demand side factors interact, where "experience and knowledge of the local venture capital 
market spread through local business and information networks encourage additional 
entrepreneurial activity to seek private equity" (Martin et al, 2005 p. 1214). Thus networks, 
formed of venture capitalists, entrepreneurs and small firm firm directors can be seen as a 
mechanism for stimulating supply and demand for venture capital investment. In 
particular Oakey (2003) notes that some UK SME owners are either unprepared or 
unconvinced about using venture capital to grow their businesses. Regional networks 
involving business angels or lawyers can help to educate would-be entrepreneurs, acting as 
dealmakers that can convert raw opportunity with the potential for commercial exploitation, 
into start-up businesses which are capable of seeking venture capital funding by providing 
advice and guideance (Mason and Harrison, 2002; Suchman, 2000). In this way regional 
network activity can influence the level of demand for venture capital. 
Florida and Smith (1993) found that areas with highly connected local venture capitalists 
will increase both the supply and the demand for venture capital investment. They collect 
network effects into a single variable measuring co-investment, to understand the influence 
of network activity on supply, in the form of VC offices, and demand, in terms of 
investment received. A venture capitalist with a high level of investment connectivity is 
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likely to increase the supply of venture capital available for investment in the region 
through syndication with other investors based in other regions. Similarly, by increasing 
connectivity with other regional financial centres they are also able to raise larger funds. 
This type of effect might be expected from highly connected venture capitalists. Echoing 
Mason and Harrision (2002), it follows from our previous discussion of networks that the 
positive influence of well connected investors on the supply of capital will simulataneously 
increase activities which promote demand for venture capital. For example, increased 
network activity between would-be entrepreneurs, investors and their associates, involving 
the discussion of opportunities and information sharing, will help to overcome the type of 
barriers to approaching venture capitalists described by Oakey (2003), stimulating futher 
demand for venture capital. 
Other factors influencing the supply of venture capital in a region are the presence of 
venture capital offices and the concentration of financial activity. The presence of local 
venture capital offices is linked to high levels of local investment and may be explained by 
the need for venture capitalists to closely monitor the progress of their investments (Powell 
et al, 2002). However, Florida and Smith (1993) found a negative relationship between the 
venture capital office location and the level of regional funding. The authors explained the 
result as in part due to network syndication reducing the importance of access to local 
venture capital. They also explain the result as due to data based on administrative 
geographical data boundaries which cut through clusters of hi-tech investment and so 
artificially increase the export of funding from key regions. As the Florida and Smith 
paper uses the number of deals, rather than the capital invested, we can improve on their 
study, by using both activity measures. 
An important factor expected to influence supply is the regional concentration of financial 
activity, as this provides a potential source of funding for VC's. However VC office 
location and financial activity have been shown to positively correlated (Florida and Smith, 
1993); particularly in the UK where it has been shown that the location of venture 
capitalists is strongly related to the concentration of financial activity in that region (Mason 
and Harrison, 2002). Therefore we expect the concentration of financial activity to 
strongly influence the supply of capital and also capture secondary effects such as the 
location of VC offices. 
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5.1.2 Interactions effects 
There are complex interactions between these supply and demand factors that influence 
historical patterns of investment. The concentration of investment in a particular region 
has a tendency to increase future investments in the same area, whilst reducing the 
available investment for other regions, suggesting that there may be lagged effects of the 
dependent variable, and therefore dynamic interactions. In this sense venture capital may 
be `learned process' whereby the activities involved in venture capital investing are built 
on year on year (Martin et al, 2005). 
We might also expect there to be an endogenous relationship between venture capital and 
entrepreneurship. It was proposed earlier that venture capital is dependent upon the level 
of entrepreneurship; however it is also conceivable that the likelihood of starting a business 
is related to the availability of venture capital finance. For example the accumulation of 
venture capital in a region may help stimulate an entrepreneurial culture, creating the 
perception of winner regions, increasing the level of business formation (Martin et al, 
2005). From a Knightian entrepreneurial perspective the availability of venture capital 
may create opportunities for a would-be entrepreneur, by reducing funding constraints or 
increasing access to profit making opportunities versus paid employment. 
To some degree there maybe interactions between the factors we have described. For 
example, business located near financial centres, and so likely to be near VC offices, may 
benefit from a greater supply of venture capital because of the result of opportunity costs 
of proximity, or the circulation of information through local networks. Clusters of 
financial activity may also indirectly offer a more plentiful supply of professional expertise, 
and business support. These are also factors suggested in section 5.1.1 as being linked 
with demand for venture capital. Overtime these interactions may reinforce or increase 
differences between regional processes related to venture capital investment in the UK. 
Therefore, such patterns may explain the persistence of regions with low levels of venture 
capital investment. We expect that some of these interactions would be captured by 
measuring networking activity in regions. However, some of the regional processes are 
also likely to represent distinctive regional characteristics resulting from historical or 
geographical factors which are not captured by measuring individual factors. 
5.2 Model 
Following the previous theoretical discussion, the remainder of this chapter specifically 
examines the relationship of venture capital to regional level variables describing the 
shares of entrepreneurial activity, financial capability, technological capability and 
-78- 
professional capability level in the population. In this section we build a model to explain 
the regional distribution of venture capital. To do this we adapt a model from Jeng and 
Wells (2000) which was used to investigate differences in the variations of venture capital 
investment between nations. We use a similar method to Jeng and Wells (2000), but 
change the variables used in the model to reflect factors that influence UK regional activity. 
A reduced form equation is derived from the following (1) demand, (2) supply and (3) 
equilibrium equations for venture capital activity (VC;, ), indexed for each region, i and year, 
t. 
(1) VC(d)u = ßi +/32Entrr +ß3Degrr +/34Patr< +ß5NetU 
(2) VC (s)it = al + a2FStr + a3Net; r + a4VC, r_, 
(3) VC (d) j, = VC (s) t 
The independent variables are entrepreneurship (Ent, t), financial capability (FS, t), 
professional capability (Deg; t), technological capability (Pat; t), networks (Net; 1). A variable 
for lagged venture capital activity (VC; 1_j) is also suggested from the previous discussions 
to help explain historical investment. A full description of how these variables are 
measured and descriptive statistics are included in the data section of this chapter. 
The independent variables in equation (1) and (2) are expected to have a positive influence 
on the corresponding dependent variable. Assuming the above are linear equations, they 
can be equated for the equilibrium equation, and the supply equation can be solved for Net 
and substituted in the demand equation. This reduced form equation gives the level of 
venture capital activity: 
(4) VC, (0) = 7t1 + Z2Ent« + 7r3Deg, t + 'r4Pat1r + 7r5Fs, 1 + 7r6VCrt_, 
Where : 
_ 
ßa3 
-ß5aI 
7r2 _ 
ß2a3 
ff3 = 
ß3a3 
7r4 _ 
ß4a3 
; 75 _ 
-ß5az 
; 76 _ 
-ß5a4 
2r1 
a3 - 
ßs 2 a3 - 
ßs a3 - 
ßs a3 - 
ßs S a7 - 
ßs 6 a3 - 
Qs 
Following Kennedy (2003) the ni coefficients in the reduced form equation can be 
interpreted as the long term multipliers of the right hand side variables in equation 4. 
These reduced form coefficients can be used to predict the level of venture capital activity 
when supply and demand are in equilibrium. However, as each reduced form coefficient is 
effectively scaled by network effects (a3 and 05); they do not tell us the value of the 
coefficients in the structural form or supply and demand equations. 
In order to identify the supply and demand equation coefficients we need to make some 
restrictions on the values of the coefficients. It follows that if we expect the structural 
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coefficients (ßl,..., ßs and al,..., a4) to have a positive value, then our reduced form 
equation suggests that the signs of the coefficients 7t5 and 7t6 are expected to be the opposite 
of 7t2,713, and i. It also follows that the actual signs of the 7; coefficients are also affected 
by the relative magnitudes of (a3 - ßs), the coefficients of the influence of networking on 
the supply and demand equation. For example, in the case where, a3 > ß5, the influence of 
networks is greater on the supply, rather than the demand for finance. Then given our 
previous assumptions, our expectation is that 7t2,713, and would be positive, and 7E5 and 7t6 
negative. 
We summarise our expectations in the table below. Table 5.1 shows our expectations 
regarding the influence of the variables in our model on investment activity. Based on the 
theoretical discussion in this chapter, the table shows the prediction for the relationships of 
each variable in the model with respect to the regional level of investment. The table also 
shows the expected direction of influence of each independent variable in the structural 
equations. We also show how our expectations for the influence of each factor translate 
into the reduced form model, where the outcome also depends on the scaling by the 
coefficients of Net (a3 - ßs). 
Table 5.1 Theoretical predictions of the influence of supply and demand variables 
Structural form Influence Direction of influence Direction of influence in reduced form* 
variables on: in structural form If a3 >5 If a3 <s 
Ent VC(d) +ve +ve -ve 
Deg VC(d) +ve +ve -ve 
Pat VC(d) +ve +ve -ve 
Fs VC(s) +ve -ve +ve 
VCt_1 VC(s) +ve 
- -ve 
+ve 
Net VC(s) +ve -J N/A N/A 
*Assuming Net has positive influence on supply and demand equations, otherwise predictions for reduced 
form do not hold 
In order to recover the value of the coefficients in the structural form, we would need to 
make additional restrictions which impose particular values of the network coefficient, a3 
and ß5. A restriction can be based on additional information from theory or other research. 
Our search of the literature does not provide suggested values for these coefficients. In 
Chapters 7,8 and 9 we examine networks in more detail to support our analysis and 
expectations. 
5.3 Issues in estimation 
In this section we consider how to apply econometric techniques to provide estimates of 
the reduced form coefficients described in equation 4. A large variety of econometric 
methods are used in the literature. However, we specifically want to understand the factors 
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that have influenced the evolution of distribution of venture capital across UK regions. 
This implies that we need to model regional activity over time. To do this we need to use 
panel estimation techniques. 
An important property of panel regression techniques is the opportunity to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity with time or across regions (Kennedy, 2003). For example, key 
characteristics of each UK region may not be captured in the variables we outline in our 
model. It is important to understand specific regional or period effects that explain venture 
capital investment. There are a variety of historical or geographical factors that can be 
controlled for, such as the local awareness or acceptance of venture capital as a method of 
finance, the distance from the capital city, or period specific effects such as changes in the 
UK stock market, which are not accounted for by the independent variables. 
To control for these unobserved types of effects we can use random or fixed effects panel 
regression. In the fixed effect regression a dummy variable is added to the model for each 
region. This new variable acts as a regional intercept or constant. It controls for the fact 
that each region may have different natural starting point or base level in the model. A 
drawback of the fixed effect estimator is that we can only include variables in the model 
that change with time, because of the estimation procedure. This means any regional 
variables that are fixed with time are captured by the intercept for each region, reducing the 
opportunity to include time invariant regional characteristics in the regression model. 
The alternative method for controlling for regional heterogeneity is the random effects 
estimator. This estimator has a similar interpretation, but computes the regional 
heterogeneity as part of the model's error term, and allows for static regional variables. A 
drawback of the random effects approach is that if the regional intercepts are correlated 
with the explanatory variables (i. e. regions with higher levels of activity have high 
intercepts) this creates bias in our coefficient results (Kennedy, 2003). 
To test for the presence of correlation between the regional intercepts and the explanatory 
variables we use a Hausman test from the EViews panel regression routine. The Hausman 
test checks whether the differences between the random and fixed effect estimates are 
significant. A statistically significant difference between the two result sets indicates the 
presence of bias in the random effects estimations. 
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The Hausman test indicated that fixed effects estimation were preferred for the models 
used in this chapter. The test rejected the null of no significant difference between random 
and fixed effects for regional dummy variables and period dummy variables. This 
indicates that using the random effects model would create bias in the estimation of our 
model coefficients, owing to correlation between the composite error and explanatory 
variables. 
To check that fixed effect estimation is appropriate we also use a redundancy test. This 
test checks whether the results of the fixed effects regressions are statistically different 
from a simple panel regression, where only one intercept is specified. The test rejected the 
redundancy of fixed effects. Therefore we use the fixed effects estimator in our regression 
procedure. 
Our estimation routine is as follows. First we run a simple panel ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression to provide a basis upon which to compare the more sophisticated 
regression techniques. Second we estimate our model using cross section fixed effects to 
control for unobserved regional heterogeneity. Third we estimate the model with both 
regional and period effects, to control for unobserved effects which change with time. 
Forth we estimate the model with only period effects. Finally we estimate a cross section 
fixed effects model with unrestricted coefficients. In this last model the coefficients (ß; ) 
are calculated for each region. This model is included to test for the presence of 
heterogeneity across different regions in the relationships between the independent 
variables and venture capital. In the results section we report the fifth model separately 
from models one to four. 
The full estimation model is shown below including the relevant effects. We also include 
the general error term, u; t and random effects error term yit. The estimation sequence is as 
follows: 
Panel least squares (pooled) 
vcr = a+ß, ent, r +ß2. s11 +ßs 
deg,, +ß4 pat,, + u,, 
Panel least squares with cross section fixed effects II 
va +ß ent +ß fs +ß de +ß at +u. =ýu2us gtr aP tr u 
Panel least squares with cross section and period fixed effects 
III 
vc. =a +ß ent +ß fs +ß de +ß at +, v, + ,rri tr z rr a grr aP tr Yr u 
Panel least squares with period effects only 
IV 
vctr = a+ßlent,, +ß2fs,, +ß3 deg,, +ß4Pat,, +Y, +u,, 
Unrestricted panel least squares with cross section fixed effects 
V 
vc a, +ß ent +&A, +ß de +ß at +u u= ;t tt t3 gu taPu tr 
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Our theoretical discussion suggested evidence for incorporating the lagged effects of 
venture capital on future values investment supply. However, it is not appropriate to 
include lagged variables in the fixed effects model. Baltagi (2005) has shown that 
including lagged variables in fixed effect panel regression will produce bias in the value of 
the coefficients produced in the order of 1/T (Baltagi, 2005, p. 135). As our previous 
discussion indicates the presence of regional heterogeneity, it is important to use the fixed 
effects estimator. Therefore, our estimations will use a static model, without lagged 
variables. We control for the effects of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity using 
White error correction. 
In section 5.1.2 we noted the possibility of entrepreneurship having an endogenous 
relationship with the dependent variable. If an endogenous variable is included as an 
explanatory variable and is correlated with the error term it can cause bias in the 
coefficient estimates. For example, if entrepreneurship is endogenous, then changes in the 
level of investment influence entrepreneurial activity. In the model a change in the error 
term influences investment, but it will also simultaneously affect entrepreneurial activity. 
As entrepreneurial activity is expected to be independent to any other activity, we obtain 
bias in the OLS coefficients produced (Kennedy, 2003). To check for the presence of 
endogeneity in the estimations we use another Hausman type test. The test rejects the 
presence of endogeneity in our estimations 8 
5.4 Data 
5.4.1 Dependent variable 
We showed in Chapter 2, that UK venture capital industry has developed differently from 
the industry in America. In this chapter, the term venture capital will refer to a wide 
definition of activities, including, start-up/early stage finance, development/expansion 
capital and MBO/MBI. We also provide two alternative measures of venture capital 
recorded by year of investment. Firstly the investment amount, VC(amount) and secondly 
the count of the number of investments, VC(count). 
The count of investment is preferred measure of investment activity. The presence of one- 
off large value MBO/MBI deals can strongly impact the regional VC (amount) data. In 
such as case a single deal may reflect a random regional shock rather than reflecting 
underlying regional processes. 
8 Thus it is assumed the estimations will be unbiased and consistent, but not efficient. The lack of efficiency 
is controlled for my using error correction. 
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During the period analysed the venture capital industry experienced rapid growth. Our aim 
is to understand the factors which influence the regional distribution of investment, rather 
than model the growth of the industry. Therefore exponential growth in investment may 
distort our analysis. To control for this we express the dependent variables in the form of 
regional shares of activity. 
The data for the dependent variable was obtained from the British Venture Capital 
Association (BVCA, 2003) annual report on investment activity, collected from its 
members each year. The report provides one of the most commonly used source of 
historical data on venture capital activity in the UK. Although the BVCA data is 
membership based, it includes the active of the majority of investors operating in the UK. 
On weakness of the data is that the membership of the BVCA is optional. Therefore the 
coverage of the earliest periods in the BVCA data is weakest. We will assume that errors 
included in this series are the result of random processes. 
5.4.1.1 Imposing regional boundaries 
In order to evaluate our regional model we must impose regional boundaries on UK 
investment activity. The data described above forms a panel dataset for the years from 
1984 to 2003 (1984 partially estimated from national totals), for nine regions of the UK. 
The choice of regional boundaries were determined by the venture capital series which are 
based on the Government Offices regions (GOR), which are reported in two time series, 
one prior to the reorganisation of the GOR (1985-1997) and one after (1998-2003). During 
this re-organisation several counties were moved between the North East and North West, 
and between the South East and East. Additionally, London is not included as an 
individual region prior to 1998. 
In order to develop a continuous series for the period 1984-20039 some GOR regions were 
merged. The result is nine regions are used in the estimation. These regions include, 
Southern (South East including London and Eastern region combined), Northern (North 
East and West), South West, Yorkshire and Humber, East Midlands, West Midlands, 
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. One positive impact of merging regions in the 
South is to minimise the effects of spatial correlation. For example it has been suggested 
that the South East and East have shown a high proportion of funding originating from 
London (Martin, 1989). 
9 Data for 1984 is provided from estimates 
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5.4.2 Independent variables 
Table 5.2 below describes the data used to measure the variables described in the reduced 
form equation (4). The independent variables, Ent, Fs, Deg, Pat are included as ratios to 
standardise for the different geographical sizes of regions. This also helps to reduce the 
potential for spurious regression arising from factors such as background population 
growth. Due to the absence of available data, no panel dataseries are available to measure 
the location of venture capital offices, although we note in section 5.1.1 that office location 
is expected to be correlated with the concentration of financial services (Fs). In the 
absence of a dataset on R&D activity for the period 1984-2003, a panel dataseries on 
patent activity (Pat) is used as substitute. Similarly data for the levels of public investment 
in venture capital funds was not available for the period analysed. 
5.4.2.1 Data sources 
As shown in Table 5.2, data for the independent variables was obtained from the UK 
Office of National Statistics (ONS) Regional Trends publications (No. s 20-38) and 
NOMIS database (official labour market statistics). Additional statistics were obtained 
from the European statistics agency EUROSTAT online. The Epapps series does not 
contain values for Scotland and further searches of data did not provide an adequate series. 
As a result the final panel data set includes eight UK regions with time series from 1984- 
2003. 
Table 5.2 Description of data and variables used in chapter 
Series Calculation* Description 
VC PE;, /PEt for Share of amount/number of investments 
Ent NVAT; t/Civt Number of new VAT registrations per civilian labour 
population 
Fs FSemp; t/Emp; t Number of financial services employees per employee 
population 
Deg Proft/Worka e;, Number of degree qualified people per working age population 
Pat EPAPPS; W Civ; t Number of patent applications per civilian labour force 
Data Data source Description 
PE BVCA annual survey Count of/Amount of Private equity investment 
NVAT ONS NOMIS 
database 
New Value Added Tax (VAT) registrations 
FSemp ONS Regional 
Trends 
Employees in working the financial services 
Prof ONS Regional 
Trends 
Number of people of working age with degree level 
qualification or above 
EPAPPS EUROSTAT 
database 
European patent applications recorded by priority year 
Civ ONS Regional 
Trends 
Civilian Labour force 
Emp ONS Regional 
Trends 
Number of employees 
Wortrage ONS Regional 
Trends 
Number of working age population 
*i regions = {1,.., N} t years= {1,.., T} 
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5.4.3 Empirical analysis 
5.4.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.3 below shows the descriptive statistics of the data set. A balanced panel was used 
with each variable containing 160 observations, of regions (N) =8 and periods (T) = 20. 
The statistics for the alternate dependent variable show some differences. The share of 
venture capital in each region show greater variation when the `amount' of investment is 
used, showing a lower minimum and higher maximum and greater standard deviation. A 
comparison of the time series graphs of the two variables shows that although a similar 
trend in fluctuations is found, the shares by count follow a less exaggerated trend. 
All series have distributions that reject a Jaque-Bera null hypothesis of normality10, 
suggesting that the regional data collected reflects distinctive regional variances. The 
patent data shows a particularly strong presence of kurtosis and skewness, indicating a 
concentration of the data around the mean score and a distribution with an extended tail. 
This is because most regions have a relatively similar Pat score. Even after controlling for 
the size of the labour force the main outlier in the Pat series is the Southern region, 
resulting in a skewed distribution. 
Table 5.3 Descrintive statistics of chanter dataset 
VC amount VC (count) Ent Fs Deg Pat 
Mean 0.116 0.111 0.006 0.116 0.105 0.021 
Median 0.059 0.063 0.006 0.106 0.107 0.014 
Maximum 0.695 0.587 0.011 0.265 0.208 0.147 
Minimum 0.000 0.003 0.005 0.055 0.056 0.001 
Std. Dev. 0.172 0.140 0.001 0.045 0.032 0.023 
Skewness 2.196 2.176 1.074 1.140 0.689 2.982 
Kurtosis 6.511 6.369 3.810 4.473 3.439 14.036 
Jar ue-Bera 210.763 201.959 35.150 49.137 13.957 1048.981 
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Sum 18.604 17.786 1.019 18.529 16.839 3.321 
Sum S q. Dev. 4.704 3.112 3.39x10-4 0.321 0.160 0.083 
Observations 160 160 160 160 160 160 
The correlation analysis in Table 5.4 shows an association between the alternative 
dependent variables and the independent variables. Overall we find our independent 
10 The central limit theorem proposes that when dependent variables are non-normal the sample 
characteristics of the estimate produced from OLS regression are still normal, so OLS is still appropriate. 
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variables are all positively and at least moderately correlated with the measures of venture 
capital investment, as we would expect. 
It is also clear that there may be some co-linearity between the independent variables, 
particularly between Deg, Fs and Pat. As discussed previously concentrations of financial 
activity may demand highly qualified staff, likewise patenting activity is shown to be 
associated with qualified labour. The correlations also suggest a strong association 
between the level of financial activity and patenting. The Florida and Kenney (1988) 
model would suggest the presence of hybrid centres in the UK, where high patenting or 
technology activity and financial activity are co-located. However, we must be careful to 
interpret Pat as a measure of all patenting including large and small firms. Therefore large 
UK cities may be home to financial services as well as large multinational firms that patent 
frequently. 
We were surprised by the low correlation level of Ent with Fs and Pat, as we might have 
expected some correlation between the level of business creation and the concentration of 
financial and technological activity. In fact we find that the concentration of human capital, 
Deg, is weakly negatively correlated with Ent. We find the negative correlation is a 
feature of all regions; in general regional human capital has increased but the level of 
business creation has slightly decreased from a peak in the late 1980s. 
Table 5.4 Correlation co-efficient table 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
VC (amount) 1 1 
VC (count) 2 0.979096 1 
Ent 3 0.513422 0.511279 1 
Fs 4 0.661223 0.674756 0.166166 1 
Deg 5 0.550679 0.557873 -0.03569 0.865566 1 
Pat 6 0.662542 0.684259 0.226098 0.861038 0.743339 1 
5.4.4 Results of the empirical estimations 
In this section we discuss the results of our estimations of equation (4). Our estimations 
include two alternative dependent variables: VC (amount), and VC (count). Table 5.5 
shows the results using VC (amount). Table 5.6 shows the results based on VC (count). In 
tables 5.7 and 5.8 we explore the regional heterogeneity in the estimation. 
The summary estimation statistics in table 6 indicate that model II, with regional cross 
section fixed effects, is most appropriate. For example this model has the highest adjusted 
R2, the lowest standard error of regression and lowest model selection criterion (Akaike, 
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Schwarz). Although the addition of period dummy variables in model III returns a 
fractionally lower sum of squared residuals (SSR) compared to model II, the value of the 
F-statistic, the proportion of variance explained (adjusted R2), and model selection criteria 
are inferior to model II. Alternatively, if only period effects are included (model IV) the 
model has very poor summary statistics with ß coefficients that are very different from 
model II and III. 
Table 5.5 also shows that the value of the 0 coefficients drop considerably from estimation 
Ito II, when the fixed effects are included. This suggests that the dummy cross section 
coefficients explain a significant amount of variance in investment activity across regions. 
By including regional dummy variables, the statistical significance of each independent 
variable is rejected, indicating that only the constants are significant for explaining the 
amount of regional investment. The signs of the ß coefficient in model II also change 
when we introduced fixed effects. For example Fs, Ent and Pat, become negative, in 
contrast to Deg which remains positive. We also note that the direction of signs on the ß 
coefficient is not as predicted in the reduced form equation (4). 
Table 5.5 Estimation summary, dependent variable VC (amount) 
VC (amount) I II III IV 
Variable t-Stat t-Stat t-Stat t-Stat 
C -0.47 -11.02 * 0.12 6.02 * 0.20 1.54 -0.60 -7.14 * 
Ent 51.61 6.71 * -1.70 -0.82 -1.72 -0.27 -14.42 -1.93 
Fs 0.76 3.12 * -0.24 -1.14 -0.82 -1.45 2.09 4.10 ' 
Deg 1.24 3.61 * 0.33 1.78 0.23 0.29 5.37 5.32 * 
Pat 1.67 3.09 * -0.20 -0.46 0.01 0.02 -0.22 -0.24 
Adj R-sq 0.62 0.94 0.93 0.78 
S. E. of reg 0.11 0.04 0.05 0.08 
SSR 1.74 0.28 0.27 0.88 
Log Iikelih'd 134.60 281.07 283.09 189.62 
Durbin-Wat. 0.29 1.16 1.19 0.47 
Akaike -1.62 -3.36 -3.15 -2.07 
Schwarz -1.52 -3.13 -2.56 -1.61 
F-statistic 65.93 213.31 70.02 25.86 
Prob(F-stat) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
JB statistic 244.65 64.49 51.71 * 38.98 
* Statistically sicanificant at 5% level wit h White cross section error adiustment 
The Table 5.6 shows the same estimation sequence using dependent variable VC (count). 
The estimation shows the same trend of a large drop in coefficient resulting from the 
addition of regional dummy variables (from model Ito II). However, in this case only Fs 
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becomes negative when regional fixed effects are used. The negative sign on Fs was 
predicted from Table 5.1. Both Fs and Deg are both statistically significant in model II. 
Table 5.6 shows that adding period dummy variables in model III appears to make no 
improvement in explaining venture capital investments. Model II is shown to be the most 
appropriate according the model selection criterion and the F-statistic. In model IV, 
adding period effects results strong statistical significance of the individual coefficients but 
with lower overall explanatory power, as shown by the summary statistics. 
More generally we also find that comparing Tables 5.5 and 5.6 shows that the model 
performs better at explaining the number of deals, than the value of deals. For example, if 
we compare the estimation results for model II between Table 5.5 and 5.6, we find that the 
estimations using VC (count) have better model selection criteria, better agreement of the 
coefficient signs with our predictions in Table 5.1 and more statistically significant 
coefficients. 
Table 5.6 Estimation summary, dependent variable VC (count) 
VC (count) I II III IV 
Variable B t-Stat B t-Stat t-Stat t-Stat 
C -0.35 -12.86 * 0.11 7.30 * 0.11 0.93 -0.44 -6.89 
Ent 40.71 6.73 * 0.60 0.37 0.56 0.11 -18.79 -4.99 * 
Fs 0.63 3.65 * -0.34 -2.99 * -0.70 -1.82 1.86 6.19 
Deg 0.89 4.61 * 0.32 2.20 * 0.69 1.13 4.34 6.46 * 
Pat 1.62 7.86 * 0.33 1.03 0.53 1.07 0.04 0.06 
Adj R-sq 0.64 0.96 0.95 0.82 
S. E. of reg 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.06 
SSR 1.10 0.12 0.12 0.48 
Log likelih'd 171.48 346.81 349.51 237.24 
Durbin-Wat. 0.18 0.57 0.58 0.35 
Akaike -2.08 -4.19 -3.98 -2.67 
Schwarz -1.98 -3.95 -3.39 -2.20 
F-statistic 71.03 327.67 108.47 32.20 
Prob(F-stat) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
JB statistic 226.38 * 96.87 * 91.38 * 53.09 * 
* Statistically significant at 5% level with White cross section error adjustment 
As expected the results in table six and seven show evidence for serial correlation with a 
Durbin Watson statistic <1.5. This is also a likely explanation for the statistically 
significant results of the Jacque-Bera (JB) test, which indicates potentially non-normal 
errors. This supports the use of cross section error adjustment which is applied to the 
estimations. 
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The remaining tables in this section are focused on understanding regional heterogeneity. 
Firstly in Table 5.7 we examine the values of the regional and period effects coefficients 
resulting from our previous estimations. Then we examine the results from estimating 
each region as an independent time series, or an unrestricted regression. Finally we test to 
see whether the unrestricted regression performs better than the fixed effects panel model. 
Table 5.7 shows the estimated values of the regional and period effects variables for 
models II - III. The values shown for each coefficient are reported as deviations from the 
value of the overall mean constant term, C, as reported in table 5.5 and 5.6. For model II it 
was also possible to obtain relevant t-statistics for each coefficient, with white cross 
section error adjustment. 
Table 5.7 Regional and period dummy coefficients 
VC amount VC (count) 
II III II III 
C 0.12 * 0.20 0.11 * 0.11 
Region effect 
Yorkshire -0.07 * -0.07 -0.05 * -0.05 
East Midlands -0.05 * -0.06 -0.06 * -0.06 
South West -0.06 * -0.05 -0.05 * -0.04 
West Midlands -0.03 * -0.03 -0.03 * -0.03 
Wales -0.10 -0.11 -0.07 * -0.07 
N. Ireland -0.12 -0.14 -0.10 -0.11 
South 0.45 * 0.49 0.35 * 0.35 
North -0.02 * -0.02 0.01 * 0.01 
Period effect 
Minimum -0.03 -0.02 
Maximum 0.03 0.01 
* Statistically significant at 5% level 
Table 5.7 confirms that adding additional period dummy variables to model II, resulting in 
model III, provides little explanatory power. The values of the period unobserved effects 
show only a small deviation from the mean, and this has little implication for the 
coefficients on the cross section dummies. Therefore we concentrate on model II only. 
We also note that the majority of regional dummy coefficients are statistically significant. 
This shows that venture capital distribution is significantly influenced by unobserved 
regional factors. The variation in coefficient sizes shows heterogeneity among regions in 
the size of the regional effect. For example, in model II the dummy variable for the South 
is much greater than for the other regions. This result indicates that unobserved regional 
effects in the South, give this region significant advantage in terms of the availability of 
venture capital investment. For regions like Northern Ireland (and Wales with VC (count) 
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as dependent variable), the actual coefficient value is not significantly different from zero, 
suggesting the absence of regional unobserved effects in this region. 
Table 5.8 below summarises the range of ßi values obtained for estimates using the two 
different dependent variables. The table shows a high level of heterogeneity in the co- 
efficient values, with a high level of variance between the minimum and maximum values. 
The average values, calculated as the arithmetic average as suggested in Pesaran and Smith 
(1995), also differ from the restricted panel estimates in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. However, in 
support of our previous panel regressions, we find that the average coefficient values in 
Table 5.8 tend to show a sign consistent with model II. 
Table 5.8 Summary of unrestricted co-efficient estimates (ß; ) 
VC(amount) VC(count) 
Variable t-stat B t-stat 
C* min -0.35 -0.20 
max 0.69 0.59 
ave 0.11 6.67 0.10 8.97 
ENT min -5.55 -0.63 -5.29 -0.35 
max 21.09 4.73 17.11 1.47 
ave 1.78 2.24 
FS min -2.84 -4.92 -2.01 -4.28 
max 1.40 3.15 0.36 1.12 
ave -0.23 -0.15 
DEG min -0.71 -1.46 -0.04 -0.09 
max 1.27 2.52 0.96 1.28 
ave 0.40 0.28 
PAT min -4.64 -5.71 -2.16 -1.33 
max 2.71 3.64 -0.77 -1.97 
ave -0.19 -0.38 
* Based on cross section dummy variable, therefore average is reported 
overall intercept 
The full estimation results for each of the ß; coefficients, shown in the appendix, display 
varied results in terms of statistical significance. For example, estimations using data on 
the Southern region (labelled as 108) showed a statistically significant relationship 
between venture capital activity and Fs and Pat. However, for data series based on Wales 
(105), all independent variables were insignificant predictors of venture capital activity. 
Overall the estimation of the ßi coefficients indicated that Ent was a poor predictor of 
regional venture capital activity. However, although Pat was insignificant in Tables 5.5 
and 5.6, we find that it is actually significant in influencing venture capital activity in three 
different regions including the South. 
-91- 
The results of the ß; estimations suggest regional heterogeneity with regards to the 
influence of the independent variables on regional investment activity. However, it is 
difficult to rely on the statistical significance of the individual ß; coefficients, because of 
the relatively small sample size of each regions time series. Therefore, we can use a 
likelihood ratio (LR) and F-test to test for the overall significance of the unrestricted model 
(ß) against the fixed effect model (II). The LR test indicates whether restricting the 
coefficients of each variable to a single value is an acceptable approximation. 
In Table 5.9 we show the results of the LR test comparing the unrestricted (ß) model with 
the fixed effects model (II), where the regional coefficients are jointly restricted to a single 
coefficient value. The test strongly rejects the joint restriction of coefficients. Our model 
of venture capital activity performs better, when each region is allowed an individual 
coefficient to determine the size of the influence of the independent variables on the level 
of regional investment activity. This result supports our assessment of the heterogeneity of 
the relationship of venture capital with supply and demand factors across different regions. 
Table 5.9 Unrestricted coefficient test 
Test VC(amount) VC(count) 
Likelihood ratio 83.74*** 68.36*** 
F-tes 2.947*** 2.284** 
**Statistically significant at 1%, ***Statistically significant at 0.1% 
Finally we can test the explanatory power of including regional time varying factors in the 
model. We can use an LR test to compare the explanatory power of a model which only 
controls for unobserved effects, against the unrestricted (ß) model. The results of this test 
are shown in Table 5.10. It shows that adding regional variables to a specification with 
only regional constants, does improve its explanatory power. 
Table 5.10 Testing the unrestricted model against a constant only fixed effect model 
Unrestricted: ßi unrestricted coefficient 
Restricted: Constant only fixed effect 
VC(amount) VC(count) 
Likelihood ratio 86.85*** 74.19*** 
F-test(32.1 191 2.703*** 2.212** 
However, we note that a constant only fixed effect specification" l accounts for a high 
proportion of the variance in investment activity. For example in terms of the VC(amount) 
and VC(count) series, the constant only specification explains 94% and 96% respectively, 
of the variance. Therefore, adding the independent variables with unrestricted coefficients 
11A constant only restriction was tested against model (11), the constant only specification restriction was 
accepted against model (11). 
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to a constant only model results in an increase of the adjusted R2 statistic by 1.7% and 
0.9%, for the VC(amount) and VC(count) models respectively. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter confirms the widely held view that the regional distribution of venture capital 
is uneven across UK regions. However, our analysis also sheds light on the factors 
associated with this uneven distribution. On the supply side there is evidence that the 
concentration of financial services influences the supply of venture capital. Financial 
services activity was shown to negatively influence investment in the reduced form 
equation for the fixed effect model (II). This is consistent with our expectations outlined in 
Table 5.1. 
On the demand side we find the influence of entrepreneurship on the level of regional 
venture capital to be statistically weak, with little evidence to suggest that the level of 
business creation is important to venture capital investment. One explanation for this 
result, in line with our discussions in Chapter 2, is that UK venture capitalists prefer 
investing in more established business, rather than start-up firms. 
Our analysis in this chapter also indicates that another regional demand side factor, the 
concentration of professionally qualified employees, has a statistically significant influence 
in determining the number of regional venture capital deals. The direction of influence of 
this factor is shown to be consistently positive in the fixed effects models, and positive on 
average in the ß; models. The positive value also fits with our prediction of the coefficient 
values in Table 5.1. In light of Table 5.1 the result for the influence of professional 
employees also agrees with the direction of influence reported for financial services and 
entrepreneurship. 
In contrast, there is little evidence for a consistent influence of the regional technological 
activity on venture capital. The concentration of technological activity is insignificant in 
the fixed effect model and the direction of influence varies across individual regions. We 
find that the average values from the unrestricted ß; models are negative. The influence of 
technology activity is inconsistent and does not agree with our predictions in Table 5.1 or 
with the pattern of our results for the other variables. 
There are two possible explanations for the inconsistency of the explanatory power of 
technology activity. Firstly that in agreement with our discussion of entrepreneurship that 
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our measure of venture capital activity based on BVCA membership activities does not 
represent investment in innovative new technology companies. Or secondly that our 
measure of technology activity, based on patenting, captures large firm innovation or 
development activity, as well as small firm innovation activity. The implication is that 
large firm activity is less influential in creating demand for venture capital and complicates 
our interpretation of the estimations. 
Our results clearly show that unobserved regional effects account for a large proportion of 
the variance explained in the models, whether we look at the volume of deals or value of 
investment in a region. The distribution of venture capital is largely explained by a 
constant for each region, suggesting a low variation in the regional distribution of venture 
capital over the twenty year period. This indicates the presence of long term processes that 
have fixed the level of venture capital investment a region receives. This analysis would 
appear to agree with Martin et al (2005) observation of the persistence of winner and loser 
regions. It implies that regional venture capital activity is concentrated to specific 
locations which have a long history of embedded regional activity. 
The regional dummies in the fixed effects estimations show that the southern region of the 
UK has a strong advantage over other locations with respect to investment activity. The 
large size of the regional dummy for the South with respect to other regions, suggests 
venture capital is embedded in the region. In agreement with our discussion of the 
literature in Chapter 2 supports the view that London acts as centre for venture capital 
activity. It follows that the Southern areas generally benefit from proximity to the wider 
financial community in the capital. Thus in future, London and the Southern regions are 
likely to maintain their dominant share of total venture capital activity. 
An important finding in this chapter, consistent with the view that UK venture capital 
activity is concerned with late stage investments in established businesses, is the absence 
of a strong association of venture capital distribution with regional high technology 
clusters or entrepreneurial activity. In the next chapter we see whether we can improve the 
performance of our model by focusing only on early stage investment activity. 
The use of fixed effect estimation has demonstrated the regionally embedded nature of 
venture capital, but is inadequate for investigating this further, as time constant variables 
are removed in the fixed effects transformation. Our estimation routine would benefit from 
the use of more advanced techniques to include a lagged specification to account for the 
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serial correlation shown, or to account for spatial correlation. However, the presence of 
strong heterogeneity in our results creates problems for the implementation of panel 
techniques. 
Finally, we note that our discussions of the results are based on the reduced form 
coefficients. These reduced form coefficients are effectively `scaled' by the coefficients of 
the network work variable. Our analysis tells us whether these variables are influential and 
the size of their influence scaled by the influence of networking. In the absence of 
appropriate time series measures of the level of region network activity'2, we can only 
recover the structural coefficients by applying assumptions to restrict the value of the 
network coefficients. Our assessment of the direction of influence of the independent 
variables suggests that our results fit the assumption that the coefficient of networking 
activity is greater on supply than demand. We continue the discussion of the validity of 
this assumption in the next chapter. 
12 An alternative which is not investigated here would be to use a proxy for the entrepreneurial networking 
activity variable. One option for future study would be to use the industrial structure of regions, such as firm 
sizes, to proxy for the level of small firm or entrepreneurial network activity. 
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Geography of early stage venture capital 
5.6 Introduction 
In this chapter we continue exploring our first thesis research question using the model 
proposed in Chapter 5. However in this chapter we use a more focused database that 
captures early stage venture capital investment. Our decision to repeat the analysis in this 
way is motivated by the fact that we know the data used in Chapter 5 contains `merchant' 
type investment activity which dominates UK investment activity. The larger value of 
`merchant' type investments has the potential to skew our estimation results. 
`Classic' type of venture capital is likely to be concentrated on early stage finance. 
However, as we note in Chapter 4, data on early stage investment activity is difficult to 
obtain from secondary sources. In this chapter we utilise a new database on SME firms 
receiving venture capital, which is used to derive data on regional early stage investment 
activity. This also provides the opportunity to disaggregate the venture capital data by 
sector and look for variations in the pattern of the distribution of investment by sector. 
In the UK, the prevalence of pockets of concentration of venture capital activity (e. g. in the 
South) has been cited as one of the main reasons for the creation of regionally based 
venture capital funds via a Government initiative. The initiative led by the Department for 
Trade and Industry (DTI) has been designed to provide locally based access to early stage 
venture capital across UK regions. This also includes the provision of funding for 
biotechnology. 
Among hi-technology sectors, the biotechnology sector is strongly dependent upon venture 
capital funding (Powell et al, 2002). Biotech businesses frequently have a high financial 
capital requirement because of the long product development times and high costs of 
research and development. In particular, the high level of technological risk and long 
product development times in biotechnology innovation has meant that venture capital and 
public investment are an important source of finance for entrepreneurial biotechnology 
firms (Sainsbury, 1999). Thus, public investment in biotechnology constituted 20% of all 
venture capital deals (4% in value) in biotechnology between 2000-04, compared to just 
8% for all other sectors deals (1% in value) that received venture funding in the same 
period. 13 
13 Author's calculations from Library House database 
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Against this background of debate about regional concentration of venture capital and the 
targeting of biotechnology by government venture funds in the UK, the aim of this chapter 
is two-fold. First, we wish to investigate whether the distribution of early stage venture 
capital investment in the UK can be explained by regional variables such as local 
entrepreneurship, availability of financial services, extent of R&D and the availability of 
human capital. Second, we wish to investigate whether the factors affecting venture 
capital investment in biotechnology are different from those affecting venture capital 
investments in other technology sectors. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised in the following way. First we add to our review 
of biotechnology and venture capital in Chapter 2. In particular we focus on the role of 
venture capital in the development of biotechnology in order to draw out a supply-demand 
based framework to explain the availability of venture capital. Then we develop this 
framework into an econometric model, similar to that in Chapter 5, and discuss the 
methodological issues involved in implementing such a statistical estimation. Next we 
outline the main characteristics of the data used in the analysis, including descriptive 
statistics that demonstrate the sector-specific and regional differences in venture capital 
availability. Finally we report the results of the econometric estimations and discuss the 
implications of those results before we conclude the chapter. 
5.6.1 Venture capital in the supply - demand framework 
The theoretical position of this chapter builds on our discussions in Chapter 2 and Chapter 
4. We continue with our approach from Chapter 4 to test whether the Florida and Kenney 
(1988) type model applies to the UK, namely, that those regions with a concentration of 
financial capital, technological capital and human capital will receive high levels of 
investment. 
Our literature review in Chapter 2 indicated that regions which receive investment in 
biotechnology have a strong association with technological and human capital. High 
concentrations of technological and human capital signal regions with investment potential 
and attract investment. However, it is also clear that biotechnology investment is focused 
in specialist locations, and therefore the general Florida and Kenney model may not apply 
to an individual sector such as biotechnology. 
Public investment into firms is expected to be targeted at regions with a low supply of 
private venture capital. UK policy has been directed towards providing funding to correct 
-97- 
for perceived funding gaps, and to provide a more even supply of capital. In general, it is 
expected that regions with a high proportion of public funding will receive lower amounts 
of funding in total. For example, if a region received 100% of its investment from a public 
source, this would indicate the absence of any private investment; an unhealthy investment 
situation. We would expect a region with such a high level of public investment to have 
lower overall levels of venture capital activity. Therefore, we expect the regional 
proportion of total investment from a public source will have a negative association with 
venture capital investment supply. 
The strong relationships between public research institutions and the creation of 
investment opportunities, particularly in biotechnology, may suggest that regions with 
increased public R&D will demand more venture capital finance to develop these 
opportunities. However, privately funded R&D may also generate investment 
opportunities for venture capitalists, through corporate spin outs, where the parent 
company wishes to diversify some financial risk. We follow the emphasis in the 
biotechnology literature on university spin outs; therefore we expect that regions with high 
levels of publicly funded R&D will demand more VC. 
Powell et al, (2002) observed that for US biotechnology firms there was a strong 
relationship between venture capitalist investors and research and development (R&D) 
centres. Concentrations of R&D were found to generate the ideas and intellectual 
materials from which commercial opportunities arose. However, Powell et al (2002) also 
observed that biotechnology investment was strongly concentrated in a small number of 
specialised locations; only certain research centres had an associated concentration of 
biotechnology firms (ibid). 
In line with Chapter 5 these factors and theoretical positions are used to create a model of 
regional venture capital investment in the UK, which is presented next. The remainder of 
this chapter will present the method used to test the model, and the results which include 
descriptive and regression based analysis. 
5.7 Method 
5.7.1 Model 
We adopt the model outlined in Chapter 5, making some changes to the variables used 
because of changes to data. As before, only a static reduced form equation will be 
estimated. The reduced form equation is derived from the following (1) demand, (2) 
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supply and (3) equilibrium equations for venture capital activity (VCit), indexed for each 
region, i and year, t: 
(1) VC (d )j, = ßl + ß2Ent, t + 
ß3Deg + ß4R & D,, + ß5Net + ß6R & Dratio 
(2) VC (s), r = a, + a2FS,, + a3Net,, + a4VC _ 
public 
(3) VC (d ), 1 = VC (s),, 
The independent variables familiar from Chapter 3 are entrepreneurship (Engt), financial 
capability (Fs, 1), professional capability (Deg; t), technological capability (R&D; t), networks 
(Net, 1). We also add two new variables public investment (VC public; 1), public R&D 
(R&D ratio, 1) to capture the role of public investment. A full description of how these 
variables are measured and descriptive statistics are included in the data section. 
The independent variables in equation (1) and (2) are expected to have a positive influence 
on the corresponding dependent variable. Assuming the above are linear equations, they 
can be equated for the equilibrium equation, and the supply equation can be solved for Net 
and substituted in the demand equation. This reduced form equation gives the level of 
venture capital activity: 
(4) VC, , 
(0) = z, + 7r2 Enter + 2r3Deg« + tt4 R& D + 7r5 Fs,, + 7r6 R& Dratio, t +'r7VC _ public 
Where : 
Qla3 - YSa1 )r2 _ 
ß2a3 
7r3 _ 
ß3a3 
; r4 _ 
ß4a3 
a3 - Qs a3 - Qs 
3 
a3 - Qs a3 - 
Qs 
-ßsaz 
Qea3 -ß5a4 
115= ! r6= %[7 _ 
a3 - 
QS a3 - 
QS a3 - 
QS 
As in Chapter 5 we summarise our expectations in Table 6.1. We show how our 
expectations for the influence of each factor in the structural supply and demand equations, 
translate into the reduced form model, where, as in Chapter 5, the outcome also depends on 
the scaling by Net. 
Tsh1e A1 Theoretical nredictinns of the influence of sunnly and demand variables 
Structural form Influence Direction of influence Direction of influence in reduced form* 
variables on: in structural form If a3 >5 If a3 < 
Ent VC(d) +ve +ve -ve 
Deg VC(d) +ve +ve -ve 
R&D VC(d) +ve +ve -ve 
R&D ratio VC(d) +ve +ve -ve 
Fs VC(s) +ve -ve +ve 
VC public VC(s) -ve +ve -ve 
Net VCs +ve N/A N/A 
*Assuming Net has positive influence on supply and demand equations, otherwise predictions for reduced 
form do not hold 
# Assuming that increasing public investment will increase demand for venture capital and give the expected 
coefficient signs for the reduced form equation on this basis. 
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5.7.2 Issues in estimation 
We use our early stage investment data to generate three versions of the model, using three 
different dependent variables. Firstly we estimate the model using all early stage 
investment (All deals), then we partition the early stage data in two, and estimate a model 
using biopharmaceutical investment (Biopharma), and then estimate a model on the 
remaining sectors of investment activity (Rest of sectors). In each version of the model the 
independent variables remain the same. The only exception is VC public which we adjust 
to match the type of sectoral activity described by the dependent variable. As in Chapter 5 
we estimate each version twice using the count of deals and then the value of investment 
made in a region. 
In this chapter we take natural logarithms of the data used to estimate the model. 
Therefore, the reduced form equations are estimated using a log-log specification. The 
coefficients produced from a log-log specification can be interpreted as elasticities. An 
elasticity coefficient has the advantage of having a dynamic interpretation. The elasticity 
coefficient value indicates the percentage movement in the dependent variable resulting 
from a1% movement of the respective independent variable. For example, a coefficient 
value for Ent in the regression of 5.4, would indicate that a1% change in the value of Ent 
would result in a 5.4% change in the amount or number of venture capital deals. Therefore 
a log-log specification is helpful when trying to understand the relative impact of different 
factors on the dependent variable. By using coefficients of elasticity it also simplifies 
comparing the results of the different versions of the model. This helps when comparing 
biotechnology with other sectors, or comparing the influence of our independent variables 
on the number of regional deals against the value of deals. 
A final advantage of the log-log specification is that it reduces the chance of our 
coefficients being affected by time trends or spurious relationships in the data. In order to 
take logarithms of the dataset a transform of log(x+l) is applied to allow for the presence 
of zero values in some of the series. This transform has little impact on the associations 
between the transformed series, but prevents the zero value from being excluded. 
As with Chapter 5 we use panel regression to estimate the coefficients of each version of 
the model. We also use the Hausman test to determine that fixed effects are preferred to 
random effects. We also find the presence of heteroskedasticity and mild levels of first 
order serial correlation. As we will see in section 6.2.3, our dataset in this chapter is 
relatively small; therefore we can expect the presence of a certain level of non-normality of 
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errors. As in Chapter 5 we correct for non-normality in the error test using white cross 
section robust covariance. 
However, the specification and diagnostic tests revealed several differences to those 
obtained in Chapter 5. For example, we find that fixed effects are insignificant for some 
versions of the model. Table 6.2 shows the results of the F-test for the redundancy of fixed 
effects. The table shows that the presence of time constant regional effects is statistically 
weaker for the regression of the Biopharma sector. This suggests that specific regional 
factors are less important for investments in the biopharmaceutical sector. In particular the 
Biopharma count and value model reject the use of fixed effects over panel least squares at 
the 5% level, suggesting that only a restricted single intercept model should be estimated. 
However, for the Rest of sectors, and All deals models fixed effects are significant. To 
allow for this variation we report the results of the least squares regressions in the chapter's 
appendix and show the fixed effects estimation in the results section. 
Table 6.2 F-test of the joint significance of fixed effects vs. least squares 
Model Sector 
Bio/ harma Rest of sectors All deals 
Count model 
Value model 
N/S 
* 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
N/S Not significant, ***1% confidence level, ** 5% confidence 
level, * 10% confidence level. 
A second difference from our estimations in Chapter 5 is that some of models in this 
chapter are diagnosed with the presence of endogeneity regarding entrepreneurship. The 
results of the Hausman test showed the presence of endogeneity in the regressions for the 
biopharma model at the 5% significance level. To control for the potential bias produced 
from endogeneity we apply an instrumental variable and use the two stage least squares 
regression technique. The level of regional unemployment (Claim) was found to be an 
appropriate instrumental variable for entrepreneurship using Stock and Watson's (2003) 
procedure 14. We discuss the result of the two stage least squares regressions for the 
biopharmaceutical models in the results section of this chapter. 
5.7.3 Data and variables 
Although individual series may have long time series, to obtain a balanced panel the 
dataset used in this chapter is for the period 2000-2003. However, in contrast to Chapter 5 
we have data for the 12 UK Government Office Regions (GOR) regions, giving each series 
48 data points. The UK GOR disaggregate the data along political/administrative 
14 Based on an F-test of the significance of the first stage regressors. 
- 101 - 
boundaries where Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland are included at the national level 
whereas England is broken down into a further nine regions. The GOR are considered the 
"primary classification for the presentation of regional statistics" in the UK (National 
Office of Statistics). 
5.7.3.1 Variables 
The dependent variables for venture capital activity are given as the number of deals and 
value of investments. These are calculated from the Library House dataset as outlined in 
Chapter 2. The independent variables Ent, Fs, Deg, R&D, R&D ratio are included as 
ratios, as shown in Table 6.3, to standardise for the different geographical sizes of regions. 
Standardising variables in this way helps to reduce the potential for spurious regression 
arising from factors such as background population growth over the period. The variable 
Claim is used as an instrumental variable for Ent. 
As we discussed the collection of data for the independent variables in Chapter 5, here we 
limit our discussion to the additional variables included in the model, VC public, R&D and 
R&D ratio. The variable VC public is calculated as the proportion of deals (by count or 
value) that include finance from a public source. In a minority of deals, public investors 
syndicate with private investors, inflating the size of the public contribution. However, as 
we shall we in Chapter 7 this is the exception, rather than the rule. We generate an 
approximate measure of the level of funds from public institutions in the dataset. One 
complication is that private firms are sometimes used to run or manage public funds, for 
example the RVCF. As these investors also manage other private funds we cannot include 
these as public finance. In RVCFs the public funds contribute to approximately 30%15 of 
the total fund involvement. As the RVCF may syndicate with other investors this further 
reduces the relative size of the public contribution. 
In this chapter we use R&D data from EUROSTAT instead of patent applications to 
measure the regional concentration of technological activity. Although EUROSTAT's 
patent data has a long time series, it is missing values for Scotland. The R&D data16 is 
populated for each region in our analysis, and also disaggregates according to public and 
private investment in R&D. This provides the opportunity to include a measure of the ratio 
is According to interview with RVCF fund manager. 
16 Our measure of R&D is a general measure of UK research and development, where R&D definition is that 
used by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defined as, 
"Creative work undertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, including 
knowledge of man, culture and society and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise new applications". 
One implication of our R&D measure is that this includes research relating to new innovation as well as the 
development of existing innovation. 
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of public to private R&D investment in each region. One implication of using R&D 
investment is that this might capture investments to improve existing innovation and 
therefore be biased towards development of existing products, rather than the creation of 
new innovations. We summarise the data series and respective data sources in Table 6.3 
below. 
Table 6.3 Description of data and sources used in chapter 
Series Description Source 
VC count Count of VC deals Library House database 
VC value Value of VC investment Library House database 
Ent Number of new VAT registrations per 
civilian labour population 
NOMIS, Office of National Statistics 
Fs Number of financial services employees 
per employee population 
Regional Trends publication, Office of 
National Statistics 
Deg Number of degree qualified people per 
working age population 
Regional Trends publication, Office of 
National Statistics 
VCpublic Proportion of public investment (deals or 
value) 
Library House database 
R&D Investment into R&D per civilian labour 
force 
EUROSTAT online 
R&D ratio Ratio of public/ private R&D investment EUROSTAT online 
Claim Number of long term unemployed 
claiming benefit 
Regional Trends publication, Office of 
National Statistics 
5.8 Results 
5.8.1 The distribution of venture capital investment 
The distribution of venture capital in the UK is known to be uneven and Table 6.4 reflects 
this observation. The table shows the total count and value of deals made between January 
2000-September 2006 in the UK, split by GOR, for Biopharma investments and the 
remaining sectors and then the totals for all deals. 
During the period a total of £l Obn is recorded as being invested in the UK in over 4000 
deals. The table clearly shows that there is a wide variation in the level of venture capital 
activity in regions across the UK for both types of technology investment. The highest 
Biopharma funded region was the East (£600m), which received over a 500 times more 
funding than the West Midlands (£1m). Over the same six year period London received 
the highest level of funding for the other sectors (£3bn) which was around 50 times larger 
than the lowest funded region, suggesting less variation between the highest and lowest 
funded regions for this sector grouping. It is also clear from this table that regions such as 
the East, North East and Yorkshire have a high proportion of investment into 
biotechnology compared to the rest of the sectors. 
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Table 6.4 Investment by deal and value - Library House dataset 
Bio/harms Other sectors All 
_Region 
Deals Value £000's Deals Value £000's Deals Value £000's 
East 177 602,410 464 1,040,417 641 1,642,827 
E. Midlands 19 11,268 107 92,953 126 104,221 
London 79 211,913 877 3,111,905 956 3,323,818 
N. Ireland 4 1,775 67 92,037 71 93,812 
N. East 26 25,723 92 51,986 118 77,709 
N. West 33 105,949 232 382,274 265 488,223 
Scotland 62 225,733 361 591,866 423 817,599 
S. East 107 462,410 668 1,827,047 775 2,289,457 
S. West 37 70,865 154 553,891 191 624,756 
Wales 13 3,614 100 98,718 113 102,332 
W. Midlands 5 1,093 233 512,688 238 513,781 
Yorkshire 33 24,982 119 211,436 152 236,418 
Total 595 1,747,735 3474 8,567 218 4069 10,314,953 
Source: Author's computations on Library House data 
Presenting the deal information from table one, in terms of regional shares of the total 
investment activity in the UK, reflects the distribution of venture capital investment. It 
also allows a statistical comparison to be made between the different patterns of 
distribution between Biopharma and the Rest of sectors investment. 
Table 6.5 also shows that four regions, the East, London, South East and Scotland, account 
for around 70% of all venture capital activity regardless of technology type, although the 
order of importance of the UK regions does vary with the type of technology. 
Table 6.5 Regional shares of UK investment total 
Bio/harms Rest z-test significance 
Region Countshare Valueshare Countshare Valueshare Countshare Valueshare 
East 30% 34% 13% 12% *** *** 
E. Midlands 3% 1% 3% 1% 
London 13% 12% 25% 36% *** *** 
N. Ireland 1% 0% 2% 1% 
N. East 4% 1% 3% 1% 
N. West 6% 6% 7% 4% 
Scotland 10% 13% 10% 7% ** 
S. East 18% 26% 19% 21% 
S. West 6% 4% 4% 6% ** 
Wales 2% 0% 3% 1% 
W. Midlands 1% 0% 7% 6% *** *** 
Yorkshire 6% 1% 3% 2% * 
100% 100% 100% 100% 
*This statistic was calculated comparing the overall shares of investment activity (countshare) in both technology types 
for each. *** 1% confidence level, ** 5% confidence level, * 1% confidence level. Percentages are based on the totals 
in Table 3, and sample size = 762 deals. 
The comparison of proportions z-test shows a statistically significant difference between 
biotechnology investment shares and the remainder of investments for certain UK regions 
when evaluated at a 90% confidence level. This result suggests that Biopharma investment 
follows a different regional trend to the Rest of the sectors. 
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The East and Yorkshire show a significant positive statistic indicating a relatively higher 
share of UK biotechnology deals compared to the regions share of other sectors investment. 
We would expect the East, centred on Cambridge, to feature strongly in biopharmaceutical 
activity. The data also pick out that Yorkshire is relatively specialised in 
biopharmaceutical activity compared to the other sectors receiving investment. One 
additional observation is that Scotland takes a consistent proportion of the number of deals 
whether we look at biopharmaceuticals or the other sectors. However, we find that in 
terms of the value of deals, Scotland's biopharmaceutical investments outperform, taking a 
larger slice of the total investment made. We will return to this point later on in the 
chapter. 
Interestingly, London and the West Midlands show a lower share of biotechnology deals 
compared to their activity in the other sectors, suggesting that biotechnology is less 
prominent in these regions compared to other types of opportunities. Therefore, although 
London is the second largest region in terms of biopharmaceutical investment, we find that 
compared to the East, biopharmaceutical investment in London is a much smaller part of 
the regions overall activity. To make greater sense of these results, in Chapter 10 we 
reflect on the biopharmaceutical organisation of regions such as the East, London, Scotland 
and Yorkshire in more detail, to understand the activities underlying these regional 
investment totals. 
These results provide evidence for relative regional strengths and weaknesses of regional 
venture capital funding overall. We also show that biotechnology investment does not 
necessarily follow the general pattern of regional investment. In Table 6.6 we show the 
proportion of investment activity within each region that can be traced to a public source. 
As with Table 6.5 our purpose is to compare these regional proportions across the two 
technology categories. 
Our first observation is that overall the proportion of finance in biopharmaceuticals from a 
public source is 20% by deal count and 5% by value. On average, in non- 
biopharmaceutical sectors the proportion of public finance is lower, 10% by deal count and 
only 1% by deal value. As we discussed in the literature review, this is likely to be a result 
of the Governments perception of biotechnology as a priority area for support. 
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Table 6.6 Public investment as a nronortion of total investment in each sector 
Bio/pharma Rest z-test 
Region Count Value Count Value Count Value 
East 23% 2% 13% 2% ** 
E. Midlands 16% 29% 13% 2% ** 
London 25% 3% 6% 0% *** ** 
N. Ireland 25% 28% 36% 7% 
N. East 23% 10% 15% 2% 
N. West 18% 9% 7% 0% * 
Scotland 27% 1% 16% 2% * 
S. East 16% 8% 8% 1% * ** 
S. West 11% 17% 9% 2% *** 
Wales 15% 16% 9% 1% * * 
W. Midlands 20% 1% 6% 1% 
Yorkshire 12% 6% 4% 0% 
GrandTotal 20% 5% 10% 1% *** *** 
the z-test sample is ditterent for each region, as it's based on the number of deals in each region rather than the total UK 
population in Table 4. This may affect the significance for results for regions with a low number of deals e. g. Northern 
Ireland. Public investment expressed as a proportion of total investment made into each technology sector, i. e. public 
investment into Biopharma/total investment into Biopharma. 
Thus, we find a mixed picture of public support. We can illustrate these complexities 
using the scatter plot in Figure 6.1 below. Figure 6.1 is divided into four quadrants. The 
lower left quadrant contains the majority of regions, particularly according to their public 
investment into sectors other than biopharmaceuticals. For Regions in the lower left 
quadrant, such as the North West and South East, direct public investment is not a strong a 
feature of the total regional investment activity; it contributes to less than 20% of the total 
investment by count or value. 
Figure 6.1 Scatter plot of public investment, deal count against deal value 
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Regions in the lower right quadrant, (mainly in terms of Biopharma activity), have a 
relatively high proportion of deals involving public sources. However, this quadrant is 
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characterised regions where public deals have a low financial impact relative to the total 
investment made in the region. In these regions public finance acts in a `pump priming' 
role, seeding opportunities. This quadrant includes biopharmaceutical activity in the East, 
London and Scotland. Only one region, Northern Ireland is included for activity relating to 
non biopharmaceutical investment. 
The top quadrants include only two regions where the value of public investment in 
biopharmaceutical deals contribute to greater than 20% of the overall activity in the region. 
We have already noted that Northern Ireland is very dependent on public investment, and 
this region is located in the top right quadrant. The top left quadrant contains the East 
Midlands where the public deals have received a relatively high proportion of public 
finance. Although we note that Table 6.4 indicates a low level of total investment in the 
East Midlands region, which explains the predominance of public investment. 
Table 6.4 also indicates that differences between the proportion of public funded deals, in 
biopharmaceuticals and the rest of sectors are statistically significant. For example the 
main investment regions identified in Table 6.3 (London, East, South East) have a much 
higher proportion of public deals in Biopharma compared to the Rest of sectors. In terms 
of the relative value of public investment to total regional investment, places such as the 
East Midlands and the South West, which have low levels of funding in general, show a 
much higher proportion of public investment in Biopharma compared to the Rest of sectors. 
In summary, this section has confirmed the uneven distribution of venture capital in the 
UK at the regional and sub-regional level. It has also highlighted that certain regions such 
as London, South East and East have large concentrations of venture capital activity in 
both sector groupings. This section has also shown that there are significant differences in 
the patterns of activity between Biopharma and the Rest of sectors grouping. 
Finally, we have shown regional differences in the proportion venture capital from a public 
source. Firstly we have found that biopharmaceutical investment receives a higher than 
average level public investment. Secondly, that the regional disbursement of public 
investment has different impacts on regions relative to their total investment activity. The 
impacts of public investment vary from a pump priming role - increasing deal making to a 
significant contribution to regional investment. 
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5.8.2 Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics for the logarithms of variables in the panel data set for the 12 
GOR regions 2000-2003 are given in Table 6.7 below. The statistics are given for the 
dependent variables, Biopharma and the Rest of sectors with their combined total named 
All deals, in terms of the count of deals (VC count) and value of investment (VC value). 
The next section of the table gives the descriptive statistics for the independent variables, 
including the proportion of public investment in each sector group by count and value. 
Finally the statistics for the instrumental variable Claim are given. 
Table 6.7 Descriptive statistics of the panel dataset 
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
VC-count: 
Biopharma 1.56 1.50 3.53 0.00 1.03 0.05 2.26 
Rest of sectors 3.29 3.14 5.20 1.79 0.89 0.42 2.01 
All deals 3.44 3.26 5.23 1.79 0.90 0.40 1.94 
VC value: 
Biopharma 6.81 7.25 12.29 0.00 4.05 -0.65 2.15 
Rest of sectors 10.57 10.62 13.73 5.99 1.71 -0.40 2.74 
All deals 10.74 10.82 13.77 5.99 1.74 -0.42 2.70 
Independent: 
Ent 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.06 0.01 -0.65 4.03 
FS 0.21 0.20 0.34 0.10 0.06 0.58 3.38 
Deg 0.14 0.12 0.22 0.09 0.03 1.46 4.81 
R&D 0.44 0.44 0.94 0.22 0.19 0.97 3.13 
R&D ratio 0.53 0.46 1.01 0.19 0.28 0.33 1.52 
VC_public: 
Biopharma deals 0.15 0.18 0.51 0.00 0.15 0.45 2.08 
All deals 0.12 0.10 0.45 0.00 0.08 1.37 6.16 
Rest of sectors deals 0.10 0.09 0.45 0.00 0.09 1.48 6.12 
Biopharma value 0.12 0.01 0.69 0.00 0.21 1.79 4.68 
Rest of sectors value 0.02 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.04 3.08 12.49 
All deal value 0.03 0.01 0.21 0.00 0.04 2.74 10.76 
Instruments: 
Claim 4.40 4.33 5.24 3.56 0.41 0.11 2.28 
*Skew expressed as difference from normal distribution, the kurtosis of the normal distribution equals three. 
The first observation is that there are regions without biopharmaceutical venture capital 
activity in certain years as shown by the zero minimum value for all of VC count and 
VC value series, although all regions did have investment in biopharmaceuticals at least 
once in the period 2000-2003. The range (maximum-minimum) for the VC_count series 
show similar values across the sector groupings. However, the range for the VC value 
series is much larger due to certain regions receiving very high amounts of investment. As 
anticipated from the tables presented earlier, the mean values for the Biopharma series are 
much lower than the statistics for the rest of sectors series. 
The log transform of the variables also has the benefit of increasing the normality of the 
data series distribution. Only the VC public series based on the value of investment in the 
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Rest of sectors and All deal series show strong evidence of a non-normal distribution. 
These series have excess kurtosis and skew, when compared to the normal distribution, 
because of a high occurrence of zero values. 
Next we use Pearson correlations to evaluate any basic pairwise associations between 
variables in the dataset. The correlation analysis provides a preliminary indication of any 
relationships between the transformed dependent and independent variables. The 
correlations reported in Tables 6.8 and 6.9 are based on the panel data for the period 2000- 
2003. Table 6.8 uses the count of deal and Table 6.9 reports that correlations based on the 
value of deals. 
Table 6.8 Log model: VC_count series 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
VC_count: 
1 Biophanna 1.00 
2 Rest of sectors 0.68 "'" 1.00 
3 Bio VC_public 0.42- 0.16 1.00 
4 Rest VC public -0.15 -0.18 -0.07 1.00 
5 Ent 0.21 0.58- -0.05 -0.15 1.00 
6 Fs 0.46 " 0.79- 0.05 -0.12 0.85 ""' 1.00 
7 Deg 0.45 """ 0.73- 0.17 -0.11 0.51 "'" 0.80 """ 1.00 
8 R&D 0.62- 0.59 """ 0.08 0.12 0.34- 0.58- 0.46- 1.00 
9 RDratIo 0.09 0.09 0.20 -0.27 -0.02 -0.06 0.15 -0.57- 1.00 
10 Claim 0.03 0.38- 0.01 0 03 0.75"' 0.62- 041 "'" 0 02 0.28 " 1.00 
Table 6.9 Log model: VC value series 
Vanables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
VC_value: 
I &ophanna 1.00 
2 Rest of sectors 0.49- 1.00 
3 &o VC_public 0.10 -006 1.00 
4 Rest VC, yublic -0.09 -027 " 0.00 1.00 
5 Ent 0.22 " 065 "" -0.18 -0.08 1.00 
6 Fs 042- 0.75- -0.18 -004 0.85- 1.00 
7 Deg 0.39- 0 61 "" -0.10 -0.08 0 51 "' 0 80 "' 1.00 
8 R&D 0.46- 0.48- -0.14 0.09 0.34- 0.58- 0.46- 1.00 
9 RDratlo 0.15 0.07 -0.01 -0.27 -0.02 -0.06 0.15 -0.57- 1.00 
10 Claim 010 047"' -0.17 -007 075"' 062"' 041 "" 002 0281 100 
All correlations for data between 2000-2003 for 12 UK Government regions (N=48) ***1% confidence level, 
** 5% confidence level, * 10% confidence level 
Table 6.8 shows a moderate relationship (0.68) between Biopharma and Rest of sectors in 
terms of the number of deals. This association suggests regions with high levels of deals in 
biopharmaceuticals are also likely to have high levels of investment into other sectors. The 
same relationship is weaker (0.49) when the amount of investment is considered in Table 
6.9. This result is generally consistent with the discussion of Table 6.3. 
Interestingly the correlations for both venture capital deal series (Biopharma and Rest of 
sectors) show a significant association for Fs, Deg and R&D by count and value of deals. 
The smaller correlation coefficients of these variables with Biopharma compared to the 
Rest of sectors indicate that the importance of these factors to biopharmaceutical 
investment may be different. 
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The R&D series is strongly correlated with both Biopharma and Rest of sectors. In general 
the strength of the correlation between R&D and the two VC series are similar. The 
strength of the association of R&D is slightly lower for correlations based on the value of 
investment (VC value) compared to the number of deals (VC_count). However R&D 
ratio is very weakly positively associated the venture capital variables, but not at a 
statistically significant level. We also note that R&D and R&D ratio are negatively 
associated, indicating that high levels of public investment in R&D are associated with a 
lower overall regional level of R&D investment. 
In contrast to the correlations presented in Chapter 5, Ent shows a strong positive 
association with Fs, Deg, R&D, and Rest of sectors. However, we note that the association 
between Ent and Biopharma is weak. This suggests that general entrepreneurial activity in 
a region is not strongly associated with biopharmaceutical investment (either by count or 
value of deals), whereas investment in non-biopharmaceuticals is correlated with 
entrepreneurial activity. A final observation regarding Ent is that it is strongly correlated 
with Claim, satisfying a requirement for its use in the biopharmaceutical regressions as the 
instrumental variable for Ent. 
The correlation results report a difference in the association of Biopharma and Rest of 
sectors with their respective VC public series. For example Rest of sectors is negatively 
associated with public investment in the same sector group (Rest VC public) but with 
relatively weak statistical significance, regardless of whether we use VC count or 
VC value. This result suggests that regions with high proportions of public investment in 
sectors non-biopharmaceuticals sectors will have lower levels of investment overall. 
The variable Biopharma has a strong statistically significant and positive association with 
Bio VC public in Table 6.8. It follows that regions with a high proportion of public deals 
in biopharmaceuticals will have a high number of deals. In Table 6.9 the association 
between these two variables is positive, but not statistically. Therefore according to the 
correlation results, the total amount of regional investment into biopharmaceuticals is not 
strongly associated with public contributions. 
In summary, with the exception of VC public, the correlation coefficients suggest that 
venture capital has a positive association with the independent variables. The correlation 
results also match the theoretical predictions shown in Table 6.1. The proportion of public 
venture capital investment was shown to have a positive association in Biopharma 
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investments, but a negative association for the Rest of sectors. This difference in 
association with public investment between sectors which was not expected. Finally, the 
ratio of public to private R&D was shown to have a statistically insignificant association 
with venture capital activity. 
5.8.3 Estimation results 
Tables 6.10 and 6.11 provide the results for the regression of the reduced form model using 
VC investment data by sector group. The results of the estimations are provided using 
fixed effect least squares estimation. Table 6.10 uses data from the VC count series, 
Table 6.11 uses data from the VC value series. However, we previously noted in section 
6.2.2 that the diagnostic tests for estimating biopharmaceutical investment indicated that (a) 
the fixed effects estimation should be substituted for the panel least squares technique, and 
(b) that the presence of endogeneity in the Biopharma estimations indicates that two stage 
least squares estimation is appropriate. It logically follows that we should report estimates 
for Biopharma using panel least squares (panel OLS) and two stage panel least squares 
(panel TSLS), without fixed effects. The results of the OLS and TSLS regressions are 
given in Table 6.12. Therefore we concentrate our discussion of Table 6.10 and 6.11 on 
the results for Rest of sectors and All deal regressions. The results for Biopharma are 
included in Table 6.10 and 6.11 for completeness. 
In the results tables summary statistics are provided for each regression. These include the 
adjusted R2 value, the standard error of regression (S. E. reg), sum of squared residuals 
(SSR), the log likelihood (Logl'hood), Durbin Watson (DW) test for serial correlation, 
Akaike and Schwarz information criterion (lower values show best fit), and F-statistic for 
the joint significance of variables included. The statistical significance for the presence of 
endogeneity in Ent and the results of fixed effects significance tests are included in each 
table for clarity. 
The regression summary statistics in both Table 6.10 and 6.11 show that the best fit to the 
model is found using Rest of sectors in the deal count model, or the All deal model for the 
deal value. Not surprisingly these regression models have stronger F-statistics, lower sum 
of squared residuals and better model selection criteria than the regressions based on 
Biopharma. 
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Table 6.10 Dependent variable: Deal count, fixed effect regressions 
Fixed effect Bio/ pharma Rest All deals 
Variable Std. Error Sig Coefficient Std. Error Sig Coefficient Std. Error Sig 
Const 0.44 1.39 1.56 1.00 0.91 0.81 
Ent -27.78 11.52 8.04 8.12 2.24 5.39 
FS 10.19 5.79 ' 8.08 6.41 11.62 6.53 ' 
Deg -1.30 14.26 -1.61 5.69 -0.70 3.50 
R&D 2.27 2.74 -0.75 0.43 ' -0.12 0.80 
R&D ratio 1.03 0.77 -0.73 0.36 -0.27 0.22 
VC public 1.09 0.56 2.01 0.66 1.37 0.43 
Fixed effect sig. N/S 
Endogeneity N/S N/S N/S 
Adjusted R-squared 0.76 0.93 0.93 
S. E. of regression 0.51 0.23 0.23 
SSR 7.73 1.59 1.61 
Logl'hood -24.29 13.73 13.34 
DW 2.28 2.58 2.67 
Akaike info criterion 1.76 0.18 0.19 
Schwarz criterion 2.46 0.88 0.90 
F-statistic 9.64 39.60 39.70 
***1% confidence level, ** 5% confidence level, * 10% confidence level. n/s not significant 
In terms of the influence of individual variables shown in Table 6.10, Ent, Fs, R&D, R&D 
ratio and VC public are all shown to have a significant influence on the number of 
regional deals. However, the results also show that for example the influence of each 
variable is dependent on the measure of venture capital activity. Only VC public has a 
consistent statistically significant influence across each of the three estimations shown. In 
contrast Deg is not shown to be significant in any estimation shown in Table 6.10. 
Similarly, the influence of Ent on Rest of sectors and All deal investment is positive, 
although not statistically significant. 
Table 6.10 shows when Rest of sectors is used as the dependent variable, R&D and R&D 
ratio are both negative and statistically significant. This result suggests that 1% increase in 
R&D levels in a region would reduce the level of investment in the rest of sectors by 
0.75%. The negative direction of R&D ratio would indicate that increasing private R&D 
activity would attract more investment. Although the influence of R&D and R&D ratio on 
All deals is shown to be in the same direction as Rest of sectors, the results are not 
statistically significant. 
The most consistent result in Table 6.10 is the influence of VC public on the regional deal 
count. The coefficient of VC public was positive and statistically significant in all results. 
The results indicate that a 1% change in VC public results in a 1-2% change in the number 
of regional investments. 
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Table 6.11 shows the results of the regressions using the deal value as the dependent 
variable. These results indicate that the regional fixed effects are significant in explaining 
the regional distribution of the value of investment into both Biopharma and Rest of sector 
models. However, our results for Biopharma also indicate the presence of endogeinty in 
association of regional investment with entrepreneurship, confirming that the most 
appropriate results for Biopharma are shown in Table 6.12. 
Table 6.11 Dependent variable: Deal value, fixed effect regression 
Fixed effect Bio/ pharma Rest All deals 
Variable Std. Error Sig Coefficient Std. Error Sig Coefficient Std. Error Si 
Const 14.23 7.95 * 10.49 3.29 *** 10.46 3.12 "** 
Ent -110.54 32.49 "** 21.15 18.32 20.16 16.36 
FS 11.11 34.04 -4.35 21.68 -3.70 18.72 
Deg -22.56 55.84 28.74 11.88 ** 21.35 13.20 
R&D 2.89 11.50 -9.53 0.59 *'* -7.83 0.83 *** 
R&D ratio 3.45 2.17 -1.17 1.26 -0.51 0.93 
VC ublic 3.60 1.96 * -3.90 4.26 -0.19 1.70 
Fixed effect sig. 
Endogeneity ** N/S N/S 
Adjusted R-squared 0.57 0.77 0.79 
S. E. of regression 2.64 0.82 0.80 
SSR 209.56 19.98 19.36 
Logl'hood -103.48 -47.07 -46.32 
DW 2.41 2.56 2.45 
Akaike info criterion 5.06 2.71 2.68 
Schwarz criterion 5.76 3.41 3.38 
F-statistic 4.74 10.34 11.24 
***1% confidence level, ** 5% confidence level, * 10% confidence level. n/s not significant 
In contrast to the results in Table 6.10, we find evidence for the statistical significance of 
Ent, Deg, R&D and VC public in at least one of the estimation models, but no evidence for 
the significant influence of Fs or R&D ratio. The results in Table 6.11 show R&D is a 
significant influence on investment in All deals and Rest of sectors. A 1% increase in the 
level of regional R&D per head of the population results in approximately an 8-10 % 
decrease in the amount of investment. Interestingly, the affect of R&D and R&D ratio, in 
Table 6.11, show a similar direction of influence to those discussed in Table 6.10. 
However, R&D ratio is not a statistically significant influence on the value of regional 
investment. 
The results in Tables 6.10 and 6.11 show differences between the influence of the regional 
variables on the count of deals and value of venture capital investment. In contrast to the 
results produced from modelling the number of deals, Table 6.11 shows evidence that Deg 
is important for determining the value of deals. Deg has a significant positive influence on 
the value of Rest of sectors investment. Another difference between the results in Table 
6.10 and Table 6.11 is that VC public is only found to be significant for the value of 
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Biopharma investment. In fact, in Table 6.11 we find the coefficients for VC public in the 
Rest of sector and All deal model are negative, the opposite direction compared to the 
results in Table 6.10. 
The regressions associated with Tables 6.10 and 6.11 also produce values of the fixed 
effects for each region. These are given as deviations from the average constant value 
(Const). We summarise the value of the regional fixed effect coefficients for Tables 6.10 
and 6.11 in the appendix. Evaluating the value of the regional fixed effects for the Rest of 
sectors and All deal models, consistently shows the Eastern, South Eastern and Scottish 
regions have the largest positive deviation from the average constant value. In contrast, the 
largest negative deviations for the count data are associated with regions such as Wales and 
Northern Ireland, or Yorkshire and the East Midlands based on the value of investment. 
In this final part of the results section we concentrate on the Biopharma estimation results 
shown in Table 6.12. Overall, the results for Biopharma in Table 6.12 are consistent with 
the Biopharma results in Table 6.10 and 6.11, in terms of the direction of influence of the 
independent variables. We also find the coefficient for VC public is positive and 
statistically significant, in agreement with previous results. However, we find the 
magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficients change as a result using the 
appropriate estimation technique. 
Table 6.12 Results of two stage least squares models for Biopharma 
Estimation Least squares Two stage least squares 
Model: Count Value Count Value 
Variable ß Std. Error Sig Std. Error Sig Std. Error Sig P Std. Error; Sig 
Const -0.13 0.54" -0.510. 3.07+ 3.65 424 8.54 17.86' 
Ent -29.00 11.09' -99.10 47.20 -94.17 71.57 -255.35 289.66' 
FS 11.12 3.18 45.84 18.81' " 33.16 24.27 98.93 94.611 
Deg -13.86 2.75; -52.04 20.02 -27.81 15.47 " -85.78 62.55' 
R&D 5.31 0.21 17.96 2.34, 4.16 1.47, "" 15.4 6.32"-" 
R&D ratio 2.53 0.19 10.37 1.90 2.55 0.18 10.36' 1.73 
VC_public 1.54 0.36' 4.47 2.55 1.44 0.43- 4.55' 2.04 
Endogeneity N/S n/a i n/a 
Adjusted R-squared 0.73 0.48 0.58 0.421 
- S. E. of regression 0.53 2.92 0.67 3.08 { 
SSR 11.57 350.17 18.17 388.17, I 
Logl'hood -33.96 -115.80 n/a n/a 
DW 1.80 1.60 1.91 1.63 
Akaike info criterion 1.71 5.12 _t_ -- ---- ---- Na -------- 
, ----- Na ---- -- 
Schwarz criterion 1.98 5.39 Na n/a 
F-statistic 22.69 8.24' 24.97 . 26 '"" 
I I M 
. 
nstrument nstrument nk Na ä Nä Na 7 . 00 . 00 9e 
Second SSR N 1 17.00, "C . 57' 
***I% confidence level, ** 5% confidence level, * 10% confidence level. n/s = not significant. n/a = not 
applicable. 
Although the panel OLS results in Table 6.12 indicate a strong statistical significance of all 
the independent variables, we must take into account the presence of endogeneity in the 
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estimation of the model using the count of biopharmaceutical deals. Similarly, as previous 
estimations in Table 6.11 suggested the presence of endogeneity in the estimation of the 
model using biopharmaceutical deal value, there is reasonable suspicion of bias in the 
panel OLS results. Therefore, given the persistent presence of endogeneity in the 
estimations based on Biopharma series, we concentrate our analysis on the TSLS results 
for Biopharma and compared to the results shown in Table 6.10 and 6.11. 
Table 6.12 shows several important differences to the results in Tables 6.10 and 6.11. We 
find that R&D and R&D ratio are statistically significant influencers of biopharmaceutical 
investment activity, by deal count and value of investment. These results indicate that 
either an increase in regional R&D funding, or an increase in the level of public R&D 
funding, would have a positive influence on biopharmaceutical investment activity in the 
reduced form equation. 
Although the negative direction of influence of Ent is consistent across all results in this 
chapter, we find no statistical significance of Ent in the TSLS results. Similarly, we find 
that the regional concentration of financial services activity (FS) is not a predictor of 
biopharmaceutical investment. However, the TSLS results in Table 6.12 show Deg is a 
statistically significant negative influence on the count of biopharmaceutical deals. 
The results in Table 6.12 also confirm variation according to technology sector in the 
direction of influence of the independent variables. For example, comparing the results of 
Biopharma in Table 6.12 to those for the Rest of sectors and All deal results in Table 6.10 
and 6.11, shows the different influence of R&D and R&D ratio on Biopharma compared to 
the Rest of sectors and All deal regressions. Likewise, we find further differences between 
biopharmaceutical and non-biopharmaceutical activity associated with the influence of 
Deg. Interestingly, we find some consistency across biopharmaceutical and non- 
biopharmaceutical sectors, in terms of the direction of influence of VC public on the 
number of investments. 
5.8.4 Discussion and implication of empirical results 
In this section we interpret our results by focusing on the first question presented in the 
thesis introduction. Specifically, this is to determine what factors affect the regional 
distribution of venture capital and secondly whether biotechnology investment is shown to 
be different from other sectors. 
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The results in section 6.3.3 indicate strong general support for the variables proposed in 
our venture capital model. We find that the summary statistics for each regression indicate 
support for the explanatory power of the independent variables. Individually each 
independent variable is also shown to be significant in at least one regression. As with 
Chapter 5 we find general support for the use of fixed effects estimation. This indicates 
the presence of unobserved regional effects. Over the period we evaluate, venture capital 
activity, in terms of the number of deals and value of investment, is tied to specific 
locations. This is shown to be a feature of early stage investment generally (All deal), and 
non-biopharmaceutical investment (Rest of sectors). The size of the fixed effects indicates 
this effect is largest in regions receiving the largest amount of investment, demonstrating 
the embedded nature of venture capital investment. However, we find in London, the 
region with the largest share of early stage investment activity, did not have the largest 
fixed effect coefficient. This result suggests that factors included in the model play a role 
in determining London's early stage investment activity. 
As with Chapter 5, the fixed effects have the strongest statistical significance and larger 
coefficients when we evaluate the value of regional investment. This indicates that 
background regional effects, or regional endowments are important for determining which 
regions have high levels of funding. On the other hand, the flow of deals was not found to 
be as strongly regionally embedded. We find tests for regional fixed effects using the 
VC(count) data series are significant, suggesting the presence of unobserved effects, but 
their average coefficient value (Const) is not statistically significant in the regressions. 
In contrast to Chapter 5 and our previous discussions, we find that investment in 
biopharmaceuticals is not strongly tied to regional fixed effects; the influence of regional 
specific factors on biopharmaceutical investment is weak or unsupported. For example, 
the number of regional biopharmaceutical deals is explained best by the independent 
variables used in the model. This is a clear difference between the organisation of 
biopharmaceutical investment and the results for other sectors shown in this chapter. 
The Biopharma results indicate that investment in biopharmaceutical activity is organised 
according to the independent factors in the model, rather than specific regional 
endowments and historical associations with venture capital. This corresponds with our 
discussion of regional innovation systems and the literature reviewed in this chapter. Our 
results suggest that biopharmaceutical investment is the product of regional resources 
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which can be developed over time. The next step is to evaluate the influence of individual 
factors. 
To understand the influence of individual factors we need to consider their affect on the 
supply or demand of investment. In section 6.2 we note that the coefficients in the results 
section are estimates of the reduced form equation coefficients. The reduced form 
coefficients include a scaling effect from the network coefficients in the structural form. 
As in the previous chapter, in order to fully interpret our results we need to impose a 
restriction on the value of the network coefficients (a3,05). In Chapter 5 our results 
indicated that an appropriate restriction was that, i) network effects exert a positive 
influence on supply and demand of venture capital, and ii) that the influence of networking 
was strongest on the supply side (a3 > ß5). Thus, the sign of coefficients for Fs and 
VC public in our reduced form regressions results must be reversed (from negative to 
positive or vice versa) if we want to understand their influence in the structural form 
supply side equation (equation 2 in section 6.2.1). This restriction, in conjunction with 
Table 6.1, means we expect our regression results for the reduced form coefficients in 
section 6.3.3 to show Fs as negative coefficient, and the opposite sign to Ent, Deg, R&D, 
R&D ratio and VC public 
Our results suggest that some factors in the model do not influence venture capital 
according to our expectations. This is clearly the case because we find several factors in 
the Biopharma estimations frequently show the opposite influence to the Rest of sectors or 
All deal estimations. For example, we find the concentration of human capital (Deg) and 
R&D activity have a different direction of influence on Biopharma compared to non- 
biopharmaceutical investment activity. Likewise, although not statistically significant, the 
coefficient of entrepreneurship is shown to be negative in the biopharmaceutical results, 
but positive in all other results. These results support the view of variation due to activity 
in different sectors. 
The coefficient of R&D is consistently negative for the All deals and Rest of sectors 
estimations and in the majority of cases is statistically significant. In contrast, the 
preferred results for Biopharma (shown in Table 6.12), indicate that R&D is significant 
and has a positive influence on investment activity. Applying our network restriction to 
these results confirms our expectation that regions with high levels of R&D generate 
demand for biotechnology venture capital investment. However, in the non- .. 
biopharmaceutical sectors, increasing regional R&D may have a detrimental influence on 
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the level of venture capital activity overall. This suggests, like in Chapter 3, that the bulk 
of venture capital investment is not directed towards high tech innovation, but flows to 
firms not associated with significant levels of R&D. 
The results for the ratio of public to private R&D (R&D ratio) also support our analysis of 
biopharmaceutical investment. Table 6.12 clearly shows the coefficient of R&D ratio is 
positive and significant. Under our network assumptions this result indicates that 
increasing the level of public R&D investment increases demand for investment. This is in 
agreement with our expectation that biotechnology firms are closely linked to university 
research. We find that increasing R&D, particularly the public component of R&D, has 
positive implications for the strength of demand for venture capital from biotechnology 
opportunities. Although the demand for investment in non-biopharmaceutical sectors is not 
stimulated by increasing R&D activity, we find that increasing the private component of 
R&D is shown to be somewhat important for increasing the demand for investment from 
non-biopharmaceutical sectors. 
The influence of the final demand side variable, Deg, also varies according to different 
sectors investment activity. The results also show that the concentration of professional 
workers is statistically of some influence on the level of venture capital activity. Applying 
the network restrictions indicate that increasing concentrations of professional workers 
negatively influences the number of biopharmaceutical deals, but encourages the amount 
of investment in non-biopharmaceutical sectors. We expected the concentration of 
professional workers to be a positive influence across both sectors. We find that regional 
demand for investment is generally increased by the concentration of degree qualified 
workers, but potentially at the expense of biopharmaceutical activity. For example regions 
with large concentrations of human capital may create a strong demand for investment 
from less specialist sectors. Given the risks of investing in sectors like biotechnology, the 
demand from non-specialist opportunities may appear more attractive to investors, and 
compete with demand from biotechnology firms. 
On the supply side we find another difference to the results in Chapter 5. The results show 
that when the coefficient of Fs is statistically significant, it has a positive value. Our 
expectation under the network restriction described previously, is that the coefficient of Fs 
would be negative in the estimations, indicating that increasing the regional concentration 
of financial services would increase the supply of venture capital. Under. the network 
restrictions we find that increasing financial services activity has the reverse effect. 
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One potential explanation for the influence of financial activity in our results is that during 
the period analysed, the general growth of UK financial services activity has not resulted in 
an increase in the supply of early stage investment. Our discussion of the literature in 
Chapter 2 suggests that in the post 2000 period venture capital funds for early stage 
investment have been impacted by the collapse of the Internet bubble. Our analysis 
reflects a decoupling of financial activity with early stage investment supply during the 
post 2000 period. 
The other supply side variable in the analysis, VC public, captures the influence of 
increasing the proportion of investment from Government on total investment. We find 
this variable consistently has a positive and significant influence on investment activity in 
the reduced form estimations, irrespective of sector. A positive coefficient value matches 
our expectations, given the restriction on the network coefficients. It indicates that regions 
with a high proportion of public finance are associated with lower levels of investment 
supply overall. This statistical finding can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, that public 
investment has generally been targeted at areas with low supply. Secondly, as our 
coefficients are elasticity's, this also implies that increasing the proportion of public 
investment in a region has a detrimental influence on the overall supply. However, 
because of the limited period of analysis, it remains possible, that overtime, higher public 
funding may stimulate future private investment. 
It follows that if public investment is used to increase venture capital supply, it must 
stimulate private supply as well, and not result in an increase to the proportion of 
investment from a public source. Here we find clear agreement with the literature. For 
example, the growth of venture capital in Israel is accredited to the successful use of public 
finance in seeding private funds (Avnimelech and Teubal, 2006). Our analysis supports the 
view that public investment in venture capital should be partnered with an appropriate 
private investor, preferably with specific experience in venture capital (Dossani and Desai, 
2006). 
5.9 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have shown that early stage investment is concentrated into certain 
regions of the UK. We have also tested a model for explaining the regional variation of 
early stage venture capital activity in the UK, in terms of deals and value of investment, 
using measures of a region's entrepreneurial behaviour, financial, human and technological 
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capabilities. We have also examined the importance of public investment in the form of 
direct public venture capital and public R&D. The results have shown that these variables 
are relevant for explaining variations in regional levels of funding, although it is clear that 
the influence of specific variables differs between biopharmaceutical and other sectors. 
This chapter also show several important aspects of biopharmaceutical venture capital 
activity. Firstly, regional trends in biopharmaceutical activity are different from those in 
other sectors. Biopharmaceuticals have been shown to be a regional priority in regions 
such as the East, but of lower prominence in London. Scottish biopharmaceutical firms 
outperform other sectors in the region in terms of the amount of finance received. We 
have seen variation in the role of public investment in regions, and observed the stronger 
reliance of biotechnology firms on Government finance. 
Secondly, we have found that venture capital investment in biotechnology is more strongly 
associated with regional activity. In general early stage investment activity is strongly tied 
to specific regions and relates to long term regional factors. However, we find 
biotechnology investment is only weakly influenced by unobserved regional specific 
factors. Rather than being distributed according to historically embedded regional 
endowments, biopharmaceutical investment is responsive to changes in regional activity in 
agreement with our discussion of clustering and regional systems of innovation in Chapter 
2. For example biopharmaceutical investment is influenced by the level of regional R&D, 
particularly from a public source. On the one hand this indicates the potential for 
influencing the regional distribution of venture capital activity, however, given the policy 
towards dispersed clustering this may reflect wider UK policy initiatives to promote basic 
University based research wherever located. 
Thirdly, we find that UK policy can have a complementary role in encouraging venture 
capital activity, by targeting different areas of the economy. For example, investment in 
biotechnology shows distinctive patterns of influence from regional activities, such as 
R&D. This finding emphasises the application of sector targeted regional policy, which 
take account of variations in technology sector. We find strong evidence that policies 
directed towards supporting public investment in R&D encourage biopharmaceutical 
investment. The lack of impact of R&D investment on non-biopharmaceutical investment 
needs further evaluation; it appears that other sectors respond to concentration in private 
R&D activity, rather than the overall level of R&D investment. We also find that if public 
investment is directed towards venture capital directly, then this must be made in 
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partnership with the private sector. We find little support for increasing the proportion of 
public venture capital investment in a region. Our analysis indicates that policy should be 
designed to target specific sectors and be applied as a package of policies to support 
existing activities in the regional economy. 
However, without a method to identify the scaling effect of network effects on the supply 
and demand of venture capital it is not possible to give a precise size of influence of the 
independent variables in the structural supply and demand form equations. We have 
consistently applied a restriction to the reduced form coefficients to help understand the 
influence of factors on the supply and demand for venture capital. Together with the 
importance of regional factors this suggests the structure of networks may play an 
important role in determining the regional distribution of venture capital and underpin 
regional advantage. Therefore, we continue our thesis by focusing on networking activity 
related to venture capital activity. We will return to these results in the final chapter this 
thesis to explore the implications of our assumptions regarding the influence of networks 
on investment activity. 
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6 Syndication networks 
6.1 Introduction 
As we have observed so far, the distribution of investment for small to medium sized 
enterprises (SME) in the UK, as elsewhere, is frequently concentrated into one or two key 
geographical areas which are anticipated as providing the most beneficial nurturing 
environment for start-up firms, often referred to as clusters. These environments are 
frequently described as being supported by access to local resources such as the core 
knowledge required to support the start up, experienced human capital, proximity of 
investors and the benefits of access to knowledge and information flowing around local 
informal networks (Florida and Kenney, 1988; Powell et al, 2002; Castilla et al, 2000). As 
venture capitalists also benefit from the flow of information regarding new opportunities 
and utilise networks to develop associations to improve the performance of their 
investments, it follows that an investor's ability to access new deals may decrease with 
distance from the investment opportunity (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). 
However, networks, particularly those based on syndication between investors (as 
described in Chapter 3), play an important role in overcoming the difficulties presented by 
the distance between investor and opportunity (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001; Kogut et al, 
2005). As we have outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, networks are important activity in the 
venture capital industry. In agreement with social capital theory, venture capitalists form 
relationships with other investors to help to facilitate the transfer of information about 
investment opportunities, as well as develop long term trust between investors. By 
examining the structure of relationships formed through syndication we can understand the 
importance of actors, or groups of actors and their impact on the function of the structural 
social capital in the UK venture capital network. 
The aim of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, to investigate whether we observe established 
patterns of syndication networks in the UK. Secondly to analyse the structure of these 
networks compared to the literature on other national VC networks and to investigate 
whether the characteristics of the networks vary according to sector. Thus, this chapter 
contributes towards answering our second thesis research question. 
6.1.1 Structure of networks - the role of geography 
Sorenson and Stuart (2001) call on a history of sociological research that draws out the 
importance of proximity in terms of physical and social space in creating social interaction. 
They suggest that increasing distances across either space, results in a lower probability of 
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forming relationships. In the world of US venture capital, which has been shown to thrive 
from informal connections and where economic activity is embedded in physical spaces, 
Sorenson and Stuart (2001) find that increasing distance between venture capitalist and a 
new target firm causes a decline in the likelihood of investment. This reflects the localised 
nature of VC activity, and the strong preferences for investing in their own local area and 
industry. 
Several studies have shown that investors are co-located with their investments in the US, 
(Powell et al, 2002, Griffith et al, 2007) and often based nearby in the UK (Rosiello and 
Parris, 2008). Although Kenney and Patton (2004) suggest that some sectors such as 
biotechnology are less dependent on co-location. A preference to provide finance to local 
businesses means they also capture important information regarding the firm, entrepreneur 
and technology to reduce information asymmetries. Clearly, there is a debate about the 
location of individual investors, but what are the dynamics of syndication networks? 
Sorenson and Stuart (2001) argue that investors who have a central position in the 
syndication network can reach more distant opportunities by using their relationships with 
other investors to identify and evaluate new opportunities. The authors find that central 
investors receive invitations to syndicate in opportunities from other VC's looking to 
attract the reputation of established investors. If the VCs are in different geographies the 
resulting syndication can create long distance relationships. The likelihood of a long 
distance investment is increased if they participate in a syndicate containing a prior 
affiliate, where that affiliate is local to the deal. 
"VC firms with a history of provincial investment patterns and those without central 
positions in the industry's co-investment network tend to invest locally; those who have 
established many and dispersed relationships with other VCfirms invest across 
geographic and industrial spaces more frequently. " (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001. p. 1584) 
In general Stuart and Sorenson (2001) believe that the syndication network provides an 
institutional structure that allows the "expansion of the spatial range of exchange in 
markets that rely on private information or a high degree of trust for transactions to occur" 
p. 1584. Their research also emphases the importance for a firm to have connections to 
locally based investors. A firm hoping to obtain funding in a region without locally based 
VC community with some experience may find it difficult to gain access to the wider 
networks (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). 
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Kogut et al's (2005) research finds that a giant network component quickly develops in 
their models of venture capital syndication. This component provides full geographical 
coverage of the US. Therefore, despite the emphasis on local ties, the syndication network 
operates on a national basis. This giant component is a distinctive characteristic of the 
venture capital industry. At the centre of the giant component Kogut et al (2005) find 
experienced investors whose names are synonymous with venture capital. These investors 
operate nationally and repeatedly syndicate with other nationally orientated investors, in 
preference to searching out new entrants to expand their network of ties. In this way 
established investors at the centre of the network acts as `spanners across geographies', by 
building trust based relationships with other established investors in different locations. 
Syndicates can be viewed as the building blocks of larger venture capital networks, as 
without the co-ordination of syndicates, venture capitalists would invest alone, and the 
giant network component observed by Kogut et al (2005) would not arise. The rapid 
formation of a large network component is thought to be a distinctive form of organisation 
in the venture capital industry; such networks have implications for the overall success of 
the venture capital industry. Research on US syndicate networks has shown there to be a 
core group of repeatedly syndicating investors (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). Bygrave 
(1987) found that from a sample of over 400 VC firms, a core of 61 investors was found in 
'/ of the portfolio firms. This result suggests an extensive network was formed around 
these central investors. Bygrave (1988) also finds that relationships between investors 
were particularly dense in hi-tech investments. In hi-tech investments the need to gather 
information to reduce uncertainty is highest; as a result the networks were tighter with 
denser linkages. 
As we discussed in Chapter 3, the distribution of relationships between agents in a network 
can indicate important network properties. Kogut et al (2005) find that the best `fit' to the 
degree distribution17 of investors in their syndication networks, followed a power law. 
However this was a poor fit. At the extremes of the US investor degree distribution the 
numbers of investors with few connections were too high and a small minority of investors 
had too many connections to give the right fit. They rule out preferential attachment as a 
means of expanding the network, particularly as they find that highly connected investors 
prefer other highly connected investors, as opposed to generating new connections. 
17 Definition of degree centrality given in chapter 3. 
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6.1.2 The role of network development 
Investors must balance their preference for repeating ties with familiar partners, by 
obtaining access to new opportunities. In order to access new opportunities and diversify 
their portfolio they must form new relationships with relatively new entrants. For example 
new investors may enter the industry because of their expertise in an emerging technology. 
In this case the new investor is a specialist, so may have a competitive advantage over 
more established investors who are less familiar with the new technology. To form a 
relationship with a new entrant, incumbents tend to invest in opportunities where at least 
one syndicate member is known from a previous deal; thus reducing the risk of entering 
into deals with unknown syndicate partners (Kogut et al, 2005) 
Overtime, reciprocation between investors is expected to develop strong patterns of 
syndication. Given an established investor's aversion to syndicating with an unknown 
investor, Hochberg et al (2007) suggest strong relationships between investors may act as a 
barrier to entry for other local investors. This may prevent smaller locally based investors 
from gaining access to deals. In order to gain entry to the network local investors have to 
work to attract other established investors to participate in their deals. 
Although we emphasise the informal social networking aspect of syndication networks, 
these discussions are also complemented by considering the financial risk motivation to 
syndication. The financial risk motivation to syndicate is driven by a desire to share the 
risk and financial burden of financing a particular company with other investors (Manigart 
et al, 2006). The financial risk motivation for syndication is explored in more detail in 
Chapter 8. However, the financial risk motivation suggests that from a network 
perspective we should expect strong repeated relationships to form between the largest 
investors. For example forming a relationship to a large investor is likely to have a greater 
value for the other partner. The larger the investor the greater the ability to share the 
financial risk, and the greater the opportunity to obtain reciprocation on future deals. It 
logically follows that a large investor should choose to network with other large 
established partners who are able to share the risks of investing. This maintains close 
relationships with those investors who are most likely to co-ordinate the network and 
reciprocate with access to their own investment portfolio. 
Following the logic of the financial risk motivation larger investors should only network 
with smaller investors to gain access to new opportunities, which may have previously 
been perceived as too risky or difficult to assess their potential. The alternative motivation 
- 125 - 
of investor syndication to add value is expected to create relationships between investors 
based on particular skills or expertise. In this case we would expect that biopharmaceutical 
deals would develop a sub-set of investors able to provide the relevant sectoral guidance to 
the firm. We continue these discussions of motivations to syndicate in Chapter 8. 
6.1.3 Performance 
The centrality of investors in the network has been shown to increase the performance of 
their fund, portfolio exits and firm survival (Hochberg et al, 2005,2007). Hochberg et al 
(2007) find that after controlling for factors known to determine VC performance, that the 
position of VC's within a syndication network was important for both fund and individual 
portfolio firm performance. Well networked VC's with central positions in the network 
were linked with more exits and trade sales, and also connected to improved survival of 
portfolio firms. The connectivity benefits were highest for those VC's connected to other 
`well connected VC's. Strongly linked investors were expected to have greater control 
over cooperating, which explains why Hochberg et al (2007) found deal valuations to be 
positively linked to measures of the network size. In their analysis accounting for network 
measures reduced the importance of the experience of VC's on performance. 
Although Sorenson and Stuart (2001) make no comment on the implications of network 
ties for the profitability of an investor, it follows that we can bring together their findings 
on the geography of investment with the work of Hockberg et al (2005,2007). For 
example, Sorenson and Stuart (2001) find that older more established investors with 
central network positions are able to invest over larger distances than younger less 
experienced peripheral investors. In light of Hockberg (2005,2007) we would also 
anticipate that investors with greater geographical access to deals, will have a larger choice 
of deals and therefore have better access to high quality opportunities regardless of 
location. 
6.1.4 Some conjectures about VC syndication networks in the UK 
Based on the literature we can expect investors in SME to be situated in a network of past 
and present affiliations with other investors, which potentially influences their access to 
future deals. The function of these networks is partly to share information about investment 
opportunities, but also, as suggested in the syndication literature, is to share access to deals 
with the expectation that this will be reciprocated. The co-ordination of the network is 
based on familiarity and trust. 
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Therefore in terms of network structure we expect the main co-ordinators of UK 
syndication networks to be a minority group. As in Kogut et al (2005) we expect the 
distribution of relationships for each investor to approximately follow a power law. We 
also expect this general trend to hold across different sectors. However, sector networks 
are expected tobe different. In line with Bygave (1988) high uncertainty associated with 
hi-tech sectors, such as biopharmaceuticals, will to lead to relatively dense network 
structures compared to low-tech sectors. Similarly, hi-tech sector network will have a 
higher proportion of strong or repeated relationships between investors. 
The overall network will have a giant network structure which includes the majority of 
investors, organised around a core of central investors. As Kogut et al (2005) stress that 
new technologies involve specialist investors, we might also expect that the central 
structure of the network is different across sectors. We expect that the importance or 
centrality of investors in a network may change according to sector. 
In the giant network structure we expect that the established names of venture capital to 
play the key co-ordinating role. Established names of UK venture capital will operate on (i) 
on a national basis; (ii) at the centre of the network, (iii) connected by strong repeated and 
dense linkages. (iv) building on the expectation that established investors will act as the co- 
ordinators of the network, they will provide the links between different geographical 
pockets of activity. It follows that experienced actors have the ability to run multiple 
offices, as well as invest outside of their own locality using their wider network of contacts 
to support their investments. Therefore established investors will control connections of 
local investors to the main component. 
We expect that local investors will be (i) smaller in size (ii) being locally constrained, will 
be strongly connected to other smaller local investors, so dense patterns of linkages should 
be observed where local investors syndicate together on local opportunities. (iii) Finally 
because of difficulties in attracting large investors only some groups of local investors will 
be joined to the main network component through connections to national investors. 
Therefore we expect that peripheral areas of the network will be characterised by small 
groups of strongly inter-connected small investors. We expect to be able to associate these 
smaller groups with specific UK regions. 
The combination of position and strength of relational ties of the established investors 
provides further benefits in the form of control, firstly through their influence on using the 
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network to improve the performance of their own portfolio, but also in terms of the 
formation or expansion of the wider network through weaker less frequent linkages with 
new entrant investors. The network grows either by entrants allowing established investors 
to invest in their deals or where new entrants follow established investors into deals in later 
stages. In both cases the position of the established investors provides some control over 
how new entrants can profit from the benefits of association with the high performing 
central investors as found by Hochburg et al (2007). Therefore, we can envisage two 
different types of new entrants -a small local investor looking to syndicate with 
established players to improve their investment performance, or larger institutional or 
general investors looking to invest in opportunities with an established performance profile 
and therefore of a more acceptable risk. The latter group could also include large corporate 
companies investing with ambition to acquire the firm at a later stage. 
6.1.5 Analysis of networks 
We have used the literature to generate a number of expectations regarding the role and 
structure of syndication networks. In the following sections we will compare the structure 
of networks observed in the UK to these expectations. This is pertinent because despite 
literature discussing the different motivations of syndication in the UK compared to the US 
literature, the network literature makes few references to the UK specifically. We also 
note the lack of significant discussion of networking as a sector specific activity, or 
investor specialisation. Therefore we will explore how these expectations fit with our UK 
data and investigate differences according to sector and region. 
6.2 Method and approach 
6.2.1 Relational data 
In this chapter we use the Library House database of early stage investment deals to 
provide the information on each firm, the amount of investment received, and the names of 
different investors in each round. In some cases the data available on the investors in a 
round will provide the fund name. Using the Internet, and the membership details of trade 
associations, such as the BVCA we drafted a list of all investors active in the UK, and used 
this to determine the names of active investors. In the cases where the named investor in 
the data did not appear on our list we used the Internet to find the name of the fund 
manager. 
During these searches we also encountered cases where a fund is administered through one 
agent, but the investment managed through a second party. In these cases we take the 
details of the named managing investor, rather than the specific fund. We cannot rule out 
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that there are some `fund of fund' type arrangements, particularly where large investors 
have seeded a small start-up venture capital firm. These types of relationships are not 
included in our analysis, as we interested in understanding the relationships between the 
active investor as opposed to the financing source. We also make the assumption that the 
finance provided is venture capital investment, i. e. with the intention of creating a new 
business as opposed to any other motivation for creating a new entity, such as control of IP, 
or other competitive reasons. 
Finally, in some cases only the type of funding is indicated, for example, University 
Challenge fund, institutional investors. Where these investments could not be traced they 
are removed from the analysis, as they create `false' linkages if they remain in the data. 
6.2.2 Network representation and analysis: affiliation and co-investment 
syndicates 
In the process of analysing the data for this chapter we used several different types of 
network representations, including one mode (investor only) and two mode (investor and 
firm) representations. As our main aim is to analyse the relationships between investors 
we report the results for the one mode network only. We will also manipulate the 
relationships to show strong relationships (relationships that occur between network actors 
more than once) and also to reduce the network to show only those actors who provide 
links in the network and so decide the network structure. 
In addition to the data being comprised of two modes, we use two definitions of 
syndication to construct the relationships in the network (Brander et al, 2002). The first is 
a wide definition of syndication, based on the shared affiliation of investors to the same 
firm. In the mode 1 network representation of an affiliation network a line between two 
investors indicates that they share an affiliation to at least one firm. In interpreting this 
network there is an implicit assumption, that because these investors both provide finance 
to the firm, at some point, there is a connection between investors although not necessarily 
a formal relationship. Clearly in cases where there are multiple common affiliations it is 
likely that there is a strong relationship between investors, and we can assume that this 
relationship will involve the transfer of information about opportunities and repeated 
relationships suggest the development of trust. However, it does not necessarily mean that 
they co-invested together at the same time. 
The alternative definition of a syndicate is based on co-investment. In a co-investment 
network we introduce the restriction that a relationship between investors only exists if 
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investors have provided finance to the same firm at the same time. This is a more formal 
relationship. As a firm may receive multiple rounds, often from the same group of 
investors, the same firm may appear several times in the dataset. In this case we just look 
at relationships between co-investors, and the details of the firm receiving the investment is 
of less importance. The co-investment networks are expected to be more fragmented and 
provide a more formal view of relationships between investors formed only when 
investments occur between investors in the same firm at the same time. 
We can then compare how these two representations of syndication networks differ. A 
large difference would indicate that investors use different networks for obtaining 
information compared to the relationships they build through investing with other investors. 
In all network examples described in this chapter no distinction is made when drawing the 
networks as to which period individual investments relate. The network represents 
investors with a common affiliation to particular firms. It is possible to identify the 
affiliation of these investors across several firms. 
As we only show the network formed from the cumulative activity of investors in our 
dataset, we concentrate our analysis to examine the expectations generated from the 
literature for the structure of the network, rather than how the network may evolves or the 
performance outcome of the network structure. Based on our discussion we categorise our 
expectations and propose a method of evaluating these expectations. 
Table 7.1 Expectations for the structure of UK investor networks 
_Category 
Expectations Method 
Structure Network to include a single large Visual inspection of sociograms and 
component comprised of established network statistics 
national investors 
Established investors to have the most Use of centrality statistics to indicate 
central positions; smaller investors in most central investors and visual 
peripheral positions ins ection of sociograms 
Ties between central investors to be Modification of sociograms to exclude 
strong (repeated) weaker ties- count of repeated ties 
Ties between smaller local investors to be Modification of sociograms to exclude 
strong (repeated). weaker ties- count of repeated ties 
Smaller local groups will be connected to Visual inspection of sociograms 
the main component through ties to 
national investors 
Geography Strength of ties between investors to Applying categories to the vertices of the 
indicate different regional clusters. sociograin according to geography 
Sector Network density to be higher in more Network statistics 
technological uncertain sectors 
Centrality of investors will vary across Correlation of centrality measures across 
sectors of activity sectors 
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In the first instance we examine some general properties of the network, including the 
distribution of relationships between investors based on affiliation and co-investment 
networks. Then we use network statistics to examine whether the networks are organised 
differently according to sector, before examining the centralities of investors according to 
sector according to our sector level expectations. This helps to understand whether we 
should view the full network as a single network, or an aggregation of different sectors. 
Finally we examine the expectations for the detailed structure and geography of the 
network using network various representations - sociograms, to show different types of 
network structure and activity. We use network analysis software called Pajek to analyse 
our network and report network statistics and sociograms. 
6.3 Network analysis 
6.3.1 Skewed distribution of relationships 
We find that the majority of investment activity is concentrated to a minority of investors, 
relative to the total active pool of investors. Approximately 90% of all investors make five 
or less investments, and this trend holds regardless of whether we consider all investments, 
only biopharmaceutical investments or investments at a regional level. When we graph the 
number of investments held by each investor we find the distributions have extended non- 
continuous tails with a small minority of investors with particularly large number of 
investments, as shown in Figure 7.1 
FianrP 71C. rnnh of tha rlictrih>>t; nn of inveetnr rpIntinnchinc with nnrtfnIin firme 
We find approximately 70% of investors are affiliated to only one firm. Of these, 4% 
involve no syndicate (i. e. one investor per firm) and so are isolated from the network in 
terms of co-investment and shared affiliations to other investors. This description of the 
data suggests that a feature of investment activity in the UK is the diversity of involvement; 
as shown by the combination of a minority of investors with large portfolios, and a 
majority who participate infrequently. A similar pattern is found for the biopharmaceutical 
sector. 
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In line with Kogut et al (2005) we also examine the measure of the degree of each venture 
capitalist. As we find our degree distribution is non-continuous we follow Kogut et al 
(2005) and use cumulative frequency graphs and remove vertices with degree equal to zero. 
To check for the presence of a strong power law relationship we use a log-log plot. As we 
examine the network as a static structure, a linear relationship in the log-log plots is 
suggestive of a structure containing hubs. 
In Figure 7.2 below, we show four log-log cumulative frequency graph for investor degree 
centrality based on the 1-mode network. Following Newman (2005) we plot the 
cumulative degree distribution to evaluate our data for the presence of hubs. We show 
plots from the Biopharma and All deals data, using statistics based on the affiliation and 
co-investment networks. 
Figure 7.2 Graph of log-log plot of cumulative frequency of investor degree 
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Figure 7.2 shows all plots to be approximately linear and share a similar pattern. Adding a 
linear trend line to the All deals network provides a good approximation, explaining around 
97% of the variation. So we find that the power law relationship is a strong fit. In 
agreement with the observations of Newman (2005) regarding networks and power laws, 
the linear trend is strongest in the tail of the distribution. However, to be sure of the 
presence of a power law the data needs to be evaluated over a range of four orders of 
magnitude (Newman, 2005). Our distribution of degree statistics only includes three 
orders of magnitude. Similarly, Barabäsi and Albert (1999) suggest that the gradient of the 
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linear trend should have a magnitude in the range 2.1 to 4, to indicate preferential 
attachment. The gradient of the trend line shown in Figure 7.2 is outside this range. 
Whilst we find that the presence of extremely high degree investors in each network is 
indicative of a linear trend and the presence of hubs, like Kogut et al (2005), we find 
evidence that the hub and spoke type structure is not a good model to apply to this network. 
For example, in order to fit the Barabäsi and Albert (1999) criteria, the trend line would 
need to be much steeper. This indicates that in our results, we either observe too small a 
minority of investors with high degree statistics relative to population of investors; or 
alternatively, given the size of our population, we observe a minority of investors with a 
much bigger degree statistic than would be expected. 
Finally, as the investors in the biopharmaceutical network are a subset of the investors in 
the main network, it follows that their cumulative frequency degrees scores are lower, as 
there are a smaller number of investors to link with. We also note that the affiliation and 
co-investment network consistently show similar trends. This indicates that they share a 
similar distribution of investor degree scores, despite differences in how we have 
constructed the network. In the next section we focus on the statistics based on the 
affiliation network as the overall structures are similar. In the later sections of this chapter 
we will return to the detailed network properties of these investors, in terms of affiliations 
and co-investments. 
6.3.2 Relational statistics in different sectors 
As highlighted in Chapter 2, the biotech sector is shown to be more intensive in terms of 
the demands put on investors in terms of the amount of finance. In this section we will 
examine how different sector activity translates in to network structures. 
Table 7.2 compares the characteristics of affiliation networks across sectors. To do this we 
consider the network in 1 mode form, specifically looking at the shared affiliations 
between investors. Each sector is defined according to the firm receiving the investment, 
thereby creating a network of investors with interests in a particular sector. Table 7.2 
shows the number of vertices and edges in each 1 mode sector network. A vertex in this 
chapter refers to an investor; an edge refers to the connection between two investors. We 
consider each edge to be undirected, and can have an integer value greater than zero. 
Edges of value greater than one refer to multiple ties between investors (i. e. repeated 
affiliations between two investors). The second part of the table shows the density of the 
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each network. The density is defined according to the ratio of count of actual ties in the 1 
mode network, to the count of all possible ties if each investor was connected to all other 
investors. As the density statistic is sensitive to network size (and higher numbers of 
vertices tend to decrease network densities) this makes it difficult to compare densities 
across networks. We follow De Nooy et al (2005) and include average degree statistics to 
understand the relative cohesion of different networks. The table shows the average 
degree'8 value in terms of the mean and median. The density of a network is generally 
specific to the size of a network; the mean and median degrees are measures of the density 
of relationships between investors which can be compared across different sized networks. 
Table 7.2 Investor network statistics by sector 
Sector Total network Density 
Edges Edges % Mean Median 
Vertices (any value) valued >1 multiple Density de ree degree 
Comms 329 798 15 1.9% 0.015 4.85 4 
Biopharma 402 2071 153 7.4% 0.026 10.30 7 
Healthcare 192 438 20 4.6% 0.024 4.56 3 
IT 743 2657 149 5.6% 0.010 7.15 4 
Other 643 1564 79 5.1% 0.008 4.86 3 
All 1585 6980 589 8.4% 0.006 8.81 5 
The table shows the total network includes 1585 different investors, sharing nearly 7,000 
relationships to the same portfolio firms. Of these 7,000 relationships 589 (8.4%) are 
repeated on more than one occasion. This means that investors have more than one shared 
affiliation in nearly 600 of the relationships. We note that for the entire network 
approximately 0.6% of all potential relationships are found, given by the density statistic. 
The final row of Table 7.2 shows that for the total network, on average each investor has a 
minimum of 8 ties based on the mean degree score, and 5 ties based on the median degree 
value 19. 
When we look at the sector network statistics we find that nearly half of all investors in the 
database have made an IT investment (47%), compared to 25% of investors into biopharma. 
The number of investors active in IT is 1.8 times the number of investors active in 
biopharma. Yet in terms of relationships, IT has only 1.3 times the number of relationships 
of biopharma. Similarly in the second largest sector network, categorised as `Other', the 
18 The average degree is the simple calculation of the sum of the degrees of each investor divided by the 
number of investors in the network. This measure counts multiple ties as one relationship. 
19 As the degree measure is an ego centric score, a relationship between investors A and B, counts towards 
the degree score of A and B. Therefore multiplying the average score by the number of investors does not 
equal the number of relationships, and is an average with respect to each investor. 
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number of relationships are fewer than in the biopharma network. Thus, Table 7.2 shows 
that the biopharma network consistently has higher density measures than other sectors. 
Finally, the statistics for the proportion of multiple relationships indicates that biopharma 
has a relatively high proportion of investors who repeatedly fund the same firms, compared 
to the other sectors. Although biopharma investors are not the largest group, we find that 
they have greater and stronger connections to each other through common affiliations than 
compared to the other sectors. 
6.3.3 Summary 
In summary this analysis shows that there are relatively few investors who have made 
more than five investments and a high proportion of investors are only affiliated to one 
firm. However, we still find an extensive network is formed through common affiliations 
between investors, suggesting that the majority of investors have a tie to another investor. 
A minority have a vast number of ties. 
We also find evidence of repeated affiliations between investors. This suggests that 
relationships between investors also vary in strength. In general the majority of 
relationships are weak, with affiliations occurring only once. Those investors tied with 
repeated `strong' relationships occur most frequently in the group of biopharma investors. 
6.4 Network structure 
In this section, using a variety of statistics, we will look in more detail at the structure of 
the core of the networks discussed in the previous section. The first statistic we look at is 
the size of the core component2° and its size relative to the total pool of investors. The 
size of the core component indicates how many investors are connected (directly and 
indirectly) to the central investors. The percentage of investors connected to the core 
component indicates how coordinated the network is, or alternatively how fragmented the 
network is. If the number of investors in the largest component is low it suggests the 
presence of several different networks, rather than the single large component as found in 
US syndication networks. 
We also measure the average distance between vertices. The average distance provides an 
indication of how information could travel through the network, as high values indicate 
that information has on average to travel further between different actors in the network. 
20 By core component we refer to the largest connected group of investors 
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The average distance between vertices is calculated by taking an average of all geodesics21 
from one vertex to another in the network. As we exclude pairs that are unreachable, this 
measure refers to the distance between vertices in the core component. 
In order to evaluate how the network is structured it would be useful to describe the 
network in terms of centrality. Firstly we discuss how the network is organised in terms of 
general structure of the network and whether it is organised around key co-ordinators who 
operate at the centre of the network (centralization), and secondly to know who the most 
central actors are (centrality of investors) (De Nooy et al , 2005). 
To measure centrality we have three different calculations, from which we can generate 
network centralizations. A direct measure of centrality uses the degree of each vertex, as 
central actors will have larger numbers of relationships. We measure the degree 
centralization of a network as "the variation in the degrees of vertices divided by the 
maximum degree variations which is possible in a network of the same size" p. 126 (de 
Nooy et al, 2005). 
The alternative measures of centrality include indirect links between actors to calculate 
centrality. The first is betweenness centrality, which perceives central actors as 
intermediaries between other actors in the network. Therefore the measure of betweenness 
centralization, "is the variation in betweenness centrality of vertices divided by the 
maximum variation in betweenness centrality scores possible in a network of the same 
size" p. 131, where the betweenness centrality for a single vertex is expressed as a 
proportion of "all geodesics between pairs of other vertices that include this vertex" (de 
Nooy et al, 2005 p. 131). 
The second measure of indirect centrality uses the distance between a vertex and all other 
vertices, with the assumption that actors who are close to other actors will have more 
central positions. As with other measures, the closeness centralization is the, "variation in 
the closeness centrality of vertices divided by the maximum variation in closeness 
centrality scores possible in a network of the same size" (de Nooy et al, 2005 p. 127). As 
this centralization is based on geodesic distance, the score is based on the core component 
vertices only. 
21 Geodesics are the shortest path length between two vertices 
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A common feature of these three measures is that they compare networks to the most 
central structure of a network which is based on `star' type configurations. In a star type 
network a single central actor is directly connected to all other actors. This centralised 
structure facilitates efficient transfer of information to the other actors in the network. 
From a degree centrality perspective, the central actor is tied to all others, from a closeness 
perspective this minimises distances between network actors. In both cases this structure 
optimises how easily information can reach all the network actors. From a betweenness 
centrality perspective, the central actor is the link between all other actors, therefore this is 
the optimum structure for an intermediary or a controller (De Nooy et al , 2005). In all 
cases the higher the centrality score, the greater the contrast between the centre and the 
periphery of the network. 
However, we can anticipate two potential drawbacks in using centrality measures for this 
analysis when we think about our discussion of networks in Chapter 3. At one level we 
view the relationships between investors based on sharing information and building trust. 
From the information sharing perspective, in large networks the central actors could 
potentially operate as a bottleneck if all information is transferred and accessed through a 
single actor and may result in some inefficiency. 
If we think about the relationships as about sharing risk, then assumptions regarding the 
efficient transfer of information may not hold. For example a high network centrality 
score would suggest a small group of investors share a large burden of risk in a particularly 
industry. Taking both points together indicates that the optimum network structure for 
venture capital investing may not always be the most centralized and might indicate the 
presence of small world type structures. However, the literature does indicate that 
centrality will be a feature of the networks if they are managed by the established national 
investors. 
Our goal here is to use the centrality measures to understand whether different sectors have 
more centralised network structures and to highlight the presence of central investors in co- 
ordinating the network. To achieve this we report in Table 7.3: the number of vertices in 
the largest component, the proportion of investors in the core compared to the total 
network, the average distance between investors, and the three network centralization 
scores. We compare these measures across the sectors to understand how network 
structures may vary. 
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The table shows that the total network of all investors demonstrates a strong presence of a 
single core component containing 90% of investors. In contrast to our earlier findings that 
a large number of investors only invest occasionally, the majority of these investors do 
have an affiliation to other investors that join them to the centre of the network. 
In the individual sector networks the percentage of investors connected to the core are 
lower. This suggests that some relationships between investors occur independently of 
sector classifications. By expressing the networks as sector based, some investors in sector 
networks appear isolated from the core of that particular sector network. For example an 
investor may participate in more than one sector and so have relationships which do not 
feature in a given sector network. As we aim to capture sector specific characteristics this 
is not a problem. 
Table 7.3 Network statistics by sector 
Sector Centralit measures 
Vertices in Core % of total Ave. distance Between Close- 
component vertices between vertices Degree -ness ness 
Comms 202 61% 3.56 0.10 0.105 0.31 
Biopharma 359 89% 2.84 0.24 0.234 0.36 
Healthcare 149 78% 3.15 0.26 0.344 0.43 
IT 623 84% 3.36 0.18 0.269 0.43 
Other 484 75% 3.68 0.16 0.262 0.40 rZýAll 
1423 90% 3.31 0.17 0.191 0.38 
The table shows variation in the proportion of investors involved in the network core 
across different sectors. Biopharma has the largest network core relative to the pool of 
active investors, with 89% of investors connected to the main component. In contrast, 
investors in communications are more fragmented with only 61 % of investors connected to 
the main component. We find that the investors in the main component in biopharma are 
the most closely connected, on average being only 2.84 vertices apart. It suggests that 
information can be transferred from one investor to any other investor on average through 
3 investors in biopharma, compared to 4 investors in the other sectors. 
The results of the centrality analysis suggest that the biopharma network is less dependent 
on central investors compared to the other sectors. The centrality scores measure the 
variation in centrality of individual investors. A low variation in scores translates into a 
more distributed network structure. In terms of direct centrality (degree), biopharma is 
ranked second after the healthcare sector, but in the indirect measures biopharma performs 
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relatively poorly, with a low centrality in terms of betweenness and closeness, relative to 
other sectors such as IT, Healthcare and `Other' types of technology. 
Interpreting these measures of centrality suggests that the UK biopharma network is 
formed of a relatively large and dense core component. The degree statistics indicate the 
presence of central actors, or hubs with many direct connections. The geodesic statistics 
indicate this sector has relatively short distances on average between each investor. 
Therefore we can view investors in this sector as generally well connected with few 
investors isolated from the core. 
However the centralization scores look for structure with a clear centre and periphery. The 
lower centrality scores based on the intermediary positions (betweenness) and distance 
(closeness) between investors indicate a lower level of network centrality than found in 
other sectors. We expect this is a result of a low variation in the centrality scores across 
different investors. This determines a network structure that is more distributed when we 
consider the indirect linkages, which matches the lower average geodesic. We can expect 
to find central biopharma investors with many direct connections. But, the higher average 
degree and density statistics for biopharma suggest that the network is generally 
characterised by high connectivity, and therefore a more distributed general structure. 
We find the biopharma network is not fragmented, but is distributed across different 
investors. We have described a network where information will move easily through the 
network. Biopharma investors have built up many relationships and the presence of 
several well connected investors reduces the reliance on any particular investor to act as an 
information source. In terms of control of the network, the distributed structure means an 
absence of controlling investors. This may suggest the absence of specialist biopharma 
investors. Compared to other sectors, no minority group of investors coordinates the 
network. 
However, these results are not weighted by the importance of relationships with particular 
investors, and each relationship is considered equal. To understand how these 
characteristics may shape the network structure we will use sociograms in later sections. 
Next we look at the centrality scores of investors, to see how they specialised across 
sectors. 
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6.5 The presence of specialist investors 
An implicit assumption in the discussion above is that investor activity can be separated 
according to sector activity. We previously noted that dividing activity by sectors may 
interfere with the overall network structure. We cannot assume that important actors in 
each sector are not important across all sectors. In this section we attempt to understand 
the level of sector specialisation of investors. 
We use the same measures of centrality as described previously, but report these statistics 
for individual investors across sectors. We then look for correlations in each investor's 
centrality scores across each sector, comparing two sectors at a time. We also use two 
types of correlation measures, listwise and pairwise correlation to generate two different 
correlation statistics. In the first approach we produce a listwise correlation statistic based 
on the centrality statistics for each investor, setting the centralities of investors not active in 
a particular sector to zero. Therefore the listwise correlation analyses all 1585 investors in 
the data. In the second approach, using pairwise correlation, the correlation statistic 
analyses only the sector centrality scores reported for each investor, so only analyses a sub- 
set of the list of investors. The pairwise correlation analysis, which compares the reported 
centrality scores of investors across two given sectors, will ignore investors not active both 
sectors, thus specialist investors are excluded from the pairwise correlation statistic. 
By comparing the results of the two correlation statistics, we can highlight the affect of 
specialist investors, i. e. investors only active in one sector. The pairwise correlation 
statistic excludes specialists, and by definition only analyses generalist investors, whereas 
the listwise correlation includes specialists with a zero score for sectors where they are 
inactive. We illustrate this in the Figure 7.4 over the page. 
In Figure 7.3 we show two examples of the differences that can occur in correlation 
statistics, using eight investors. Investors 1-2 are active in only sector B, investors 7-8 are 
active in sector A, and investors 3-6, are active in both sectors A and B. We call investors 
3-6 generalists and investors 1,2,7 and 8, specialists. 
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Figure 7.3 Examples of centrality correlations scenarios 
Example one: Moderately correlated generalist investors 
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In both examples we show the centrality statistics for each investor, in two sectors. We 
show three scenarios where the specialist investors occupy different network positions: 
centrally positioned specialists- `high specialisation', moderately central positions - 
`moderately specialisation', and finally peripheral positions - `low specialisation'. In each 
example we keep the generalist investor centrality scores constant so we can describe how 
different levels of specialisation in the network result in different correlation statistics. The 
final point to note, is that we set the centrality scores for investors who are absent from a 
particular sector to zero (shown in italics). Without this correction the correlations would 
always report the pairwise correlations, which would only ever include investors 3-6. The 
listwise correlations are based on all investors 1-8. Changes to the generalist investor 
correlations influence the result of the list wise correlations. Therefore we must always 
consider the results of the list wise correlations with respect to the pair wise results. 
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Our main point is that increasing the centrality of specialised investors consistently reduces 
the list wise correlations coefficients scores relative to the pair wise results. When we 
compare statistics for each scenario, the more central (important) the specialised the 
investors, the larger the difference in pair wise and list wise correlations. This is true even 
when the generalist investors are perfectly correlated; introducing central specialist 
investors reduces the overall correlation. The presence of specialist investors who have 
peripheral positions does not make large difference to the correlation scores. 
Our `list wise' approach means we capture all investors' position in the network. A strong 
positive correlation coefficient indicates an absence of specialist investors in central 
network positions. The `pair wise' approach compares the positions of investors who, due 
to the fact they operate in at least two sectors, are more general by nature. A high pair 
wise correlation coefficient indicates that generalist positions in the network structure do 
not vary according to sector. 
Overall we find that irrespective of how we perform the correlations, the centrality scores 
of investors in each sector are correlated to the centrality scores of the same investors in 
the total network (all sectors combined). Therefore, investors that are important in 
individual sectors remain in central positions when the investor's activities are pooled. 
However our primary interest is in comparing the different sectors. 
One issue we have with this method of comparing list wise and pair wise correlations is to 
understand what constitutes a significant difference between coefficient scores. We decide 
that rather than compare individual correlation coefficients, we compare the range of 
correlation coefficients produced for each correlation approach and choice of centrality 
measure. 
In Table 7.4 we find a mixed set of results. The table shows each correlation approach, the 
centrality measure used and the coefficient range based across the five different sectors 
(Biopharma, Comms, IT, Healthcare and Other). By using the coefficient range we can 
talk generally about the position of specialists in the networks, rather than talking 
specifically about specialists in one sector. 
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Table 7.4 Summary of correlation results 
Correlation 
approach 
Centrality 
measure 
Coefficient range 
(comparing sectors) 
1-List wise Betweenness 0.42-0.83 
Closeness -0.09-0.15 
De ree 0.23-0.60 
2-Pairwise Betweenness 0.42-0.85 
Closeness 0.12-0.47 
Degree 0.45-0.75 
The presence of specialist sector investors who are central to the networks should result in 
lower coefficient scores in approach one compared to approach two. For example a 
biopharma specialist with a high centrality in the biopharma sector, will not be active in 
other sectors, so we default their centrality score to zero in these other sectors. In the 
correlation between centrality scores of investors in biopharma versus a different sector, a 
biopharma specialist will appear as an outlier, thereby reducing the correlation trend. In 
the case of specialists occupying very central positions, we may find that the listwise 
correlation is negative. In the second pairwise approach we do not default the scores to 
zero and specialist investors are excluded. This should improve the second coefficient 
value by removing the outliers. 
In Table 7.4 we find that comparing the range of scores based on betweenness centrality, 
the range of coefficient values are similar in approach one and approach two. These results 
suggest that important intermediaries in the network are not tied to specific sectors, but are 
generally important in all sectors. As we find that the correlation coefficients values based 
on betweenness are generally moderate to high, we can also say that generalists occupy 
similar network positions across sectors. Generalist investor's betweenness centralities in 
the biopharma network are very similar to those in healthcare, IT and the `Other' sector 
networks. 
However for the degree and closeness centrality correlations, there is some indication that 
coefficients are lower in the first approach compared to the second. As the minimum and 
maximum range values are lower in approach one compared to approach two. This 
indicates that the position of investors in the network in terms of their direct connections 
(degree) and distance to other investors (closeness) does vary with sector specialists. 
For the results of the correlation of investor degree centrality, removing the specialist 
investors generally gives higher correlation coefficients in approach 2. However, the 
listwise results are still statistically significant and of a moderate score, indicating that 
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despite including specialist investors, a positive correlation trend holds in both approaches. 
It suggests that specialist investors are not central to their respective sector networks. 
In general correlations based on investor's closeness centrality scores are weaker than 
found using the other centrality measures. This indicates that even generalist investor's 
position in the network, measured by their distance to all other investors, changes 
according to sector. Comparing closeness centrality scores between correlation approach 
one and approach two shows a sizeable change in the range of reported coefficient values 
resulting from the position of specialists in the network. In the list wise approach we find 
negative associations between investor centralities in different sectors. Here specialist 
investors appear to influence the results, indicating that their network position relative to 
other investors is more pronounced. As closeness centrality is sensitive to the core 
component of a network, it suggests that specialists are a feature of the core network. 
When we combine these results, we find that the network importance of specialists comes 
from having direct contacts (degree) to other investors at the core of the sector networks. 
However, the intermediary (betweenness) positions are held by generalists. We find these 
observations agree with the literature. Specialist investors provide an important role in the 
network through sector specific expertise, which can be utilised by the established 
investors. Specialists are positioned in the core of the network, but act as an aid to the 
main industry players, rather than a central player themselves. 
6.5.1 Summary 
This section has described the general properties of investor networks in the UK, and 
compared these properties across technology sectors. This research has confirmed that 
syndication networks are generally well connected and formed from a single component 
core including the majority of investors. Our results are similar to the network structure 
described by Kogut et al (2005). In line with a literature on technological uncertainty and 
information sharing we have found differences in networks across sectors. Biopharma 
networks were found to be relatively dense with highly connected investors but with a 
distributed structure. 
Finally we find an ambiguous result for examining the importance of investors across 
sectors. There appear to be two processes at work. We find a core of generalist investors 
who are central to the structure of all networks regardless of sector. In addition these 
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investors are supported by specialists who operate in the centre of the network and are well 
connected, but do not take the prime co-ordinating position. 
To confirm these results and explore them further, we need to examine the detailed 
network structure. In the next section we examine the network representations, particularly 
focusing on the core network structures. We will include detail on the type of investors 
and their geographical locations and try to understand what bearing this has on the network 
structure. 
6.6 Mapping of syndication networks 
6.6.1 Analysis of the core component 
Figure 7.4 shows the network formed from shared affiliations between all investors in the 
dataset. To this point we have used statistics which include all investors, regardless of 
their relational activity. However, actors without any relationships to other investors are 
isolated from the network. To concentrate on the structure of the network we remove 
investors without any connection to other investors (degree = 0). We also code the vertices 
by colour to represent the regional coverage of each investor, as calculated from their 
activity in the total dataset. Investors activity in more than four regions are coded as 
national, those with interests in more than one region are multi-regional, and investors with 
interests in only one region are categorised as local. 
The network clearly shows a single large dense component at the centre. In line with the 
expectations from the literature we find that at the centre of the main network component 
are the national investors having interests across several regions. Conversely as we move 
from the centre to the periphery we find that we move from investors with a multi-regional 
presence to those operating solely in one region. 
We find that Figure 7.4 is predominantly formed from local investors. Over 70% of 
investors in the network are local to one region; the largest presence of single region 
investors is in London and the South East. However this representation does not account 
for the contribution of investors. If we were to represent the approximate contribution of 
each investor we would find that the core national group of investors contribute over 40% 
of the value of investment, based on only a 109 investors22 from the total of 1518. 
22 We don't have information on the exact contribution of investors in each deal, so we calculate the amount 
individual investors contribute by assuming each investor contributes evenly in every investment round, and 
then sum the total contribution. 
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Figure 7.4 Sociogram of syndication network of all investors (degree -: > 1) 
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In the core group of national investors we find established large investors such as 3i Group, 
Aberdeen Asset Managers, and YFM Group. However, we also find other types of 
investors, such as companies solely managing VCT (Venture Capital Trust) funds such as 
Oxford Technology Management, and Government related initiatives including direct DTI 
finance, as well as investment from charities such as the Wellcome Trust. 
We also analyse the network formed from 401 investors active in biopharma firms. For 
these investors we find increased levels of financial concentration towards the national 
actors compared to the previous discussion. In the biopharma network, 55% of investment 
is attributed to just 76 investors. This small group of investors all have a national presence 
and are located at the centre of the network. 
However, we also observe less consistency in terms of the structure of the network 
according to locational presence. A visual inspection the distribution of locally acting, 
multi-regional and overseas investors suggests a more even spread. In fact the number of 
single location investors represents less than 50% of the active biopharma investors. It 
suggests that investors in biopharma firms need to be larger more established investors. 
This is in line with the discussion in Chapter 5, as biopharma investment is high risk, only 
established investors more likely to accept these deals. 
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We have frequently referred to centrality as an important aspect of network structure. Who 
are these central investors? We examine the betweeness centrality to understand who the 
most important intermediaries in the network are. We find that in line with their high 
degree statistics two investors consistently have central positions as measured by the 
betweenness centrality in the all sector network. The most central venture capitalist is 3i 
Group being an intermediary in 18% of geodesics in the total investor network and 15% in 
the biopharma network. However, the most central intermediary in the affiliation network 
is the DTI. The DTI it is involved in 19% of the pathways between investors overall (23% 
in biopharma). 
This observation runs against our expectations. We predicted that the most central 
investors would be the established names of venture capital. DTI funding, typically via 
grants and other public investment schemes (excluding professionally managed funds), are 
provided as seed capital finance. We can see that the DTI as a provider of seed capital has 
many affiliations with other investors who have provided funds to the same firms. 
However our literature does not indicate what type of intermediary role the DTI plays at a 
network level beyond providing finance. Clearly as a central investor in the network it has 
strong potential in terms of the informal circulation of information or participation in VC 
networking events. 
Through common affiliations the DTI is connected to most major investors such as 3i 
Group, Oxford Technology Management, YFM group. We also find that the DTI has 
repeated affiliations that link it to other public institutions, such as NESTA, Carbon Trust, 
Scottish Enterprise and University affiliated bodies such as Cambridge Enterprise. In 
approximately 25% of cases the DTI money was used as the first recorded investment, 
rising to over 50% of cases within the first two rounds. However, the range of 
participation includes the 10th round suggesting that DTI funding is provided across a 
range of development stages. Finally we note that its central position in the network 
suggests it fulfils an important role in the financing of firms. However, in terms of the 
financial significance, or the estimated value contributed by each investor, we find that the 
DTI is approximately 29 times smaller than 3i, and 11 times smaller in biopharma. This is 
in agreement with the DTI's report in to Venture Capital provision in England (2005). 
This report finds that the DTI is one of the main providers of capital in the sub £500k 
market. 
- 147 - 
6.6.2 Repeated relationships 
We have consistently referred to repeated ties between investors as indicating the strength 
of affiliation between investors. We find that 92% (93% in biopharma) of the relationships 
between investors involve a single common investment in a single firm. This type of 
relationship can be viewed as a relatively weak tie. In Chapter 3 we noted weaker ties can 
facilitate the distribution of information around a network, and are of significance, 
particularly for managing uncertainty. The high proportion of weak linkages in UK 
networks is in agreement with Bygrave (1987,1988) who suggests the main role of 
syndication networks is to manage uncertainty. 
Our literature review also notes that investors favour trust based ties to organise their 
relationships, particularly established investors who routinely invest with other similar 
status investors. Through repeated cooperation and repeated ties these investors build trust. 
In our network only a small minority of investors are affiliated to more than one firm, and 
therefore can potentially develop trust based relationships. Of these investors the largest 
number of repeated affiliations is found between Oxford Technology Management and the 
DTI. They are linked by 15 common affiliations. Again, this is not expected, this links the 
UK Government with a Venture Capital trust management firm. In contrast the strongest 
link between biopharma investors is between two established VC's Avlar Bioventures and 
Merlin Biosciences, which is what would be expected 
To understand the structure and involvement of investors with strong links we can remove 
the weak relationships between investors to concentrate on investors that have repeated 
common affiliations. This creates a core of 248 strongly connected investors (from a total 
of 1586) of which 205 operate in more than one UK region. In the biopharma subset we 
find a core of 82 investors of which 62 investors have made investments in more than one 
region. We show these two networks based on strong relationships as Figure 7.5 and 
Figure 7.6 over the page. 
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Figure 7.5 Sociogram of affiliation network for all investors where line multiplicity >I 
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Figure 7.5 shows the total sector network; Figure 7.6 shows the biopharma network. Both 
figures hide affiliations between investors that occur only once. The vertices are colour 
coded to reflected investors with national activity (red), multi-regional (green) and 
international investors without a UK office (blue). We also indicate which investors which 
operate in a single region23. Single region investors are most visible in the biopharma 
network. In addition we also weight the size of the vertices according the estimated 
investment made (see footnote 6). Therefore vertex sizes are comparable within each 
network (but not between different networks). 
These affiliation networks are created from where investors have provided finance to the 
same firms. The thicker and darker the line the more common affiliations; the stronger the 
affiliations between investors, the more we expect them to know about each other and the 
stronger the relationship between investors in terms of the transfer of information and 
creation of trust. 
At the centre of network of repeated ties we still find a range of different types of investors, 
ranging from direct public finance (DTI), public-private initiatives (Scottish Enterprise 
Ltd), International banks (Royal Bank of Scotland), Venture Capital Trusts (Oxford 
Technology Management) and the top venture capital firms (3i, Advent, Apax, plus several 
others). Therefore, as in the centrality analysis we find a core of investors, who are 
established investors and are repeatedly tied to one another. In agreement with our 
previous discussions, in this chapter and Chapter 3, many of these investors are the main 
names of venture capital in the UK. However, we still find the presence of public based 
investment sources. 
From the geographical perspective, we find a low presence of investors with locally 
bounded operations in Figure 7.5. It indicates that relatively few investors who operate in 
one area have strong ties to other similarly operated investors. As we found in Figure 7.4, 
investors with a presence in a single region are located in the periphery, but often linked 
individually or in small groups to national investors at the centre of the network. When we 
scale the vertices by financial contribution, we find that regional investors contribute 
relatively small amounts of finance. Only Scottish investors appear as making a sizable 
contribution, where Scottish Enterprise is one example. 
23 East = yellow; Light blue = South East, White = London, Black = Scotland, Pale Green = 
Yorkshire and Humber, Mauve = East Midlands, Pale Pink = North West 
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This only partially matches our expectation for local investors. In line with our 
expectations, investors with specific single location presence appear connected to the main 
network with repeated ties to larger investors. However, in contrast to our expectations we 
find little evidence of strong ties between locally bounded groups of investors. In fact 
there are few strong links shown between our single location investors. Instead, and not 
predicated, we observe that investors without a UK base are strongly tied to the network, 
and to other overseas investors, as indicated by the blue vertices. It is likely that these 
strong ties help reduce information asymmetries presented from being located away from 
the deal. The relationship between UK and overseas investors may be similar to the type 
of boundary spanning relationships found in the US syndication networks. 
In the biopharma network we cannot compare the characteristics, such as density, to the 
overall network, because of the different network size. However, examining the investors 
in Figure 7.6 shows national investors in biopharma appear as a well connected group with 
multiple strong relationships between investors. Many of these investors are also present 
in Figure 7.5, confirming that investors at the centre of the biopharma network are not 
specialists. 
The biopharma network also indicates a potential division where the network is formed of 
two groupings of national investors. The DTI appears as the central actor in one group, 
which has relatively weak ties to several investors in the second group. This second group 
is predominately comprised of large private VC's who have strong connections to each 
other, including strong ties between 3i, Merlin and the Wellcome Trust. Also noteworthy 
is the absences of a strong tie between two central investors, Avlar BioVentures and 
Abingworth Management, both with offices in Cambridge. 
In the first group, the DTI is tied to many smaller contributors including the presence of 
other public-private funds (Scottish Enterprises Ltd, Northern Enterprise runs a RVCF, 
CRIL was formerly a fund connected to Cambridge University), and University funds 
(Bloomsbury Bioseed fund is a University Challenge fund, Cambridge Enterprise 
connected to Cambridge University). The division is less apparent in the unrestricted 
biopharma network (showing weak affiliations) as investors have a larger number of 
incidental linkages across the network. 
In the biopharma network we also observe that overseas investors (without UK office) are 
relatively big contributors and closely tied to the central actors. We also find that single 
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region investors are relatively more active as shown by Unibio investing in London (white), 
the University of Oxford and ISIS Innovation (light blue) operating in the South East. It is 
interesting to note that many of the investors associated with Cambridge, such as Avlar 
Bioventures and Cambridge Enterprise have invested in portfolios that cover regions 
outside the East and so are coded as having a national or multi-regional presence. As a 
result the Eastern region (coded yellow) appears underrepresented relative to the finance 
we have shown it receives in Chapter 6. 
6.6.3 Co-investment networks 
The previous analysis in this Chapter has considered the network formed from common 
affiliations to early stage firms. An alternative and more direct form of networking that 
occurs is through co-investment. If we restrict relationships to only those formed through 
co-investment in each round, (and so use the investment round as the joining property) do 
we still observe similar properties? 
Overall we find the co-investment and affiliation networks are very similar, the overall 
importance of investors does not change whether we consider affiliation or co-investment 
networks. For example the centrality scores of individual investors in each network highly 
correlated (0.80) indicating that the national players in the affiliation network are central in 
the co-investment network. 
There are three main differences between affiliation and co-investment networks in terms 
of network structure. Firstly we find that co-investment networks have a smaller core 
component. In the all sector co-investment network we find the size of the core component 
is reduced from 1423 to 1038 investors. This result confirms that many investors are 
weakly linked to the centre of the network through participation in funding the same firm, 
but not at the same time. A smaller core component size in co-investment networks 
suggests a smaller network of dedicated VC's who formally work together. Our 
expectation was that the network would be developed through the addition of two types of 
investor who operate at periphery of the network; the small locally based investor and the 
larger corporate investor. In an affiliation type network, these investors would increase the 
size of the main component, investing in the same deals as other investors indicating that it 
is likely they create informal relationships with the other investors. However, in the co- 
investment network we find many of these two types of investor are isolated. For example 
lone investors are often business angels, regional development agencies, and large blue 
chip companies (e. g. Vodafone, Microsoft). It indicates that these actors have different 
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strategies to the core investors which result in them not working directly with other 
investors, despite contributing resources to the same firms. 
Secondly, we find that public finance and seed funds do not feature as strongly in co- 
investment networks. As with the affiliation network we find that the biopharma co- 
investment network still shows that the major national investors co-ordinate the network 
through connections to smaller investors. However, and importantly, we see that from a co- 
investment perspective many of the seed investors identified such as the DTI, Bloomsbury 
Bioseed fund and University based funds are no longer central. Instead they located on the 
periphery of the co-investment network or are absent; because they sometimes invest alone 
at the earliest stages where private investors may not prepared to provide funds. 
Finally, and in contrast to finding a smaller core size, the co-investment network based on 
repeated ties is larger than found with an affiliation network. We find a core of 391 
investors who have opted to syndicate in more than one round in the same firm. As 
investors repeatedly syndicate together to provide rounds of finance, it indicates that these 
ties are strong, and represent a core of investors who frequently work with each other. A 
commitment to finance a firm with a group of investors is therefore binding, and 
consequences, such as the dilution of an investment, will occur if investors pull out of a 
syndicate. 
6.7 Conclusion 
This analysis fords agreement with many of our expectations regarding syndication 
networks. Analysis of the UK affiliation investor network shows a minority of central 
actors, with a national presence, forming a dense network core. To operate at the centre of 
the network investors must be able to invest nationally (potentially internationally), and not 
be constrained to a particular location. We find that national investors repeatedly work 
together being affiliated to the same firms, and form the strong relationships between a 
range of different types of investors, but predominantly private investors form the core 
network structure. Thus, in contrast to our expectation of regional concentration in 
networking activity, we find the network organised on a national basis. 
Our analysis also indicates that syndicate network structures reflect characteristics of 
structural social capital discussed in Chapter 3. For instance we find that the networks are 
organised around key players, demonstrating the importance of investors with high 
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structural positions. Similarly we find evidence to suggest that strong relationships are 
formed between these important national level investors, indicating the presence of groups. 
The activities of groups of strongly linked investors are not geographically bounded. We 
find evidence to suggest that the structure of syndication networks in the UK is co- 
ordinated at a national level by a central group of investors, in contrast to a simple hub type 
structure. We suggest this has some similarity to a small world type network structure, 
although local clusters in the network do not reflect concentrations in geographical 
investment activity. 
However, our expectations regarding differences in networking across sectors are partially 
upheld. The analysis indicates that sector specialists have prominence in their respective 
networks, but they are still sub-ordinates to a group of generalist investors. The structures 
of each sector network showed differences, with biopharma appearing as a densely 
connected, but relatively distributed network. The sociograms for biopharma also 
indicated that even with a good general connectivity between investors, the network was 
formed around two strongly connected structures; one group of the main large private 
investors and a separate set of smaller public/private investment. 
We also compare the affiliation network to a more formal co-investment network. In 
general the co-investment network suggests weaker relationships between investors in UK 
SME. We also find the network is more dispersed, as it has a smaller core component. 
Public investors in the co-investment network are less prominent and lack direct 
investment links to the established players. Similarly large corporate investors are also 
shown as peripheral players in the co-investment network. 
In contrast, at the core of the co-investment networks the relationships are shown to be 
very strong formed from repeated investments between the major UK investors. Investors 
at the centre of the co-investment network have national or international reach and large 
investment funds. These top investors repeatedly share the financing of the same firms. 
It is clear from this analysis that large nationally mobile investors are essential for the 
provision of finance, particularly in sectors such as biotechnology. We find that these 
investors predominately co-invest together, but obtain support from a myriad of other 
smaller investors, indicating that information regarding opportunities spreads relatively 
well. We find that smaller local investors are present in the networks, but generally 
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peripheral, contributing to a small number of investments, and often investing alone. 
Although we expected regional networks to be visible, even in regions such as the East, 
investors operate on a national basis. We expected to find large national investors acting 
as `spanners' linking locally tied groups of investors, this was not shown in co-investment 
network, and only weakly shown by affiliation. Instead we find that strong relationships 
occur between large national or international investors, who link weakly to a range of 
smaller investors. It suggests that the large investors have greatest control over 
opportunities, and although seed investors exist, they lack strong co-investment 
relationships to major investors, particularly in biopharma. 
These observations of syndication have some implications for policy. For example many 
public funds have been created as a means to seed opportunities for exploitation by large 
private investors. Oakey (2003a) expects that the deliberate integration of public sources 
with private investor networks, from the outset, can prevent funding gaps for SME firms 
and help supply critical follow-on funding for early stages businesses. The lack of 
integration we observe between these types of investors in biopharma may signal a 
warning that public funding has attracted further public finance into the same businesses or 
that public funds have been directed into business which are unattractive to private 
investors. This is a cautious assessment as many public schemes are only a few years old, 
and new entrants may naturally be excluded from the main network. We observe a high 
level of integration in the all sector network, but on a sector basis at the level of repeated 
relations that we observe the structural weakness in the network, albeit over a relatively 
short period. One alternative interpretation is that our results may indicate the beginning 
of the integration of new forms of investors, rather than the continued exclusion of them. 
Finally we note from a policy perspective that constraining funds to a local region may be 
a strong disadvantage, as even investors based in Cambridge seek opportunities elsewhere 
and we find little indication of strong networking between groups of local investors. 
An important part of network analysis is to observe what is missing. Our network analysis 
does not show the involvement of RVCF. In Chapter 4 we noted that these new public- 
private initiatives were designed to bring public and private investment together in a 
privately managed fund. Our network analysis confirms our interviews with RVCF 
managers, that biotechnology investment was considered too demanding in terms of the 
level of finance and the perceived risk. 
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In contrast to the Israeli Yozma program, public investment was made into private funds; 
under the condition that each fund must be partnered with a foreign VC to ensure only 
credible managers got access to public finance. The Yozma program has been very 
successful and able to identify promising start ups. There is also evidence that local Israeli 
Yozma investors have learnt from foreign investors, improving the national VC 
competences. Many of the original Yozma funds have gone on to raise new private funds 
(Avnimelech et al, 2004). 
We have examined the structure of investor networks at a national level looking for 
concentrated geographical activity, but have not unpacked the office locations of these 
national investors. This analysis only provides a partial view of investment activity at the 
regional level, where stark contrasts in investment activity have been shown. Rosiello and 
Parris (2008) have found that a high percentage of UK deals involve at least one proximate 
investor, whilst the bulk of UK investors have an office in London. This may suggest that 
whilst investment networks are co-ordinated by investors who are nationally active, 
relationships between investors are partly supported by a physical concentration of 
investors in London. 
We expect that at the regional level different network structures will evolve, in terms of 
size and density of connections, but more importantly in terms of the type of investors that 
make up the pool, whether they are nationally or regionally orientated, and located near or 
afar. We will return to these issues in Chapter 10 in particular focusing on four regional 
cases, the East, London, Scotland and Yorkshire. 
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7 Network position and size of syndicates 
7.9 Introduction 
The syndicate can be regarded as the building block of venture capital networks; in 
syndicates relationships between investors are formed. In a syndicate a group of investors 
fund the same firm and take a share in the future financial return. This type of 
collaboration could be seen as anti-competitive, as investors work together to agree deal 
terms with the entrepreneurial firm. This makes syndication in venture capital a unique 
from of investment. According to Lerner (1994) the practice of syndication has long been 
an activity found in the issuance of equity in the US. The private issuance of equity for 
venture capital is not strongly scrutinised by the Securities and Exchange Commission and 
therefore allows investors to co-operate and syndicate when investing in private companies 
in the US (Lerner, 1994). 
The dynamics of syndication have implications for the organisation of venture capital in 
the UK. We have seen in Chapter 5 and 6 that investment activity is concentrated into 
specific UK locations. We also show in Chapter 5 that biotechnology investment has a 
different pattern of concentration from the total investment activity, and less strongly 
influenced by historical association. However our findings in the previous chapter suggest 
that networks of investors are organised at the national level, and relationships are 
concentrated around national actors. However, we do not know whether syndicates, the 
basic units of the VC network, show evidence of regional concentration or regional 
variation which reflect investors' preferences to concentrate their investment in particular 
locations. Therefore this chapter contributes to answering both thesis research questions. 
This chapter continues to focus on the thesis theme of exploring the influence of location 
and technology sector on venture capital activity, but also investigates the extent and 
nature of relationships between investors. Specifically, we seek to understand whether 
location and technology sector are important influences on the level of syndication. In 
order to do this we also consider other factors that may influence syndication activity. For 
example, we know that the regulatory environment may allow syndication to occur, but 
why do investors choose to syndicate, who do they choose to syndicate with and what 
factors drive the size of syndicates? 
The chapter is developed as follows. In the first section of this chapter we search the 
literature for the theory relating to syndication and factors influencing syndicate sizes, 
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second we provide some descriptive statistics of syndication in the UK relative to the 
activity in the US, and finally we use the literature to develop a model to explain the level 
of investor participation in firms. We test this model using statistical regression. 
7.2 Motivations for syndication 
The literature on syndication has a strong focus on understanding the motivations for 
syndication. Investors and particularly venture capitalists are generally expected to be 
motivated by profit. To those unfamiliar with syndication practices, it might seem strange, 
that given a profit maximising motivation, venture capitalists would be prepared to share 
investment opportunities. For this reason, understanding motivations to share investments 
are important to understanding syndication. Therefore, we start with a review of investor 
motivations, and then review the literature available on syndicate sizes. 
We structure this section around the discussion of three categories of motivation for 
syndication proposed by Manigart et al (2006). These motivations are driven by individual 
deal considerations, such as investment selection, monitoring and adding value. They are 
also motivated by considerations regarding the overall management of an investor's 
portfolio or fund, such as spreading the financial risk through portfolio diversification. 
Finally syndication can also be related to the specific characteristics of each venture 
capitalist. 
7.2.1 Motivations to syndicate a deal 
Lerner (1994) summarises two theoretical perspectives to explain why investors may 
syndicate. The first, adapted from Sah and Stiglitz (1986), proposes that syndication is 
used to manage deal selection. Investors are expected to make better investments if the 
decision to invest is made jointly. The process of agreeing on investments helps to avoid 
poor quality investments. If several parties are willing to invest, it follows that the 
opportunity is of higher quality than a deal which attracts only one investor. Syndication 
will be most useful in early investment rounds where the information asymmetries are 
greatest. The advantage of syndication is also greatest when experienced investors work 
together in the initial rounds to evaluate an opportunity jointly. Once an investment is 
made, other less experienced investors may enter the syndicate in a similar effect to 
herding (Welch, 1992; Lerner, 1994). Lerner (1994) finds that established investors 
frequently syndicate in the initial rounds of biotechnology deals. 
The second perspective outlined in Lerner (1994) is based on Admati and Ptleiderer (1994). 
In this case syndication arises in later rounds of investment because the initial investor 
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needs to maintain a constant share of equity in the business. Maintaining a constant equity 
share provides the optimum signal regarding the performance of the company. If the initial 
investor takes significantly more or less equity then information asymmetries between the 
initial investor and future investors can develop. Information asymmetries between 
syndicate members may generate concerns that the price of equity is being overstated, as 
no other party will have had access to the inner workings of the firm to fully assess the deal. 
The use of syndication is a necessary tool to signal the correct pricing of the firm. Lerner 
finds that overall the changes in share ownership between rounds is relatively statistic, in 
approx 70% of investments the change in equity ownership is less than 25%. 
Brander, Amit and Antweiler (2002) include an additional justification for syndication 
based upon the value added to an investment by the VC's experience or contacts. In the 
value added hypothesis, the investor should prefer to choose investments according to 
whether they can add value. In this situation syndication is driven by the ability of the 
group of investors to provide different benefits to the investment. The benefits provided 
might include recruitment of management or access to networks, markets or future finance. 
However, Brander et al (2002) and Lockett and Wright (2001) note that syndication for 
value added incurs costs in terms of management time, collaboration and the organisation 
of resources. In this case, a decision to syndicate would need to provide benefits 
significantly greater than the costs of managing and delivering the value added via a 
syndicate. 
7.2.2 Portfolio driven motivations to syndicate 
Manigart et al (2006) survey of European VC's finds their primary motivation for 
syndication is to access other investor's finance. Their findings suggest investors use 
syndication to increase the number of deals in their portfolio and reduce their exposure to 
idiosyncratic deal risks. Their survey strongly indicates that portfolio management 
motivates European VCs to syndicate (Manigart et al, 2006). 
Lockett and Wright (2001) also find strong support for the financial risk sharing approach 
in their survey of a representative sample of UK venture capitalists. They find that the 
most important reason for syndicating is the size of an investment relative to the size of 
each investors own fund. The need to syndicate is greatest for deals which are relatively 
large compared to the size of the fund being managed. In their survey, venture capitalists 
attach a moderate importance to syndication for obtaining additional non-financial 
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resources from other investors, indicating that value added motivations are a lower priority 
than financially driven ones. 
In contrast to sharing the financial risk of investing, VCs may need to share information to 
reduce uncertainty. In similarity to Lerner's (1994) selection hypothesis, Bygrave (1987) 
suggests that co-investment occurs in high-tech sectors, where uncertainty surrounding 
deals is greatest. The motivation to syndicate is driven by the need to reduce the 
uncertainty of investing. However, information sharing operates at the portfolio level, 
rather than on a deal by deal basis. The choice of syndicate partners may have 
implications for future investments (as we have described in Chapter 7). For example 
syndication provides access to information on other deals being considered by the 
syndicate partners and the opportunity to access information to help investment decisions. 
Bygrave (1987) finds that uncertainty is reduced by working with specialists investors, 
showing that hi-tech deals are more likely to involve co-investment than their low tech 
counterparts. Bygrave (1987) concludes that syndication is more about specialisation and 
access to expertise and information, than an investors fund size or financial management of 
the portfolio. 
Although Norton and Tenenbaum (1993) suggest that Bygrave's (1997) findings are only 
partially conclusive they generally support his view. In Norton and Tenenbaum (1993) 
survey of the portfolio of US based investors, they find that US VCs portfolios were 
specialised in terms of deal stage or sector. Their findings agree with Bygrave (1987, 
1988), that investors need to develop specialist expertise and access to specific types of 
information on deals and opportunities to help them make investments. Their results, 
along with Bygave (1987), suggest that hi-tech sectors demand a greater use of syndicates. 
However, their findings also indicate that the size of a syndicate may be smaller if 
specialist investors participate, as specialists understand the sector and may reduce the 
risks and uncertainty of investing. 
A third portfolio driven motivation to syndicate is investor collusion (Lerner, 1994). In 
this case syndication is used as a method to overstate the performance of an investor's 
portfolio. Investors join syndicates to gain access to late stage opportunities, as a follow- 
on investor, particularly when the portfolio company has been successful. By gaining late 
access to a successful syndicate deal, the follow-on investor can claim greater legitimacy 
from association to the deal. As it is difficult for outsiders to gain independent information, 
for example on the length of involvement or exact return of any particular syndicate 
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member, the follow-on investor benefits from their association to the deal. This helps the 
follow-on investor market their fund and raise finance. 
The original members of the syndicate are likely to accept follow-on investors into 
profitable deals, as they too can benefit from reciprocation, in the form of access to the 
portfolios of the new syndicate members. It follows that experienced VCs are most likely 
to be accepted as follow-on investors, as they offer the best opportunity to return the favour. 
Lerner (1994) shows that established VCs join investments after a sharp increase in deal 
valuation. However, smaller sized investors did not benefit from this type of syndication 
activity. 
7.2.3 VC characteristics and motivation to syndicate 
A venture capitalists preference to specialise in early stage opportunities can influence 
their motivation to syndicate. For example, Manigart et al (2006) survey of European 
investors found early stage VCs were more likely to lead a syndicate and be more 
specialised than other types of investor. Although managing financial risk was by far the 
most important motivation to syndicate for any of the surveyed investors, early stage 
investors were associated with syndicating to obtain value added services, access to deals 
and deal selection support from other investors. In contrast, later stage investors were very 
weakly motivated to syndicate by these factors. 
An investor's motivation to syndicate can also change with the size of the fund under 
management. Manigart et al (2006) survey showed that investors with larger funds are less 
reliant on the financial risk motivation to syndicate, as they can adequately manage the risk 
in their portfolio. However for smaller investors, syndicating is a means of managing 
financial risk and overcoming their small fund size. In contrast to Norton and Tenenbaum 
(1993), small investor specialisation, in terms of preferred investment sectors or locations, 
was not shown to be strong influence on motivations to syndicate in Manigart et al's (2006) 
group of European investors. Although, as a high proportion of investors in the sample 
operated over a restricted geography, it is possible that geographically specialised 
syndication would arise naturally (Manigart et al, 2006). 
Motivations to syndicate can also depend on the roles of each syndicate member in the deal. 
Wright and Lockett (2002) find that investors in a syndicate do not have equal levels of 
control. They found that a lead investor will often take a larger equity share to obtain 
"greater return in recognition of this effort". The lead role may also indicate their greater 
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responsibility to provide the necessary resources to the investment, rather than syndicating 
to obtain them. The lead, with the largest share of equity, was found to be more influential 
in decision making than the authors had expected. The position of lead investor meant 
decisions could be forced on the syndicate, in stark contrast to the selection hypothesis. 
Wright and Lockett (2002) observations suggest that the motivation to syndicate is about 
managing financial risk. On the other hand, investors who frequently syndicate as non- 
lead or follow-on partners are more likely to place importance on the value adding 
expertise of other syndicate members (Manigart et al, 2006). 
7.2.4 Regional syndication 
One element missing from this review of syndication is an appreciation of the factors that 
drive syndication on a regional level. We have not found literature on this sub-topic for 
syndication specifically. The literature in Chapter 2 outlines the benefits of investor 
proximity to deals, such as reducing information asymmetries, maintaining control and 
monitoring of investments and generally helping to manage the growth of the firm. 
Investors who operate over longer distances have also been associated with smaller 
portfolios of deals (Cumming, 2006). Therefore, the tendency of investors to operate 
locally generates the expectation that areas without local investors may struggle to obtain 
backing from large syndicates. However, the literature on investor location does not make 
predictions about the variation in syndicate size according to location. 
7.3 Summary 
In summary the literature on syndication offers many different explanations for investor's 
motivations to share access to their investment opportunities. We find that the majority of 
the motivations revolve around investors need to manage and control their investments as a 
group or a portfolio of investments. For example investors syndicate to provide access to 
future opportunities or expert information, manage the perceived performance of their fund 
or improve the risk profile of their portfolio through diversification. Although it can be 
argued these motivations may have performance benefits for the firms they invest in, only 
one motivation for syndication is centred on directly improving the performance of the 
firm - the value adding motivation. We also find that at the firm level the literature 
examining the dynamics of venture capital syndicates is less prominent, and makes no 
prediction about the role of location in determining the size of syndicates. We focus the 
remainder of this chapter on understanding the factors that influence syndication, and the 
size of syndicates. 
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7.4 Modelling syndicate size 
In this section we outline a model of factors that influence the size of syndicates in firms. 
It is based on Guler and McGahan (2006) study of international syndication. As the title of 
their study suggests, we need to adjust their model to focus on factors important within a 
nation, such as the UK. Guler and McGahan (2006) suggest several factors influence the 
size of syndicates. We categorise them into the characteristics of the firm, the 
characteristics of the investment and the characteristics of the investors. These factors 
include: 
" At the firm level; its sector of operations, national location, founding year and age at first 
investment. 
" At the investment level; the total amount of investment, the number of rounds and how 
frequently (duration) the rounds occur. 
" At the investor level: The nationality of the investor. 
We follow a similar model to Guler and McGahan (2006), including the investment level 
factors listed in their model. However, we note that they include no measure of firm 
quality, which may be important from a risk based perspective. To account for this we 
include a measure of firm quality as an additional firm level variable. At the firm level we 
are interested in syndication occurring within a country, and therefore we model the 
regional location of firms receiving investment. Therefore we exchange their national 
measures for those of a regional nature. 
We improve the Guler and McGahan (2006) model by including factors to measure a range 
of investor attributes to control for variation in the characteristics of investors. In Guler 
and McGahan (2006) the details of the investors for each firm are restricted to only the 
nationality of the investor. In contrast, Manigart et al (2006) show investor activity and 
syndication motivations vary according to the type of investor. Bygrave (1987) also 
indicates that investor specialisation and access to information has a role to play in forming 
syndicates. Therefore our model includes measures of the characteristics of investors, such 
as whether each investment involves a sector specialist, and the average portfolio size of 
investors. We also include the average centrality of investors in the investor network, as 
investors with many relationships have greater access to information. We also include a 
measure of the geographical investment preference of investors in the syndicate, including 
whether the investors are based overseas to indicate the geographical range of investors in 
each syndicate. 
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In the next section we discuss each factor expected to influence the number of investors 
participating in financing a firm, including how each factor is predicted to change the size 
of a syndicate. We conclude the section by summarising our expectations. 
7.4.1 Firm level factors 
At the firm level we expect that older firms will have a greater history of activity, be more 
established, and provide more information for an investor to make an informed decision to 
invest (Gompers and Lerner, 2000). For this reason we expect that the older the firm at 
first investment, the lower the uncertainty of investing, and the smaller the resulting 
syndicate. 
The funding environment is responsive to the national business environment (Guler and 
McGahan, 2006). For example investors respond to wider economic conditions that 
influence exit windows and other external economic events. We might expect that 
economic conditions will change investor's tendency to syndicate. Therefore, measuring 
the founding year of a firm may capture different financial situations and have implications 
for investors and their syndication strategies. We do not make specific predictions about 
the direction of this influence, but include this as a control factor. 
We have previously discussed regional and sector influences on syndicate size in section 
8.2 and 8.3. Guler and McGahan (2006) find that large syndicates are associated with 
biotech deals and smaller syndicates with consumer related deals. Specific industry risk 
may play an important role in determining the risk of an investment. Therefore hi-tech 
sectors such as biotechnology, where information asymmetries are high, are expected to 
increase syndicate sizes under a financial risk perspective. 
The `value adding' motivation may also result in larger syndicates, particularly in 
demanding sectors such as biopharmaceuticals where a variety of investor backgrounds 
can contribute different types of value to the firm. Direct benefits for the firm include 
recruitment assistance or strategic and business guidance, whilst indirect benefits can 
include benefits predicted from social capital theory which might arise from investor 
prestige or access to resources and contacts etc. However, we have noted in the literature 
review that the co-ordination of investors to provide resources is costly and in 
biopharmaceuticals these costs will be ongoing through the lengthy development times. 
Under the value added hypothesis we would expect an optimum number of investors to 
evolve as acceptable in the industry which would minimise the size of syndicates. Under 
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these assumptions we might expect syndicate size to be relatively constant across sectors. 
In a survey of European investors Manigart et al (2006) found weak support for value 
adding motivations to syndicate, although this support was stronger for early stage 
investors. 
Our expectations regarding the influence regions on syndication are less clear. We have 
consistently found regions to provide different venture capital environments. It suggests 
different regions may offer more supportive systems. Following a value adding motivation, 
a syndicate of investors with different experiences can better support a firm, resulting in 
larger syndicates in particularly well supported regions. From a purely financial 
perspective there is no reason to assume that geography prevents the flow of finance, 
therefore from a financial risk perspective regional variations are not important, so 
syndicate should not vary with geography once we control for the other factors. 
Guler and McGahan (2006) note that smaller syndicates, or single investor deals can arise 
when the risk is low relative to the return. Small syndicates can also occur when the deal 
quality is perceived as high, such that the ratio of risk to reward is balanced in favour of 
maximising the reward, rather than syndicating to reduce risk. In such cases larger 
financial risks may be taken. Therefore, a higher deal quality may reduce syndicate size, 
as investors try and capture the full potential return. 
7.4.2 Investment level factors 
Sahlman (1990) suggests that the staged infusion of capital can be used to control 
investments, and reduce the risk of making bad decisions. However, this must be balanced 
against the costs of staging an investment. The costs of staging a deal maybe large as the 
deal must be re-assessed and changes in the investor syndicate may occur (Guler and 
McGahan, 2006). It is unclear whether deals with more rounds will involve a greater 
number of investors. However, a staged deal provides the opportunity to stop an 
investment if it performs badly (ibid). Given the more cautious nature of UK investors, 
investments with many rounds are likely to indicate successful investments, and so more 
likely to attract new investors. 
It also follows that if an investment is staged, a period of time elapses between each 
investment. The duration between investment rounds may also play a role in managing the 
risk of investing. Guler and McGahan (2006) note that Gompers (1995) found investment 
uncertainty was linked with shorter durations between rounds, in order to closely monitor 
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the firm's progress. However, Guler and McGahan (2006) find duration between rounds to 
be unimportant after controlling for the other factors; therefore we will exclude it. 
Guler and McGahan (2006) include total investment in the firm, as a factor likely to 
increase syndicate size. The emphasis on syndication as a tool to manage financial risk 
means we should expect syndicate sizes to reflect the inherent risk of each deal. Risk per 
investor reduces with the size of a syndicate. In line with this Brander et al (2002) suggest 
that syndicated investments may be more risky than those involving a single investor. This 
indicates that deals requiring large levels of financial support should require larger 
syndicates. 
However, our discussions have also indicated that there are costs to adding additional 
investors. The costs of larger syndicates come from managing an investment involving a 
large number of stakeholders. These types of costs may restrict the number of investors to 
a natural maximum. In the model we will include the square of total investment to test for 
an inverted "U" type parabolic relationship. 
7.4.3 Investor level 
We augment the Guler and McGahan (2006) model with the use of more information on 
investor specific factors which may influence syndicate sizes. We expect that investors 
who specialise in a particular sector will reduce the syndicate size. Specialist investors can 
add greater value to their investments, reducing the need to syndicate for expertise, 
particularly in the initial investment rounds. Similarly their specific sector knowledge 
should reduce their perception of uncertainty compared to more generalist investors. This 
is expected to reduce their need to share the risk with other investors. 
We also include two other measures of investor characteristics; the average centrality of 
investors in the syndicate and the geographical coverage of investors. From the literature 
we review in Chapter 7, we can expect that investors with a central network position are 
the established names of venture capital. It follows that established names are the most 
experienced investors and have developed capabilities in investing. The presence of 
central investors in a syndicate should reduce the need for additional investors. 
As we identified in the literature review, there is less known about the influence of the 
geographical coverage of investors in a syndicate on syndicate size. Therefore we include 
this measure to understand the role of investor's geographical presence on syndication. To 
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reflect the different types of investor, we examine each investor's geographical portfolio 
coverage, in terms of whether they operate in a single region, nationally or are based 
overseas. Guler and McGahan (2006) found that the presence of US investors in non-US 
deals increased syndicate size, indicating that overseas investors may be connected to 
larger syndicates. As overseas investors are expected to be relatively remote from the 
investment, this would suggest a financial motivation for syndicating. 
We would expect investors who operate locally to benefit from being embedded in the 
local area, having greater opportunity to assess the risks of investing and therefore be able 
to minimise investment uncertainty. We expect that, after controlling for other factors, 
local investors should be able to take greater risks compared to more distant investors, 
reducing the need for large syndicate sizes. In contrast, investors with a more national 
outlook are likely to invest over greater distances and more likely to reduce the financial 
risk of investing by syndicating. Therefore we might expect, that after controlling for other 
factors, that national investors are associated with larger syndicates. 
We also control for the size each syndicate member's portfolio. Manigart et al (2006) 
suggest that larger investors are less financially motivated to syndicate. We would expect 
that the greater the value of the portfolio of each syndicate members, the smaller the 
overall syndicate size. 
Finally the initial investment rounds may have important implications for setting the 
structure of the syndicate. For example Lerner (1994) shows established investors operate 
in initial rounds syndicating to select only the best deals. It logically follows that the 
overall size of the syndicate maybe influenced most strongly by the investors in the initial 
rounds. We allow for this possibility in the model by controlling for the investor 
characteristics at the first round. In particular we consider the presence of specialist 
investors, the average size of the syndicate member's portfolio and network centrality 
scores at the first round of investment in each firm. 
7.4.4 Empirical conjectures 
Our discussion in the previous section has generated expectations regarding the influence 
of specific factors on the number of investors required to support an investment in a firm 
(no of investors). Next we generate a model which can be used to test our expectations. In 
the model we include the following independent factors expected to influence the number 
of investors in a firm; dummy variables for the regional location and technology sector, 
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age at first investment (Age at first invest), year of firm founding (Founding). At the 
investment level the model includes, total investment (Total invest), the number of 
investment rounds (Rounds), the square of total investment (Investsqr), and the quality of 
the deal (Quality). To control for the specific characteristics of investors in each syndicate 
the model includes, the average centralities of all investors in the syndicate (Central) , the 
average centrality of investors in the first round (Central -RI) , 
the presence of overseas 
investors (Overseas), the proportion of national investors (P Nationao, the proportion of 
local investors (P Local), the presence of specialist investors (Specialist), the presence of 
specialist in the first round (Specialist RI), and finally the average size of the portfolio of 
first round investors (Ave portfolio RI). 
Table 8.1 summarises the predicted direction of influence on the number of investors per 
firm. These predictions are expected to be approximately linear in terms of the 
independent variables relationship to the dependent variable, with the exception of the 
Investsqr variable. 
Table 8.1 Predicted direction of influence of variables on syndicate size 
Variable Predicated influence on dependent variable Motivated 
by: 
Regional dummies No significant impact Financial risk 
Sector dummies Biopharma connected to more investors than other sectors Financial risk 
Age at first invest ll di Old fi h t Fi i l i k Founding ave sma er syn er rms ca es nanc a r s 
Total invest Larger investment related to more investors Financial risk 
Rounds More rounds the greater opportunity for investors to access 
deal - larger numbers of investors 
Investsgr Positive non linear effect Value added 
Quality Higher quality reduces the number of investors Financial risk 
Central More central investors reduce number of investors 
Deal 
selection 
Central-R1 More central investors in the first investment round reduce 
number of investors 
Deal 
selection 
Overseas Larger syndicates connected to presence of overseas 
investors 
Financial risk 
P_National A greater proportion of national investors should increase 
syndicate size 
Financial risk 
P 
-Local 
A greater proportion of local investors should reduce the 
need for additional investors 
Value added 
Specialist 
S i li k Specialist R1 pec a st nowledge reduces number of investors Value added 
Ave. portfolio_R1 Larger portfolio reduces number of investors Financial risk 
The Investsqr variable is used to capture any non-linear effects of investment size with 
respect to the number of investors. In the case of a significant positive coefficient on Total 
invest, ß; n,,, and a significant negative coefficient on Investsqr, Pinvsqr, then according to 
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Wooldridge (2003 p. 683) we can conclude that syndicate size increases with investment to 
a maximum value, at which point the total investment equals: 
ßinv/(-2ßinvsgr)" 
In the UK the emphasis in the literature on syndication is towards risk management. This 
emphasis suggests that syndication is motivated by the management of finance, rather than 
a shared responsibility to add value, or access to specific experience. Therefore our 
expectations favour this hypothesis, as indicated by the motivation column. 
7.4.5 Method 
We use econometric analysis, using the software STATA to test whether the factors we 
propose are able to explain the variation in syndicate size of early stage investment. As the 
dependent variable is the count of the number of investors who provide finance to a 
particular firm, we need to use a count data estimation technique. The standard ordinary 
least squares (OLS) estimator is not applicable to count data models, as the dependent 
variable is limited to a few values and is non-negative. In the standard OLS estimations a 
situation can arise where the predicted value of the dependent variable based on the 
independent variable coefficients are less than 0. However applying an exponential form 
to our model prevents this problem (Wooldridge, 2002). 
We apply two commonly used count data estimation methods, known as the Poisson and 
the Negative Binomial estimation, the general form is shown below. In both estimation 
techniques the conditional mean, or number of investors in firm i, is given by the 
exponential of the product of the ith row of X and P. X is a data matrix of dimensions, ix 
k (where k is the number of variables in the model) and ß is the vector of coefficients for 
each variable (Long, 1997): 
No. of investors, = Exp(X, ß) 
A final point regarding the estimation method is that our dependent variable cannot equal 
zero, as we observe no zero sized syndicates. This means the dependent variable is 
truncated. Both the Poisson and Negative Binomial distributions need to be adjusted to 
account for the truncated distribution of the dependent variable. We use the truncated 
regression option in STATA to correct for missing zero values. 
As with the previous estimation methods in Chapter 5 and 6, estimating the model 
produces estimates of the 0 coefficients. The value of the coefficients indicates that for a 
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unit change in the 0 independent variable (xk), holding other variables constant, the 
expected dependent variable count changes by a factor of Exp((3k), where (3k is the 
coefficient value for xk. Alternatively, coefficients can be interpreted as having a 
percentage influence on the dependent variable of, 100(Exp(ß)-1) (Long, 1997 pp. 224-225). 
7.4.5.1 Issues in estimation 
Poisson and its adjusted form, the Negative Binomial, both use the exponential form. In 
the Poisson model the probability of a particular count (number of investors) is determined 
by a Poisson distribution. In the Poisson distribution, the mean is a function of the 
independent variables (Long, 1997). However, the Poisson model implies a restriction that 
"the mean and the variance of the number of occurrences to be equal" (Kennedy, 2003). 
This restriction is often invalid as the variance is often greater than the mean and is known 
as over-dispersion. To allow for over-dispersion, the Poisson model can be adjusted to a 
Negative Binomial model. This is achieved by adding a random error term ci, transforming 
X; ß to X; ß+c1. Thus it is assumed that the expected value of E[Exp(c1)]=1. This 
transformation does not affect the expectation of the dependent variable, but makes it 
possible for the variance conditional on the independent variables to be different from the 
conditional mean (Long, 1997). 
We test for the presence of over-dispersion using the alpha values (the ratio of variance to 
mean) reported by STATA. We consistently find the presence of over-dispersion in our 
Poisson estimations, as shown by an alpha value statistically different from one. As over- 
dispersion in Poisson estimation can lead to bias in the standard errors this can influence 
the statistical testing (z-tests) of the significance of the independent variable coefficients. 
To avoid this problem we concentrate our analysis on the Negative Binomial regressions. 
For completeness, we also show a table including the Poisson results in the chapter's 
appendix, as the coefficient values are consistent even in the presence of over-dispersion. 
Our model includes independent factors that are qualitative. For example our model 
includes factors such as the region in which a firm is based, or the presence of a specialist 
investor. In cases where the variable reflects the presence of absence of a certain 
characteristic, such as the presence of specialist investor, then the use of dummy variables 
is simple. To include this type of data in the model we use dummy variables which can 
take binary values (either 0 or 1). We also use several binary dummy variables to describe 
factors such as location or sector; in these cases a dummy variable is required for each 
category (e. g. each region). 
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When several dummy variables are used to describe an aggregate property of the data, such 
as a relationship to localities (i. e. regions), they can cause a downward bias in the standard 
errors of the estimated coefficients the independent variables. The bias is a result of 
correlation which can occur between the errors terms associated with each group of 
individual dummy variables describing the aggregate characteristic (e. g. the regional or 
sector), as unobserved correlations may exist between the dummy variables (Moulton, 
1990; Kennedy, 2003). This can cause variables to appear overly significant. We use 
robust standard errors in the calculation of the statistical significance of variables to correct 
for this problem. The use of standard errors also corrects for heteroskedasticity in the 
estimation and generally reduces the level of spurious reporting in significance testing. 
Another issue with the aggregate dummy variables is multicollinearity, which occurs when 
a directly relationship exists between the independent variables because of the way they 
have been coded. For example if each firm is assigned to a sector, and a dummy variable 
included for each sector, then a perfect linear relationship is created by the set of dummy 
variables. For each firm it is possible to determine its sector without the full set of dummy 
variables. A relationship between independent variables creates problems in determining 
the correct coefficient values, as they are inter-related. To avoid multicollinearity we drop 
a dummy variable from each of the regional and sector categories. The coefficient values 
on the remaining dummies should be interpreted with respect to the omitted variable, i. e. 
the dropped variable becomes the reference variable (Kennedy, 2003). 
However, we also find additional multicollinearity in our estimation as a result of 
independent variables having a similar over overlapping influence on the size of syndicates. 
This also prevents the STATA from producing reliable estimates. For example we find 
founding year and age at first investment create a source of multicollinearity. Both 
variables are highly correlated and the multicollinearity arises as a property of the dataset, 
as in later years firms receive their first investment round at a younger age. We can drop 
founding year from the model without loss of the explanatory power, which solves the 
multicollinearity problem. Similarly, we cannot include investor centrality and the 
average size of the portfolio in the same estimation model because of multicollinearity. We 
find that both factors have a very similar influence on the dependent variable suggesting 
they measure the same property. Finally we also find that our measures of 1St round 
activity, in terms of investor specialisation, centrality and average portfolio size also have a 
very similar influence to their counterparts which measures all round activity. This 
supports the view that the first investment round captures important information on the 
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total predicted syndicate size. We generally include the ls` round measure in our model, 
with the exception of centrality where we include the more inclusive measure. 
7.4.5.2 Estimation process 
We report the Poisson and Negative Binomial estimation results for six different models. 
We summarise our estimation strategy in Table 8.2. In regression models 1-3 we build the 
analysis to include firm and investment level variables. In models 4a-4c we include 
different variants of the independent variables to minimise multicollinearity issues, and 
confirm the consistency of results. In models 5 and 6 we include the measure P national 
to see how this affects the other investor level variables which were included in model 4a 
and 4c. 
Table 8.2 Estimation strategy 
Model Regression description Reference model in sensitivity analysis 
1 Results regressing only the firm level 
variables 
n/a 
2 Results regressing only the investment 
level variables 
n/a 
3 Models I and 2 combined 2 
4a Extend model 3 by including investor level 
variables (Centrality and Specialist) 
3 
4b Alteration to model 4a exchanging 
Centrality for the Ave. portfolio RI 
3 
4c Alteration to model 4a exchanging 
Specialist for the Specialist RI 
3 
5 Extend model 4a by including P national 4a 
6 Extend model 4c by including P national 4c 
We also test for the sensitivity of including particular groups of variables in the model. 
We group our variables according to firm level, investment level and investor level 
characteristics. A Likelihood ratio and Wald test are used to indicate whether we can 
restrict the coefficients of all variables within a particular group to zero. If the restriction 
is accepted, it shows that the group of factors have low explanatory power. We 
consistently find both sensitivity tests reject the zero restrictions for each group of factors. 
Thus, each group of factors contributes to explaining the variance of syndicate size. We 
report the results of these tests with the estimations in section 8.5. 
7.4.6 Data 
To operationalise the factors described in section 8.4.4, we collect data shown in Table 8.3 
from our Library House database at the firm level. A description of the Library House 
dataset is given in Chapter 4. In contrast to previous chapters which use aggregated 
regional statistics, this chapter benefits from using the firm level data. The Library House 
data is used to produce a cross section of data based on 1562 firms. However, due to 
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missing values, particularly relating to the total investment, the minimum number of 
observations used in the estimation is 1004. To reduce the use of regional dummy 
variables we group regions together, so that for example the North East and North West are 
grouped as the North24. We note that only variables in bold are included the model, whilst 
all variables in the table are shown in the correlation table for completeness. 
Table 8.3 Data used to measure factors influencing syndicate size 
Series name Description Variable 
no of investors Count of number of different investors in a firm Dependent 
Firm variables 
london Equals I if firm based in London, otherwise equals 0 Dummy 
east Equals I if firm based in East, otherwise equals 0 Dummy 
scotland Equals 1 if firm based in Scotland, otherwise equals 0 Dummy 
North Equals 1 if firm based in Northern England, otherwise equals 0 Dummy 
Midlands Equals 1 if firm based in the Midlands, otherwise equals 0 Dummy 
South Equals 1 if firm based in Southern England, otherwise equals 0 Dummy 
Wales&NI Equals 1 if firm based in Wales or N. Ireland, otherwise equals 0 Dummy 
It Firm activity in Information Technology Dummy 
Comma Firm activity in Communications Dummy 
HC red Firm activity in Healthcare (excluding biopharmaceuticals) Dummy 
Biopharma Firm activity in biopharmaceuticals Dummy 
Other red Firm activity in Other sector (financial/media) Dummy 
Age at first invest Age of firm in years at first investment Independent 
Founding Year firm founded Independent 
Investment 
variables 
Total Invest Total investment in each firm in £m Independent 
Rounds Number of rounds of investment in each firm ent 
Invests r Square of Total Investment variable Independent 
Quality Firm has IPO or exit recorded in database. Dummy 
Investor variables 
Centrality Average centrali of all investors in firm Independent 
Overseas Syndicate includes overseas investor Dummy 
S ecialist Syndicate include specialist investor (only invests in one sector) Dummy 
Specialist RI 1s` round include specialist investor (only invests in one sector) Dumm 
Ave portolio_R1 Average value of the investment portfolio of P round syndicate 
investors (Each investors portfolio is calculated from their total 
commitment to all firms in the database 
Independent 
P 
-Local 
Portion of investors in firm coded as local (investment in only one 
region) 
Independent 
P 
-National 
Portion of investors in firm coded as national (investments in 4 
regions or more 
Independent 
7.4.6.1 Descriptive statistics 
In Table 8.4 we summarise the descriptive statistics of the data. The average firm in this 
dataset has 2.5 investors, was founded in 1999, and received a total of 2 rounds of a total 
value of £6.7m. We note that the standard deviation of investment is large relative to the 
mean, indicating that a wide range of investment levels are captured in the data. Similarly, 
24 Reducing the number of dummy variables within a particular class aids interpretation of the variables in 
later analysis. 
25 Centrality based on intermediary positions in the network - other centrality measures provide similar 
results. 
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we also see a large variation in founding year, given that one standard deviation about the 
mean gives a range of 1993-2005, although the minimum value for founding year indicates 
the presence of outliers firms. 
Table 8.4 Descriptive statistics of data used in chapter 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
no of investors 1562 2.50 2.10 1.00 17.00 
London 1562 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
East 1562 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 
North 1562 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Midlands 1562 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
South 1562 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Wales&NI 1562 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
Scotland 1562 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
IT 1562 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Comms 1562 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
HC 1562 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Biopharma 1562 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Other 1562 0.38 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Age at first invest 1562 1.67 3.84 0.00 43.00 
Founding 1562 1999 6.07 1903 2006 
Total invest 1013 6.71 17.32 0.01 304.15 
Rounds 1562 2.01 1.32 1.00 11.00 
Invests r 1013 344.89 3238.44 0.00 92507.22 
Quality 1562 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
Centrality 1557 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.14 
Overseas 1562 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
Specialist 1562 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Specialist R1 1562 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
Ave. portfolio R1 1530 74.93 193.43 0.00 889.97 
P Local 1562 0.32 0.38 0.00 1.00 
P National 1562 0.52 0.41 0.00 1.00 
In the appendix we report the pair wise correlation coefficients between the variables. As 
we have previously discussed issues presented by multicollinearity in section 8.4.5, we use 
the correlation analysis to understand the association between the independent and 
dependent variables. 
We find the correlation analysis indicates good support for the choice of variables in the 
model. The majority our independent variables are correlated with the number of investors 
at the 5% significance level (as indicated by *). The main exceptions are individual 
dummy variables relating to a specific region or sector, which also show variation 
according to the direction of association. This suggests heterogeneity across regions or 
sectors with respect to their association with firm syndicate size. We also find that the 
variable Quality is not shown to be associated with syndicate size. 
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The directions of association are also in broad agreement with our expectations. An 
exception is P 
-Local 
and P National which have associations to syndicate size in the 
opposite direction to that predicted. It is possible that these variables reflect more than just 
geographical characteristics of investors. For example geographical coverage may be 
correlated with investor size or experience. Therefore we interpret these variables 
carefully in the estimation. 
In contrast to our expectations regarding the importance of the early involvement of 
specialist investors, we find that correlation of Specialist with no of investors is stronger 
than for Specialist-R. I. As we include both variants of the measure of specialist in the 
estimation we can evaluate their influence on syndicate size more fully when controlling 
for other factors. In the next section we discuss our syndicate data in more detail in view 
of other studies in the UK. 
7.4.7 Prevalence of syndication in the UK 
Syndication amongst VCs varies according to national location and sector. In the US 
Sorenson and Stuart (2001) find syndicates in two-thirds of all US VC backed firms in the 
period 1986-1998, with a typical firm receiving investment from on average 5.3 VCs. 
Manigart et al (2006) shows that European investors on average indicated an expectation to 
syndicate between 20-40% of investments, with a similar percentage of investors intending 
to participate as lead within the deals they syndicate. In Canada, Brander et al (2002) find 
that 40% of investment deals are syndicated. In the UK, Wright and Lockett's (2003) 
analysis based on EVCA survey data finds that 27% of deals were syndicated in 1999, 
falling to 13% in 2000. Thus, they argue that the proportion of deals syndicated in the UK 
is behind Europe (29.5%) and the US (63.6%). 
Using the Library House dataset we find that 77% of firms receive finance from more than 
one investor, however if we consider only institutional investment (involving formal VC 
organisations) this falls to 65% of deals. This difference can be explained by the fact that 
other forms of finance available from business angels, charities etc, are generally focused 
on providing high risk early stage investment, and therefore syndication is used more 
widely. In the statistics for the institutional deals, these informal investment deals are 
excluded. 
For individual rounds of investment the level syndication is much lower; typically 35% of 
rounds involve more than one investor, rising to 46% of institutional deals. These 
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proportions are consistent with Wright and Lockett (2003) analysis of EVCA data. 
However, although we observe a lower level of financing activity in the year 2000, we do 
not observe a fall in syndication activity. Therefore, in our data, the impact of the internet 
bubble did not influence syndication in early stage investment. One explanation for the 
difference in syndicate statistics is that the EVCA data includes the full activity of all 
members, rather than just early stage investment. 
We also find sectoral differences in the extent of syndication. In total 88% of all 
biopharmaceutical firms in our data are funded by more than one investor, and 86% of 
these receive institutional finance. This level of syndication is higher than found in other 
sectors. For individual investment rounds, the level of syndication is also higher than 
average. For example 41 % of all biopharmaceutical investment rounds are syndicated, 
rising to 54% of institutional biopharmaceutical rounds. 
Thus, syndication is a feature of UK investment activity, especially when we concentrate 
on the biopharmaceutical activity. However, we find that proportion of firms receiving 
investment from more than one investor, is much higher than the proportion of rounds 
involving co-investment. This result indicates that the structure of syndicates change with 
the growth of the firm. To capture the full participation of investors in each firm we follow 
Brander et al (2002) and analyse our data using two measures of syndication activity. The 
usual understanding of syndication is at the level of individual rounds. We also include a 
measure for the full participation of investors in firms overall to represent the wider 
demand for investors in biotechnology and pharmaceutical deals. A measure of 
syndication by round may underestimate the wider participation of active regional 
investors, such as seed funds, that may only participate in the initial rounds. In both 
statistics, a high value indicates greater investor cooperation and involvement for deals in 
the region 
We also compare the syndication statistics for each GOR and across different investment 
sectors, including Communications (Comms), Information Technology (IT), Healthcare 
excluding Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals (Healthcare), Financial services, media, 
consumer based services (Other), Biopharmaceuticals (Biopharma) and All (All deal). 
Table 8.5 shows the syndication statistics per round. On average each round of investment 
involved 1.7 investors, although Biopharma has the highest number of investors per round 
on average (2.1); deals classified as `Other' (1.5) has the lowest syndicate size. However, 
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within sectors there is also variation across regions; for example, Biopharma deals on 
average involve 2.3 investors in the South East and Eastern regions, but only 1.2 investors 
in the North East and the West Midlands. 
Table 8.5 Syndication of investors per round 
GOR Comms IT Healthcare Other Biopharma All 
East 2.2 1.7 1.6 1.7 2.3 1.9 
East Midlands 1.0 1.3 1.7 1.5 1.8 1.5 
London 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.4 2.1 1.6 
North East 1.2 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.3 
North West 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 
Northern Ireland 1.7 1.8 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.7 
Scotland 1.6 1.9 22 1.7 2.2 1.9 
South East 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.5 2.3 1.8 
South West 1.5 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.9 1.7 
Wales 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.6 1.6 1.4 
West Midlands 1.5 1.7 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.5 
Yorkshire 1.7 1.4 1.8 1.2 1.5 1.4 
Grand Total 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 2.1 1.7 
Rounds 889 1693 340 1576 666 4773 
Paired T-test * ** ** ** 
Paired T-test comparing each sector to Biopharma syndicate data. Rejecting null hypothesis of no difference at 10% *, 5% **, 1% *** 
confidence levels26 
We find that the number of investors per round increases to a peak at the 4th round of 2.0 
investors in All deal and 2.6 in Biopharma. This indicates that as firms grow the 
syndicates become larger. This is consistent with Lerner (1994) who finds the number of 
investors per round in US biotechnology firms increases from 2.7 in round one to 5.3 in 3 
or more rounds. In our data, beyond the fourth round of investment the syndicate size 
reduces, perhaps as smaller investors struggle to maintain their equity position 
In Table 8.6 we show the syndication statistics in terms of the number of investors 
involved in each recorded firm. These syndication figures are higher on average than in 
Table. 8.5, by just under one investor (2.6 compared to 1.7). This result suggests that the 
composition of investors changes throughout the growth of the firm. 
In Table 8.6 we also find a large difference in the overall syndicate size for Biopharma 
having on average 3.5 investors compared to 2.1 on average per deal. We also find 
variation across regions from 2.2 to 3.3 investors in All deal and a larger range of 2.3 to 4.1 
investors per firm for Biopharma. 
26 Paired T-test indicate significant differences between syndication levels for Biopharma versus other sectors. 
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Table 8.6 Syndication of investors per firm 
GOR Comms IT Healthcare Other Biopharma All 
East 3.3 3.0 2.8 2.6 4.0 3.1 
East Midlands 2.0 2.0 23 2.2 2.4 2.2 
London 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.2 3.0 2.5 
North East 2.6 2.3 1.7 2.5 3.3 2.5 
North West 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.0 2.9 2.2 
Northern Ireland 2.0 2.8 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.5 
Scotland 3.0 3.3 3.5 2.9 4.6 3.2 
South East 2.9 2.8 2.9 2.4 3.6 2.8 
South West 2.3 2.6 1.5 2.1 3.7 2.5 
Wales 6.0 1.7 1.8 2.7 3.0 2.6 
West Midlands 2.7 2.5 2.0 1.9 2.3 2.1 
Yorkshire 2.6 2.2 2.6 1.9 3.0 2.3 
Grand Total 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.3 3.5 2.6 
Firms 189 658 137 731 215 1930 
Paired T-test *** *** *** **. 
This detailed analysis shows that there are differences in syndicate size according to sector 
of activity, irrespective of how we define syndication, and that syndicate sizes change 
according to sector specific risks. However, there are also clear differences between 
syndication levels in different regions, even within the same sectors. In the next section 
we consider how sector and regional variables influence the number of investors per firm. 
7.4.8 Summary 
We find that biopharmaceutical deals have a different syndication profile from other 
sectors, particularly when we look at the number of investors per deal. We have shown 
that biopharmaceutical deals are on average the most demanding deals in terms of the 
participation of different investors, generally having more investors per round. Although 
we find the numbers of investors per firm are less than those reported by Sorenson and 
Stuart (2001) for all US deals, and by Lerner (1994) for US biotechnology deals. 
In our analysis we find some support for the financial motivation for syndication as the 
largest syndicate sizes are in the most risky sector. However, at the regional level we find 
differences in syndication are stronger when looking at total investor participation, 
suggesting certain regions have greater levels of participation regardless of sector. To 
understand the role of regional locations in influencing syndicate size we need to control 
for other factors. In the next section we report our results of the estimation of the model 
outlined in section 8.4. This will also help to understand the influence of specific locations 
and sectors on syndicate size, as we will be able to control for the range of other influences. 
In building the model we will also be able to evaluate different motivations to syndicate. 
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7.5 Results of the multivariate analysis 
Table 8.7, over the page, shows the results of the negative binomial estimates of the model 
proposed in section 8.4. The table shows the results for the six variations in the structure 
of the model. For each included variable we show the coefficient estimate and the standard 
error in brackets. We also include the statistical significance of each coefficient, according 
to a z-test, at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) confidence level. 
The table also reports summary statistics for each model. These statistics include the log 
likelihood and the likelihood ratio test for the statistical significance of the explanatory 
power of the included variables. As described in section 8.4.5, we include the results of 
the over-dispersion test, and the value of alpha. Finally, we show the results of the Wald 
(Testparm) and Likelihood ratio tests to show the relevance of the additional included 
variables compared to a base model, as indicated. The final line in the table shows the 
estimated value of Total Invest at the maximum syndicate size. 
The results show the regional and sector variables are significant in explaining the number 
of investors per firm. Model 1, which includes the firm level variables, clearly shows that 
compared to firms based in the omitted region (Midlands) those located in either Scotland 
or East will receive investment from a larger number of investors. The coefficients of the 
regional dummies for Scotland or the East indicate that on average, firms in these regions 
receive investment from approximately two more investors than compared to a firm in the 
Midlands. We also observe a strong positive influence of Biophanna compared to the 
omitted sector Other, on the number of investors per firm. IT, Comms and Healthcare 
(HC), were also shown to increase syndicate size relative to Other, but had smaller 
coefficients than Biopharma. 
As we introduce additional variables to the model we find the direction of influence of the 
group of investment variables is stable. However we notice in models 3-6, the size of 
coefficients of the regional and sector dummies are smaller than in model 1. The change in 
coefficient size indicates that other variables partially explain our observations made in 
Table 8.6. However, the statistical significance of dummies measuring firms in Scotland 
and the South remains consistent. Similarly, in models 3-6 biopharmaceutical firms 
remain associated with larger syndicates, even after controlling for additional factors. We 
also note that the influence of Age at first invest and Founding on the dependent variable is 
initially shown to be significant in model 1. However, as additional variables are added, 
their strength of influence and statistical significance is reduced. 
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Table 8.7 Results of negative binomial regressions (continued over page) 
Model 1 23 4a 4b 4c 5 6 
london 0.44251 0.21125 0.20215 0.18587 0.20462 0.16993 0.16790 
(0.13095) (0.12892) (0.12456) (0.12378) (0.12533) (0.12890) (0.12665) 
east 0.80527 0.25565 0.30093 0.28833 0.28097 0.27167 0.24963 
(0.14295) 
... 
(0.13965) 
. 
(0.13210) 
.. 
(0.13142) 
.. 
(0.13410) 
.. 
(0.13517) 
.. 
(0.13634) 
. 
scotland 0.89578 0.56384 0.49010 0.46847 0.48186 0.48029 0.47172 
(0.14114) 
N. 
(0.13623) 
... 
(0.13100) 
... 
(0.12935) 
... 
(0.13409) 
.N 
(0.13967) 
... 
(0.13477) 
... 
North 0.13416 0.10941 0.00702 -0.02461 0.01091 -0.00531 -0.00401 
(0.13950) (0.13584) (0.13222) (0.13278) (0.13366) (0.13934) (0.13464) 
South 0.54247 0.31841 0.36243 0.35790 0.37012 0.33254 0.33557 
(0.12999) (0.12278) (0.11938) (0.11814) (0.11952) (0.12610) (0.12236) 
Wales&NI 0.50281 0.33233 0.15097 0.13211 0.12701 0.11758 0.09053 
(0.17879) (0.15367) (0.14347) (0.14209) (0.14529) (0.17973) (0.14691) 
IT 0.36004 0.18692 0.17634 0.16854 0.18419 0.16775 0.17400 
(0.08030) 
N! 
(0.07948) 
1f 
(0.07289) 
N 
(0.07323) 
ff 
(0.07369) 
N 
(0.07342) 
N 
(0.07408) 
N 
Comms 0.42538 0.19060 0.13884 0.12267 0.14121 0.12639 0.12593 
(0.10608) (0.10475) (0.10606) (0.10990) (0.10782) (0.10559) (0.10746) 
HC 0.35037 0.25038 0.25679 0.25723 0.24047 0.25623 0.24049 
(0.11478) 
N. 
(0.10734) 
f! 
(0.09936) 
Nf 
(0.09935) 
N. 
(0.10044) 
N 
(0.10961) 
N 
(0.10116) 
N 
Bio 0.93203 0.43117 0.26777 0.26438 0.30759 0.27698 0.31441 
(0.09653) 
N! 
(0.09384) 
N! 
(0.09163) 
Nf 
(0.09231) 
f. f 
(0.09382) 
.N 
(0.08794) 
fN 
(0.09370) 
.N 
Age at first invest -0.04507 -0.00337 -0.00426 -0.00311 -0.00536 -0.00222 -0.00290 
(0.01209) (0.01153) (0.01079) (0.01086) (0.01099) (0.01061) (0.01110) 
Founding -0.02255 0.00307 -0.00671 -0.00554 -0.00623 -0.00578 -0.00512 
(0.00918) 
"f 
(0.00880) (0.00897) (0.00896) (0.00913) (0.00780) (0.00912) 
No. of rounds 0.42163 0.36615 0.32970 0.33188 0.33832 0.33419 0.34293 
(0.02451) (0.02292) (0.02138) (0.02155) (0.02151) (0.02099) (0.02157) 
H. N" N. ... ... ... ... 
Total invest 0.02330 0.02140 0.01650 0.01650 0.01720 0.01600 0.01660 
(0.00283) 
. ff 
(0.00279) 
N. 
(0.00271) 
N. 
(0.00271) 
Nf 
(0.00279) 
"N 
(0.00222) 
".. 
(0.00278) 
"N 
Investsgr -0.00009 -0.00008 -0.00006 -0.00006 -0.00007 -0.00006 -0.00007 
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
Quality 0.14173 0.14995 0.18565 0.17994 0.21291 0.18729 0.21164 
(0.11062) (0.10834) (0.10019) (0.10441) (0.10025) (0.10453) (0.09951) 
Overseas 0.46122 0.46936 0.47265 0.39784 0.39824 
(0.08871) (0.08909) (0.09094) (0.09725) (0.09895) 
P_local 0.51440 0.56155 0.52873 0.28934 0.26875 
(0.09029) 
... 
(0.08832) 
... 
(0.09098) 
... 
(0.12776) 
.. 
(0.13369) 
.. 
P_national -0.30558 -0.35214 
(0.12767) (0.12097) 
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Model (continued) 1 2 3 4a 4b 4c 5 6 
Centrality -3.47644 -3.84328 -2.52945 -2.72043 
(1.26224) (1.26905) (1.60393) (1.30184) 
Ave. portfolio_R1 -0.00021 
(0.00014) 
Specialist 0.37731 0.38407 0.34882 
(0.08413) 
N. 
(0.08466) 
N. 
(0.08323) 
.N 
Specialist R1 0.27355 0.23997 
(0.12804) (0.12776) 
Const. 44.79099 -0.51636 -6.91195 12.62199 10.25004 11.63942 11.00223 9.69219 
(18.36839) 
.. 
(0.07896) 
N. 
(17.62518) (17.96075) (17.93362) (18.28132) (15.60828) (18.24680) 
Loglikelihood -2527.03 -1445.75 -1423.85 -1377.3 -1368.01 -1384.4 -1374.78 -1380.69 
Obs 1562 1013 1013 1013 1004 1013 1013 1013 
LR model test 204.34 496.1 540.41 633.51 622.55 619.32 702.99 626.74 
Compared to model: n/a n/a 2 3 3 3 4a 4c 
Testparm 46.26 
N. 
95.76 
... 
92.61 
N. 
79.98 
.N 
5.73 
.. 
7.55 
.N 
LR test 43.8 
M. 
93.11 
N. 
n/a 78.91 
. t. 
5.64 
.. 
7.42 
.N 
Maximium £M n/a 130 135 128 129 128 125 126 
In model 2 we include variables measuring the characteristics of each investment. The 
results show that Rounds and Total invest positively influence the dependent variable. This 
result indicates increasing either the number of rounds or finance a firm receives 
determines a larger number of investors. The coefficient of Total invest is relatively small 
compared to Rounds. For example, keeping other factors constant, the number of 
investors increases by 2% for each additional Elm of investment27. If we increase the 
number of rounds by one, it is expect to result in approximately a 30-50% increase in the 
number of investors. 
The size and direction of influence of Round, Total invest and Investsqr are consistent in 
each of the models 1-6. We note that Investsqr is shown to be significantly different from 
zero, but negative. The reverse is found for Total invest. Our final observation for the 
investment level variables is that Quality is not shown as significant. As we develop the 
model by including additional variables, we find that the quality of the deal becomes 
significant, although the size of the coefficient is relatively stable across models. 
27 This approximate rate is similar to that reported in Guler and McGahan (2006) for a linear relationship of 
finance to the number of investors 
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In models 4a, b and c, we introduce variables measuring characteristics of the investors in 
each syndicate. The estimation results for these models show that either the presence of an 
overseas investor (Overseas), or a higher proportion of local investors (P local), increases 
the number of investors in a particular deal. For example, keeping all other factors 
constant, a firm funded by only local investors is associated with around a 60% larger 
syndicate, than a firm not funded by any local investors. 
In Table 8.7 we find that the influence of Centrality on the number of investors is 
consistently negative. In models 4a, 4c, and 6, Centrality is statistically significant, 
indicating that including investors with a central network position in a syndicate will 
reduce the overall number of investors. In model 4b we exchange Centrality for Ave 
portfolio RI as both variables cannot be included in the same model. Although both 
variables show the same direction of influence, the average portfolio of investors is not 
shown to be statistically significant. 
The results in Table 8.7 also show that specialist investors increase the size of syndicates. 
The presence of a specialist investor is also shown to be a statistically significant influence 
on the number of investors in models 4,5 and 6. We also find that comparing model 4a 
and 4c we find the size of the coefficient of Specialist RI is smaller that Specialist, 
indicating that when the specialist is involved in the first round of investment syndicates 
maybe slightly smaller. Our final step, in model 5 and 6, was to include P _national, 
a 
measure for the proportion of national level investors financing a firm. We find 
introducing the measure of national investors negatively influences the number of investors. 
7.5.1 Discussion of results 
The results show strong support for the variables included in the model. Every group of 
variables is accepted as having explanatory power. However, we find that compared to our 
expectations there is some variation in the direction of influence of variables. 
We find that the sector dummies reflect our expectation that biopharmaceutical investment 
requires larger syndicates, supporting the financial risk hypothesis. However, we also find 
that specific locations are shown to be more likely to have larger syndicates, which goes 
against the expectations made by the financial risk motivation. In fact we find the value of 
coefficients of particular regional dummies are greatest in regions with significant 
investment activity indicating that greater access to investors is a feature of high 
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performing locations. The importance of specific locations in determining syndicate size 
supports our discussion of the value adding and information sharing perspective. 
We find that Round, Total invest and Investsqr corresponds with our expectations and 
support a financial risk motivation for syndication. Our findings also support presence of a 
quadratic relationship between the number of investors and the amount of finance received. 
The presence of a quadratic relationship means we can interpret the coefficient of Total 
invest, as representing the gradient of relationship between the two variables at the point 
when investment = 0, (i. e. the slope resulting from Total investment =1), and the 
coefficient of Investsqr as the rate at which the gradient of Total invest diminishes with 
increasing investment (Wooldridge, 2003). Therefore the maximum number of investors is 
estimated to occur in the range of £100-130m of investment28. We note that this level of 
financing is generally out of scope for this research which is focused on early stage 
financing, indicating that the relationship is approximately linear in the early stage 
investment context. 
We also find that the quality of the deal is not a consistent predictor of the number of 
investors per firm. As our correlations show that Quality is not particularly strongly 
associated to other variables, including the number of investors, we have two possible 
explanations. Firstly, that our result reflects the inherent difficulty in selecting the right 
deal; the quality of a deal only becomes apparent in the final stages of an investment. This 
means once we have controlled for the amount of investment and number of rounds the 
quality of the deal has only a small effect on the number of investors involved. This may 
also explain the positive coefficient value, as investors are attracted to successful deals in 
the final investment rounds, as per Lerner's (1994) collusion hypothesis. An alternative 
explanation for the result is that our measure of deal quality is noisy. For example our 
measure of exits may be affected by the turbulence of the internet bubble. This 
explanation is supported by the negative statistical correlation of Quality with Founding 
(i. e. high quality deals in earlier years) and a positive correlation with IT. 
The results for the influence of overseas investors and investors with central network 
locations matched expectations. The results for both factors support the presence of 
financial risk motivations to syndicate. However, other investor level variables did not 
behave as predicted. For example the results for the proportion of local and national 
28 A similar result obtained using OLS 
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investors in a deal, indicate they influence the number of investors in the opposite direction 
to our expectations. One explanation for this result is that our geographical coding 
includes additional information such as the size of an investor. For example an investor 
who operates nationally maybe larger than an investor that operates in only one location. 
This is supported by the correlation analysis, where we find that the proportion of local 
investors in a deal is negatively correlated with the size of average portfolio of investors. 
The reverse is found for the correlation of the proportion of national investors. This help 
to explain our result in Table 8.7, as investors with small funds would need to syndicate 
more than those with larger funds. 
Finally, we find that the results of the influence of a specialist on the number of investors 
are also opposite to those expected. We expected to find that specialist investors would 
reduce syndicate size, given their in-depth knowledge of the sector. In fact, we find that 
our results support Bygrave (1987), that specialist investors are invited to join syndicates 
by others investors to gain from their experience and knowledge, resulting in larger 
syndicate sizes. This also explains the finding that coefficient of Specialist is larger than 
Specialist Rl. The involvement of a specialist early in a firm means that their knowledge 
can help to reduce the need for additional investors. 
7.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have demonstrated that syndication is a significant part of early stage 
investment activity in the UK. As suggested by the literature we have found that financial 
risk considerations, such as the level of finance, the number of rounds and sector specific 
risk influence the size of syndicates. 
As biopharmaceutical investments are high risk, syndicating reduces financial risk. This 
chapter demonstrates that biopharmaceutical firms require larger syndicates than for other 
sectors. One possible implication of this observation is that biotechnology firms must offer 
large potential returns to satisfy obtaining a large syndicate of investors. 
Despite controlling for a range of variables, regional variations are persistent. Firms in the 
South, East, and Scotland are more likely to receive investment from a larger number of 
investors. These regions still outperform when additional investor characteristics (i. e. 
characteristics of investors in these regions) are introduced and sector specific risks 
controlled for. We also note that the prominence of these three locations agrees with the 
size of the fixed effects coefficients in Chapter 6. Although we conclude that financial risk 
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motivations are the primary cause for syndicating, we suggest that regional variations 
provide evidence for non-financial factors that encourage syndication and greater 
investment activity. We suggest specific locations connected with strong investment 
activity, act as quality `labels'encouraging investors to seek out syndicates in these 
locations to access investor experience, knowledge and information. We also find that 
syndicate sizes are increased by including specialist investors who bring valuable 
experience to a syndicate. 
Our review of the literature has also indicated that syndication is a portfolio level 
management tool. This indicates that it is important to view investors in the context of 
their portfolio of investments, rather than a single investment. We have noted in Chapters 
5,6 and 7 that we believe networks to be a critical part of the functioning of venture capital. 
In this chapter we have found that investors are motivated to join together to reduce risk, 
and to share information and valuable expertise. This chapter also confirms that 
syndication has important consequences for access to future opportunities and investors 
and supports our network analysis in Chapter 7. 
In this analysis, like in Chapter 7, we found that centrally networked investors and national 
investors were related and both these factors reduced the need for firms to have large 
syndicates. However we have also found syndication activity to vary according to location. 
Investor's preference to finance firms in specific locations contributes to a concentration of 
interactions between investors in geographical space. This suggests that although 
syndication networks overall are organised by national actors with national coverage, 
syndicate dynamics have a regional component and investors prefer to form larger 
syndicates in firms where investment is most concentrated. Whilst key investors can 
finance firms across the UK, their preference is to concentrate on a few key locations and 
participate in larger syndicates. Finally, as we find that network measures reduce the 
importance of regional dummy coefficients, we conclude that networks play a role in 
supporting locations. After controlling for the role of networks in transferring information 
and knowledge, the regional coefficients provide a measure of the quality of the 
information and knowledge associated with these networks and the people involved. In the 
next chapter we start our analysis of relationships between actors more closely associated 
with the demand for investment. 
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8 Entrepreneurial firm directors 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the role of social networks form by relationships between 
directors of entrepreneurial venture capital backed firms. Here our aim is also to 
understand the influence of regional location on the formation of relationships between key 
actors in the entrepreneurial process, firm directors as outlined in Chapter 3. Therefore, 
this chapter continues to examine the role of networks in venture capital. 
In the early stages of a firm's development, direct support is given by the entrepreneurial 
team. We focus on company directors as those who are expected to have important 
influence over the strategic development of the firm. In Chapter 3 we emphasise the 
importance of individuals with `business scan' gained from multiple experiences of 
entrepreneurial firms that can be put to use to help guide the strategic direction of the firm. 
As new start-ups are generally resource poor, the firm's directors can play an important 
role, ensuring that the firm's resources are used efficiently as well as supporting the firm 
providing finance and non-finance resources such as useful contacts. 
Given our discussions of entrepreneurial networks in Chapter 3, social capital is an 
importance resource for the success of the firm. Our discussions of social capital in 
Chapter 3 also tell us that the most valuable directors will be in demand by many firms and 
have the option to sit on several firm boards. Directors in demand are commonly 
associated with other `in demand' actors. Therefore we can expect the social network of 
directors to represent structural and relational social capital relevant to the study of venture 
capital and entrepreneurial firms. 
In this chapter we specifically look at the directors of biopharmaceutical entrepreneurial 
firms. We have previously noted that the challenging field of biotechnology it is expected 
to have a high demand for experienced professionals, whilst in the UK the availability of 
expertise in managing biotechnology SME is expected to be low. A pool of experienced 
managers with start-up expertise helped to develop the Cambridge area; but the availability 
of this expertise is lower in other regions (Papaioannou, 2006). 
The long transition from academic lab to established break-even biotechnology company 
adds complications to the traditional venture capital process. The need to obtain and 
manage the significant funding required for this transition, dictates the need for specialist 
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expertise in the entrepreneurial process. The type of expertise required includes a range of 
specialist skills related to activities such as strategic partnering, managing access to finance 
and preparing the company for flotation or sale. Additionally, as most biotechnology firms 
start life without a product or knowledge based service ready for market, there are 
additional requirements in terms of the need to manage the innovation strategy and 
development of products and services. 
In Chapter 3 we also indicate that VCs are associated with providing specialist director 
expertise, and can be expected to participate in director networks. However, the UK VC 
industry has frequently been criticised as demonstrating a lack of technology awareness, 
experience, or willingness to experiment with emerging technologies. The logical 
explanation given is that UK venture capitalists do not have the necessary technical or 
scientific experience to take an effective hands-on role in the commercialisation of UK 
scientific innovation. This view places an emphasis on the venture capitalist in both the 
assessment and support of entrepreneurial business. By choosing to look at business 
funded by venture capitalists, it is possible to investigate the type directors found in 
entrepreneurial high growth firms. 
We investigate to what extent directors of venture capital backed biopharma SME are 
connected and to what extent they take positions in the same firms, or in the same 
locations. This helps us to understand from a regional perspective, how social networks of 
directors relate to the development of regional biotechnology activity. We begin by briefly 
reviewing the background literature on the role of directors and director interlocks. Then 
we focus specifically on the few studies of director networks in the SME environment. 
Finally we analyse our director networks looking for the presence of key actors, their 
regional distribution and career backgrounds. 
8.1.1 Role of directors and interlocks 
In general Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996) review the literature on board director's and 
categorise three types of roles that directors can be expected to fulfil. These are: 
1. Control; which includes the monitoring of management to ensure the firm is run in the 
interests of the stockholders, and other related activities such as the appointment of the 
CEO. 
2. Servicing; to act as support and advice to the CEO and management team and, 
3. Resource dependence; that boards are a means for "facilitating the acquisition of 
resources critical to the firm's success" (Johnson et al, 1996. p. 411). 
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Similarly, these roles can also be related to the situation when a director sits on two firm 
boards, creating as an interlock. For example an interlock can reflect a director's role in 
generating resource dependence between firms. The appointment of a director from an 
investment company to a firm's board may provide potential access to financial capital. 
Analogous to our discussions in Chapter 3, for small firms, gaining access to critical 
resources can be the key to firm survival. The lack of "historical legitimacy" in start up 
business may also make the appointment of directors from prestigious firms important 
(Mizruchi, 1996). 
In resource dependence, an interlock represents a means of accessing firm resources (Boyd, 
1990). This perspective represents organisational interests rather than the director's 
personal ones, which infers that organisations are the social actors, and the patterns of 
linkages represent inter-organisational dependence and constraints (Pfeffer, 1987 p. 40). 
However, small firms, compared to larger firms, have fewer options when it comes to the 
selection of their directors. Small firms may not be able to select directors according to 
firm level organisational resource dependency preferences (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Resource sharing is also likely to involve some form of co-operation and monitoring 
activity (Mizurchi, 1996). For example interlocks can represent a controlling role when a 
large institutional shareholder appoints one of its own directors to monitor the board and 
have influence over key decisions. Directors may also be appointed to provide a service, 
such as guidance to the other board members (Johnson et al, 1996). The `servicing' role of 
the board directors has also been shown to be important for CEO's of SME, particularly 
that an outside director can provide a breadth of guidance and advice to the management 
team (Daily and Dalton, 1992,1993). In many cases the CEO supports the help of outside 
directors (Rosenstein et al, 1993. Deakins et al, 2000). Additionally, Deakins et al (2000) 
see the supporting activities of the non-executive as a method of entrepreneurial learning 
for the entrepreneur who is advised and guided through the development of their business. 
However, the service role of interlocks is not necessarily guided by firm level motivations. 
In SME, it is likely that the motivations of the interlocking director are closely aligned with 
their own career choices and professional development. Therefore, in the servicing role, a 
director may represent their own interests or those of another firm. 
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Nicholson et al (2003) suggests that understanding the motivations of individuals creating 
the interlock is also important. In contrast to purely organisational motivations for creating 
director interlocks, Boyd (1990) observes that high performing firms use fewer directors, 
but choose those who "are most densely connected to the environment" (p. 428). Here we 
see a dual property of interlocks, that aside from connecting firms, the qualities of the 
director are important. 
The literature on interlocks provides alternative perspectives on individual motivations for 
interlocks. These perspectives include elitism and career development. The elitist 
perspectives suggest that interlocks are a result of social cohesion within an elite capitalist 
class, for example they represent the interests of wealthy families (Pfeffer, 1987) or clubs 
of elite directors, and potentially associated with collusion (Bazerman and Schoorman, 
1983). However, reflecting our discussion of social capital theory in Chapter 3, Kono et al 
(1998) note that `clubby' behaviour can have positive benefits providing a means of 
maintaining trust, which helps these individuals share information and work together. 
Although Conyon and Muldoon (2006) found that interlocks in US firms could generally 
be modelled as a random network, they found some evidence of elite groups of directors in 
parts of the network where in-demand directors, sat on boards of similar in-demand 
directors. 
The career development perspective proposes that interlocks are simply the result of an 
individual's aspirations to gain exposure to new business situations, contacts and prestige 
(Zajac, 1988; Useem, 1984 cited Mizruchi, 1996). Like in the elitism model, the career 
development perspective emphasises that interlocks are important to the individual director. 
The firm is still a beneficiary of the interlock, potentially gaining access to the very social 
capital and resources that the director has accumulated through their career. This presents 
an interesting situation where communities of individuals develop, defined by their history 
of involvement with firms, but formed from director's own independent choices. 
8.1.2 Geography - directors, interlocks and social networks 
We know from our discussion of the literature in previous chapters that the propensity to 
form social ties reduces with distance (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). Simiarly, geography 
can also be seen to influence the formation of interlocks. For example Green (1983) found 
that interlocking between cities reduces with the distance, whilst O'Hagan and Green 
(2004) found that US and Canadian firms with headquarters in the same location were 
more likely to have interlocks. 
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However, Kono et al, (1998) finds that the nature of interlocks changes with distance 
between firms. They find that firms based in the same location share interlocks based on 
intense relationships between directors, indicating the presence of elite director clubs. The 
proximity of the firms created the opportunity for frequent contact between local directors, 
facilitating the creation of strong bonds and trust which "lay the foundations for local 
interlocking" (p. 896). They also found that directors of the most successful firms were 
more likely to be found on the boards of other firms. 
However, over longer distances the interlocks were motivated by resource dependence, 
particularly when financial resource dependence was involved (Kono et al, 1998). 
O'Hagan and Green (2004) found that non-local interlocks were used to access locational 
specific resources. For example, firms based in large cities were often interlocked with 
firms in smaller cities to provide access to corporate specific knowledge. 
8.1.3 UK SME director networks 
The UK studies by New (2003) and Myint et al (2005) focus on the role of key serial- 
entrepreneurs and networks connected to bio-clusters in Cambridge and London. Myint et 
al (2005) identify mini-clusters relationships in the network of directors of Cambridge 
University spin out firms. The authors find strong patterns of repeat connections between 
directors of SME firms indicating strong structural and relational social capital in the 
Cambridge region. The authors note the absence of founding scientists in the successive 
management of firms; instead they observe that, "the majority of high technology 
companies that have shaped the success of the Cambridge cluster are connected to a 
handful of serial entrepreneurs, business angels and venture capitalists" (p. 169). 
Significantly, Myint et al (2005) note one of the most important factors in the development- 
of mini-clusters is "a history of working for a common company" (p. 2005). In agreement 
with Stuart and Sorenson, (2003) and Sorenson and Stuart (2001), a shared history has 
benefits for the directors in terms of training, sharing of tacit knowledge important for 
entrepreneurship and attracting investment. The clustering of directors in a single location 
is linked to Stuart and Sorenson (2003) observation that owners and founders favour 
operating in areas where they have social networks, indicating the strong presence of 
regionally based social capital. 
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In agreement with the view of regionally based social capital, Garnsey and Heffernan 
(2005) find that the development of the Cambridge region was a cumulative generational 
process, where social capital features strongly. In this process, waves of entrepreneurs 
start firms and recruit local people to work in their businesses. These waves of recruits 
have since generated spin offs business, and in so doing created a network of experienced 
businesses capability located in the region, built on mutual knowledge and trust. 
In contrast to Cambridge, New (2003) finds fewer "key individuals" operating in the 
London cluster, potentially as a result of the strong history of biotech in Cambridge. 
According to New (2003) London has yet to acquire a critical mass of biotechnology firms 
and supporting entrepreneurial actors. We look at the detail of these issues in Chapter 10. 
8.1.4 Which perspective is appropriate? 
Our discussion of the literature on social networks generated from director affiliations to 
firms has demonstrated a variety of perspectives in this field. The focus of the interlock 
literature is mainly on large corporate firms and their boards, whilst literature on SME 
firms focuses more closely representing the social capital of directors. We find both 
literatures discuss variation in ties according to geography. 
Our literature review has demonstrated a variety of explanations for ties between firms 
based on interlocked directors. Although different perspectives can be combined in a 
complementary way, for example Mizruchi (1996) suggests that the career development 
perspective complements any of the inter-organisational views of interlocks. 
We also find literature which focuses on director motivations to form interlocks, such as 
career development and elitism which resonates with our discussions of social capital in 
Chapter 3. The focus of this thesis is on SME firms with limited resources. We include 
the firm's directors as an important SME resource. In this way the ability of an individual 
to fulfil the role of director, i. e. their `business scan' is linked to their contacts, status and 
ultimately their social capital. A network formed from the affiliation of directors to 
different firms, represents director's career development, but also creates ties between 
different directors which is indicative of the accumulation of social capital, as per Cohen 
and Fields (1999). In the SME environment we suggest that the career development 
perspective naturally complements social capital theory as we have discussed in Chapter 3. 
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Similarly, our discussions of elitism in director interlocks correspond to the concepts of 
mini-clusters and structural and relational social capital discussed in Myint et al (2005). 
Interlocks have been shown to reflect elite groups, where ties are strong between high 
performing and powerful directors. We argue that elite groups of SME directors will be 
strongly tied. For example, following our discussion of social capital and embeddedness in 
Chapter 3, important directors can be expected to accumulate high levels of social capital 
which potentially encourage the formation of strongly tied directors. Here we emphasise 
that repeated relations between directors indicate a pattern of interaction which helps these 
directors work together and form trust. It also suggests the presence of `clubs' of directors, 
formed from the most active directors in the sector. 
Finally, we find agreement in the literature regarding the effects of proximity. Firstly we 
have found that interlocks cluster in terms of social and geographical space. On a local 
basis the interlocks were driven more by individual level motivations, such as career 
advancement and elite clubs. Both Myint et al (2005) and New (2003) conclude that ties 
between key individuals with the experience and local connections help to develop 
businesses represent the formation of strong regional social capital, essential for the 
progress of bio-clusters. 
Over longer distances interlocks tend to represent inter-firm networks driven by 
motivations to access resources within other attractive firms or locations. We might expect 
relationships formed across regions to have different characteristics from local ties. We 
can expect long distance ties to be more targeted, with an absence of the presence of mini- 
clusters. It also follows that locations with concentrations of influential directors should be 
targets for other firms based in other regions, to provide access to the director's resources, 
as well as wider regional resources. 
We have also noted that some directors in our network are expected to be investors. As 
investors are likely to represent an investment firm's interests, this clearly complicates 
their role as a director. A venture capitalist can be seen as interlocking the firm and the 
investment fund, acting in combination of a monitoring, servicing and resource 
dependence role. However, the investor's skill at working with start-ups will also depend 
on their `business scan' and ability to build relationships with other influential directors. 
So in this sense neither the career development nor elitism perspective is restrictive. 
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Based on this literature review we should expect that the formation of director networks is 
likely to be associated with the development of UK regions. Extending this argument we 
can expect that local networks will vary according to the specifics of their regional context 
and available director experience. Furthermore building on the argument that social 
networks operate locally, means that key individuals are locationally constrained and 
operate in a limited geographical area, further re-enforcing local concentration of director 
activity. 
In summary our review has generated a set of expectations regarding the structure of 
networks formed between directors who share affiliations to SME firms. We can expect 
ties between directors within the same regions to be concentrated and motivated by 
individual career development choices. We can expect that ties across regions are more 
dispersed, representing more formal interactions between directors. We expect to find 
investors provide an important indicator of the function of social networking between 
directors. For example, as we find in Chapter 7, investors search for the most profitable 
firms encourages them to operate over larger distances and create network links across 
locations. However, if benefits from regional director networks are strong we will find 
investors attached to elite groups of directors. 
8.2 Method 
8.2.1 Representing networks 
We are interested in analysing the social ties of directors with experience of multiple 
directorates; to do this we build a network from the affiliations of directors to firms. The 
affiliations of directors to firms can be represented as a two mode network (firms and 
directors). However, we are motivated by the analysis of the ties between groups of 
multiple boarded directors (1 mode representation). Rather than understanding an 
individual's motivation for interlocking any two firms, we analyse the structure of 
relationships between in demand directors, or an elite director groups. By analysing the 
social network of this elite group we analyse the structural and relational social capital of 
these directors. It follows that well connected directors with more experience will have 
developed greater social capital which can be applied to the start up firms. 
Mapping the involvement of directors and firms, without limiting the network to 
concurrent directorships creates the opportunity to show the full association of 
relationships between individuals and firms. In interpreting the network, it is important to 
be cautious in assuming that two individuals linked to the same firm would have 
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knowledge of working with each other. For example, they may relate to different periods 
in time, or in fact one may be the replacement for the other. We are interested in 
understanding the pattern of interactions, and therefore consider the networks as 
cumulative process of building relationships between directors. 
If we were to represent the 1 mode director network as a sociogram, it would be very dense. 
Such a representation uses all relationships between directors; therefore each director on a 
firm board is automatically connected to every other director who has been attached to that 
firm (Conyon and Muldoon, 2006). Therefore, even a director who has only sat on one 
firm board is shown with several relationships to other directors (the directors of the same 
firm). 
Our motivation in constructing a sociogram is to highlight directors who repeatedly take 
positions on multiple firm boards. Therefore rather than represent all connections, we 
simplify the network structure to include only directors involved in creating linkages 
between firms. This simplification helps to show a structure involving key individuals with 
multiple external links, as opposed to many ties internally generated from being a member 
of one firm with a large board. 
We achieve this `reduced' 1 mode representation by modifying the 2 mode network. In the 
two mode network (directors and firms) we exclude directors which sit on only one firm 
board. We transform this reduced two mode network into a1 mode director only network, 
which represents relationships between serial or multiple affiliated directors. 
8.2.2 Analysing networks 
The network can be analysed in terms of the overall pattern of co-ordination and 
observable sub-groups. We use social network analysis, as described in Chapter 4, to 
represent the networks as sociograms, using Pajek (De Nooy et al, 2005). As in Chapter 7, 
we analyse the network to determine the structural properties of the network, as well as 
highlighting the presence and position of key actors. Social network analysis provides an 
unbiased means of identifying network co-ordinators (Castilla et al, 2000). 
Following our discussion of the career development perspective, the expected prominence 
of investors, and the role of geography in determining the structure of networks, in our 
analysis we categorise directors according to their career background and geographical 
preferences. Director's career backgrounds highlight the role of particular types of director 
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in the network, whilst directors locational preferences, based on the location of the firms 
where they have a director position, indicate geographical patterns of activity and aid our 
interpretation of the network structure. We describe how the career and locational data is 
obtained in the data section. 
A common critique of network research is that the analysis is often based on a single type 
of relationship. For example, Myint et al (2005) suggest using director appointments 
provides a limited method for tracking other forms of relationships important for 
supporting entrepreneurial firms, such as support from advisors and or more informal types 
of relationships between people. These other relationships may also have value and reflect 
social capital. However, the alternative to view all types of relationships between 
individuals has obvious practical limitations. It is difficult to collect and analyse data on a 
multiplex of relationships. As we discuss in the following section, we expand our analysis 
to include an analysis of cumulative relationships between directors formed by affiliations 
to the same firm, rather than restricting relationships to concurrent ties, to provide a more 
encompassing perspective of relationships between directors. 
Finally, we also improve on previous studies by examining the relationships formed 
between directors in four UK regions. We also consider the ties between the four regions. 
However inter-regional ties must be assessed cautiously, as without the full population of 
UK directors, from all regions, inevitably some director's ties to other regions can be 
missed. As we note in Chapter 3, a minority of actors can have a large impact on network 
structure; the same applies for missing ties. This means we cannot treat our analysis as 
representative of the UK overall. Our findings should be interpreted as firstly an analysis 
for four regional networks, formed of directors of firms in each respective region, and 
secondly as indicative of ties between each of the four regions. 
8.2.3 Networks and cumulative structures 
The use of a cumulative network structure, as described, is different from the strict 
application of director interlocks. As we do not restrict the relationships in the network by 
the timing of particular director appointments, a relationship can exist between directors 
who have been at the same firm, although over different periods. 
We justify a cumulative network structure on practical and theoretical grounds. Starting 
with the practicalities, we observe a set of biopharmaceutical firms over a relatively short 
period of time. As we indicate in Chapter 4 the majority of firms in the dataset are 
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founded between 1998 and 2006. Therefore, we assume that the histories of firms in the 
database are fairly short and it is likely that directors of these firms will have an awareness 
of the other directors that have been involved in the same firm. This is also supported by 
the average duration of a director in a particular position being over 3 years29, suggesting 
the appointment of directors is not made on a short term basis. 
A final practical point is that dates of formal appointment to the board represent a legal 
status, rather than a social relation. For example, director appointments are an important 
part of managing a SME. Appointments are carefully considered to gain the necessary 
trust between the other board members. The appointment of a director is likely to be a 
final step in the process of building a relationship between directors, such that social or 
informal relationships will start well in advance of any formal appointment. Similarly, 
even after stepping down from a board, a director's social relationships to other board 
members may persist. In summary, it would not accurately reflect the social networks 
between investors to strictly apply concurrent interlocks. 
From a theoretical perspective, in the dynamic environment of entrepreneurial firms, 
relationships between individuals are expected to be less restricted by the boundaries of 
firms and more closely tied to `group' identity (Saxenian, 1991). In this case the common 
identity is that of directors of start up firms. The historical accumulation of social capital 
and the career development perspective both indicate that it is beneficial to follow the 
development of linkages, rather than only view relationships as a snapshot. As the 
entrepreneurial context suggests, relationships should be viewed on a personal level, and 
extend beyond the formal timelines of being a director at a firm. This perspective of 
persistence in informal ties, is supported by Granovetter's(1973) work on infrequent or 
weak ties, as well as research demonstrating the importance of previous associations, such 
as shared affiliation histories (Myint et al, 2005). Therefore relaxing interlocks to more 
general accumulation of director affiliations is appropriate. 
8.2.4 Data 
Our analysis is based on the director firms in four UK regions; East, London, Yorkshire, 
and Scotland. We use the Library House dataset of biopharmaceutical firms receiving 
venture capital funding between 2000 and 2006, and information from FAME on director 
positions, to construct a relational database comprised of the history of board directors of 
biopharmaceutical firms. To aid our interpretation of this data we include details of the 
29 The actual duration of a director in a firm is likely to be longer, as some directors included in the database 
as moving roles e. g. from CEO to CTO or CFO. 
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firm's location, type of business, academic origins, and sources of funding. As described 
in Chapter 4 we also use information on director profiles, for example their qualifications, 
commercial experience etc, to improve the detail of the analysis. 
Directors are categorised according to their expertise based on the information we collect. 
We generate five categories according to whether they are acting as a venture capitalist, 
entrepreneur, consultant/advisor, professional director, or fall into the remaining `other' 
category. We identify venture capitalists as working for a venture capital firm. 
Consultants and advisors include those individuals posting active involvement in 
consultancy and accountancy or legal firms (rather than by qualification). Directors 
connected to serial board positions, but without detail of involvement in founding or 
investing, are described as professional directors typically taking executive positions 
within companies. Finally, those directors who cite being a founder or entrepreneur, but 
without association to being a venture capitalist are coded entrepreneurs. A small 
remainder were coded as `other', because they either act as company secretary or their 
details were not possible to obtain. We also collect information on the qualifications of the 
directors, according to whether they have accountancy, legal, PhD or MBA qualifications. 
The geographical location of each director is based on their affiliations to firms. For 
example, a director who served on the board of firms in one region is attributed to that 
region. If a director sits on boards of firms in different regions, then they are considered to 
be multi-regional. 
Finally, one adjustment is made to the director data as a result of changes in the ownership 
of firms. A consequence of looking at the construction of linkages over time is that the 
sample of firms is subject to change, as firms can be acquired by other firms. We stop 
tracking the directors of businesses which become acquired by large multinationals, as 
multinational firms are not the focus of this analysis. In a small number of cases, a firm in 
the database is acquired by another venture backed firm. In order to keep the analysis clear, 
for these cases we include all the directors involved in both firms, but record the firm by its 
most recent name. 
8.3 Some properties of director networks 
8.3.1 Skewed distribution of relationships 
Before we look in detail at the structure of networks, we first examine the data on directors 
to see how many individuals have served on multiple boards. We can also see how many 
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of the available board positions in firms are taken up by these multiple boarded directors. 
In total we find in our sample of 108 firms, that 1 152 individual directors account for 1434 
board positions" 
Figure 9.1 shows the distribution of all directors and board positions in the four regions 
according to the number of directorship affiliations a director has. We can describe this 
graph as capturing the degree of directors (when the network is in 2 mode form) (De Nooy 
Figure 9.1 Distribution of director degree 
et al, 2005). It shows that approximately 85% of individuals sit on only one firm board. 
These directors account for 68% of the total available board positions in the firms in our 
sample. Directors with multiple affiliations only account for a small minority of the 
directors in the sample, but because they are active in several firms, they have a larger 
impact. For example only 0.5% of directors have six board affiliations, but they are 
involved in 3% of the total board seats. 
Overall, the 15% of directors with multiple affiliations represent 32%, or approximately 
450, of the available board seats. On average each multiple affiliated director has 2.6 
board positions, where each board position is in a different firm. This means, when we 
look at directors with multiple affiliations, we are focusing on a small minority of 
individuals with a particularly high level of representation in the bio-pharmaceutical sector. 
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Graph (left) above chart the proportion of directors and boards seats held against the number of 
affiliations of directors. The line Graph two (right) shows the log of the frequency of board seats and 
directors plotted against the log of the number of affiliations of directors. 
The most striking aspect of Figure 9.1 is that the frequency of directors (and the board 
seats they fill) falls rapidly as the number of affiliations is increased. It suggests and an 
exponential decay trend or the presence of a power law. The presence of a power law in a 
one mode network has associations to the type of distributions found in a hub based or 
30 In total 1472 board positions are named, but 28 are removed as they result from the renaming or merging 
of companies. We do not count multiple board positions held by an individual in one firm. 
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preferential attachment type network, which can be demonstrated by plotting the frequency 
data on logarithmic scales. We find the lines on the graph on the right are approximately 
linear on a log-log plot and therefore are suggestive of the presence of a power law. 
Although, as in Chapter 7, we note that the distribution of the data is too narrow to confirm 
the presence of a power law. However, this analysis shows that highly connected directors 
within our sample are rare, and likely to strongly influence the structure of the network of 
directors. 
Figure 9.2 repeats the analysis of Figure 9.1 for directors based in each region. In all 
regions the directors with multiple interests are the minority. The Eastern region has the 
highest proportion of multiple board directors and Scotland the lowest. Scotland also has 
the smallest range of directorships per individual; they have no directors involved in more 
than two biopharmaceutical firms. 
Similarly the log-log plot of the count of director degree for each region shows a consistent 
linear gradient for each region. As in Figure 9.1, we find that well connected directors are 
a minority within each region. Although Scotland is clearly limited by the lack of any 
directors with more than two directorships in the data collected. A final observation is that 
for a minority of well connected directors, particularly in Yorkshire and the East, the 
frequency of these individuals is greater than suggested by a simple power law relationship. 
Figure 9.2 Distribution of regional director degree 
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Graph (left) shows the regional histogram of the frequency of directorships per individual. In graph (right) 
the data is plotted in log-log form. 
One possible explanation for the higher than expected number of high degree directors in 
Yorkshire and the East, is the presence of organised director clusters or a managed pattern 
of interaction between the key directors. For example, Conyon and Muldoon (2006) 
observations of homophily in directors suggests directors prefer to group with similar 
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performing directors. In this case, well connected investors may prefer to sit on the same 
boards as other well connected directors in the same location. 
As we measure the connectivity of directors differently from previous literature we cannot 
compare our results directly to other large firm studies. Our results suggests that at a 
national and regional level, relative to the total number of directors, only a small 
proportion of directors are active across multiple firms in the same sector. However, do 
our results suggest a national level of organisation, similar to that found in Chapter 7, or do 
the results indicate distinctive groups of regional actors? 
8.3.2 Regional co-ordination: Links between and across regions 
Next we adjust our data to account for directors who work in many regions. Table 9.1 is a 
summary of the number of individual directors categorised according to their geographical 
coverage and the number of directorships held. Table 9.1 categorises people in the dataset 
according to whether their biopharmaceutical interests are based purely in one region, or 
more evenly spread across multiple regions. For example it shows that there are 496 
individuals who only serve on boards in the Eastern region, of which the majority 434 had 
links to a single company. In the East 13% of directors had multiple interests and a small 
minority had a history with 5 or more firms in the region. 
The East has the greatest number of people with experience of acting on a biotechnology- 
pharmaceutical firm's board, but also a greater number of people with experience of 
multiple firms. In addition, some individuals with multi-region interests maintain a strong 
base of activity in the East, but with additional appointments elsewhere suggesting some 
exporting of experience from the Eastern region. 
Table 9.1 Summary of regional director activity 
Regional categories Directorships % with 
1 2 3-4 5-6 Total multiple 
interest 
East 434 46 13 3 496 13% 
London 261 26 8 2 297 12% 
Scotland 185 4 0 0 189 2% 
Yorkshire 101 4 2 2 109 7% 
Multi region (2) 32 14 3 49 100% 
Multi region (3) 6 6 12 100% 
Grand Total 981 112 43 16 1152 15% 
Chi-square test comparing proportions of multiple affiliated regional directors for the four regions only (i. e. top lour rows of table) to 
null hypothesis of no difference from the proportion for the total is rejected (pval -- 0.001) 
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For the remaining regions, London had the next highest number of directors, and 12% of 
directors with multiple interests. Scotland and Yorkshire have very low levels of multiple 
directorships, suggesting the absence of locally embedded experience specialising in 
managing biopharma businesses. 
Scotland and Yorkshire have a much greater reliance on those individuals shown to have 
multi-regional interests. These are shown by the categories named as, "Multi region (2)" 
and "Multi region (3)". The directors coded as multi regional have a distribution of 
interests across several regions. These individuals provide connections between businesses 
across regions and signal the need to examine the overall interactions between all firms. 
The presence of multi-regional directors indicates that the network features highly 
connected directors who operate at a more national level, as well as directors whose 
activities are concentrated in one region. 
An alternative perspective is to look at the number of board seats in the firms for each 
region. In doing so we can examine whether board positions are filled by a director who 
operates in one region, i. e. regionally fixed, or whether their activities cover other areas, i. e. 
regionally mobile. In Table 9.2 below, we see that there are a total of 1257 board positions 
filled by a director based only within the region, only 177 (12.3%) positions are filled by 
directors who have multiple geographical coverage. 
Table 9.2 Regional director mobility 
Region Positions held Positions held Total positions % 
by regional by regionally 
mobile directors fixed directors 
East 82 587 669 12.3% 
London 48 351 399 12.0% 
Scot 30 193 223 13.5% 
Yorks 17 126 143 11.9% 
Total 177 1257 1434 12.3% 
Chi-square test comparing proportions of mobile directors to null hypothesis of no difference from the proportion for the total is 
accepted (pval = 0.96) 
Is there a difference in the activity level of directors in each single region compared to the 
multi-regional directors? A simple calculation suggests that on average each single region 
director accounts for 1.2 board seats, whereas directors with a multi regional profile on 
average have 3 board seats. However, in order to have a multi regional profile the director 
must have a minimum of 2 board positions. If we remove directors with only a single 
directorship, and then compare between regionally fixed and regionally mobile directors, 
we find little difference in their activity level. For example, directors who have multiple 
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affiliations but are active in only one location are found on 2.8 boards on average, 
compared to 3 boards for multi-regional directors. 
A further point is that the proportion of board positions filled by directors who are 
regionally mobile is relatively stable across different regions. The number of individuals 
with expertise in directing firms across different locations is proportional to the number 
board seats available in a region, and ultimately the number of firms. There may be a 
variety of explanations for this observation, but it emphasises that regions must operate 
with the talent it has locally, rather than expect to be able to recruit the relevant experience 
from elsewhere. Only a proportion of firms will have access to expertise from these more 
mobile directors, in line with the number of funded opportunities in the region. The 
implication is that the more firms in a region, the greater number of mobile directors and 
the wider the geographical network of the region. 
8.4 The structure of director networks 
In previous research on directors Rosa and Scott (1999) showed a high proportion of high 
performing firms had multiple directorships, and Storey et al (1987) reported 75-80% of 
high growth firms had multiple directors. Our sample of firms has received venture 
finance, indicating that they have high growth expectations. We exclude all directors with 
affiliation to only one firm; instead we are interested in directors with ties to several 
biopharma companies. 
In the sample of 108 firms used in this research, we find that 87% (94) of firms have 
shared a director with another firm in this sample. The cumulative approach taken to 
mapping the directors is not directly comparable with previous work and explains the 
higher proportion. It does agree with the overall findings that high technology firms are 
likely to involve a core of dedicated directors. Next we examine the core of network of 
actors that have a history of being a director on more than one firm. 
8.4.1 Multiple director relationships 
Figure 9.3 shows the relationships between directors who have served on board of the 
same firm (within the sample of firms used). The network shows a total of 171 directors 
from the original 1052 directors we have in the database. We also code the directors 
according to their operational geography31 as represented by the colour of each node. The 
structure is achieved through running the Fruchterman Reingold and Kamada Kawi 
algorithms within the network software Pajek, until a stable structure is obtained. The 
31 The number in brackets for multi-regional directors shows the number of regions they operate across. 
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structure is graphed with the aim of drawing equal length vertices, such that similarly 
connected vertices should be placed near to each other and should minimise crossing of 
vertices. 
Figure 9.3 Sociogram of director network 
0 
East = Yellow; London = Green; Red = Scotland, Blue = Yorkshire; Pink = Multi region(2), White = Multi region(3) 
A visual inspection of the network shows one main component, and one isolated vertex. 
As would be expected from using directors with multiple affiliations, the structure of the 
network is dense and formed of one main component. One investor is isolated, and tied to 
several firms without involving any of the other directors. 
The coding of director's geographical location shows that director's positions in the 
network structure are grouped by their geography. In part this is a function of the coding 
scheme; a director only based in London is likely to sit on boards with other London based 
directors. However, the directors within each regional group occupy distinct positions in 
the network. For example, at the centre of the network the linkages are dense with 
frequent connections between a core group formed of directors who are from the East or 
operate across multiple locations. As we move to the outer edge of the main component 
we find London based directors form a connected group which has multiple ties to the core 
central group. London directors form a lower density group, formed from smaller sub- 
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clusters of repeated interactions shown by the thickness of the lines 3`". The directors based 
in Scotland and Yorkshire who feature in the network, are fewer in number and also 
attached to the outer part of the network. The Yorkshire directors are shown as a strongly 
interlocked group, with links to network centre through multi regional directors, whilst the 
Scottish directors are fragmented, with one director33 isolated from the main component. 
Our results partially indicate that the director network is organised according to a hierarchy 
of geographical clusters, connected by a group of regionally mobile directors. Our results 
also partially support the presence of hubs, operating at a national and regional level. The 
presence of relatively distinct regional clusters and directors creating inter-regional ties is 
similar to a `small world' type network. However we also find an absence of regional 
clusters in places like Scotland. Therefore we identify different patterns in the network 
according to the type of actors and their geographical location. 
The network clearly shows distinctive patterns regarding two types of directors, those who 
operate within a single location, and those that move over different regions. The latter 
generally occupy central positions in the network but also have frequent and strong 
connections to the East. The other regions appear more weakly linked to these multi- 
regional directors. The frequent ties between directors at the centre, suggests greater levels 
of social capital and a structure more similar to that we expected, where loose firm 
boundaries encourage the movement of people from one firm to another. These central 
actors are active in a well developed social network connected to all regions, suggesting 
information about opportunities and work practices in the UK will travel easily within the 
group. From a career development perspective these well connected directors have the 
greatest opportunity to learn from each other. Directors in regions such as London, 
Scotland and Yorkshire have more peripheral positions in the network and interact with a 
smaller number of directors, generally from the same region. Directors with peripheral 
positions in the network have more limited opportunity to work with different directors, 
and information and knowledge from around the UK may not be as easily accessible. 
Directors in peripheral parts of the network may lag more centrally positioned directors in 
their ability to develop the type of `business scan' we discussed previously. 
32 In networks with directed lines it is usual to talk about strong and weakly connected sub-groups. More 
frequent linkages between actors could be described as stronger, and we refer to this meaning when we talk 
about multiple relationships between directors. "One mode networks derived from two-mode affiliation 
networks are often rather dense. They contain many cliques, so we can analyze the structure of overlapping 
cliques or complete subnetworks if we want to detect cohesive subgroups", "Multiple lines are considered 
more important because they are less personal and more institutional". P. 109 Wouter de Nooy et al (2005) 
33 John Pool is an exective director of several biotechnology and healthcare firms and an advisor to Scottish 
Enterprise. 
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8.5 In-demand director backgrounds 
Focusing on a well connected sub-group of 59 directors with three or more links (degree---2) 
to firms in the sample, we find that 49% have an experience of being an investor, 25% are 
involved in acting as biotech advisors including legal advice and consulting and 22% are 
classed as professional directors with a history of directorships in biopharmaceutical and 
other sectors. Excluding investors, only 17% of this group of directors had involvement in 
founding businesses and could be described as bio-entrepreneurs. The largest group of 
specialists with multiple involvements in biotech businesses are investors. The presence of 
independent directors or serial entrepreneurs (not associated with an investment fund) was 
lower than that of investors. 
Looking at our data on the qualifications of in-demand directors we find a high proportion 
(31 %) of directors have a doctorate. Additionally, based on the available employment 
history, around 20% of directors had previous experience of working in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry. The breakdown of qualifications by the director classification is given below. 
Table 9.3 Qualification level of highly connected directors 
Directors (degree >2) Accountancy Le al Doctorate MBA Total 
Venture capitalists (or previous experience) 14% 0% 34% 0% 29 
Consultants 0% 40% 13% 7% 15 
Professional directors 0% 0% 46% 8% 13 
Entrepreneurs 0% 0% 50% 0% 10 
Others 0% 0% 25% 0% 4 
This brief analysis indicates that key co-ordinators in the network are likely to have 
backgrounds in venture capital. The high level of doctorates and backgrounds in 
pharmaceuticals in the sample suggests that these in-demand directors will also have some 
relevant technical knowledge. Perhaps most interesting is the strong presence of legal 
advisors taking multiple board positions. This indicates that at even for early stage 
biopharmaceutical firms, guidance regarding legal issues is strongly demanded. 
8.5.1 Strength of ties 
In Figure 9.3 we identified a core of directors with multiple interests which formed a well 
connected single group of directors, where regional patterns can he identified within the 
main component. This view of the network gives equal rating to relationships that may 
occur as a one-off, compared to distinctive repeated patterns of relationships. 
To understand the distinctive core patterns of relationships we concentrate on repeat 
relationships within this core group. We remove links between directors that have 
I-I 
occurred only once (multiplicity = 1). We show directors who have had an involvement in 
the same firms more than once in Figure 9.4 below. Following our discussion in Chapter 7, 
repeat ties indicate a stronger connection between two individuals and can be associated 
with the development of trust between directors. 
It is worth noting that our interpretation of the links between directors should be limited to 
dyadic ties, rather than longer paths between any two directors in a cluster. For example 
the firms that Susan Smith and Valerie Jolliffe have in common, may not be the same as 
the firms Eileen Anderson and Susan Smith have in common. Therefore, we cannot 
always interpret the mini-clusters as being based on exactly the same firms (although this 
is likely). However, these ties do indicate clusters of strong relationships in the network. 
Figure 9.4 Sociogram of directors with line multiplicity >1 
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The colour coding in Figure 9.4 is the same as previously used. The figure shows the 
modified network is now highly fragmented with different clusters of directors. The 
thicker the line between directors, the more firms, or repeated affiliations they have in 
common. The values of the line range from 2 to 5 shared firms. The largest component or 
club (top right) includes directors based in the East and with no particular fixed location. 
In fact, a general feature of the larger components in Figure 9.4 is their strong attachment 
to a particular region, but with the addition of directors without a particularly fixed 
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location. If we look at the largest cluster in detail we can see that directors such as Alun 
Jones, Mark Docherty, and Peter Keen provide key links that form the cluster. In fact 
removing these directors would result in four smaller structures, two of which would 
include no locally tied directors. The first small network structure is centred on Susan 
Foden; the second is based around Peter Keen and Mark Docherty. We note these 
directors' names and will return to them in Chapter 10. 
This discussion shows that groups of nationally active directors have strong ties to 
directors in the East. These strong ties are not found in other parts of the network. For 
example the London based directors are shown in several relatively small clusters, and 
directors in Yorkshire also formed in two groups. Only the larger of the London and 
Yorkshire clusters have any strong ties to more nationally operational directors. 
Finally, we note that Scotland is absent in this representation. Table 9.1 showed us that 
Scottish based directors in our sample tend not to have multiple director roles". The 
representation of Scottish directors in the network is low, relative to the number of active 
directors in Scottish firms. Their complete absence in Figure 9.4 indicates that directors in 
our sample who only operate in Scotland do not have strong ties to other biopharma 
directors by shared affiliation to firms. In Chapter 10 we will look at the Scottish network 
in detail to understand why they do not appear as strongly tied. 
This network represents the activity of directors across the four regions of the UK. Other 
studies have concentrated on the activities of directors within a single region or compared 
just two regions. This research shows that a single region focus will under represent actors 
who take directorships in other regions. Importantly, at the UK level the absence of any 
strong linkages between regional clusters formed by the multi-regional directors, suggests 
that strong relationships are persistent at the local regional level. We observe groups acting 
locally, and groups acting nationally, but without any evidence of repeated connections 
across different groups of locally embedded actors. This absence of strong relationships is 
in contrast to Figure 9.3 which included weaker relationships between directors. This 
matches our expectation that strong ties are generally facilitated by proximity between 
actors. 
34 They may of course be active in other sectors and different firms than in our venture backed sample. 
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In Figure 9.4 we also categorise directors according to their background, as shown by the 
numerical code. This means we can examine each cluster using information on the 
director career backgrounds. For example, we find that the large Eastern orientated cluster 
of directors, including Jones, Docherty and Keen includes all five types of career 
backgrounds. 
When we analyse Figure 9.4 using information on the backgrounds of directors, we find an 
even distribution of career backgrounds across each cluster of directors. We find that each 
cluster contains directors with a variety of backgrounds. This indicates that directors 
within each cluster fulfil particular roles making distinctive competence based 
contributions to the boards they sit on, for example providing investment expertise, 
entrepreneurial experience or general `business scan'. These directors are in-demand and 
choose to form strongly connected groups which provide a range of benefits to the firms 
they work with. We find a range of backgrounds are necessary to establish core clusters or 
`clubs' of directors. In these clubs we expect that the reputation and performance of each 
individual maintains their access to the group. Given that our data includes only venture 
capital backed firms, our findings link well with the literature that suggest investors play a 
role in coordinating access to a range of resources and strategic advice. 
We also find venture capitalists directors are distributed across different groupings, rather 
than being concentrated into one particular club. This indicates that investors have strong 
connections to directors with a range of experiences. However, we note each cluster is tied 
to specific locations, and some regions are only weakly represented. Thus we find little 
evidence that investors form strong connections with directors across several regions. 
Instead we find investors appear strongly tied to groups of directors in specific locations. 
8.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have researched the relationships between in demand directors of 
biopharmaceutical firms in four UK regions. We have assumed that active directors are in 
demand because of their expertise. We have found only a minority of directors who have 
experience in multiple biopharmaceutical venture capital backed start up firms. Of this in- 
demand set of directors we have divided them into two groups, those who operate within 
regions and those that operate across regions. 
We have found directors who stay in one location, have a similar activity level to those that 
operate across regions. We have found that mobile directors are distributed proportionally 
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to the number of board positions in each region. As such, regions with a larger number of 
firms, such as the East, benefit from a larger population of directors with greater start-up 
experience whether these directors are geographical local or mobile. 
The East is central for the network of directors, particularly for directors who also take 
positions on boards elsewhere. A consequence of regional concentration is that directors 
based in the Eastern region are strongly tied to each other, and also many of the mobile 
directors. The opportunity for directors in Cambridge and the surrounding areas to share 
knowledge and contacts with other experienced directors within the region and further 
away is greater than in the three other regions we have studied. 
The network of weakly linked experienced directors includes directors from all regions. 
However we find that strong ties reflect director's regional preferences. The analysis 
broadly suggests directors prefer to remain in one location. We find support for the idea 
that social relationships decay with distance and that proximity facilitates strong ties 
between directors. This result implies that familiarity, trust and therefore social capital is 
organised at a regional level. Consequently we find directors in the East with experience 
of working with entrepreneurial firms are clustered into groups. 
Directors in other regions, such as London, and particularly Scotland and Yorkshire, are 
peripheral to the network of directors, and have much weaker connections to the centre of 
the network. Although weak ties are associated with the flow of new information these 
regions lack directors with strong connections to other directors that operate across regions. 
This shows that access to resources, contacts and knowledge sharing with the centre of 
biopharma activity in the East, may be weak and infrequent. The literature on interlocks 
suggests these long distance ties are likely to be more formal targeted attempts to access 
resources in the East, rather than long term reciprocated relationships. Strong ties between 
investors reflect ties that occur between local actors and suggest a lack of intra-regional 
trust based exchanges. This observation reflects Gorton (1999) that actors in more isolated 
locations, may prefer to work in local markets, rather than attempt to integrate with other 
more attractive locations. 
One particularly interesting observation that needs further investigation is the low presence 
of directors with multiple firm experiences who operate only in Scotland. The Scottish 
region has received a high level of investment, and previous chapters shown a highly 
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active investment environment. One explanation for the lower representation of directors 
of Scottish firms maybe due to a lack of director specialisation in biopharma. 
We must also note that we only represent one type of relationship, and therefore directors 
based in regions other than the East may compensate for their peripheral positions by 
engaging in a range of other types of informal networking activity that is not captured in 
this analysis. For example, directors of firms in London may have a range of sources to 
obtain advice given the large business population in the city. 
In the thesis we have found persistent regional variation and concentration of investment 
activity. Our analysis of director networks supports this view of distinctive regional 
characteristics and concentration of networks with geography. In contrast, our analysis of 
the investor networks in Chapter 7 shows that the central actors have national reach, and 
invest across regions, whilst investors who remain local, link to the centre of the network, 
rather than with other local investors. However, we have yet to specify where these 
investors are located. It is seems likely that despite being able to invest over distance, even 
national investors will locate in core investment regions. 
In Chapters 7 and 9 we have analysed network activity according to different types of actor. 
In Chapter 5 and 6 we view networks as influencing both the supply and demand for 
investment. We have indicated that for an investment to occur, investors need to be in 
contact with entrepreneurs and vice versa, suggesting a wider network including different 
actors in the investment process. In the final chapter of this thesis we analyse the 
relationships of investors and directors together to help bring together the analysis in 
Chapter 7,8 and 9. 
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9 Regions in focus 
9.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to consolidate our previous empirical work and sharpen our 
analysis of regional differences in network activity. In this chapter our goal is to examine 
the links between directors, investors and firms, using networks to facilitate our discussion. 
To support our analysis we also use additional material to understand the wider dynamics 
and regional influences present. 
We also take this opportunity to think carefully about what we mean by `region'. In many 
ways our four regional cases, capture the extended activities of four UK agglomerations, 
clearly that of the City of London and surrounding boroughs, Cambridge and Norwich 
(East), York, Sheffield and Leeds (Yorkshire), and finally Edinburgh, Glasgow and 
Dundee (Scotland). The results from Chapter 6 also suggest these regions have a varied 
level of embedded venture capital activity, ranging from the strongest embedded activity in 
the East, to the weakest in Yorkshire. In this chapter, we will use these urban identities to 
help focus on the characteristics of the regions we have analysed. 
9.2 Method 
In this chapter we present four detailed case studies of UK biopharmaceutical regional 
activity, using relational data from Chapter 7 and 9, interviews, press reports and literature 
published on the internet to develop a detailed region analysis. We use sociograms to help 
to understand intraregional connections, using the full 2-mode representations to show the 
firms and connecting actors in detail. Consistent with previous chapters we concentrate the 
analysis on connecting actors in the network, focusing only those vertices which have two 
degrees or more. This ensures that the network map is drawn to show actors with more 
than one interest in the biopharmaceutical firms in a region. The network diagrams, 
grouped for each region, are shown in the appendices. In the networks we code investors 
according to their coverage of the UK, as in Chapter 7. 
Our purpose is not to evaluate the size of the networks. We have shown in Chapter 9 that 
the number of active directors in a region is proportion to the number of firms. In this 
chapter we concentrate on the structure and detail of the network ties. It is also true that 
network statistics, such as density, become more difficult to compare across different 
network sizes. We have deliberately chosen four case study regions to illustrate the 
variation in regional activity, and we expect a large variance in the size and structure of 
regional networks. To help make sense of these networks, we also use additional 
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background information to help our analysis and profile the most active directors in each 
region. Tables and figures referred to in this chapter are included in the Appendix for 
Chapter 10 (section 13.4), with the exception of Figure 9.4 which is included in Chapter 9. 
We also review the locations of VC offices investing in firms in these regions, to 
understand the type of investor operating in particular locations. In Table 13.7 we 
summarise the proximity of investors to each deal and type of investor according to their 
coverage of the UK (i. e. overall presence in the UK according to information on all deals). 
In the network sociograms we also include a numerical code to show where the investor is 
located, relative to the portfolio company. We make an assumption that the nearest 
investment office to the firm is the active office. The codes are explained in the appendix 
for this chapter. 
We start our analysis with the Eastern region, and use this region as a reference to compare 
the other regions. We then continue with London, Scotland and finish with Yorkshire. In 
each case we provide a brief discussion of the regional history, its main cities, university 
research centres and any literature available to inform our discussion of the relationships 
between investors, directors and the firms they share affiliations with. 
9.3 The Eastern region 
Although the Cambridge region dominates the Eastern region in terms of research output 
and investment, the DTI (1999) report on Biotechnology Clusters in the UK notes the 
presence of internationally significant research centres in Cambridge and Norwich. 
However, the majority of biopharmaceutical firms in the dataset are based near to 
Cambridgeshire, with Cambridge University spin out firms at the core of the regional 
network. 
Despite the prominence of Cambridge in our data, the economic development of 
Cambridge was restricted until the late 1960s (Massey et al, 1992). Prior to this period, 
Cambridge was renowned for its University and specialist research centres, such as the 
Medical Research Councils Laboratory of Molecular Biology built in 1962. 
The commercial development of the City was restricted by strong planning regulations, 
such as the use of a `green belt'. In fact companies looking to position large research 
centres in Cambridge, such as IBM were turned down (Massey et al, 1992). Eventually the 
combination of pressure from influential academics and a change of Government resulted 
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in a relaxation of restrictions to allow a `science-based' development of Cambridge 
initially focused on computing. In 1972 Cambridge built its first science park (Massey et 
al, 1992). 
In addition, other actors influenced the development of the region. One example was 
Cambridge Consultants Ltd (CCL), who focused on commercialising University research 
through the creation of spin-out ventures (Papaioannou, 2006). During the late 1980s the 
support of people involved in organisations such as CCL and local experienced 
entrepreneurs, helped to provide a supportive environment for new firms (Athreye, 2004). 
Cambridge University's research provided new innovations and material for further spin- 
out activity (Garnsey and Heffernan, 2005), increasing the demand for office and 
laboratory space from entrepreneurs. In response, additional business and science parks 
were created, such as the St John's Innovation Centre, and the number of small hi-tech 
firms proliferated (Druile and Garnsey, 2000). 
Cambridge has become "one of the main centres of technology innovation in Europe" 
(Pesola, 2005a). A result has been the branding the region of hi-tech activity around 
Cambridge, as `Silicon Fen', as a comparison to its much larger US counterpart, Silicon 
Valley (Pesola, 2005b). The region also boasts a bio-cluster in the region formed of 
approximately 200 biotechnology firms and 350 services providers (Papaioannou, 2006). 
9.3.1 Cambridge and `social networks' 
A strong component of the reported success of the region is its reliance on social 
networking to promote entrepreneurial activity, (Pesola, 2005a), information sharing due to 
transfer of people between firms (Athreye, 2004) and ultimately an accumulation of social 
capital (Garnsey and Heffernan, 2005), where, 
"social networks are in fact spin-out networks. This means that `... people who have left 
another company, they will still have ties with their former colleagues, they will still phone 
them up when they have a problem, there is this continual e-mailing and phoning going on 
between people asking for information, asking for various contacts " (Interview excerpt 
from Papaioannou, 2006 p. 1 1). 
This is also supported by investors operating in the area, like 3i's Laurence Garrett, head 
of the Cambridge office who states that "wealthy investor networks have become more 
organised.... and serial entrepreneurs, like Acorn's formed chief executive Stan Boland, 
more common" (Daily Telgraph, 2006). Athreye (2004) also notes the importance of 
groups of individuals involving people like Stan Boland, with diverse career histories, as 
entrepreneurs, scientists and later venture capitalists. These small groups can be highly 
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influential in the formation of new biotech firms and the transfer of information between 
investors, universities and other local institutions. However, a reliance on very small 
groups may come at the risk of excluding outsiders from their networks (Athreye, 2004). 
Thus, Cambridge is an example of Florida and Kenney (1988) technology type centre, with 
entrepreneurial activity concentrated around the city's University research supported by 
strong networking between local actors. Although the growth of the city may have been 
slowed by the type of infrastructure issues associated with UK cities, such as congestion 
and a lack of housing (Pesola, 2005b, Guthrie, 2007), `greenfield' land has become 
available to build the infrastructure for the new technology businesses in areas around the 
city. 
9.3.2 Eastern networks 
The Eastern investor network is the largest regional network of the four regions we study. 
Although it is formed of 143 investors, it is not a single component network. For example 
we note several firms which have received `one-off type financing from internationally 
based investors. In fact international financing is a feature of many of the firms in the 
region, particularly those that have established themselves to point of acquisition, such as 
Kudos Pharmaceuticals, acquired by Astra Zeneca, or IPO, in the case of Intercytex. 
As expected, the Eastern region has a range of investors. It includes a strong presence of 
professional VC's, public investment both directly from DTI and through University funds, 
finance from corporate venture capitalists and charity investment funds and other regional 
investment initiatives. The major private VC's are strongly linked, having invested in the 
same firms on numerous occasions. The DTI has frequent weak links to firms in the 
region, some of which are linked to private VC others to companies receiving other public 
or public/private funding. 
In line with our discussion of Cambridge we find our Eastern region networks (Figures 
13.2,13.3 and 13.9) shown in the appendix, show well connected networks, with investors 
and directors who are highly connected. The distinction between the centre and the 
periphery of the network is less clear as highly connected directors and investors are spread 
through the network. Typical of a random type network structure, we find no obvious 
central actors and ties appear evenly distributed. 
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We also recall that the names of investors with connections to several biopharmaceutical 
firms in the region are familiar from Chapter 7, as central investors with a national 
presence. A large number of these connecting investors have offices in London. However, 
other key investors in the region, such as 3i, Avlar Bioventures and Abingworth have 
offices in Cambridge. Despite many investors with local offices we find relatively few 
investors with multiple ties who only operate in the region. This supports our view that 
investors in Cambridge also invest across the UK. 
We also recall from Chapter 9 that repeated patterns of affiliations between groups of 
directors are a feature of Eastern region. For example, in Figure 13.10 we find the 
directors of Amura Holdings share the same connections to many other firms, such as 
CENES Pharmaceuticals, De Novo Pharmaceuticals and Cambridge Biotechnology. 
9.3.2.1 Investor strategies 
Our analysis of director and investor networks finds evidence for common links between 
the two network representations. We find that repeated ties between directors in the 
network often correspond to repeated ties between investment companies. We suggest that 
this may reflect distinctive investor strategies. We find an accumulation of directors with 
experience in the venture capital industry. Fourteen of the individuals who have served on 
the board of more than two firms in the region have backgrounds working in venture 
capital. 
For example Alan Goodman and Daniel Roach are highly connected directors in the East, 
both are from the same investment company Avlar Bioventures, which is based in 
Cambridge. In fact Avlar was set-up by Goodman and Roach, following a successful 
partnership investing as business angels. Avlar has also invested in many of the same 
firms as Merlin, a London based investor. It follows that directors, such as Peter Keen, 
Mark Clement and Mark Doherty, who are individually well connected in the network, 
have been investors at Merlin, and are tied to the same firms as Goodman and Roach. It 
naturally follows that investors who syndicate, and finance the same deals, may both 
provide directors to the boards of these firms. Repeated ties between investment 
companies and respective investor directors represent strong bonds between investment 
companies, on a formal and informal level. It suggests that the strategy of these investors 
is to work very closely together, sharing information and supporting their investments. 
Other investors have different strategies, for example Avlar and Merlin have also invested 
with 3i in several Eastern region firms. Here we also find strong ties between these 
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investment firms. However, we do not find such strong ties between the associated 
investor directors. In cases where 3i invests, we find the presence of experienced directors, 
such as Ian Kent or Susan Lambert on the board, in addition to the direct representation 
provided by other investors. 
We also find some relationships between investors are not fully captured in our data. For 
example Avlar Bioventures, cite 3i, in addition to a number of large investment banks, as a 
direct source of funds for Avlar investments. This indicates a greater financial 
participation of 3i in supporting early stage firms. It also indicates a risk reduction or 
diversification strategy, whereby 3i invests in early stage firms through another investor's 
fund35. It supports our observation regarding 3i's preference for using experienced 
industry based directors, rather than their own investors. 
However, both strategies outlined suggest a concentration in relationships between 
particular groups of firms, investment companies and associated directors. Ultimately it 
means that these investors have a strong influence on the financing of Cambridge based 
firms. In fact, we suggest that relationships between investment firms and their 
representative directors are the explanation for the large cluster of strongly tied directors in 
featured in Figure 9.4. The largest cluster of directors in Figure 9.4 includes 
representatives of the main investors, 3i, Merlin and Avlar. 
Other investors like Abingworth Management display a different operational pattern. 
Although Abingworth is connected to the Eastern investor network, it lacks strong ties with 
other investors through repeated relationships. Instead, we find a common group of firm 
directors involved in Abingworth's portfolio firms. We find strong connections between 
the group directors who share connections across the firms in the Abingworth portfolio, but 
much weaker relationships to directors associated with other funds. 
Abingworth have strong ties to a relatively contained group of directors. This director 
group includes individuals like Stephen Bunting, who are investors at Abingworth. Other 
members of the group have mixed backgrounds, such as Timothy Rink who was an 
academic at Cambridge, then worked in the Pharmaceutical industry and was then a 
director of biotech finns. It follows that these directors appear as an identifiable group in 
Figure 9.4. The relational structure indicates Abingworth has a preferred group of 
35 We also find Merlin and 3i are backers of Cambridge University based funds, managed by Cambridge 
Enterprise. 
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directors, which are frequently found in its portfolio firms and not strongly tied to other 
investors. This type of strategy suggests a more independent investor, with a preference 
for dealing with trusted individuals with a range of backgrounds. 
In contrast, we find University affiliated investors, such as Cambridge Enterprise capture 
aspects of these three types of private investor strategies. To some extent these university 
investors operate with a preferred group of directors. For example, Cambridge 
Enterprise's portfolio firms include a strong legal presence in the form of Zickie Lim and 
Tom Pickthorne, both lawyers at the same legal firm. Cambridge Enterprise also uses its 
own staff on the boards of firms it finances, such as the managers of the University's 
Challenge fund. It follows that we also find these directors appear as a group in Figure 9.4. 
We also note that University associated investors, such as Cambridge Enterprise or CRIL 
(Cambridge Research and Innovation Ltd) lack strong ties to the private investors. It 
follows that whilst Cambridge Enterprise has links to Avlar Biosciences, having invested 
in the same companies, we only find weak links between Avlar's directors and those 
directors connected to Cambridge Enterprise. Alternatively Cambridge Enterprise funded 
firms also include directors like Christopher Lowe, who is director of the Cambridge 
Institute of Biotechnology and was non-executive director of 3i Bioscience Investment 
Trust fund. Lowe is connected to different firms across the network and therefore shared 
boards with a range of other directors. 
9.3.2.2 Cambridge as a magnet 
As Cambridge is clearly a focal region for UK biotechnology activity and investment, this 
raises the question of whether firms that move to the region, can access the network easily. 
The analysis of firms in the region highlights variety in origin, particularly where firms are 
not strongly connected to the network in terms of either shared directors or shared 
investors. 
Firms that do not originate from the regional universities can be identified because they are 
only loosely connected to the network. For example CellFactors Plc and Cresset 
Biomolecular are attached to the network through a single shared director. CellFactors, a 
mostly self-funded firm, with one round of investment from a Cambridge based early stage 
fund, spun out from the University of Sheffield. It went into administration after being 
unable to raise additional finance in 2004 (Drugresearcher. com). 
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However, other firms without Cambridge origins are well networked, particularly those 
which can be traced to London's premier Universities. For example Amura Technologies, 
now part of Amura Holdings, has ties to Imperial College, whilst Ionix Pharmaceuticals 
co-founder is a Professor based at University College London. Both firms are tied to the 
Eastern networks, particularly to investors and associated investor directors in the region. 
The attraction of Cambridge also extends to spin outs with shared origins in Cambridge 
and other universities such as Sheffield, Manchester, Edinburgh and California. These 
partial parentage firms are also generally connected to the Eastern region network. 
The connection between London and Cambridge is also shown in Table 13.7. The table 
shows that the Eastern region has a high representation of national investors, although a far 
lower proportion of investors have a local office. The East is actually relatively dependent 
on investors based in the surrounding regions, particularly London. We also find our data 
indicates that a high proportion of overseas investors are active in the Eastern region. As 
international investors are likely to be reliant on UK investors for information regarding 
investment and co-investment opportunities, the close connection of Cambridge to London 
may provide access to international finance. 
9.3.2.3 Moving out, but remaining connected in. 
A strong feature of the Cambridge cluster is its reliance on overseas markets (Athreye, 
2004). It is not surprising that firms in the region need to expand their presence globally. 
An alternative strategy to gain access to overseas markets and finance is to move the firm 
abroad. This is a feature of some spin outs from UK institutions, one example is Domantis, 
a domain antibody company, which after spinning out from the MRC research had its 
R&D centre located in Cambridge, but located its corporate headquarters in the US. 
Domantis shares connections to other Eastern region firms through common investors, in 
particular 3i, and MVM and Albany Venture Managers but has accessed investors from 
overseas who do not feature in other firms in the region. Despite the relocation of the 
firm's headquarters we find that the directors of Domantis are connected to the Eastern 
network of directors. 
9.3.3 Summary 
As in the research by Myint et al (2005) and New (2003) we find a well established 
network of affiliations between directors and firms in the Eastern region. There is a heavy 
emphasis on Cambridge University as a spin-out source, boosted by the relocation of 
London based spin-outs. We find that the region has a core of specialist biopharmaceutical 
director expertise. The multiple relationships and the variation in strength of ties between 
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directors active in the East suggest the formation of social capital at the region level which 
helps to effectively distribute information, but also share knowledge and expertise across 
different groups of regional actors. In this respect our research strongly supports Garnsey 
and Heffernan (2005) view that social capital has contributed to the performance of 
Cambridge and surround region in supporting the development of entrepreneurial 
biopharmaceutical businesses. 
It is clear that established venture capital investors have a history of operating in the 
Eastern region, such as Merin, Avlar and 3i. These investors operate closely together, 
whilst other investors such as Apax, Abingworth and local University Challenge Funds are 
active in the region, but clearly occupy different positions in the network by not investing 
in the same firms. 
The Eastern region has a high concentration of active investors who link between different 
firms. However, in contrast to the local concentration of activity, investors are often 
nationally active. Although, some of the most active Eastern region investors have local 
offices, many are based in London. Therefore firms in the East are reliant on investors 
from London and overseas. 
Repeat interactions between directors are often associated to director's ties to specific 
investment firms. We find many of the clubs of directors identified in Chapter 9 are 
connected to particular investors either operating in close syndicates, or alone. These 
strong relationships between groups of directors and investors should reduce information 
asymmetries between investors and firms and help avoid the difficulties that can arise 
when information flows between firm and investor are unbalanced. 
In this respect we find the network has an advanced structure to support entrepreneurial 
firms. At a structural level the networks reflect random network properties facilitating the 
flow of information across the network. The network shows clusters formed of repeated 
links to support the development of trust, and an environment for sharing knowledge. 
These observations suggests a regional balance, where strong trust based ties improve the 
efficiency of communication and the transfer of knowledge for supporting entrepreneurial 
firms, yet the weak links help ensure that knowledge and information is spread across the 
region more generally. 
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Finally, considering the wider national implications of Cambridge, we find the presence of 
firms from other regions located in the East. However, firms moving to Cambridge 
without any ties to the University were not strongly linked to the director and investor 
networks. For firms without local ties it may be difficult to access the local expertise and 
gain access to local social networks and therefore benefit from the social capital resource. 
However, this was not shown for spin-outs from London's universities and matches our 
observation regarding the ties between London and Cambridge for finance. These 
connections between London and Cambridge may make relocation for London spin-outs 
easier. 
9.4 The London region 
9.4.1 Background 
London has a long been associated with banking and finance serving as "the capital of the 
unregulated Euromarket" (Warf, 1995 p. 61). Despite the growth of international finance 
over recent decades, accompanied with a reliance on high-tech global communications, 
London remains a meeting point for all the different forms of interactions in the financial 
services, as a centre for knowledge and financial innovation (Amin and Thrift, 1992). 
Entrepreneurial firms in the region can be expected to benefit from access to international 
finance, proximity to the London Stock Exchange (LSE), and the associated accumulation 
business expertise and contacts that result from London the concentration of international 
financial activity. For example, Nature reported that Alternative Investment Market (AIM) 
of the LSE has attracted American biotech companies to the London market for their initial 
public offerings (Chipman, 2006,2007), suggesting the availability of finance for these 
more specialised types of investment opportunity. 
9.4.1.1 London and the life sciences 
In addition to its presence in financial markets, London is also reported as having the 
highest concentration of "life-science research investment in Europe with 28 Universities, 
55 hospitals and headquarters of many of the World's life-science companies" (Life 
Science Clusters, 2007 p. 7). London is clearly an important centre of finance and 
technology, our research in Chapter 3 and 4 show that firms based in the capital region 
receives the large majority of venture capital finance, although only a small share goes to 
biopharmaceutical firms based in London. 
However, Huggins (2006) suggests the concentration of research in the capital not been 
matched by commercialisation outputs, such as spin-out firms. The author suggest that a 
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lack of integration, communication and networking between the financial investment and 
higher education communities has held back spin out activity in London. Huggins (2006) 
notes that in contrast to the character of London as a global financial centre, University 
spin outs face difficulties in accessing early or seed stage finance, and experienced 
management to support the firms. 
9.4.2 London networks 
An inspection of the London network sociograms (13.4,13.5 and 13.10) find that in line 
with the lower level of total investment received by biopharmaceutical firms in the region, 
the director and investor networks are smaller in size, due to a smaller population of firms. 
As with the firms in Cambridge, the majority of firms in the London network originate 
from one of the city's universities. However, unlike Cambridge, London is home to 
multiple universities. In London, Imperial College (ICL), University College (UCL), and 
Kings College (KCL) are the main contributors of biopharmaceutical spin-off firms. These 
universities have internationally respected departments in fields relevant to biotechnology, 
according to the 1996 Research Assessment Exercise (Sainsbury, 1999). These institutions 
are also attached to technology transfer offices, such as Imperial Innovations or UCL 
Business. 
In contrast to our analysis of the Eastern region, we find a relative absence of private 
venture capitalists in defining the structure of the network, particularly concerning strongly 
tied clusters. For example, the most connected directors in London are associated with 
university technology transfer offices and university affiliated investment funds. 
We find directors operate in distinct areas of the network which are associated with spin 
outs from particular universities. For example, a large distinct "Imperial" group can be 
identified in Figure 13.11. This group is formed by connections between directors of firms 
spun out from Imperial. The Imperial cluster involves a large number of interconnected 
directors. At the centre of this group we find evidence of strong repeated ties. We can 
identify the core of the Imperial cluster in Figure 9.4, involving Paterson and Maguire. 
Imperial Innovations, is a subsidiary company of Imperial College which floated on AIM 
in August 2006, with the aim of capitalizing on the Universities intellectual assets. Susan 
Searle, writing in Nature (2003) indicates that Imperial Innovations has been highly active 
in supporting Imperial's spin outs. Imperial Innovations provide support by being 
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proactive and hands-on, for example they may take board positions in the firm, or guide 
the firm towards specialist advisors. They can also help the firm obtain finance or recruit 
other professionals to support the firm's development. 
It follows, given their hands on approach, that the directors involved in the Imperial group 
reflect connections through employment within Imperial Innovations, such as Susan Searle 
(CEO of Imperial Innovations) and, Robert Bahns and Naiem Hussain. Their hands on 
approach is one reason for their desire to invest directly in the Universities spin outs using 
funds from their IPO, to reap the full rewards of their efforts (Financial Times, 2006). 
Although this finance is evident in our data and networks, it became available towards the 
end of our observation period, minimising its impact in our analysis. 
As with our discussion of Cambridge Enterprise, a similar type of technology transfer 
office, the two most connected agents in this Imperial cluster are both independent legal 
advisors (Paterson, Maguire). Both have experience in advising companies in corporate 
transactions. This matches with Imperial approach of providing external access to external 
advisors on tax and business issues at preferential rates (Nature, 2003). 
9.4.2.1 London's investors 
The London region has the highest proportion of investors with local offices relative to the 
other regions, as shown by Table 13.7. Around 39% of the active investors in London's 
biopharmaceutical firms are nationally orientated. We also find that the London network 
has a sizeable proportion of investors from overseas, as you would also expect given our 
discussion of London as an international financial capital. 
In contrast, our analysis of the investor network and Table 13.7 emphasise a strong 
representation of investors who only invest in London, suggesting the presence of smaller 
sized investors in the region. Whilst large investors are active in London, they are not 
shown to be the most active investors in the London network. 
One of the smaller investment funds used by many London biopharmaceutical firms, 
including those from Imperial, is the Bloomsbury Bioseed fund. This seed fund can invest 
in eight of the top London universities and research institutes in the life sciences. Stephane 
Mery as fund manager of the seed fund, has a high level of involvement in the London 
network, and integrates a range of different spin out sources. Stephane is frequently a 
director in the same firms as the funds entrepreneurial advisor, Keith Powell. 
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Another network cluster is attached to small embryonic firms, receiving small amounts of 
grant and venture capital finance from the Wellcome Trust and an investor called Javelin 
Ventures. Javelin manages several London University funds investing in technology from 
Universities such as KCL, where Susan Smith36 has a role in managing spinouts. Jolliffe 
and Anderson are both managers Javelin, and additionally Anderson has other non- 
executive responsibilities which connect them to directorships of the same firms. We can 
identify Jolliffe, Smith and Anderson in Figure 9.4 as they form a strong mini-cluster. 
Many of the firms from the Javelin, or Imperial group have not received finance from the 
large UK national investors (as at September 2006). Similarly, given the number of firms 
spun-out from Imperial, it is surprising that we find a low presence of repeated ties to 
venture capitalists in the Imperial cluster. Instead Imperial spin-outs are backed by a range 
of financiers, frequently with offices in the city. As our data is focused on the period prior 
to Imperial Innovations IPO, the absence of a consistent source of finance for Imperial 
firms may be one reason for Imperial deciding to provide their own investment funds. 
The participation of the larger UK investors, who we are familiar with from Chapter 7, are 
connected to a small grouping of London biopharmaceutical firms. The grouping of large 
investors, both UK and internationally based, is strongest around companies such as 
Inpharmatica, Ark Therapeutics and Xytis Pharmaceuticals. These companies all share 
directors with Arrow Therapeutics. They are also relatively established firms compared to 
the Imperial and Javelin group and account for over half the investment (by value) made 
into biopharmaceutical firms in our London sample. Several have produced an exit for 
their investors, for example Inpharmatica was acquired by Galapagos, a European 
integrated pharmaceutical company, for ¬l2.5m37 in 2006 a relatively low return on 
investment. On the other hand Arrow Therapeutics was purchased by Astra Zeneca, for 
$150m in 2007, clearing the £49m38 of investment recording in the Library House dataset. 
We can also link these firms to University College London (UCL) research. For example 
Kenneth Powell, who was head of the Wolfson Institute for Biomedical Research at UCL, 
acted as a co-founder (Arrow, Inpharmetica, Ark39) of these firms and a CEO of Arrow. 
36 Based on limited information for Susan Smith 
f 37 hgp: //www. plpjz. com/t)ress/2006/26. pd 
38 This is £4m higher than cited at http: //www. arrowt. co. uk/invmedia-current. htm, but does not includes £4m 
GE Finance 
39 According to www. arrowt. co. uk. However no formal record as a director at Ark Therapeutics. We note 
that Arrow Therapeutics was founded by six scientists, from London, Newcastle, Cambridge and Oxford, and 
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Powell also features in the top science entrepreneurs list published in The Times Higher 
(2006). 
A strong characteristic of the UCL group of firms it that they have attracted significant 
capital from the familiar names of venture capitalist operating in the UK such as 3i, and 
Merlin, Advent International and Advent Venture Partners and overseas investors. They 
also share six common directors, representing a range of backgrounds, particularly 
directors working for the venture capital investors, but also academic research and 
directors specialising in hi-tech firm development. The cluster of directors associated to 
these firms can be identified in Figure 9.4, involving Powell. 
9.4.3 Summary 
The London network, like that of Cambridge, is centred on spin out companies from 
academic research. Unlike Cambridge, London has several prominent Universities which 
create distinct patterns of director ties in the network. In particular we identified groups 
connected to Imperial and UCL. Universities in London have taken different strategies 
towards commercialisation, and created relationships to particular groups of directors to 
help manage their spin out business. It shows a varying degree of success in overcoming 
the integration of academia and business identified by Huggins (2006) for individual 
Universities. 
We also find some evidence that structural patterns in the network of directors are tied to 
specific investors. We find a clear distinction in the network between different types of 
funding sources if we look at deals as opposed to the value of deals. The majority of firms 
in the network are reliant on range of financial sources, particularly local seed funds 
connected to universities, investment from the DTI and charities such as the Wellcome 
Trust. However, significant investment is concentrated into a minority of firms, receiving 
finance from predominantly private investors in the UK and overseas. Although these well 
funded firms are connected to UCL, with the exception of Kenneth Powell, the firm's 
director show less attachment to the University, acting as representatives of international 
investors or as professional directors. 
From a regional perspective we observe weak integration of experienced management and 
investors working together compared to Cambridge. The failure to form strong 
associations between different groups is likely to restrict the development of social 
moved to London following the first round of finance (www. arrowt. co. uk), suggesting a wider participation 
of University outside London in the creation of the firm. 
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networks and social capital which can be used to support biopharmaceutical firms. For 
example, there appears to be a low mobility of individuals between the university 
groupings. Our analysis of the network suggest resource (both financial and human) are 
effectively owned by University commercialisation clusters, rather than supporting 
development across all London Universities. 
We previously commented that London and the East are tied. One issue for London is that 
firms which develop ties to large investors or non-university affiliated directors may 
relocate to Cambridge, particularly given concerns regarding office space and costs of 
working in the capital. As many of the firms we analyse are at a very early stage this may 
account for uneven distribution of investment in the network. Similarly, the weak links 
between local directors and large private investors may continue to encourage firms to 
relocate, despite the proximity to local investors. 
9.5 The Scotland region 
9.5.1 Background 
Historically Scotland is a region characterised by declining output in heavy industry such 
as Shipbuilding (Papaioannou, 2006), competing on low cost, low skilled labour (Leibovitz, 
2003) and a lack of entrepreneurial activity around new technologies (Papaioannou, 2006). 
Until the 1990s, Scotland suffered a number of `false starts' in trying to stimulate the local 
economy. This included attempts by the UK Governments in the 1970s to push new 
industries, substantial cash and development agencies into the region to promote hi-tech 
industries. However, these strategies failed to establish Scottish owned enterprise and the 
associated cohorts of local influential entrepreneurs and investors (Papaioannou, 2006). 
In the late 1990s, led by the RDA - Scottish Enterprise and the Scottish Executive, the 
economic development policy for Scotland was centred on tapping into local innovation 
and knowledge to drive the economy. A key part of which was based on developing 
bioscience clusters (Leibovitz, 2004; Rosiello and Orsenigo, 2008). The subsequent 
development in Scotland embodies a strong public "top-down" Government type approach 
(Papaioannou, 2006), which has consequences for the type of development compared to 
Cambridge. For example Scotland involves a wide range of public-private collaborations, 
between universities, firms and intermediary organisations. One such organisation is the 
Intermediary Technology Institute (ITI) designed by the Scottish Executive to broker 
public-private collaborations with commercial potential. However many of these 
collaborations are of a formal nature (Papaioannou, 2006). 
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In contrast, informal social networking between firms is found to be weak. This is partly 
because of fragmentation in the nature of SME activities and a desire to collaborate 
internationally. It is also because networking events often facilitated by public agencies 
are conceived to be geared towards promotion of high tech hubs, rather than the building 
social networks to support social capital as a factor in innovation (Leibovitz, 2004). 
One advantage of a top down approach to regional development is a common alignment in 
the direction of development between different institutions, with initiatives geared towards 
issues of public interest. On a formal level the regional system of innovation is more 
cohesive, with participation from a range of public and private bodies (Papaioannou, 2006). 
Yet, consistently in the literature we find Scotland referred to as lacking critical mass in 
terms of cluster size and embryonic (Leibovitz, 2004) or lacking depth in terms of 
extensive networks between local firms based on information sharing for competitive 
advantage (Papaioannou, 2006). A particular issue with the embryonic nature of Scottish 
innovation system is a lack of experienced managers (Leibovitz, 2004) which has been 
slow to attract management from elsewhere, such as overseas (Rosiello, 2005). 
9.5.1.1 A region of the future? 
The situation in Scotland is changing, our analysis of investment in biopharmaceutical 
firms shows Scotland is one of the most important investment areas. The region has also 
received several high profile foreign investments in the area, with plans to extend 
bioscience activities. Leibovitz (2004) reports that Scotland has access to financial capital 
from sources locally and in London. In addition formal investment in biotechnology firms 
has been boosted by informal finance from a range of angel investors40. The provision of 
investment has been further encouraged through the use of public-private initiatives, such 
as Scottish Enterprises co-investment scheme, where private investment is matched by the 
public purse. This maybe one explanation for the observation that in Scotland's bioclusters, 
"one form of local social relations contributing to the viability of firms materialises in the 
form of investors and venture capitalists who serve constructively on the managing board 
of newly formed firms and provide advice and expertise on business strategy. There is 
some evidence that this is happening, especially in spin-out companies who have reflected 
positively on the role of venture capitalists in providing valuable advice and experience" 
Leibovitz (2004, p. 1151). 
9.5.2 Scottish Networks 
One consistent observation with Scotland is the strength of the University science base. 
Bioscience activity is concentrated around Edinburgh, Glasgow and Dundee, each of 
40 Interview with Scottish angel investor/academic 
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which has recognised excellence in bioscience research, and contributes strongly to the 
number of UK science PhD produced each year (Life science Clusters 2007). In our 
database of firms, over half those citing locations in Scotland are from the regions' 
universities. However, the origins of the firms do not define the networks shown in Figure 
13.6,13.7 and 13.11, either in terms of shared directors or investors. 
We find spin outs from universities such as Edinburgh, (Ingenza, Amoebics, and Ardana - 
from MRC lab in Edinburgh) or Glasgow (Grannus Biosciences, Crusade Laboratories) are 
distributed across the networks, and rarely share the same directors or investors. It follows 
that there are few strong links shown in either the investor or director networks. The only 
example of repeat patterns of affiliations between directors and investors is between Holt 
and Keen. These directors have connections to Merlin Bioscience, and the firms in 
question received finance from Merlin. In the investor network we find a strong division 
between the active connecting investors, in terms of public and private sources. For 
example 3i, Merlin, Scottish Equity Partners, share connections to a similar group of firms, 
whilst the remaining firms in the network are centred on more public based sources, such 
as, Scottish Enterprise, DTI, or University Challenge funds such as the Edinburgh 
Technology fund. However, we note that including all financing sources in the network 
representation, indicates a large number of investors, albeit not repeatedly investing within 
the sample of Scottish firms. 
In agreement with the literature on Scotland, we find investment is attracted to specific 
opportunities, rather than being particularly reliant on a small core of specific investors, or 
investors attached to university sources. The network identifies a range of investment 
sources, from local to national or international funds, with offices in the region, adjacent 
regions, or located in the south. Table 13.7 shows Scotland has a high proportion of 
investors who only feature in the database as active in Scotland (54%); at odds with this, is 
the lower reported level of investors with proximate offices. This result is explained by the 
many `un-coded' investors in Scotland. `Un-coded' investors tend to be business angels or 
other informal sources where an office location could not be obtained. 
However, despite the perception of adequate funding, like in Cambridge, some of the 
region's top performing firms have opted to move their commercial head office to the US. 
One example, Cyclacel, received $9mill from Scottish Enterprise. However, it later 
underwent a reverse merger with a firm listed on Nasdaq, citing the need to gain access to 
the deeper pockets of the American investors (Pollack, 2006). Cyclacel is a 
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biopharmaceutical firm focused on drugs to inhibit uncontrolled cell division connected to 
cancer and other abnormal cell proliferation diseases. It has retained its R&D facility in 
Scotland which is guaranteed until 2010 under the agreement between Scottish Enterprise 
and Cyclacel, and has connections to Dundee and Cambridge. 
9.5.2.1 Weak networks 
We find weak regional networks between investors and directors in Scottish 
biopharmaceutical firms. Instead the region has an extensive pool of investors who have 
provided funds to Scottish biopharmaceutical firms. In fact the number of investors active 
in Scotland, per biopharmaceutical firm, is greater than found in the Eastern network. We 
find a wide range of investors, from business angels, to banks to public organisations are 
active in the regions firms. In further contrast, the strongest representation from large 
venture capital firms comes from Merlin, which has offices in London. 
Investors in Cyclacel are typical of commitment we tend to find in Scottish firms. It 
includes investment from the main UK financiers of biotech, such as Merlin Biosciences, 
large investment banks such as Dresdner Kleinwort Benson, Lloyds and Citiventure, as 
well as individual private investors and their own associated funds, such as Brian Souter 
(founder and chief executive of Stagecoach) and their associated private investment fund, 
Highland & Universal Securities41(Batt, 2003), in addition to public based funds such as 
Scottish Enterprise. 
Few directors of Scottish biotech firms have multiple directorships. In contrast to directors 
in the East and London, the Scottish directors are also more difficult to code. Firstly 
because most directors appear have varied experiences, as entrepreneurs, firm founders and 
investors, and secondly because those who are non-executives are often not specialists in 
biotech firms and may have positions on non-biopharmaceutical boards. 
We also find that many of the directors creating links between firms are more closely 
associated with the Eastern region, supporting our observations in Chapter 9 that directors 
with experience of biopharmaceutical firms on several boards of Scottish firms, are often 
multi-regional, rather than tied to Scotland. For example, individuals like Ian Kent who 
have committed their own investment to Scottish businesses, are familiar from the Eastern 
region networks. 
41 http: //www. telegraph. co. uk/money/main jhtml? xml=/money/2003/02/01/cncoachO 1. xml 
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9.5.3 Summary 
The findings from our analysis can be interpreted in view of the literature on Scotland we 
discussed earlier. The network analysis shows Scottish director and investor networks to 
be relatively weakly connected, but not necessarily as a result of an inability to attract 
management or finance to the area. Instead we see the reverse, that Scotland has attracted 
a diverse range of actors to the regions firms. However, like previous researchers have 
found, the issue is that the critical mass of interactions has yet to be reached, and resources 
within the region for biopharmaceutical firms are relatively unspecialised or shared with 
other regions. In time this may serve as an advantage for the region, our analysis suggests 
Scotland has developed a variety of links with local, national and international players, 
which may provide a fruitful foundation for the future development of the region. Given 
the reported strength of the research base, initiatives to attract further FDI for the 
development of hi-tech infrastructure and an ability to attract investment and expertise, the 
commercial bioscience presence in Scotland is likely to increase. 
9.6 The Yorkshire region 
9.6.1 Background 
Yorkshire Forward, Yorkshire region's development agency, suggests that the region's 
clusters supported by the strength of the universities in the region, are some of the fastest 
growing in the UK. They identify their clusters according to seven technology areas with 
future potential, of which two are bioscience and healthcare (Yorkshire Forward). The 
DTI42 (2001) report on UK clusters finds that traditional activities in the region, such as the 
manufacturing of steel or textiles (wool), although past maturity, remain a feature of the 
region. The DTI report cites a number of industry clusters with expected growth potential 
in the region, including surgical equipment and web design. In cities in Yorkshire such as 
Leeds, financial and business service activity has grown by 50% in the last decade, with 
the presence of major national and international banks in the region (Willman, 2008, FT). 
9.6.1.1 Bioscience clusters 
Perhaps the most embryonic region of those discussed in this chapter is Yorkshire and the 
Humber. The 1999 Sainsbury report describes the Yorkshire region as at the start of 
developing a biotechnology cluster, with less than 30 firms operating in the bioscience area. 
This corresponds with our analysis that finds the Yorkshire region has the smallest number 
of early stage biopharmaceutical firms of the four regions studied, with only 13 firms 
included, three of which have no common directors. The Yorkshire region is a relative 
42 http: //www. berr. gov. uk/files/file25035. pdf 
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new comer to entrepreneurial biopharmaceutical SME and only two of the firms featured 
have any director history prior to 2000. 
9.6.2 Yorkshire networks 
It follows, given the regions embryonic status, that the regional network representations are 
small owing to a smaller population of biopharmaceutical firms. Like in Scotland, when 
we look at the most connected directors operating within the regions group of firms, we 
find a variety of backgrounds, with entrepreneurs, consultants, and professional directors. 
Unlike Scotland, we find several individuals with many connections to the regions firms. 
There are signs of patterns of relationships forming. For example a group of firms 
associated with Sheffield University Enterprise and particularly Richard Birtles and David 
Catton are associated to the Biofusion fund. 
The Biofusion fund has exclusive rights to the intellectual property resulting from the 
university's medical sciences (Times Higher, 2006). The fund was created by floating a 
company on AIM with 10 year rights to the University intellectual property (IP). The 
flotation raised £8.2m, and also attracted investment from the investment arm of Japanese 
Bank, Nikko Cordial Corporation. Nikko invested £2m in Biofusion and El Om in separate 
a University based fund (Barkas, 2006). Since 2007, Biofusion has grown to include the 
management of IP originating from Cardiff University. 
The Biofusion fund is clearly active in financing Sheffield University spin-outs. Like 
Imperial in London, Sheffield University spin outs share the same directors. This group 
connected by Birtles and Catton, who are directors of Biofusion, are also shown as a 
strongly connected cluster in Figure 9.4. This group also includes several other 
experienced Sheffield based directors with experience as biotech entrepreneurs, 
pharmaceutical executives, such as Peter Grant and Paul Rodgers. 
Leeds University spin-outs appear well connected with ties to the region's most active 
investors, they also share few common directors to firms in the region. For example, 
Photopharmica and Synoptix are isolated from the network and share no common directors 
with other firms in the region. Spin-outs from York University on the other hand, such as 
Cizzle Biotechnology, Pro-cure Therapeutics and Xceleron, form a small group sharing 
directors, but no coherent source of finance. 
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We notice that a number of directors cite historical connections to Cambridge, for example 
David Calton connects himself to Cambridge Consultants, and John Bates runs a 
consultancy with an office in Cambridge. However, the only director with multiple ties to 
Yorkshire firms and those in the East is Tom Pickthorne, a solicitor active in Cambridge. 
We also find Zickie Lim, listed as a director of Cizzle Biotechnology, who is tied to the 
same practice as Pickthorne. This indicates a tie between Yorkshire based firms and some 
of the supporting actors in Cambridge. 
9.6.2.1 Regional funding 
Another important aspect of the Yorkshire group of firms, directors and investors, is the tie 
to the White Rose Seed Fund, managed by Aberdeen Asset Managers, with Joseph Wiley 
as manager of the seed fund. This seed fund has invested in many of the firms connected 
to Biofusion. The White Rose Seed Corn fund is a 0m fund supported by Yorkshire 
Forward, Leeds, Sheffield and York Universities, aiming to invest in new technology 
emerging from the region. This fund, like the Bloomsbury fund in London, has invested 
across the region's University spinouts. It is one of the only actors in the region to invest 
across Universities; the other is the Wellcome Trust. 
The full investor network in Figure 13.8 shows a range of active investors in the region, 
including private and public investors from Cambridge, additional public investment from 
the regions university based funds, the DTI and other private investors from predominantly 
London. However, of these only Biofusion, the Wellcome Trust and the IP group have 
funded more than one firm in the region. The IP group, like Imperial Innovations and 
Biofusion, is also floated on AIM, but is responsible for the commercialisation of a 
national network of university partners, including York and Leeds University. 
One interesting observation in the Yorkshire region is that public finance has come from 
the RDA, various regional venture capital funds or the regional universities directly. For 
example, the direct DTI investment which is active in the other regions does not have a 
strong presence in Yorkshire. We find funds run by the regions universities and 
technology transfer offices, as well as investors like Ridings Early Growth Investment, and 
YFM (Yorkshire Fund Managers) which manage public private funds for Yorkshire, play 
small roles in supporting regional biopharmaceutical firms. The RVCF manager, YFM is a 
national investor as it manages several other funds including other RVCF in London and 
the South West. In fact we find RVCF are not a strong feature in any of the regional 
biopharmaceutical networks. 
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Overall, Table 13.7 shows that investors in Yorkshire region have a local presence (41 %), 
but that the funds are managed by predominantly national investors (62%). We find that 
the region has the lowest level of investors, compared to London, East and Scotland, who 
only operate locally. However, this may overstate the role of national investors, as several 
national fund managers are responsible for allocating regional linked funds. The use of 
locally officed, nationally active investors to manage regional funds may have advantages. 
For example, such investors are likely to be experienced and have access to contacts 
outside the region. One element lacking in Yorkshire, compared to other regions is the 
presence of overseas investors. This may be a result of overseas investment into 
University funds, as in the case of Biofusion, rather than a particular absence of overseas 
investment. 
9.6.3 Summary 
Although, several Yorkshire firms have exited for their investors and returned a profit, 
such as Syntopix which floated on AIM, we find Yorkshire to be embryonic, and 
connections between different actors are only just beginning to form. We find Yorkshire is 
similar to Scotland, in terms of the mixed backgrounds of active directors, but also having 
ties to Cambridge based investors and directors. 
We also find similarity to London with the prominent role of University based funds, 
particularly comparing Biofusion to Imperial, as both have raised finance from the stock 
market to support associated university spin outs, and assembled a group of directors to 
support the University's spin-outs. 
9.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown variation between regions according to the size and structure of 
networks. We have shown that regions differ according to the composition of actors, 
including investors, directors and research institutions. We have highlighted different 
relationships between networked actors can be explained by different strategies taken 
towards supporting entrepreneurial firms. 
We observe Cambridge, compared to other regions, is relatively rich in experienced 
management, access to investors taking up board positions and providing finance, and able 
to draw in resources from London and further afield. Simultaneously we also find a role 
for the Eastern region in providing support to other UK regions, confirming that it acts as a 
centre for biopharmaceutical activity in the UK helping to transfer knowledge and 
expertise to other locations. 
- 232 - 
We find a regional perspective highlights the role of Universities in London and Yorkshire 
in terms of co-ordinating the investment and managing the development of the firms. In 
Yorkshire, Sheffield University has bundled its life sciences IP raising finance through its 
own investment/commercialisation arm, Biofusion providing a common source of finance 
and director support for Sheffield University firms. In London, Imperial was shown to be 
active through its commercialisation arm, Imperial Innovations. Imperial Innovations 
supplies management and finance to Imperial spin outs. In London and to some extent 
Yorkshire, University activity has also been supported with regional level public 
investment initiatives, managed privately has helped to link the different University 
activities. 
However, our case studies reflect a distinctive or individualistic strategy used by some UK 
Universities. By bundling their intellectual property rights, UK Universities have been 
able to raise their own finances, through public stock markets, or private investors, hedge 
funds such as Sloane Robinson who provided finance to help commercialise IP from 
Oxford's Institute of Biomedical Engineering (Schurr and Boone, 2006). In some cases 
this is associated with a distinctive group of advisors and directors who work with 
University firms. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the drivers and 
implications of this strategy in the long term. From a regional perspective, supported by 
our network analysis, it may work against policy designed to support regional level 
approaches to innovation and commercialisation. For example, whilst Yorkshire network 
of directors appears more connected than Scotland's, its investment performance is much 
poorer. 
Scotland's regional approach appears different. In Scotland we find the full range of 
investment sources and directors with varied backgrounds. From our network analysis, 
relationships between the different actors appear more fragmented than we might expect 
given the level investment of activity. In Scotland the `net' is thrown wider, repeated 
relationships between directors or investors are less frequent, but are more varied. We find 
links in the network to a variety of local actors, as well as those operating on a national or 
international basis. 
In agreement with our discussion of the national networks, across the different regions, 
national VC investors are the main network co-ordinators, and each region has examples of 
investors with proximate offices, but who are also willing to invest nationally. This is also 
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true of investors based in London; we only find small investors connected to London's 
Universities operating regionally. Many of the major investors based in London are 
attracted opportunities outside the region, particularly to the Eastern region. 
We find that our analysis supports the assessment of relationships between directors as 
being predominantly coordinated on a regional basis. We have explained the core groups 
of directors shown in Chapter 9, and related them to relationships between investors and 
research institutions. The analysis of the East emphasises the presence of venture 
capitalists in helping to facilitate interactions between different firms and directors, in 
London and Yorkshire the networks emphasise connections to research institutions. In 
London the co-ordination of the network is left to regional funds, whilst larger investors 
hand-pick their investments. 
In recent years the DTI has favoured the creation of RVCF, which are privately run small 
funds. In the words of the directors of YFM, the funds have been designed to target 
opportunities not accessible for other funds (McFall, 2004). However with respect to 
RVCF managers interviewed in this research, the demands of high risk biopharma 
investment appear to be incompatible with the RVCF initiative, instead regional funding is 
provided through wholly public funds, such as University Challenge funds or universities 
own funds, sourced in a variety of ways. 
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10 Conclusion 
10.1 Introduction 
In this final chapter of the thesis, we return to the questions which we asked in the 
Introduction. These questions have defined the structure of our analysis. Our main aim in 
this concluding chapter is to bring together the findings we have generated from our 
previous chapters. In this final chapter we `sum up' and address our original research 
questions. A secondary aim of this chapter is to assess the state of UK venture capital. We 
particularly focus on how our findings can contribute to policy for the development of the 
UK venture capital industry. We also consider the implications of UK venture capital 
policy for hi-tech sectors such as biotechnology. 
An important contribution of this thesis is to provide an analysis of patterns of UK 
investment activity and their relationship to regional economic activities. The thesis also 
captures and describes patterns of interactions between actors involved in the venture 
capital investment process. The unique approach of this thesis provides a comprehensive 
assessment of UK venture capital activity at the national, regional and sub-regional level. 
Unlike existing studies of venture capital this thesis uses multi-level analyses to investigate 
the distribution of investment. In this way, the thesis captures the complexities of the 
organisation of UK venture capital, using regional statistics as well as a detailed analysis of 
activities. Our detailed analysis provides an important contribution to the literature. 
Firstly, we analyse the relationships between UK venture capitalists and a wider group of 
associated entrepreneurial actors and relate this to investment patterns. Secondly, 
interactions between actors involved in financing entrepreneurial firms are central to 
regional innovation system theory, but are not described in detail in the literature. Our 
analysis considers the role of different investor characteristics and their influence on the 
organisation of UK venture capital activity. We have also framed our analysis to reflect 
the current orthodoxy in academic studies, that policy initiatives should be based on 
regional or localised activities. Our final contribution in this chapter is to consider the fit 
of the region as a focus of policy activity. 
The thesis combines an econometric analysis of UK regional investment with a social 
network analysis of regional and sub-regional relational activities. As a result, a key 
contribution of this thesis is to demonstrate the complexities in modelling the distribution 
of venture capital. Overall investment activity in the UK is concentrated in particular 
locations. However, the system supporting investment activity, such as the efficient 
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transfer of information and knowledge of opportunities, and the management of risk, 
operate on a national and regional level. Our research shows that investors operate across 
geographies, even when based in prime investment locations. However, the distinctive 
characteristics of UK regions are important. These characteristics include regional 
histories, proximity to London, the strength of relationships between actors in the local 
network, and their interaction with national networks. Thus, UK venture capital activity 
can be viewed as regional, but not in isolation from national and international systems. We 
find distinctive regional systems exist and create potential advantages, but also rely on 
interactions with investors and firm directors based in other locations within the UK and 
beyond. In this way, the thesis shows the importance of situating regional activity within a 
national context. The thesis also demonstrates the weakness of policies which fail to take 
account of the interregional interactions. 
10.2 Answering the questions 
In our thesis introduction we proposed two main research questions. Firstly, we were 
concerned with factors that determine the distribution of venture capital investment across 
regions in the UK. Related to this question we also seek to understand whether these 
relationships varied between biopharmaceutical investment and other sectors? In our 
second question we set out to describe how relationships between investors, firms and 
entrepreneurial firm directors are organised. An important link between literature on 
regional innovation, clustering and venture capital is the role of social networks. Thus, in 
line with the regional theme of the thesis, we specifically want to know how relationships 
between these actors are related to regional advantage, in terms of access to venture capital 
investment. 
10.2.1 Regional variations 
To answer our first question, we used the literature, predominantly from the US, to design 
a model based on the relationship between regional resources and venture capital. In the 
thesis we find the organisation of venture capital is regionally concentrated. We also find 
the concentration of investment is regionally embedded and the geography of investment is 
relatively fixed. In Chapters 5 and 6 we found that long-term regional characteristics had a 
strong influence on the investment activity regions. We found a significant part of the 
investment performance of key regions was due to regional specific factors, or regional 
endowments. 
Our findings confirm Florida and Kenney (1998) and Martin et al (2005) research 
demonstrating the existence of persistent winner regions in terms of their regional share of 
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venture capital activity. However, we also extend our understanding of the organisation of 
venture capital in two important ways. Firstly, we demonstrate the persistence of regional 
funding variations is a result of long term factors, rather than changes in regional structural 
economics. Our research shows why policy attempts to manipulate the overall regional 
organisation of venture capital are difficult to apply successfully. Secondly, in Chapter 8 
we found the same high performing regions were associated with higher levels of investor 
participation, even after controlling for other factors, such as investment risk and variations 
in the character and type of investors. Our research shows that the success of regions is 
related to `labels' that indicate quality. Even after controlling for the structure of networks, 
we find key regions attract more investors, indicating that the quality of information and 
knowledge available in these areas is high. This finding is important as it demonstrates 
that investor characteristics alone are not enough to explain the strong performance of 
certain regions. Our findings indicate both the structure of networks, and the quality of 
information flowing around networks, are important in determining regional advantages. 
Our research also indicates that regions should be analysed on a case by case basis. In 
Chapters 5 we demonstrate strong regional variation in terms of the heterogeneity of the 
relationship between venture capital and regional resources. We find the relationship of 
factors like human and technological capital, financial services, and entrepreneurship with 
venture capital investment, are not necessarily stable across locations. Interrogating 
regional activity further, Chapter 10 revealed important characteristics of the regions 
studied. For example, regions are made from cities that have very different histories in 
terms of their financial and industrial development. Similarly, even within the top UK 
destinations for investment activity, our research finds variation in terms of contribution of 
public investment and the influence of local or national government policy. Although we 
find universities are prominent innovation sources across regions, the wider role of the 
university as an actor in the development of firms varies from region to region. 
However, our findings also show that biotechnology is different. In contrast to the overall 
venture capital industry, biopharmaceutical investment activity is not closely tied to 
unobserved long term influences, despite being concentrated into specific locations. 
Instead, we find the influence of regional resources on biopharmaceutical investment is 
more pronounced, particularly in terms of deal activity. Our results suggest that policy can 
influence activity in particular sectors. 
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In biopharmaceutical investment we conclude that deal activity has dissociated from long 
term background influences and is more closely linked to contemporary regional resources. 
This finding suggests a shift in the pattern of investment concentration, reflecting a more 
rational regional approach. However, we notice that our results vary according to whether 
we model the number of deals or the value of deals in a region. Compared to the flow of 
deals, the value of regional investment is explained more strongly by specific long term 
regional factors. A likely explanation is that policy, which has generally been directed 
towards local seed finance or `pump priming', has increased deal activity in areas 
traditionally weak in venture capital activity. This has reduced some of the regional 
imbalance which arises because of long term factors. However, the substantial volume of 
investment required in sectors like biopharmaceuticals, has still remained more strongly 
tied to specific regions, reflecting a superficial policy influence. Thus we conclude that 
policy aimed at specific sectors must also be sensitive to regional activity. Policy must 
promote high quality opportunities to attract private venture capitalists, rather than simply 
increase the quantity of entrepreneurial firms. 
Our interpretation of the findings for question one is dependent on the role of networks in 
venture capital. In particular our understanding of the supply and demand of venture 
capital investment is dependent on the influence of regional network activity. Our findings 
in Chapter 5 and 6 strongly suggest that the coefficients of the network variables have a 
stronger influence on the supply of investment than the demand for investment. As our 
second thesis research question is also motivated to understand network activity in venture 
capital, this provides a strong link between our first and second research question. In light 
of this link between research questions, next, we examine how our research contributes to 
the understanding of networks and regional advantages. Then we consider the implications 
of venture capital networks. 
10.2.2 Networks and regional advantages 
In Chapter 3 we bring together literature on venture capital, regional innovation systems, 
social network analysis and economic sociology to develop a model which describes the 
organisation of networks associated with venture capital investment and entrepreneurial 
firms. At the core of the model is the expectation that networks help link the supply of 
investment with demand for finance from entrepreneurial firms. For example, the use of 
this type of network is one way investors are able to share information, collaborate and 
develop trust based relationships with other investors and entrepreneurial actors. These 
relationships extend beyond a formal financial connection of simply providing finance to 
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the same firm and are an important part of establishing the type of social networks 
described in the literature on clusters and regional innovation systems. Our model in 
Chapter 3 expects venture capitalists to be important actors in the network, helping to 
establish effective social networks. 
Our analysis broadly supports the model of venture capital networks proposed in Chapter 
3. Our findings suggest that investors fulfil a co-ordination role between different firm 
boards, and ultimately between the directors of these firms. We also find evidence that, in 
line with the literature, venture capitalists are active investors, connected to the boards of 
their portfolio firms, building relationships with other board directors. However, we also 
enhance the model proposed in Chapter 3 by extending our understanding of the sub- 
structures and different types of relationships that contribute to the overall organisation of 
venture capital networks. 
One implication from our network analysis in Chapter 7 is large investors prefer to build 
strong relationships with other important investors. This is supported by our findings from 
Chapter 8 that investors are motivated to form relationships that minimise the risk of 
investing in hi-tech businesses. On the one hand this motivation drives investors to form 
relationships with many other investors, as this minimises risk by sharing it with other 
investors who finance the same firm. On the other, it is to form long term, reciprocated 
relationships with important or influential investors. As influential investors manage large 
funds, they reduce their need to join large syndicates for purely financial reasons. Large 
investors fund multiple opportunities to diversify their portfolio and gain access to superior 
returns. For these reasons, large investors have a great deal of control over the structure of 
networks and the flow of information and knowledge. . 
In the UK a single group of large investors occupy a very powerful central position in the 
network. By working together closely, this group of investors control the majority of 
finance, potentially at the expense of small new entrants. The preference of large 
influential investors to build strong relationships with their equivalents, results in a core 
group of closely and strongly linked investors. The preference of influential investors to 
work together, balanced with the needs of less influential investors to access to this 
important group, result in a centralised national network structure. Central investors 
commit the majority of finance in a predominantly generalist approach, operating across all 
regions of the UK. Central investors prefer to repeatedly use the same investment partners, 
creating strong repeated relationships. These strong ties are characteristic of trust based 
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ties that extend beyond formal financial commitments. The strongest ties are generally 
formed between the large experienced investors. We find weaker, more opportunistic, 
relationships tie the majority of the smaller investors to the core central group. In contrast 
to the literature, our findings show small investors compete with each other to syndicate 
with the large investors, rather than establish smaller local clusters. 
Our results from Chapter 10 show the participation of different types of investors varies 
across regions. The variation in strength and structure of ties at regional level provides a 
link between the view of venture capital as a nationally organised network of investors, 
versus a regionally concentrated pattern of investment distribution. Within the national 
network, regional networks are varied, in terms of the number and more importantly the 
strength of ties. For example, the network in Cambridge reflects the national network, 
with national investors playing a strong co-ordination role. In other regions, large private 
investors are less prominent, or more peripheral. In London and Yorkshire publicly 
orientated investors dominate the networks. Scotland has ties to an array of different types 
of investors, from individual angel type investors to overseas banks. 
Similarly, we find that the national network described in Chapter 7 highlights a separation 
between public and private investors. Public investors are only weakly tied to the network 
through ties with larger private investors. It follows that social connections between these 
smaller investors are also weak. It points to a lack of integration of smaller investors into 
the industry. On a regional basis divisions between public and private finance vary; some 
regions are more dependent on connections between public investors to raise finance. 
Our analysis from Chapter 9 also contributes to our understanding of regional variation. In 
general, entrepreneurial directors operate over more restricted geographies than investors. 
Networks of biopharmaceutical firm directors are formed around a minority of directors 
who occupy a large proportion of board positions in our sample group. Like in the venture 
capital network, we find the director network covers all geographies and is co-ordinated by 
a central group of mobile directors who define the structure of the director network. In 
contrast to the venture capital network, in some locations we find evidence of regional 
concentration in strong and weak ties between directors, which support local network 
activity. Our analysis emphasises the role of Cambridge acting as a core knowledge base 
for biotechnology SME directors, supporting actors such as venture capitalists that operate 
across regions. It indicates that places like Cambridge have a distinct advantage in terms 
of the flow of knowledge and information around the region and access to top expertise in 
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managing biotech firms. The analysis shows venture capitalist directors are a strong 
feature of co-ordination of the network between directors, but are also supported by a 
variety of other types of supporting actors, providing coverage of a range of competences. 
We link the performance of Cambridge in attracting investment activity, with extensive 
trust based connections between local groups of experienced business people. These trust 
based ties help structure local networks, as well providing access to large investors in 
London and overseas. Our analysis of the network structures and sub-structures fits 
closely with our discussion of social capital theory and entrepreneurial networks in Chapter 
3. Similarly, Chapter 10 shows that regional investor and director networks are well 
connected in the Eastern region. We find the ties between different investment funds, are 
supported by ties between firm directors. Often these ties involve investment executives, 
re-enforcing that venture capitalists play an important co-ordination role in the network. 
We find Cambridge, and networks involving Cambridge firms, act as a central resource for 
experienced biopharmaceutical directors in the UK; other regions share weak connections 
to directors of firms in Cambridge to try and access this resource. 
In several cases the strength of Cambridge attracts firms from other regional universities to 
relocate in the area. The relocation of firms from a region diminishes that region's local 
demand for finance. For firms moving to Cambridge, this strengthens the demand for 
finance in the East. The added demand of finance can be met through Cambridge's 
connections to the centre of the supply of venture capital with investors from nearby 
London. 
However, the role of the venture capitalist co-ordinator is only part of the story. In the 
regional network analysis we find variation in the strategies of venture capitalists. For 
example, some investors prefer to tie with particular groups of professional biotech 
directors. The experience of professional directors, who have histories of working in 
different biopharmaceutical companies, can be used by venture capital firms instead of 
supplying their own investment executives. This type of strategy matches closely to the 
career development perspective we discuss in Chapter 3, whereby individuals are 
motivated by their own career development, and in doing so become valuable directors 
with a distinctive experiential based expertise or `business scan'. 
We also find relationships between firms that don't fit the expectations developed in 
Chapter 3. The relationships between firms strongly indicate ties to universities and fit 
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neither the view of the venture capitalist as co-ordinator, or an individual career 
development perspective. For example, firms spun-out from Imperial College or Sheffield 
University, that have remained located in their original region, have also remained close to 
the finance and expertise offered by their University's technology transfer arms. As both 
Sheffield and Imperial have publicly floated their technology transfer arm, the 
relationships associated with ties to these universities blur any traditional boundary 
between public and private investment, or academic and business activity. The 
relationship is based on an extended management role of public institutions. This role 
includes firm creation, promotion of university intellectual property, and a share of the day 
to day responsibilities of the financial and strategic management of their affiliated firms. 
These publicly based, but privately financed vehicles have moved into the sphere of 
venture capital, with first refusal rights to commercialise institutions intellectual property. 
We find groupings of university affiliated firm groups prominent in our data, in the East, 
London and Yorkshire. The directors involved in these firms have backgrounds as 
academic entrepreneurs, investors, and professional directors, as well as legal advisors and 
employees of university technology transfer offices. 
In summary we find a wide variety of relationships in the networks we analyse. In 
Cambridge, we observe a highly focused region, with strong a strong mix of public and 
private based support spread throughout the network. At first view Scotland appears as a 
fragmented network. However, directors of Scottish firms have diverse backgrounds, 
recruited from other industries, `borrowed' from other regions, and often co-ordinated by 
the RDA. In London, and to a limited extent Yorkshire, we find university strategies are 
prominent whereas traditional private venture capital activity is concentrated to pockets of 
firms. 
We set out to find relationships between venture capitalists, investment executives and 
firm directors. In doing so, we highlight a contrasting picture between a national versus a 
regional perspective. At the national level, we observe a strong structure formed around a 
minority group of large nationally orientated investors, active in a large number of deals. 
At the regional level we see variation between regions, in terms of the density of 
connections between private investors, regions without distinctive sector based networks, 
or those with a greater emphasis on the university as innovator, fundraiser and local co- 
ordinator. 
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However, consistent across both the national and regional view, is the lack of integration 
between the regional actors into the main networks. The investment networks show 
regional network groups are less visible at a national level. To be sustainable, private 
investment funds are selective, and this motivates their national orientation to search out 
promising opportunities and work with other similar national players to diversify their 
portfolio. Investment tied to specific regions is often formed from small funds involving 
public finance, with limited opportunity to repeatedly fund their portfolios. Imposing 
regional restrictions on a fund works against its integration into the national industry 
structure and limits their participation in financing the minority of firms that are successful. 
Likewise, we find the structure of the director network is provided by a small group of 
mobile directors, which outside Cambridge has a weaker regional structure. 
Comparing our findings with the literature from Chapter 2 shows some similarity with the 
model of the organisation of venture capital proposed by Florida and Kenney (1988). 
Their model emphasised connections between different locations or venture capital 
complexes, which connect active investors in technology centres, with passive investors in 
financial centres. However, in this thesis, investors are concentrated around one financial 
complex, most likely to help fundraising activities, but invest across different locations. 
Our analysis also indicates rather than being distinct types of complexes, financial and 
technology activity exist locally, as well as being supported by activities across locations. 
We find a core group of investors who operate across regional boundaries, as passive and 
active investors. Our results also provide some indication that investors and directors in 
the more intensive technology based regions interact with other weaker locations. In our 
research we find the local social structures of innovation that Florida and Kenney (1988) 
connect to technology complexes, in fact extend beyond the region. 
Similarly, linking to the literature on clusters in Chapter 2 we draw a distinction between 
the clustering of investment and the clustering of investors. We place less emphasis on the 
co-location of investors in technology clusters; instead we observe the attractive power of 
key locations for investment. It maybe a result of smaller geography of the UK, with 
respect to the US, that means investors prefer to cluster around a single financial centre, 
and pursue investments across different geographies. A national investor network suggests 
information on opportunities in all regions should be easily accessible. However, our 
research indicates that concentrations in investment activity arise as a result of a 
combination of historically embedded processes, such as investor perceptions of quality 
and variations in the strength of social ties developed through investment activity. In 
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biotechnology we find clusters of research activity are important and universities play a 
key role attracting investment, which to some extent can limit the influence of the 
historically embedded nature of venture capital. 
However, we highlight local variation in network activity. In Scotland, an important 
venture capital region, regional social structures appear weaker in the biopharmaceutical 
sector. We find an absence of strongly tied local directors. The performance of Scotland 
is a result of different processes involving a range of different types of local actors and 
more formal links to directors in other regions. In Scotland, directors' backgrounds 
suggest social networks operate across sectors to support local firms. Scotland has been 
able to attract large pools of investors who operate nationally and internationally, rather 
than develop strong local investment networks. According to the literature in Chapters 2 
and 3, access to venture capital networks is important for regional development. Thus, the 
Scottish pattern of network activity may result in regional disadvantage in terms of the 
access and diffusion of new knowledge and information. However, given the level of 
regional activity in Scotland, there may also be advantages from adopting a distinctly 
different strategy of network activity compared to places like Cambridge. 
10.2.3 How do networks influence investment supply and demand? 
In Chapters 5&6 we find networking in venture capital supports investment supply more 
strongly than investment demand. Our detailed analysis of the networks in places like 
Cambridge show the presence of strong connections with large London based investors, 
increasing the supply of investment to the region. In other regions our network analysis 
highlights supply and demand side motivations. For example Imperial Innovations 
facilitates demand for finance by promoting Imperial College to spin out firms, offering 
support from a dedicated pool of expertise. It also helps these firms by directly supplying 
investment capital. In this section we evaluate the role of networks in influencing 
investment supply and demand. 
We have found networking a strong feature of actors in the supply of investment. Chapter 
8 demonstrates that strong motivations exist for investors to network in order to increase 
their own investment supply; sharing the investment burden reduces their risk exposure, 
and diversifies their portfolio. We expect a large network of active investors, directors and 
associated actors in a region will have a positive influence on investment supply. 
Experienced investors and directors with a history of activity in hi-tech business, attached 
to region's firms, are likely to have extensive networks which can be utilised at a regional 
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level. We also find the presence of strong relationships between investors, including those 
overseas, which can be utilised to increase investment supply. We have shown that 
although the networks for top UK regions are structured differently, they are extensive and 
include national and overseas investors. Our results strongly suggest that regions with 
extensive networks will positively influence the supply of regional investment. 
We do not anticipate that these networks will influence the demand for finance as strongly. 
It is possible, that in developing regional networks of investors and directors, the demand 
for finance is increased. For example, following the theory of social capital, regional 
networks help entrepreneurs develop an awareness of the requirements of venture capital 
as a source of funding. Alternatively networks can provide access to experienced business 
people, including those with previous experience of venture capital, which helps to 
facilitate a greater demand for finance in the region. 
However, assessing the level of demand for venture capital is complex. On a basic level 
we can see demand as being concerned with any SME looking for investment. However, a 
general demand for investment might substitute venture capital for different forms of 
investment or loans. Similarly, it would not make sense to provide finance to all 
opportunities that demand it. A more appropriate measure of demand regards firms that 
are appropriate for VC funding or classed as `investor ready' (Mason and Harrision, 2001). 
Investor ready businesses have engaged in activities which make the firm attractive for 
investment, such developing a suitable business plan, or engaging in local networks to seek 
out advice and access to important resources. The demand from investor ready businesses 
should be fulfilled, rather than matching the demand for finance from any business. The 
question is then, how strongly does generating relationships between investors, directors 
and other active parties increase a region's demand for investment from investor ready 
opportunities? 
Here we find ambiguity. UK investors frequently report that there is large general demand 
for venture capital as a form of investment, but a lack of investor ready opportunities 
(McFall, 2004). In contrast, Government sponsored surveys outline that funds connected 
to public sources have been the majority of incumbents into the UK venture capital 
industry, with 26% of active funds now involving public contributions (of this 32% are 
purely public) (DTI, 2005). Furthermore, even in areas targeted by public investment 
where local investors have been positioned to help develop the relationship between the 
local business community and investors, such as the North West and East Midlands, 
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difficulties have arisen in stimulating acceptable demand (DTI, 2005). Similarly, Angel 
investors, who are generally hands-on investors, report weakness in the quality and 
presentation of opportunities (DTI, 2005). In summary, we suggest that the factor limiting 
demand is the quality of opportunities seen by investors. This is supported by the BVCA 
(2005) promoting that very early stage firms remain in universities, rather than being 
immediately spun out. In effect, the BVCA are seeking to reduce overall demand for 
investment deals. 
It has been suggested that regions with low levels of venture capital lack deal makers who 
are able to transform the demands of entrepreneurs into a form acceptable for investors 
(McFall, 2004). In our network analysis we find that many of the directors with 
experience, have connections to an investment fund, suggesting the presence of deal 
makers. We have found that expertise, in terms of directors with experience in serving on 
biotechnology firm boards, is centred in Cambridge. In Cambridge the increased 
networking between experienced directors, universities and investors, with the 
entrepreneurial firms, has helped create an environment supportive to the development of 
investor ready opportunities. This environment has strengthened the demand from investor 
ready opportunities in the region. 
However, we have also found that experienced actors are often tied to a particular investor, 
rather than free to network across investors. This reduces the impact that individuals can 
have in stimulating demand by facilitating connections between entrepreneurs and different 
investors. We find experienced directors, on balance, are positioned as working for the 
supply side actors, managing investments, rather than seeking new demand. Similarly, 
when experienced actors are connected to sources of demand, such as universities, they 
form isolated groups, which serve the university, rather than the wider region. Therefore, 
the impact of increasing the size or interconnectivity of actors in local networks will not 
have an immediate effect on demand for investment; whereas increasing a region's 
connectivity to investors will influence investment supply. For, example our analysis of 
Yorkshire, as an embryonic region, shows a lack of international investor activity. Clearly, 
increasing its networks to include international investors will have a direct impact on 
regional supply. 
The impact of networks on demand will always be secondary to the level of entrepreneurial 
innovation and creativity that exists in a region. It follows from our discussion of 
networks and investment demand, that we might expect demand to be stimulated as a 
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secondary response to increase regional networking. Our results show that networks of 
directors and investors are formed of supply side actors, many of which have been 
`artificially' created to provide supply and to stimulate demand through participating in 
local networks. However, networking alone is not enough to have a large influence on 
demand. We know that the limiting factor in demand is not that investors lack an 
awareness of the demand for finance, but concentrate on demand from investor ready 
opportunities. 
It is not enough to expect that increasing the connections between individuals will have an 
immediate effect on the level of demand. It takes time to create the knowledge and 
acceptance of working with venture capital. In places like Cambridge the expertise and 
knowledge required to produce `investor ready' opportunities has been supported by a 
cumulative generational process based on shared career histories of individuals working in 
the area. Therefore increased networking is only likely to create stronger demand if it 
facilitates access to more investment opportunities within the region, and this process is 
likely to be cumulative. Increasing the size of the networks will introduce new investors to 
the region who can be expected to readily increase the supply of capital. 
We conclude that expanding a region's network will have a greater and more immediate 
influence on the potential supply of investment, than on the potential demand for it. 
Through expanding investors and directors social networks we can expect that investment 
from regional financial centres will be better integrated, or drawn from further afield. 
Developing the regional demand for investment is a long term process, which may be 
aided by developing networks and connecting expertise to a location. Developing 
networks may help to support the business community and formulate appropriate business 
plans. These activities may help stimulate demand for venture capital, but ultimately the 
level of demand depends on a more generational process within the region. 
10.3 Government policy and public funding for biotechnology 
In this thesis we have found that public finance has been a strong feature in the analysis. A 
persistent difficulty for investors in biopharmaceutical innovation is that potential returns 
may not outweigh the large risks of failure. However, in the long term, biotechnology and 
associated innovations may have large social or national economic returns. Here lies the 
motivation for Government involvement. 
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Following Schumpeter (1961), new opportunities are expected to encourage waves of 
entrepreneurs. However, only the best opportunities obtain finance from private capitalist 
investors who take on high risk projects anticipating high rewards. Venture capital is 
expected to fill role of risk based finance as it is strongly driven by profit motivations. VC 
should carefully select the opportunities to finance. Venture capitalists fund a minority of 
the opportunities they encounter, only the highest quality opportunities stand a chance of 
being funded. The risk of using public finance to support SME is that many firms are 
encouraged that have only a very small chance of accessing follow-on funding, and are 
potentially inappropriate for larger investment from private venture capitalists. 
We find in some cases public finance has been provided to firms which have also attracted 
investment from the private sector. In other cases public finance has attracted further 
public investment. We do not find a strong involvement of Regional Venture Capital 
Funds (RVCF) in our data. The Government's role appears to be more successful for 
encouraging venture capital investment in biopharmaceuticals, when public money is 
directed towards R&D. Investing in basic research has the expectation that this will 
stimulate demand for investment. 
The major issue here is what is the role of government? We find public money is used on 
the supply side to provide high risk seed finance. Seed finance is used to move new start- 
ups beyond proof of concept, or to reach a position where they can approach private 
investors for funding. This suggests public seed funds are a tool to encourage further 
investment supply, bridging a gap in the market. However our analysis suggests that 
simply increasing public finance may not be beneficial overall. For example, existing 
private investors remain tied to different opportunities and we observe weak integration 
between public and private funds. In contrast to public venture capital, we find the 
strongest integration of public and private finance in the investment networks is where 
firms have receive direct public investment in the form of DTI grants. 
Similarly, the creation of regional or university funds has not resulted in strong integration 
between public and private investment sources, despite being a justification for their 
creation. Local sources are predominantly public, and tied to a single location. Like all 
funds, public funds must syndicate to invest in high risk opportunities. However, if public 
funds invest in high risk projects, on a commercial basis, then they must be selective to 
ensure they can back the opportunity through each investment round, or else face excessive 
dilution. In contrast, private investors are nationally orientated, free to access the best 
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opportunities wherever located, and have access to large amounts of finance from similarly 
sized and trusted partners. 
This thesis has also described new institutional forms which operate with the dual purpose 
of stimulating investment demand and creating their own supply of investment. Typically 
financed with private capital, University IP (Intellectual Property) management companies 
are more integrated with private investors, but not necessarily with venture capitalists 
finance or expertise. The difficulties associated with information asymmetries in early 
stage biopharmaceutical firm investment have been overcome by raising finance on the 
back of an IP portfolio covering years of university research output. IP management 
companies, raising small investment funds, may be a solution for the transfer of university 
research from public to private sphere. However, their sustainability, as for the other 
smaller sized funds, will depend on their ability to support the development of their 
portfolio and integrate with other private investors. 
One difficulty with the UK policy on biotechnology clusters and venture capital is that 
these policies work against the preference of the private investors. The literature describes 
clusters and venture capital as operating in close proximity, using social networks to 
exchange information and knowledge, as well as provide access to resources such as 
influential human capital. In regions such as Cambridge, we can recognise this description 
of the clustering of investment, firms, networks and influential individuals, acting as a 
magnet for high tech activity and those interested in working in it. However, a secondary 
aim of Government policy is to distribute the supply of investment more evenly. This also 
supports other regionally distributive policies such as the creation of regional bioclusters. 
A policy of regional cluster creation naturally expects further distribution of investment 
funds. However, we have found in general, UK venture capital activity is persistently 
concentrated into a few locations. Investors are based in London and to a large extent 
investment is concentrated in regions around London. 
Stimulating the formation of bio clusters in other locations presents difficulties in bringing 
together the system to support new firms. We see that Cambridge acts as a central 
resource for expertise in biopharmaceutical firms and has established links with investors 
in London and internationally, as well as having a core of locally based investors. Other 
regions have weaker access to experienced directors or locally based private investors, so 
compete to access resources in Cambridge. On the other hand, firms that move to 
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Cambridge, weaken networks in their home region, and are often unable to benefit from 
the network connections utilised by firms with local Cambridge origins. 
To be a sustainable, bioclusters need to develop access to investment and expertise. To 
support embryonic locations public finance is supplied to the region with the goal of 
providing access to funding and expertise. The weakness we consistently observe is that 
public finance only partially integrates with private players43. We frequently find that 
private finance is concentrated into a minority of firms, managed by the experienced 
investors and directors. In contrast locally constrained public based funds operate with 
fund sizes that can only support the first steps of firm development. In regions receiving 
public funds, few of the associated firms are tempting prospects to private investors, 
raising the question of whether pump-priming policies are effective in the long term, or 
work against the dynamics of the industry. It is interesting to observe that our analysis of 
biopharmaceuticals indicates policy action on demand side activity, such as investment in 
R&D, is more effective than supply side initiatives such as increasing public finance. 
Our analysis is concerned with recent years, in terms of activity and policy. Since work 
began on this thesis, the funding environment had changed; global financial liquidity has 
reduced following the financial services losses associated with sub-prime mortgages in the 
US, with repercussions for access to finance for firms seeking IPO. Amongst this 
background, investors who are central to venture capital, albeit with a decreasing early 
stage focus, have announced their continued movement away from venture capital. This 
includes firms like 3i, with speculation that they will close their Cambridge office. 
Similarly other major investors, such as Chris Evans of Merlin Biosciences, have warned 
that now is `crunch time' for UK Biotech (Highfield, 2008), with declining investment, 
limited access to financial markets, the credit constraints of 2008, mean biotech's have 
limited options. 
These conditions make the environment very tough for SME biopharmaceutical firms. 
Only the best quality opportunities will have access to significant private finance. The risk 
is that public finance will support weaker opportunities, which reduces the chance of these 
funds becoming self sustainable. The DTI (2005) report stresses that public entrants are 
serving a different section of the market from private investors, such that public investment 
is not substituted for private. Thus the Government argues that businesses are being 
43 Unlike in the Israeli Yozma funds discussed in chapter 8 
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funded that would otherwise struggle to obtain finance. In contrast, the BVCA (2005), 
commenting on recent policies to promote demand for venture capital, urge firms to remain 
within universities until they are at a more advanced stage. The limiting factor in 
developing venture capital is stimulating the quality of demand. Venture capital is an 
important part of the regional innovation system, but operates within that system, and 
attention should be directed towards improving the quality of the demand. 
Our analysis shows that in the long term, venture capital does not spread evenly, and 
attempts to achieve this in the UK are unrealistic. Historically, some publicly created 
entities have been successful. For example, one response to the perception of an equity 
gap for financing smaller firms was 3i. 3i has eventually moved from investing in many 
small deals to moving towards large deals, and has been successful in doing so. Despite 
having coverage of the UK, 3i's investment was still concentrated to the South. 
As incumbents move into bigger private equity investments, we find new entrants are 
adopting new investment models raising finance by auctioning rights to University 
intellectual property. However to be sustainable, particularly in sectors like 
biopharmaceuticals, large private follow-on investment will be necessary, signalling a need 
to access to overseas finance. We have consistently referred to London as the home of 
investors and Cambridge as source of expertise in commercialising biotech firms. We find 
some actors operate across regional borders, connected to firms in Scotland and Yorkshire. 
However, we can anticipate that any downturn in financial activity will be felt most 
strongly in those regions without the global contacts and access to finance. It calls into 
question whether investigation of alternative strategies might be appropriate, and that not 
every UK region can support a US style biotech cluster. 
This thesis supports the use of regional innovation systems thinking in UK innovation and 
entrepreneurship policy. However, it must be applied to support activities occurring within 
each region, rather than as a national prescription applied locally. Policy must be used to 
achieve a balance: encouraging connections between the different locally based actors, 
without denying connections to actors based in other locations across the world. This type 
of system, akin to small world networks, can balance locally generated support with access 
to new expertise and knowledge generated in other national and international locations. 
Systems must be designed to promote quality, rather than quantity. The extensive use of 
public funds on the supply and demand side of our regional analysis generates lots of 
opportunities, which risk demanding finance from public sources, rather than private. In 
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the long term this is unsustainable. Regional innovation systems need to promote demand 
from high quality opportunities to stimulate private investment. 
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12 Appendices 
12.1 Appendix for Chapter 5 
Table 13.1 Unrestricted co-efficient model 
Unrestncted ä, VC(amount) VC(count) 
Variable a t-stat a t-stat 
C 0.11 6.67` 0.1 8.97 
Yorkshire-ENTYorkshire 1.78 0.29 -3.98 -0.57 
E. Midlands--ENT 21.09 4.73' 7.21 1.69 
S. West--ENT -3.97 -0.75 -2.07 -1.49 
W. Midlands-ENT -5.55 -0.63 3.08 0.71 
Wales-ENT -3.13 -1.17 4.78 0.91 
N. Ireland--ENT -2.41 -0.86 -2.91 -1.04 
South-ENT 10.02 0.43 -5.29 -0.35 
North-ENT -3.62 -0.25 17.11 
1.47 
Yorkshire-FS 0.97 2.44' 0.24 0.51 
E. Midlands--FS 1.4 3.15' 0.36 1.12 
S. West--FS -0.21 -0.61 -0.19 -1.57 
W. Midlands-FS -0.12 -0.26 0.21 1.19 
Wales-FS -0.26 -0.94 0.08 0.23 
Nlreland--FS -0.44 -3.21 * -0.04 -0.16 
South-FS -2.84 -4.92' -2.01 -4.28 
North-FS -0.3 -0.2 0.19 0.29 
Yorkshire-DEG -0.71 -1.46 0.15 0.25 
E. Midlands--DEG 1.27 2.52' -0.04 -0.09 
S. West--DEG 0.15 0.23 0.08 0.56 
W. Midands-DEG 1.03 2.02' 0.12 0.42 
Wales-DEG -0.19 -1.14 0.03 0.1 
N, Ireland--DEG 0.33 2.83 * 0.37 2.46 " 
South-DEG 0.34 0.58 0.6 0.5 
North-DEG 1.01 0.77 0.96 1.28 
Yorkshire-PAT -1.03 -3.77' -0.77 -1.97 
E. Midlands--PAT -4,64 -5.71 * -0.7 -1.05 
S. West-PAT -1.11 -1.04 -0.63 -3.28 
W. Midlands-PAT -0.67 -0.68 -0.7 -2.27 
Wales-PAT 1.32 0.75 -2,16 -1.33 
N. Ireland--PAT 0.12 0.53 -0.37 -0.84 
South-PAT 2.71 3.64 2.02 3.19' 
North-PAT 1.75 0.31 0.27 0.11 
Fixed Effects (Cross) 
Yorkshire-C -0.09 -0.04 
E. Midlands--C -0.35 -0.11 
S. West--C 0.01 0.01 
W. Midlands-C -0.06 -0.06 
Wales-C -0.03 -0.09 
N. Ireland--C -0.09 -0.09 
South-C 0.69 0.59 
North-C -0.08 -0.2 
Adjusted R-squared 0.95 0.97 
S. E. of regression 0.04 0.03 
Sum squared resid 0.17 0.08 
Log likelihood 322.94 380.99 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.85 0.94 
Mean dependent var 0.12 0.11 
S. D. dependent var 0.17 0.14 
Akaike info criterion -3.54 -4.26 
Schwarz criterion -2.77 -3.49 
F-statistic 84.45 116.52 
Prob(F-statistic) "' ýýý 
12.2 Appendix for Chapter 6 
Table 13.2 Least squares results based on VC count series 
Least squares Bio/ harma Rest All deals 
Variable Std. Error Sig Coefficient Std. Error Sig Coefficient Std. Error SI 
Const -0.13 0.54 0.22 0.22 0.59 0.31 
Ent -29.00 11.09 -5.40 5.31 -9.55 5.24 ' 
FS 11.12 3.18 8.71 1.42 9.38 1.20 
Deg -13.86 2.75 0.26 1.60 -2.12 1.13 
R&D 5.31 0.21 2.51 0.28 3.11 0.28 
R&D ratio 2.53 0.19 *** 1.28 0.13 1.54 0.11 
VC 
-public 
1.54 0.36 -0.82 1.15 -1.16 0.74 
Endo enei N/S N/S 
Adjusted R-squared 0.73 0.73 0.76 
S. E. of regression 0.53 0.46 0.44 
SSR 11.57 8.81 7.79 
Logl'hood -33.96 -27.43 -24.48 
DW 1.80 0.78 0.96 
Akaike info criterion 1.71 1.43 1.31 
Schwarz criterion 1.98 1.71 1.58 
IF-statistic 22.69 21.98 26.38 
Table 13.3 Least sauares results based on VC value series 
Least squares Bio/ harma Rest All deals 
Variable Std. Error Sig Coefficient Std. Error Si Coefficient Std. Error Si 
Const -0.51 3.07 4.41 1.51 *** 3.98 1.54 
Ent -99.10 47.20 ** 16.36 16.78 16.15 18.39 FS 45.84 18.81 ** 14.20 7.79 * 14.27 7.82 ' 
Deg -52.04 20.02 ** -2.60 8.89 -7.67 9.29 
R&D 17.96 2.34 *** 3.15 1.44 ** 4.63 1.40 
R&D ratio 10.37 1.90 *** 1.51 1.03 2.46 0.99 
VC public 4.47 2.55 * -9.30 7.49 -1.20 5.90 
Endogeneity N/S N/S N/S 
Adjusted R-squared 0.48 0.61 0.59 
S. E. of regression 2.92 1.07 1.12 
SSR 350.17 46.66 51.32 
Logl'hood -115.80 -67.43 -69.71 
DW 1.60 1.42 1.05 
Akaike info criterion 5.12 3.10 3.20 
Schwarz criterion 5.39 3.37 3.47 
F-statistic 8.24 13.23 12.16 
Table 13.4 Dummv variables from fixed effects repressions 
Biopharma* Rest of sectors All d eals 
Region Deal count Deal value Deal count Deal value Deal count Deal value 
East 0.9 5 0.66 4.95 0.65 4.83 
S. East 0.29 4.95 0.84 3.64 0.48 3.58 
Scotland 0.42 1.78 1.03 0.94 0.95 0.98 
London -0.25 5.53 0.82 0.67 0.13 0.87 
S. West -0.29 -0.42 -0.2 0.85 -0.17 0.87 
N. East 0.62 1.5 0.14 -0.51 0.31 -0.41 
W. Midlands -0.56 -3.75 -0.14 -0.66 -0.09 -0.57 
N. West -0.74 -2.5 -1.61 -0.59 -1.42 -0.88 
E. Midlands -0.14 -1.2 -0.86 -1.61 -0.68 -1.67 
Yorkshire 0.23 -0.41 -0.48 -1.91 -0.35 -1.89 
Wales 0.29 -6.07 -0.06 -2.33 0.01 -2A 
N. Ireland -0.19 -4.4 -0.13 -3.44 0.19 . 3.3 
* Biopharma coefficients for fixed effects were not shown to be jointly significant in regressions 
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12.3 Appendix for Chapter 8 
Figure 13.1 Histogram of dependent variable - number of investors per firm 
v 
M 
CN 
N 
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no-of-investors 
Table 13 .5 Pair%ise correlation coefficients of variables (* indicates significant at 5%) 
No. V: iaole 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1r of Nwesfors 1.00 
2 broon -0.04 1.00 
3set 0.15 "-0.21 " 1.00 
4 mo8ad 0.10 " -0.18 "-0.12" 100 
5Noih . 0.10 ". 0.24 "-0.16" -0.13' 1.00 
6Mdads -0.12 "-0.19 "-0.13" -0.11" -0.14" 1.00 
7 Sgjh combned 0.03 . 0.31 " -0.21 " -0.18' -024 " -0.19 " 1.00 
8 Wales&NI -0.01 . 0.13 " -OL 00 " -0.07 " -0.10 " -0.08 " -0.13 " 1.00 
0 Ape at lstin est -Om " 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.11 " 
10 Foudrv year -0.03 0.03 -0.05 " -0.08 " 0.01 0.07 " 0.00 -0.02 -0.68 " 1.00 
11 Centrmity -0.08 " -0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.05 " -0.04 0.14 " -0.21 " 1.00 
12 Over as 0.35 " -0 . 05 all " -003 0 00 -0.07 
" O L05 " -0.04 -0.05 0.01 -0.02 1.00 
13 Spscalst 025 " OW " 003 -003 -0.04 -0.05 002 -0.03 -0.06 0.05 -0.08 " 0.12 " 1.00 
14 IT 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 003 -0.01 -0.05 " 0.07 " -0.01 0.00 -0-05* 0.06 " -0.04 -0.01 
15 Comm 0.03 0A3 0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 004 -0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 
16 HC 0.00 -0.03 0.02 001 0.04 0.00 -0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.08 
17 B. apharms 024 " -0.05 " 0.13 " -0.03 0.01 -0.07 " 002 0.00 -0.08 " 0.06 " -0.05 " 0.24 * 0.20 
18 Other -0.19 " 005 " -0.09 " 001 0.00 0.12 " -0.08 " 0.02 0.07 " -0.02 -0.02 -0.09 " -0.04 
19 Specal"1 0.11 " 0.09 " 002 -004 -0.06 " -0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.05 0.05 " -0.07 " 0.05 " 0.78 
20 Ave paU o_i1 -0,06 " -01)1 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.06 " -0.04 0.10 " -020 " 0.90 " -0.02 -0.07 
21 Total Gwas1 nie t 0.35 " 0-05 002 -0.01 -0.07 " -0.05 006 " -0.05 -0.03 -0.10 " 0.06 " 0.16 " 0.12 
22 Nod roods Om' -0.05 " 0.18' 0,07* -0.07 " -0.10 " 0.03 0.00 -026 " -0.05 " -0.04 0.20* 0.13 
23 iwe1srr 0.15 " 0.00 000 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.10 
24 O any 0.04 " 0.3 0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.05 0.02 -0.04 0.01 -0.09* 0.12* -0.01 -0.02 
25 P_jocat 0.13 " -0.03 -0.08 " 016' 0.13 " -0.03 -0.22 " 022 " -0.07 " 0.10 " -0.26 " -0.06 " 0.05' 
26 Pjal -0.19 " -0.05 0.01 -0.07 " -0.05 " 0.11 " Q 13 " -0.15 " 0.08 " -0.09' 0.34 " -0.11 * -0.14 
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
14R 1.00 
15 Comma -024 " 1.00 
16 HC -021 " -0.10 " 1.00 
17Bocoarnu -025" -0.12" -0.10" 1.00 
18Olher . 0.55" -026" -0.23"-028" 1.00 
19 Specasst R1 0.00 -0.05 " -Q OB " Q10 " 0.00 1.00 
20 Ave ports q_R 1 0.07 " .0 . 01 0.00 -0.06 " -0.03 -0.06 " 1.00 
21 Total hrestrnsnt -0A2 -0.01 -0.06 " Q05 0.02 0.11 " 0.12 " 1.00 
22 Nb of rowels 0.03 0.05 " 002 Q19* -020* -0.01 -002 0.25 " 1.00 
23 i+velagr -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.05 0.13 " 0.02 081 " 0.16 " 1.00 
24 Q. sty 0.07 " -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.08 0.04 -0.06 0.00 1.00 
25 P local 0.00 0.01 -0.01 000 000 0.05 " -0.24 " 0.00 0.04 0.01 -0.07 " 1.00 
26 Pj and -0.01 -0.02 002 -0.04 0.04 -0.13' 029 " -0.09 " -0.06 " -0.06 " 0.04 -0.74 " 1.00 
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Table 13.6 Poisson Regression model 
Model 1 23 4a 4b 4c 5 0 
london 0.39704 0.21835 0.19845 0.17978 0.20497 a 17425 0.17000 
(0.11086) 
.N 
(0.12307) (0.12394) (0.12321) (0.12353) 
. 
(0.11886) (0.12492) 
east 0.70006 0.26456 0.32612 0.31410 0.29992 0.29827 0.27050 
(0.11924) 
N. 
(0.13462) 
N 
(0.12720) 
.N 
(0.12615) 
." 
(0.12849) 
« 
(0.12245) 
N 
(a13112) 
"" 
scotand 0.77886 0.54566 0.48961 0.46773 0.46940 0.48080 0.46150 
(0.12093) 
ýN 
(0.13119) 
. i. 
(0.12939) 
N. 
(0.12756) 
N" 
(0.13296) 
.N 
(0.12711) 
«. 
(a13397) 
N" 
North 0.12058 0.10636 0.01425 -0.01791 0.01573 0.00354 0.00324 
(0.11864) (0.12778) (0.12769) (0.12764) (0.12912) (0.12897) (0.13038) 
South 0.48976 0.33443 0.38054 0.37470 0.38982 a35429 0.35900 
(0.11011) 
.N 
(0.11569) 
.N 
(0.11546) 
N. 
(0.11392) 
Nf 
(0.11534) 
.N 
(0.11573) 
M 
(0.11834) 
». 
Wales&NI 0.39428 0.32143 0.17070 0.15238 0.14717 0.14051 0.11412 
(0.15123) 
.N 
(0.14101) 
N 
(0.13889) (0.13749) (0.13969) (0.16480) (0.14127) 
IT 0.31330 0.21327 0.19683 0.18979 0.20750 a 18813 0.19696 
(0.06993) (0.07983) (0.07257) (0.07277) (0.07301) (0.06653) ((107385) 
Comms 0.37635 0.21631 0.14049 0.12424 0.14229 0.12872 0.12814 
(0.09419) 
N. 
(0.10297) 
N 
(0.10561) (0.10907) (0.10821) (0.09448) (0.10758) 
HC 0.30216 0.25765 0.25643 0.25680 0.24261 0.25544 024176 
(0.09814) 
.N 
(0.10328) 
N 
(0.09629) 
N. 
(0.09588) 
«. 
(0.09716) 
« 
(0.09825) 
.N 
(1109811) 
.. 
Bio 0.80215 0.46060 0.27459 0.27129 0.31435 0.28460 0.32190 
(0.08470) (0.09353) (0.09061) (0.09126) (0.09238) (0.07787) (0.09245) 
Age at first invest -0.03327 -0.00091 -0.00219 -0.00113 -0.00305 -0.00071 -0.00132 
(0.00888) (0.01136) (0.01090) (0.01093) (0.01118) (0.00960) (0.01113) 
Founding 
-0.01177 0.00597 -0.00384 -0.00258 -0.00292 -0.00346 -0.00254 
(0.00405) (0.00929) (0.00938) (0.00934) (a00966) (0.00683) (0.00047) 
No. of rounds 0.34771 0.31678 0.30014 0.30058 0.30635 0.30415 0.31057 
(0.02008) (0.01885) (0.01913) (0.01914) (0.01859) (0.01601) (0.01840) 
n" wr ... N. .N ... N. 
Total invest 0.01950 0.01870 0.01490 0.01470 0.01530 0.01440 0.01470 
(0.00341) 
N. 
(0.00269) 
.M 
(0.00247) 
.M 
(0.00244) 
«. 
(0.00259) 
M. 
(0.00179) 
M. 
(0.00259) 
«. 
Investsgr 
-0.00008 -0.00007 -0.00006 -0.00008 . 0.00008 -0.00008 . 0.00000 
(0.00003) 
N. 
(0.00002) 
N. 
(0.00001) 
... 
(0.00001) 
N. 
(0.00001) 
... 
(0.00001) 
N. 
(0.00001) 
N. 
Quality 0.22160 0.20018 0.20838 0.20137 0.24353 0.20975 024128 
(0.09800) 
"f 
(0.09575) 
N 
(0.08812) 
N 
(0.09080) 
"" 
(0.08962) 
N. 
(0.08739) 
M 
(0.08005) 
N" 
Overseas 0.45332 0.46005 0.47214 0.40015 0.40940 
(0.08910) 
N. 
(0.08969) 
«. 
(0.08962) 
N. 
(0.08093) 
M 
(0.09872) 
«. 
P local 0.48391 0.52984 0.49791 0.28720 0.27207 
(0.08626) 
N. 
(0.08447) 
N. 
(0.08702) 
.N 
(0.11314) 
« 
((112582) 
.. 
P national -0,20914 0.0821 
(0.11304) ((X11220) 
Centrality 
-3.21335 -3.47738 -233995 -2.45350 
(1.21678) 
N. 
(1.20840) 
.N 
(1.44532) (124049) 
.. 
Ave. portfolio RI -0.00015 
(0.00013) 
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Model (continued) 1 2 3 4a 4b 4C 5 6 
Specialist 0.35641 0.36063 0.33346 
(0.08189) 
N. 
(0.08265) 
"N 
(0.07024) 
N" 
Specialist Ri 0.27128 024755 
(0.11941) 
N 
(a11880) 
N 
Const. 23.63933 -0.22103 -12.54837 6.97778 4.43814 5.13061 6.44393 4,61876 
(8.09389) (0.06067) (18.59615) (18.77810) (18.68944) (19.33142) (13.67568) (18, Q2858) 
Loglikelihood 
-2707.31 -1480.05 -1442.18 -1385.84 -1375.24 -139218 -1381.07 -138&4 Obs 1562 1013 1013 1013 1004 1013 1013 1013 
LR model test 467.48 
«t 
880.44 
"N 
956.32 
Nf 
1072.87 
N- 
1063.53 
"N 
1056.18 
N. 
1078.39 
N" 
1003.55 
"N 
Compared to model: Na Na 2 3 3 3 4a 4c 
Testparm 18.58 16.17 99.96 5.53 7.58 
LR test 75.88 
1N 
116.55 
N1 
n! a 99.85 
N. 
5.67 
.. 
7.37 
.N 
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12.4 Appendix for Chapter 10 
Table 13.7 Description of investors, in terms of presence and office location relative to 
deal 
Region Investor presence in dataset Office locati ons relative to deal 
National Multi- Local Local Next within UK Overseas Uncoded 
regional region onl re ion 
London 39% 20% 39% 44% 8% 6% 33% 10% 
East 46% 17% 36% 14% 33% 3% 34% 16% 
Scot 35% 11% 54% 26% 4% 30% 22% 18% 
Yorks 62% 5% 29% 41% 0% 41% 5% 14% 
Investor presence is coded removing investors overseas. These investors are coded as without a UK office. 
The regional networks in this section have vertices are colour co-ordinated to represent the 
geographically coverage the UK of each investor. The colours are consistent with colours 
used throughout the chapter, with the addition of a new colour for representing the 
biopharmaceutical firms in the 2 mode representations. The numerical codes refer to the 
location of the investors relative to the company. 1= in same region, 2= bordering region, 
3= nationally, 4= overseas, 5= encoded. 
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Figure 13.2 Eastern region network (only multiple affiliated investors showing) 
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Figure 13.3 Eastern region network (full structure) (colour codes = investor coverage, 
number codes = proximity to deal) 
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Figure 13.4 London region network (only multiple affiliated investors showing) 
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Figure 13.6 Scotland region network (only multiple affiliated investors showing) 
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Figure 13.8 Yorkshire region network (full structure) 
/"[3] Close Ventue Me s5Qement 
j3] Sums Techaba Gros Ltd 
0[7 
] CeMd Science Laboratory " 
[31 Fw: ome Investments Ltd 
10]X(ELERON LTD 0131 
Scottish Co-nve: eneR Fund 
101NA=DI PROTEINS LTD [1]Ut-euiry dYodc 
ýý5ý 
Michael Bimnand 
15] DTI 
Q1j 
Ridnq: Exy Growth 
`((1 Urwdüy of Sheffield 
BioVenhxm Ltd 
" 
l] Nwartis VeNUe fud 
j0] BIDACTA LTD 
MOLECULAR SKINCP. RE 
. Trust 
PHARMA (R&D) LTD 
101 
7,1 ises Ltd. 
31 Pat- hös UK Plc 
- 278 - 
FAVACTA GROUP PLC 
IP Group Plc 
[O) PHOTOPHARMICA HOLDINGS LTD 
LTD [O)CLZZLE BIOTECHNOLOGY LTD 
101AXORDIA LTD 
1 Aberdeen Assel Managen 
ISI BBSRC 
OJADJLNANTD< LTD 
101 PRO-CURE THERAPEUTICS LTD 
LTD /0IASTERION 
LTD 
YFM Group 
j Bidusion Plc 
0 00 
cR 
; 
ymö 
m 
0 
D 
a 
Z 
F 3 
0 
C5 
b 
r F4 
O 
m 
2 
IL m 
3ý 
3 
a 
mm 
rr 
1 
H 
m 
0 
rQ m 
U, 
w 
ö 
0 
2 
Cýýý 
ýQ 
ýý 
m 
ý9 
iý mýýJJ ý S 
C 
_ti 
ýý 
C 
rn 
m 
0 
-279- 
Figure 13.9 Eastern region director affiliation network 
Figure 13.10 London region director affiliation network 
Dotted line shows the grouping of Imperial spin-outs and directors 
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Figure 13.11 Scotland director affiliation network 
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Figure 13.12 Yorkshire director affiliation network 
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